

SPECIAL ISSUE:
Centenary of the Armenian Resettlement

REVIEW OF
ARMENIAN STUDIES

A Biannual Journal of History, Politics and International Relations

no:
31
2015

Sina AKŞİN

Tal BUENOS

Sadi ÇAYCI

Sevtap DEMİRCİ

Maxime GAUIN

Christopher GUNN

Michael M. GUNTER

Uluç GÜRKAN

Birsen KARACA

Jean-Louis MATTEI

Armand SAĞ

Turgut Kerem TUNCEL

BOOK REVIEW

Jeremy SALT



REVIEW OF ARMENIAN STUDIES

A Biannual Journal of History, Politics and International Relations
2015, No: 31

EDITOR

Ömer Engin LÜTEM

MANAGING EDITOR

Aslan Yavuz ŞİR

EDITORIAL BOARD

In Alphabetical Order

Prof. Dr. Seçil KARAL AKGÜN	Ömer E. LÜTEM (Ret. Ambassador)
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI (Middle East Technical University)	Prof. Dr. Nurşen MAZICI (Marmara University)
Prof. Dr. Nedret KURAN BURÇOĞLU (Boğaziçi University)	Prof. Dr. Nesib NESSİBLİ (Khazar University)
Prof. Dr. Sadi ÇAYCI (Başkent University)	Prof. Dr. Hikmet ÖZDEMİR (Political Scientist)
Prof. Dr. Kemal ÇİÇEK (İpek University)	Prof. Dr. Hüseyin PAZARCI
Dr. Şükrü ELEKDAĞ (Ret. Ambassador)	Prof. Dr. Mehmet SARAY (Historian)
Prof. Dr. Temuçin Faik ERTAN (Institute of History of Turkish Revolution)	Dr. Bilal N. ŞİMŞİR (Ret. Ambassador, Historian)
Dr. Erdal İLTER (Historian)	Dr. Pulat TACAR (Ret. Ambassador)
Alev KILIÇ (Ret. Ambassador, Director of the Center for Eurasian Studies)	

ADVISORY BOARD

In Alphabetical Order

Ertuğrul APAKAN (Ret. Ambassador)	Dr. Ayten MUSTAFAYEVA (Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences)
Prof. Dr. Edward ERICKSON (Historian)	Jeremy SALT
Prof. Dr. Michael M. GUNTER (Tennessee Technological University)	Prof. Dr. Norman STONE (Bilkent University)
Prof. Dr. Enver KONUKÇU	Prof. Dr. Ömer TURAN (Middle East Technical University)
Prof. Dr. Jean-Louis MATTEI (Historian)	Prof. Dr. Hakan YAVUZ (Utah University)
Prof. Dr. Justin MCCARTHY (University of Louisville)	

PUBLISHER

Ali Kenan ERBULAN

Review of Armenian Studies is published biannually

Review of Armenian Studies is a refereed journal. Review of Armenian Studies is indexed in EBSCO and TUBITAK-ULAKBIM databases. Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The editorial board takes into consideration whether the submitted article follows the rules of scientific writing. The articles are sent to two referees known for their academic reputation in their respective areas. Upon their decision, the article will be published in the journal, or rejected. The reports of the referees are kept confidential and stored in the Journal's archives for five years.

On behalf of AVRASYA BİR VAKFI (1993)
All Rights Reserved.

Publication Office

Terazi Yayıncılık Bas. Dağ. Dan. Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Abidin Daver Sok. No. 12/B Daire 4 06550 Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24 • **Faks:** 0 (312) 438 50 26
www.avim.org.tr

ISSN: 1303-5304

Subscription Office

Hülya ÖNALP
Terazi Yayıncılık Eğt. Org. Mat. Kırt. Ltd. Şti.
Süleyman Nazif Sok. No.12/B Daire 2 06550
Çankaya/ANKARA
Tel: 0 (312) 438 50 23-24
Fax: 0 (312) 438 50 26
E-mail: terazi yayincilik@gmail.com

Design

Ruhi ALAGÖZ

Printing

Özyurt Matbaacılık
Büyük San. 1. Cad. Süzğün Sok. No: 7 İskitler / ANKARA
Tel: +90 312 384 15 36 **Fax:** +90 312 384 15 37

Printing Date: 16 April 2015

Annual Subscription: 20 US \$
15 TL

Please send your payment to the following bank account:
For TL - Terazi Yayıncılık, Garanti Bankası-Çankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/6296007
Postal Check Account Ankara/Çankaya/Merkez 5859221

For US \$ - Garanti Bankası- Çankaya/ANKARA Branch 181/9086957
IBAN: TR60 0006 2000 1810 009 0869 57

Statements of facts or opinions appearing in Review of Armenian Studies are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the editor and publisher.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written authorization of the Center for Eurasian Studies.

CONTENTS

(İÇİNDEKİLER)

	Page
Contributors	5
(Yazarlar)	
Editorial Note	9
(Editörün Notu)	

ARTICLES

(MAKALELER)

A General Appraisal of the Armenian Issue.....	15
(Ermeni Meselesinin Genel Bir Değerlendirmesi)	

Prof. Dr. Sina AKŞİN

Historiography and the Future of Multiculturalism in Europe: Perinçek v. Switzerland.....	35
(Tarih Yazımı ve Avrupa'da Çok-Kültürlülüğün Geleceği: Perinçek-İsviçre Davası)	

Tal BUENOS

Lawfare Against Turkey: A Case Study On Armenian Claims On Insurgencies and Ottoman Counter-Measures During the First World War	57
(Türkiye'ye Karşı Hukuk Savaşı: Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Yaşanan Ayaklanmalar ve Osmanlı Devletinin Aldığı Karşı-Önlemler İle İlgili Ermeni İddiaları Üzerine Bir Vaka Analizi)	

Prof. Dr. Sadi ÇAYCI

From Sevres to Lausanne: The Armenian Question (1920-23).....	65
(Sevr'den Lozan'a: Ermeni Sorunu (1920-23))	

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevtap DEMİRCİ

The Armenian Forced Relocation: Putting an End to Misleading Simplifications.....	93
(Ermeni Zorunlu Göçü: Aldatıcı Basitleştirmelere Son Vermek)	

Maxime GAUIN

The Rise and Fall of ASALA and Armenian Revolutionary Federation Terrorism.....	133
(ASALA ve EDF Terörizminin Ortaya Çıkışı ve Çöküşü)	

Assist. Prof. Dr. Christopher GUNN

A Century Later: Towards Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?.....	153
(Yüzyıl Sonra: Türk-Ermeni Uzlaşmasına Doğru?)	

Prof. Dr. Michael M. GUNTER

The Malta Tribunals.....181

(*Malta Yargılamaları*)

Uluç GÜRKAN

Armenian Terror During the Change in the
Perception of and Reaction Towards Terrorism205

(*Terör Algısının ve Teröre Karşı Verilen
Tepkilerin Değişim Sürecinde Ermeni Terörü*)

Prof. Dr. Birsen KARACA

Droshak Newspaper: A Newspaper That Openly Supported Terrorism.....223

(*"Droşak" Gazetesi: Açık Açık Terörizmi Savunan Bir Organ*)

Prof. Dr. Jean-Louis MATTEI

The Perfect Ethnocide:
A Review of Bas Kromhout's 'De Perfecte Genocide'243

(*Mükemmel Etnosid:
Bas Kromhout'un 'Mükemmel Soykırım' Yazısının Değerlendirmesi*)

Armand SAĞ

A Look at the Perinçek v. Switzerland Case:
Examination of a Lawsuit to Understand the Current State of the
Armenian-Turkish Dispute And Prospective Developments293

(*Perinçek-İsviçre Davası'na Bir Bakış: Ermeni-Türk İhtilafının
Güncel ve Gelecekteki Olası Durumunun Anlaşılması İçin Bir Dava Analizi*)

Dr. Turgut Kerem TUNCEL

BOOK REVIEW

(*KİTAP TAHLİLİ*)

A Lawyer's Blundering Foray Into History.....325

(*Bir Hukukçunun Tarihe Karşı Kör Edici Saldırısı*)

Jeremy SALT

Contributors

Sina AKŞİN is a retired professor of history. He graduated from Istanbul University Faculty of Law. He earned two master's degrees on International Relations from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Boston. He earned his PhD degree from Istanbul University Faculty of Letters. He lectured in Robert College in 1961-1967. He served as a professor of history at Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences until his retirement in 2004. Akşin has many articles published in different newspapers and journals. He is also the author of several books including *Turkey, from Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to Present*; *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terrakki* (Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress) and *Essays in Ottoman-Turkish Political History*.



Tal BUENOS is currently a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Utah. He has a Master's degree in Theological Studies from Harvard Divinity School, and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Jewish Philosophy from Tel Aviv University. Tal's main focus is on the relations between international politics and the genocide discourse. His research interests include American foreign policy, British imperialism, conflict between Armenians and Turks, international relations theory, multiculturalism, postcolonialism, and racism. Tal has published articles in Turkish and Israeli newspapers such as Daily Zaman, Hurriyet Daily News, Daily Sabah, and the Jerusalem Post.



Sadi ÇAYCI is a professor of international law at Başkent University. He is also the Vice Dean of the Faculty of Law and the Director of the Baskent University Center for Strategic Research. He teaches courses on European Union Law, National Security, Law of Rules of Engagement and Basic Legal Concepts. Previously, he served as a military judge (askeri hakim) in the Turkish Armed Forces (1975-2004), and Advisor of International Law at Ankara based think-tank Eurasia Strategic Research Center (ASAM) (2004-2008).



Sevtap DEMİRCİ is a lecturer at Boğaziçi University Atatürk Institute. She graduated from Marmara University Faculty of Political Sciences and earned a master's degree from the Institute of Social Sciences of the same university. She also holds a master's degree on International Relations from Cambridge University. She earned her PhD in International History at London School of Economics and Political Science. Demirci is the author of four books, including *Strategies and Struggles - British Rhetoric and Turkish Response: The Lausanne Conference 1922-1923* and *British Public Opinion towards the Ottoman Empire during the Two Crises*.





Maxime GAUIN is a researcher at the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM). He has an MA in History from Paris-I-Sorbonne University. He is currently a PhD candidate at the Middle East Technical University department (located in Ankara). He has published articles in several academic journals. He regularly contributes to different newspapers with his commentaries.



Christopher GUNN is an assistant professor of history at Coastal Carolina University in South Carolina. Dr. Gunn received a BA in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia, an MA in Political Science from the University of Rhode Island and a PhD in History from Florida State University. His current research interests include transnational violence, terrorism and militias in the Ottoman Empire, Turkey, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean.



Uluç GÜRKAN is a renowned journalist and former Deputy Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. He graduated from Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences. He worked at several newspapers and news agencies such as Sabah, Güneş, Star and ANKA News Agency. He served three terms as a member of parliament and was the chairman of the Turkish groups of the Parliamentary Assembly at the European Council and the Assembly of the Western European Union. He is currently a lecturer at the Middle East Technical University. Gürkan is the author of three books; *Malta Yargılamaları* (Malta Trials), *Ermeni Katliamı Suçlaması Yargılama ve Karar* (Armenian Massacre Allegations, Trials and Verdict), *Ermeni Sorunu Anlamak* (Understanding the Armenian Question).



Michael M. GUNTER is a professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University where he teaches courses on international relations, international organizations, international law, American foreign policy, European politics, and American politics, among others. He also is the Secretary-General of the EU Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC) headquartered in Brussels. In the past he taught courses on international and comparative politics for many years during the summer at the International University in Vienna, as well as courses on Kurdish and Middle Eastern politics, among others, for the U.S. Government Areas Studies Program and U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Institute in Washington, D.C. He is the author of eleven books on the Kurdish question and co-editor (with Mohammed M. A. Ahmed) of three more books on the Kurds, among others. He was a former Senior Fulbright Lecturer in International Relations in Turkey and also has held Fulbright awards for China and Israel.



Birsen KARACA is a professor of Armenian language and culture at Ankara University. She received a BA on Slavic Languages and Literatures, and an MA on Russian Language and Literature from Ankara University, and a PhD on Armenian Language and Literature and on Russian Language and Literature from Lomonosov Moscow State University. She is the author of seven books on Russian literature, Armenian literature and Armenian history and a Turkish-Eastern Armenian

dictionary. Her articles appeared in Review of Armenian Studies, GeoPolitica, Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, Dialog-MGU, Levant Report Series, Ermeni Arařtırmaları Dergisi, Diplomatic Observer and several others.


Jean-Louis MATTEI is a historian and author. He graduated from the Department of French Literature and Latin-Ancient Greek, Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences of Aix-en-Provence and earned his master's degree from the same university. After teaching at Lycée de Galatasaray and Lycée Tevfik Fikret, he worked as a specialist at the Department of French Language Teaching, Faculty of Education at the University of Uludağ (1988-2004). He has many translations and articles on published in various journals. Mattei also published about twenty books of his original literary work and translations. Some of his works are *Belgelerle Büyük Ermenistan Peşinde Ermeni Komiteleri* (Armenian Committees in Pursuit of a Greater Armenia), *Une Épopée d'Eba Müslim*, *Vie de Saint Théodore de Sykéon*, *Affaires Turques*.



Armand SAĞ is a Ph.D. fellow in the Netherlands, He is the Chairman of the Institute for Turkish Studies based in Utrecht, Netherlands. He is the author of *History and More: Reflections of a Historian* (2011) and *Learning Grammar of Turkey-Turkish: Answers*, and the co-author of *Revolutions in the Middle East: Perception and Consequences* (2012), among many other titles and publications.



Jeremy SALT is a former journalist and a retired academic. He taught courses in modern Middle Eastern history and propaganda in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Bilkent University, Ankara; and in Middle Eastern Politics in the Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne. He wrote two books; *Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians 1878-1896* (Frank Cass, London, 1993) and *The Unmaking of the Middle East. A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). His articles appeared in Middle East Policy, Third World Quarterly, Insight Turkey, Arena, Middle Eastern Studies, Muslim World, Current History, Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, International Journal of Turkish Studies, Journal of Palestine Studies, Review of Armenian Studies.



Turgut Kerem TUNCEL is a specialist at the Center for Eurasian Studies (AVİM). He completed his undergraduate degree in 2001 at Middle East Technical University with a major in psychology and a minor in sociology. He holds a M.A. in political science from Bilkent University. Dr. Tuncel earned his Ph.D. degree in Sociology and Social Research from Università degli Studi di Trento in 2014. His research interests include diasporas, digital culture, social memory, society and politics in the Caucasus, Armenian diaspora, society and politics in Armenia, and Armenia-Turkey relations. Dr. Tuncel is the author of the book *Armenian Diaspora: Diaspora, State and the Imagination of the Republic of Armenia*.



Remembering and commemorating the past events experienced by peoples or nations is an ordinary thing to do. However, freshening up past grudges and reviving those events in the present day, in a time when peaceful notions and behaviors gain more importance, should be seen as unapprovable. Also, instrumentalization of commemoration of the past events to bring up problems that were previously solved by international agreements creates a legally unacceptable situation.

In this context, another point to dwell on are the efforts to show events that took place a century ago as having political significance or to create a new political significance for those events. If this method is adopted or at least is excused, it will provide opportunity to reopen the files formerly closed by a legal process and to get back to deal with the previously resolved issues with other countries or communities. This will result in the questioning of the present political system and for this reason, it may cause new crisis triggered by focusing on past events. It is impossible for such a position to be adopted by some of the few countries and communities which have not yet faced the past events, accepted their fate and the foundation of a new political system.

Let us try to explain this thought by an example. For instance, at the present, if Turkey, the successor of the Ottoman Empire, would start to question and even refuse the legal consequences of the Balkan Wars and the First World War that happened one century ago in the era of the Ottoman Empire, this would amount to the non-recognition of the sovereignty of the Balkan and Arab countries. Insisting on such a stance would cause new crises in the Balkans and Middle East. However, despite the power it currently possesses, Turkey does not try to break the status quo in its favor, but on the contrary, Turkey struggles to preserve it.

On the other hand, Armenia and especially the Armenian Diaspora continues to have a particularly hostile attitude of questioning the political system established a century ago in the South Caucasus region. Although it might be thought that such attempts will bear no results due Armenia's frailty, there is still a potential danger arising from the absence of bilateral political trust. Thus, constantly living under the effects of the past events, creates a situation which obstructs the building of a future.

Neither Armenia nor the diaspora have been able to forget their century old ambitions despite the fact that there is no possibility for them to become true.

The ostentatious ceremonies and activities regarding the centennial of the Law of Resettlement reminds Turkish public opinion of these ambitions, builds up the existing racial hatred and revanchist emotions towards Turkey and Turks, and resurrects demands from Turkey.

What sort of demands do Armenians have from Turkey?

First and foremost, is the recognition of the “genocide”. But, referring to the 1915 events as genocide is just an assumption, because according to Article 6 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the United Nations, an authorized court in the country where the offence took place or an international criminal court judgement on the character of the event. As long as there is no such judgement, it is legally impossible to characterize the 1915 events as genocide. Therefore, Turkey does not have any obligation to recognize those events as genocide.

The second demand is compensations to be paid to the resettled people or their descendants. This demand does not have any legal basis, compensations to be paid to the resettled people or their descendants. There is no such provision at the Treaty of Kars -which had settled the Armenian issue, or no provision regarding this issue in any international treaty. Despite this, especially the Diaspora insists on the compensation issue and they put forth fantastical numbers ranging from 104 to 850 billion dollars of compensation.

The third demand is the restitution of the properties of Armenians subjected to resettlement. An important fact that is overlooked many times is that, following the Armistice of Mudanya, Ottoman Governments restituted their properties to the Armenians that returned. It is understood that this process took at least four years. As for the period after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, a law titled “Emlâk-ı Metruke” was passed on this issue. According to this law, it is essential to appeal to the courts. It is known that properties were restituted following the appeals in accordance with this law. However, since a long time has passed regarding this issue, it should be remembered that many properties have ended up being inherited by the state.

The fourth demand is Turkey giving land to Armenia, which is a subject frequently spoken about in the Diaspora and the Armenian public, is not or cannot be brought forward as an official claim by the Armenian state. Since the Turkey-Armenia border was settled with the 1921 Treaty of Kars which includes the signature of the Armenian representative, Armenia’s territorial claims from Turkey do not have any legal basis. Even though some Armenian authors and Armenian political parties such as the Dashnaks claim

that the Treaty of Kars is invalid, there is no doubt that the Treaty of Kars, which has been implemented to this day since its signing, is valid as there has been no objection from any countries including Armenia, and there are international provisions proving the validity of treaties determining borders.

The fifth demand is the opening the Turkey-Armenia border. It goes without saying that this issue is not legal but political. Turkey closed its borders with Armenia in 1993 in response to Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territories despite all warnings and United Nations Security Council resolutions. There is no reason to open the borders as Armenia continues to occupy Azerbaijani territories.

Contrary to Armenia, Turkey has made serious efforts to establish normal relations with its neighbor since Armenia's independence. The most important one is Turkey's signing of two protocols with Armenia on October 10, 2009 despite not solving disagreements caused by genocide allegations and unclear statements on the recognition of borders between both countries. Turkey wanted to benefit from the Protocols for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and for this purpose, it stated that the Protocols would be ratified in case of improvements in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and thus the borders would be opened. On the other hand, Armenia opposed this, asserting that the normalization should be without preconditions and later withdrew the protocols from its parliament in the beginning of this year, thereby, *de facto*, ended the process opened up by the protocols.

Lastly, in order to overcome negative emotions against Turkey and the Turks created among the Armenians due to genocide allegations which pose a psychological obstacle for reconciliation between the two countries, Turkey, through the words of its prime minister, offered its condolences to the grandchildren of Armenians who died during the First World War. However, this meaningful gesture was not received well in Armenia and was prevented from assisting the normalization process.

Under the influence of a euphoria -created by ostentatious commemoration of the centennial of the resettlement- currently felt by both Armenia and the Diaspora, the constant accusations and certain demands against Turkey have created a climate that makes the reconciliation between both countries difficult, or at the least one that is being delayed. In brief, in the present context, it is not realistic to expect reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia neither in the short- nor even the medium-term.

* * *

The centennial of the resettlement has resulted in the increase of worldwide increase of the publications on this incident and related questions. Worldwide about this incident and other aspects of the Armenian issue. Inspired by this trend, articles in more than the usual amount will be published in this issue of our journal.

Sina Akşin is a renowned Turkish historian specialized on the late-Ottoman and the early-Republican periods. The article titled **“A General Appraisal of the Armenian Issue”** was previously published in his book *Essays in Ottoman-Turkish Political History* (2011). In his article Prof. Akşin analyzes how Armenian issue emerged, and focuses on the effects of the nationalist movements in the Balkans and the resulting forced migration of the Moslem/Turkish population into the Ottoman lands.

Tal Buenos’ article titled **“Historiography and the Future of Multiculturalism in Europe: Perinçek v. Switzerland”** argues that the academic debate on multiculturalism neglects the existence of irreconcilable narratives of history that constitutes the foundations of the formation of group identities, leading to a misconception of the failed integration of Muslims in Europe. He focuses on the recent and very important case before the European Court of Human Rights, i.e. Perinçek v. Switzerland and explores how historiographical differences due to difference of national heritage stifle civil integration in Europe.

Sadi Çaycı’s article titled **“Lawfare Against Turkey: A Case Study on Armenian Claims on Insurgencies and Ottoman Counter-Measures During the WWI”** focuses on the importance of legal integrity and consistency while dealing with the events of 1915. He argues that abusing legal concepts for political objects does not foster harmonious relations.

Sevtap Demirci analyzes in her article titled **“From Sevres to Lausanne: The Armenian Question (1920-23)”** the brief and critical period that starts with signing of the Sevres Treaty in August 1920 until the Lausanne Treaty in July 1923. Demirci argues that during that period Allies were ready to endorse the Armenian claims on East Anatolia in return for the latter’s service to their cause during the First World War, but the nationalist victories both against the Armenians in the East and against the Greeks in the West resulted in the Lausanne, which did not contain any reference whatsoever to an Armenian National home, let alone a state, putting an end to the centuries old Eastern Question as well as the Armenian Question which became the integral part of it.

Maxime Gauin’s article titled **“The Armenian Forced Relocation: To Put End to Misleading Simplifications”** deals with three aspects of the Turkish-

Armenian conflict; first Armenians who were exempted from relocation; second the protective character of the Ottoman government's policy vis-a-vis the Armenian exiles although a failed one; and third the need to consider the Russian relocation of Armenians and the responsibility of the Armenian extremists in the emigration of Armenians from Cilicia as well as Greek policy that forced the Christians out of Western Anatolia..

In his article titled **“The Rise and the Fall of Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) Terrorism”**, Christopher Gunn analyzes why ASALA and ARF took up arms in 1975, how they sustained themselves and the reasons behind their abrupt disappearance. Gunn argues that Armenian terrorism was the end result of anti-Turkish nationalism rooted in short-term local political gains by the ARF, which eventually witnessed positive response and the emergence of favorable international conditions, followed by the emergence of ASALA and Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. He concludes that in the end, these terrorist movements not only became an end themselves but also disintegrated due to inter-group struggle among their ranks.

Michael M. Gunter's article titled **“A Century Later: Towards Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?”** deals with several attempts for the reconciliation between Turks and Armenians. He argues Zurich Protocols is a sign of progress and future possible reconciliation. Gunter argues that civil society engagement will help lessen stereotypes and confidence-building in both sides.

In his article titled **“The Malta Tribunals”**, Uluç Gürkan argues that there is an international court ruling in hand which refutes genocide claims, which when an investigation conducted by the Crown Prosecution Service during the Malta tribunals. Gürkan shows that British government's attempts to sentence Turkish detainees were fruitless on the grounds that “it was unlikely that such charges could be proven in a British court of law.”

Birsen Karaca's article titled **“Armenian Terror in the Period of Change in the Perception of Terrorism and in the Reaction Toward Terrorism”** analyzes the evolution of Armenian terrorism by contextualizing it within the history of terrorism, the turning point of which was French Revolution. It is argued that the Armenian terrorism was resistant and mutated in time thus adopting to the transforming international perception towards terrorism.

In his article titled **“Droshak Newspaper: A Newspaper that Openly Supported Terrorism”** Jean Louis Mattei examines newspaper published in

January 1897, a newspaper which was the official news organ of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF or Dashnaksutyun). Mattei shows that the newspaper served as an organ of the ARF that openly promoted and praised the terrorist movements within and against the Ottoman Empire and those Armenians of the Empire who refused to cooperate. Accordingly the same Droshak newspaper gave birth to the French ProArmenia newspaper, which also became a tool of ARF.

Armand Sağ critically examines Bas Kromhout's article published in Dutch newspaper 'Historisch Nieuwsblad' in his article titled "**The Perfect Ethnocide: A Review of Bas Kromhout's 'De Perfecte Genocide'**". He argues that the article uses academic or scholarly debate to disturb and distort historical and juridical facts surrounding the events of 1915. .

Turgut Kerem Tuncel's article titled "**A Look at the Perinçek v. Switzerland Case: Examination of a Lawsuit to Understand the Current State of the Armenian-Turkish Dispute and Prospective Developments**" analyzes in detail the legal process that led to the Perinçek v. Switzerland case and critically examines the current condition of the Turkish-Armenian dispute with a view towards the near future.

Lastly, Jeremy Salt reviews the book by Geoffrey Robertson QC "An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians?" in his article titled "**A lawyer's blundering foray into history**". Salt shows how Robertson's book cannot and should not be seen as a serious study of the Armenian question or a legal consideration of the events surrounding the 1915 events. Salt shows how Robertson's piece is problematic and absurd as he attempts to distort history.

Have a nice reading and best regards,

Editor

A GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE ARMENIAN ISSUE*

(ERMENİ MESELESİNİN GENEL BİR DEĞERLENDİRMESİ)

Prof. Dr. Sina AKŞİN

Abstract: *The Armenian issue was one of the many issues which plagued the Ottoman Empire in its later days, corresponding to the last quarter of the 19th century. By the year 1878, all major Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans had created their independent or autonomous states. During this process, no attention was paid to the fact that the Muslim and/or Turkish population of the Balkans were a very numerous element, that they had lived there for centuries, that in many areas they constituted majority. All three major national movements – the Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian movements – were determined that the Muslim/Turkish population should leave, that if need be, that they should be exterminated. It was against this background that the Armenian issue was raised. Speculation is incompatible with serious historiography. However, one cannot resist the temptation of asking whether or not Muslim- Armenian peaceful coexistence might not have been possible, if World War I had not intervened. Today, we are entering a new phase in the Armenian issue. The attention that the Diaspora Armenians and Armenian propaganda has been able to get from the European Parliament, the US Congress and similar bodies, may be seen as a success for them. However, it is far from certain that they will be able to get exactly what they want. As more balanced views of the Armenian issue become prevalent in Western scholarship, these will gradually filter down to the media and thus in turn influence public opinion. Armenians of the Diaspora (and those who had lived in the Soviet Union), seeing that their exaggerated views are no longer accepted, that they are being subjected to critical examination, will have to let go of their passionate positions. Perhaps then, a symbolic reconciliation and a scholarly dialogue will be possible.*

* This article is a facsimile of the article titled "A General Appraisal of the Armenian Issue", published in Sina Akşin, *Essays in Ottoman-Turkish Political History*. (Gorgias Press & Isis Press, 2011) pp. 69-84. We would like to thank Prof. Sina Akşin and the ISIS Press for their permission to publish the article in this issue of the Review of the Armenian Studies.

Keywords: *Armenian issue, Balkan national movements, World War I, Armenian diaspora, reconciliation*

Öz: *Ermeni meselesi, 19. Yüzyılın son çeyreğine denk gelecek şekilde, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun son günlerinde vahim sonuçlar yaratan pek çok meseleden bir tanesiydi. 1878'e gelindiğinde, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Balkanlar'daki tüm Hristiyan nüfusları bağımsız veya özerk devletler kurmuşlardı. Bu süreçte Müslüman ve/veya Türk nüfusun Balkanlar'da sayıca bir hayli fazla olduğu, o coğrafyada yüzyıllardır yaşamış olduğu ve pek çok bölgede çoğunluk oluşturulduğu tamamen göz ardı edilmiştir. Üç büyük milli bağımsızlık hareketi olan Sırp, Yunan ve Bulgar bağımsızlık hareketleri, Müslüman/Türk nüfusun gitmesi ve gerekirse de yok edilmesi konusunda kararlıydı. Ermeni meselesi böyle bir arka plan mevcutken ortaya çıkmıştır. Dayanaksız görüş belirtmenin, ciddi tarih yazımında yeri yoktur. Ancak, Birinci Dünya Savaşı araya girmiş olmasaydı acaba Müslüman-Ermeni barışçıl ortakyaşamının mümkün olup olmadığı çok cezbedici bir sorudur. Günümüzde Ermeni meselesinde yeni bir döneme giriyoruz. Ermeni diasporasının ve Ermeni propagandasının, Avrupa Parlamentosu, ABD Kongresi ve benzer kurumlardan elde ettikleri ilgiye bakarak kendilerinin başarı elde ettiğini düşünebilirler. Ancak, tam olarak istediklerini elde edecekleri kesin olmaktan çok uzak olasılıktır. Batı akademi dünyasında Ermeni meselesiyle ilgili daha dengeli görüşler yaygınlık kazandıkça, bu görüşler zamanla basına yansıtılacak, bu vesileyle de kamuoyunu etkileyecektir. Abartılı görüşlerinin artık kabul görmediğinin farkına varan ve eleştirel incelemelere maruz kalan Ermeni diasporası mensupları (ve eksi Sovyetler Birliği'nde yaşamış olanlar), bu meselede tutkuyla kenetlenmiş oldukları konularından vazgeçmek durumunda kalacaklardır. Belki bu gelişme olduğunda, sembolik bir uzlaşma yapmak ve akademik bir tartışma gerçekleştirebilmek mümkün hale gelecektir.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Ermeni meselesi, Balkan milli bağımsızlık hareketleri, Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Ermeni diasporası, uzlaşma*

The Armenian issue was one of the many issues which clouded the life of the Ottoman Empire in its later days, during the last quarter of the 19th century. The Ottoman Empire, according to European public opinion, was the “sick man of Europe”. It was the source of the Eastern Question, that prickly problem which continually threatened to bring on a general European war. From the point of view of European opinion, the solution to the problem was the creation of national states and the expulsion, “bag and baggage” of the Turks, first from the Balkans, and then, perhaps, even from Anatolia or at least from sections of it. Thus, the Ottoman Empire, a multi-national state, was to be transformed into separate national states. Since in many cases the national homes, far from being clear-cut, were very blurred and different ethnic groups were living ‘enmeshed’ in each other, the creation of national states meant the expulsion of a great number of people from their homelands. Especially in the case of Moslems, this expulsion was often accomplished by terror and/or massacre. The nationalist within each group were irresistibly attracted to this model, and European diplomacy continually strove, by peaceful or war-like methods, to achieve this aim. By the year 1878, all the major Christian peoples of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans had created their independent or autonomous states. There still remained Albania and the division of Macedonia and Thrace, but it was felt that it was question of time before Macedonia and Thrace would be shared between the Balkan states. The Greeks also had irredentist claims in Ottoman Asia. During this process, no attention was paid to the fact that the Moslem and/or Turkish population of the Balkans were a very numerous element, that they had lived there for centuries, that in many areas they constituted majority. All three major national movements – the Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian movements – were determined that the Moslem/Turkish population should leave, that if need be, they should be slaughtered out of existence. Majority rule, self-determination, the right to a homeland was not for the Moslems.

No attention was paid to the fact that the Moslem and/or Turkish population of the Balkans were a very numerous element, that they had lived there for centuries, that in many areas they constituted majority. All three major national movements – the Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian movements – were determined that the Moslem/Turkish population should leave, that if need be, they should be slaughtered out of existence.

It was against this background that the Armenian issue was raised. First, it entered the 1878 Treaty of Berlin (art. 61) – the Ottoman government was called upon to introduce reforms in the so-called “Armenian” provinces in Eastern Turkey. Then, with the creation in 1878 of Hintchak, in 1890 of

Dachnak organizations, the Armenians themselves began to agitate for autonomy/independence. Nationalist Armenians and probably most Europeans felt that it would be a 'repeat performance' of what had happened in the Balkans. Indeed, if the Entente navies or armies had been able to break through the Dardanelles in 1915, or if the Treaty of Sérvés had been put into effect, they might have come pretty close to their ideal (of course, whether they could have maintained an Anatolian Armenia for long is a different matter altogether).

By hindsight, these efforts appear to be the very height of folly, because the Armenian organizations chose the Bulgarian model or method. This meant practicing terrorism and from time to time organizing open revolts where Moslems would be massacred. The Moslems, in their turn, would conduct counter-massacres. This would draw the attention of European public opinion, which, disregarding the massacre of Moslems (very often, this wouldn't get reported), would pressure their governments to intervene in favor of the Armenians. This line of action seemed attractive, but there were very serious impediments to its success: 1) The Armenians were nowhere in Anatolia in the majority. Even in Bitlis, where they were most numerous, they were only one third of population. 2) Eastern Anatolia was almost inaccessible to European powers because of the extremely mountainous terrain and the almost complete absence of railroads and roads. 3) On top of this, the Armenians were to attempt this feat on the eve of, and during the Young Turk revolutionary period (1908-1918) – just when a revolutionary government was attempting a rapid modernization of the country. In other words, the adversary of the Armenians were now not the decadent Sultans of yore, but the Young Turk governments that were determined to end the "sickness" of the Ottoman Empire by radical means.

Though in reality unanswerable (because of its speculative nature) this seems a valid question, because thanks to the 1908 Revolution, the Armenians, like everyone else, achieved political representation in Parliament. As far as I know, relations between the Dachnak and the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress – the Young Turks) leaders were continuous and cordial. Armenian deputies played an active and constructive role in Parliamentary debates. Relations between Moslems and Armenians were peaceful – except in the bloody events in Adana during the abortive and short-lived counter-revolution of 1909 – and in many places, I presume, must have returned to pre-1890 cordiality. A few weeks before the beginning of the War, the Dachnaks, in their Congress held in Erzurum, had decided not to engage in anti-Ottoman activities. However, the enthusiastic activity of Armenian bands based in Russian territory, the conditioning and encouragement provided for many years by American missionaries and Europeans in general, the rhetoric Armenian nationalism and,

finally, the entry of the Ottoman Empire in the War, the catastrophic defeat of the Ottoman Army before the Russian army at Sarikamış, and the appearance of the mighty fleets and armies of the Entente before the Dardanelles, swept away all Armenian scruples. Many of them committed what every country in the world considers an act of heavy treason – they not only sided with the enemy, but they actively fought with the Russians or else they engaged in guerilla warfare against their lawful government and their compatriots. Thus, the decision to transfer the Armenian population of Eastern and Central Anatolia to Syria and Iraq.¹ During this transfer, many Armenians died. For different reasons, like revenge, robbery, hatred, some were killed. In some of the latter cases the open or tacit cooperation of the local authorities may have existed. A large number also died because they had to walk very long distances due to the absence of proper means of transportation. During the War, 1397 persons were tried by military courts for acts connected with the Armenian evacuation. As an illustration of the difficult conditions in Eastern Anatolia, let me point out that during the French retreat from Maraş in the winter of 1920, of the 5000 Armenians who marched with them to İslahiye, 2000-3000 died on the way exposure, hunger, disease.² There was no fighting on the way, and the French troops certainly must have done all they could for the fleeing Armenians.

A ‘*solution*’ to the problem: The Armenian side is full of stories of atrocities committed by Moslems *vis-à-vis* the Armenians. Some of these stories are probably pure fabrications, others may be gross exaggerations, but it seems to me that many are probably true and contain acts that are to be deplored. However, the Moslem side is also full of stories about Armenian atrocities.³ Again, some of these horror stories are probably pure fabrication, other may be gross exaggerations, but many are probably true and contain acts that are to be deplored. (Often the Armenians themselves tire of showing themselves as pure martyrs and then they begin to sing the praises of their heroes and warriors, recounting how well they “punished” the Moslems.) Unfortunately, there are few Armenian writers or pro-Armenians who are ready to concede this symmetry. Many Armenians died during the transfer of population, but so did 2.5 million Anatolian Moslems between 1914 and 1923. A good many of these were most certainly killed by the Armenians. Of course, it is true that

1 Transfer or evacuation of population and not deportation, because Syria and Iraq were then not foreign countries, but provinces of the Ottoman state.

2 George Boudière, “Notes sur la Campagne de Syrie-Cilicie”, *Turcica*, tome IX/2-X, (1978), p. 160.

3 See, for instance, Kâmuran Gürün, *Le Dossier Armenian* (Triangle, 1984); Kara Schemsi, *Turcs er Arméniens devant l’Histoire* (Genève, Imprimerie Nationale, 1919); Congrès National, *Documents Relatifs aux Atrocités commises par les Arméniens sur la Population Musulmane* (Constantinople, 1919); Général Mayéwski, *Les Massacres d’Arménie* (Péttersbourg, Imprimerie Militaire, 1916). The last three have recently reprinted.

there is no symmetry in fact that, whatever their suffering, the surviving Anatolian Moslems were able to stay in their homelands, whereas Armenian survivors, though eventually given a chance to return to their homelands, generally chose not to.⁴ In that respect the Armenian situation is perhaps more tragic and merits our further sympathy. The Turks, who have the tragic experience of hundreds of thousands of Balkan Moslems who survived sword and fire, but were uprooted from their homelands and were forced to take refuge in Anatolia and Thrace, are in a position to understand the feelings of Armenians.

My purpose is not to minimize anybody's suffering, least of all that of the Armenians. But it does seem to me that the Armenian problem must be 'solved'. And the only realistic and humane 'solution' is for the Turks and Armenians to accept publicly the fact that they inflicted great wrongs on each other. I believe Armenians privately admit the wrongs they did to the Turks, but they probably insist that the wrongs done to them were much greater than the ones they perpetrated. This is a matter which can and perhaps ought to be argued, but I am afraid no conclusion would be reached – first, because though the essential facts are more or less known, many of the details are either very difficult to find or else unavailable and secondly, because it is such an emotional issue. But if we suppose that a monument were to be erected to commemorate those who died in Anatolia during and immediately after World War I, irrespective of creed and nationality, and if representatives of the Turkish and Armenian peoples, were to place wreaths at this monument, such an act might go some way towards 'solving' the problem. I would think (and hope) the Turks and Turkish Armenians would do this, but how about Soviet Armenians or Armenians of the Diaspora or even European Armenophiles? It seems to me the latter have worked themselves up into such a psychology that many of them would have some difficulty in performing such an act.

Turkish and European attitudes towards the issue: At the end of World War I, the Ottoman government signed the Treaty of Sérvés (1920) which was to create a large and independent Armenia in Anatolia. However, no state ratified this treaty, which thus never entered into force. Instead, the victorious democratic-nationalist government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly signed the Lausanne Treaty (1923) which preserved the integrity of Anatolia and secured the complete independence of the new state. With these

4 According to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), Armenians living in territories which had been detached from Turkey were given the right to come to Turkey and opt for Turkish nationality within two years. If I am not mistaken, at the end of World War II, the Soviet Union also opened its doors to Armenians who wished to settle in Armenia. I do not know if it was possible for Armenians to emigrate to Armenia before that or whether they can do so since then.

developments, a large number of the Armenians who had not been evacuated from Anatolia in 1915 or who had returned at the end of the war left Anatolia by their own volition. Only a small number stayed on. Relations with Armenia had been settled by the Treaty of Alexandropol (Leninakan) at the end of 1920. The new Turkish regime was a radical departure from the past, a revolutionary republic which set out to create entirely new institutions. Even the alphabet was changed. The Turks felt that Ottoman past and, with it, the Armenian problem was now buried and forgotten. Turkish history school books dealing with Ottoman history did not even mention the Armenian problem. University scholars or historians in general never did any significant research that dealt primarily with this issue. (Perhaps the only notable exception was a book by Esat Uras (*Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*) published in 1950.)

While Turks paid almost no attention to the Armenian issue, believing that it was now something irrelevant, belonging to the Ottoman past, the issue was kept alive in Europe and the US by Armenians and others – alive, but very much in the background. For instance, Bernard Lewis, in *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (1961) doesn't even mention the Armenian evacuation in his account of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, but he later has two brief paragraphs on the Armenian question and the evacuation in a chapter entitled "Community and Nation".⁵ All along, the Turks felt confident they made a clean break with the past.

While Turks paid almost no attention to the Armenian issue, believing that it was now something irrelevant, belonging to the Ottoman past, the issue was kept alive in Europe and the US by Armenians and others – alive, but very much in the background.

However, European opinion, like all public opinion, especially as regards foreign countries, is prone to think in *clichés* (stereotypes). According to such *clichés*, Brazilians dance the samba, Mexican wear sombreros and like siestas, Spain is the land of bullfighting, the French like wine and women, the Germans tend to be overweight and are fond of beer, etc. Thus the *cliché* of Turkey, "land of harems" and, on the same level, "the barbarian, infidel Turks" who had successfully conquered and ruled for a very long time a good part of Europe (at the same time terrorizing the rest) continued to co-exist with the image of modern Turkey of Atatürk's reforms. The *cliché* was ready to accept at face value Armenian (or pro-Armenian) accounts of the evacuation. So readily and so uncritically, in fact, that with the passage of years the Armenian accounts

⁵ B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford, 1968), p. 356.

became more and more exaggerated. It would make an interesting study to ascertain the progress of this exaggeration. But it should be borne in mind that the initial story itself was one-sided and exaggerated enough. It had been prepared by the war-time propaganda machine of the Entente, by Toynbee, Bryce and others who were doing 'military service' with their historiography.⁶ It was the same propaganda machine which called the Germans "Huns", and which fabricated or exaggerated horror stories of German soldiers starving Belgian children and bayoneting defenseless women.

On July 15, 1974, with encouragement from the junta of colonels who at that time ruled Greece, Nikos Sampson, leader of EOKA (the Greek Cypriot extreme right-wing terrorist organization) seized power in Cyprus. The aim of the coup was probably to achieve union with Greece. Thereupon Turkey, to safeguard the Turkish Cypriots, who had suffered a great deal from Greek Cypriot oppression (and atrocities), used its right of intervention which was given it by the international treaties of London and Zurich. A Turkish force landed in Cyprus and occupied the northern section of the island. The next year, with the murder of the Turkish ambassador in Vienna (October 22, 1975) began a campaign of Armenian terrorism directed primarily against Turkish diplomats. Since then, over 30 diplomats have been murdered. The great majority of these attacks occurred in European countries. Turkish Airlines has also been a frequent object of attack. Armenian terrorists in 1982 attacked Esenboğa Airport (Ankara) and in 1983 Orly Airport, killing indiscriminately (nine in the first, eight in the second, besides many wounded). As a propaganda feat, it must be admitted that the campaign was until recent years a major success: 1) For many years, European police were unable to find the culprits, who seemed to disappear into thin air. In later years, sometimes suspects were caught, but in many cases they were released, acquitted or else they received light sentences. The Armenians were allowed to convert the trials of terrorists into propaganda forums where the 'sins' of Ottoman and Turkish governments were vociferously 'judged'. 2) European newspapers, radio-television networks immediately ran stories about "the Armenian genocide" in order to "explain" to their publics why the latest murder or murders occurred. This sort of behavior became a 'warm' invitation for the next attack.

Why did Europe receive Armenian terrorism 'so well'? First, because many European countries had Armenian minorities which, thanks to their skills and

6 Toynbee later had this to say: "...I was being employed by His Majesty's Government to compile all available documents on the recent treatment of the Armenians by the Turkish Government in a 'Blue Book' which was duly published and distributed as war-propaganda!" About Armenian war-time cooperation with the Russians: "... the Armenians had got themselves massacred by the Turks for helping the Allies without getting the Allies committed in return to doing anything for them." A. J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1923), pp. 49-50.

industry, had built a place for themselves. This enabled them to exert a certain influence which they used to spread their side of the story. This was happening while Turks paid no heed to Armenian issue. One other reason why European were receptive to the Armenian version was because the ancient cliché of the “barbarian, infidel Turk”, even though initially in the background of the collective mind of Europe,⁷ provided fertile ground for it. Thirdly, despite the fascist nature of the Greek junta and of the Sampson coup, and the legal character of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, Greek propaganda was able to considerable extent to impress European public opinion that this was a “Turkish invasion” pure and simple. Fourthly, the negative attitude of European public opinion towards military rule and/or martial law in Turkey since 1980 was also an important factor. These factors helped to re-animate the old *cliché* and the image of the modernizing, progressive Turkey of Atatürk began to fade into the background.

Of course, another question that should be answered is why the Armenians, ‘out of the blue’ began their campaign of terrorism in 1975. One factor was probably the desire to exploit the anti-Turkish current in Europe resulting from the Cyprus affair. Another factor may have been Greek Cypriot encouragement and aid to avenge the Turkish intervention. A ‘good number of Greek Cypriots had a great deal of experience in terrorism. A third factor may have been Soviet encouragement, especially directed towards ASALA, the Marxist Armenian terrorist organization. Presumably, the motive for this would be to introduce another element of discord into NATO. A last factor which comes to mind is the ease with which terrorists could be trained in Lebanon, which has a sizable Armenian population and which lately has been living in conditions of anarchy and civil war.

The moral issues raised by terrorism: In a democracy any organ of the mass media is entitled to its opinions and prejudices. A television or radio station, a newspaper may believe every word of the Armenian question as presented by the most extreme Armenians. They may make, if they so wish, daily programs or run full-page stories about the Armenian “genocide”. However, decency, morality and civilization require that when a Turk has been assassinated by Armenian terrorists, this act should be fully and squarely condemned, not “explained” by trumpeting once more Armenian propaganda. The mass media in question should make or resume their propaganda only after a ‘decent’ span of time has elapsed. Otherwise, with the deceased person’s family still quivering under the shock of assassination, that sort of propaganda is an obscene act. It is also an invitation to the next murder. I use the word

⁷ What I say about Europe and Europeans in this article generally also applies to North America, though perhaps to a lesser degree.

civilization on purpose. One of the foremost hallmarks of the transition from barbarism to civilization is that punishment is meted out only to the person who has committed a crime and to no one else. Punishing his family, descendants, neighbors, fellow-countrymen, coreligionists is a sign of barbarism and/or racialism. A civilized person cannot or is not supposed to see the slightest justice in the killing of a Turk who wasn't even born in 1915. On the Armenian issue, the behavior of European mass media has, on the whole, been a dismal failure of morality and decency, a surrender to the most primitive prejudices.

I would also like to point out that this kind of uncritical pro-Armenian attitude probably is a disservice to the Armenians themselves. Nobody with any sense of justice can expect the Armenians to forget the tragic events of 1915. However, not forgetting is one thing, making a tragic historical event the central characteristic of an ethnic group, a characteristic by which others are to recognize it, is another thing. I am not a social psychologist, but it seems to me that the latter situation is not a very healthy one. The Armenians as an ethnic group, with their particular language and religion, their various qualities, have more to them than their evacuation from their homelands. An ethnic group that has vitality should not live in the past, but in the present and the future. Secondly, attitudes and action that tend to make Armenian terrorism a 'success' probably often elevate terrorist organizations into becoming representatives of the Armenian community. The unpleasant problems associated with rule, administration or representation by gun-wielding persons are well enough known to necessitate elaboration.

The end of Turkish neglect: One result of the campaign of Armenian terrorism has been that some Turks and some Westerners who are not Armenophiles (or Turcophobes) have begun to look into the matter. Their research has led to certain publications which have revealed some of the exaggerations, distortions or fabrications of Armenian propaganda. Those who desire to have a balanced, objective view of the Armenian issue will have to read some of these publications. I will enumerate a number of them and put forth their main arguments.

One such book is a work by Şinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca, *Ermenilerce Talat Paşa'ya Atfedilen Telgrafların Gerçek Yüzü*.⁸ The arguments in this book have been summarized in English, French and German by Türkkaya Ataöv.⁹

8 Şinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca, *The True Nature of the Telegrams Attributed by the Armenians to Talat Pasha*, Ankara, TTK, 1983.

9 Türkkaya Ataöv, *The Andonian "Documents" Attributed to Talat Pasha are Forgeries!* (Ankara, SBF, 1984). Ataöv is the author of various booklets such as *A British Source (1916) on the Armenian Question (1985)*; *A 'Statement' Wrongly Attributed to Mustafa Kemâl Atatürk* (SBF, 1984); *A Brief Glance at the "Armenian Question"* (Ankara Chamber of Commerce, 1984).

Andonian is the name of the Armenian who got hold and later published certain telegrams written purportedly by the Minister of the Interior Talat Pasha, ordering the massacre of the Armenians. The study in question is a thorough investigation which proves that the so-called documents are forgeries.

Another work is by Bilal Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri*.¹⁰ Şimşir here recounts, according to documents from the British and Turkish archives, the story of about 140 Turks who were imprisoned by the British in Malta at the end of World War I with the main intention of bringing them to trial for persecuting the Armenians. However, even though the Ottoman archives were at the disposal of the British (as well as of the French and Italians) who had occupied Istanbul and though they had about three years in which they could build a case – with the help of the Armenians – nothing came out of it. Not only that, but earlier when the Tevfik Pasha government, in February 1919 addressed notes to five neutral countries of the time, namely Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, Spain, asking them to send two judges each in order to sit in a Commission of Inquiry that would ascertain those responsible for the transfer and the events accompanying it, (the Ottoman government undertook to cover all expenses), the British took measures to prevent this move. They, together with the French, discouraged the Spanish, Danish and Dutch governments from responding favorably to this quest. As to Sweden and Switzerland, the occupying powers went so far as to prevent the sending of the telegrams addressed to these governments.

A third work is by former ambassador Kâmuran Gürün. Published in Turkish and French,¹¹ it is a very comprehensive book (360 pages in the French version) which studies this question up till the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

A fourth book by Justin McCarthy, entitled *Muslims and Minorities* is a demographic study which looks into the population question of Ottoman Anatolia in the early 20th century.¹² Each community is separately taken up and province by province, figures emanating from official Ottoman sources, the Patriarchates, European sources are compared. The result, as regards Armenian

10 *The Malta Exiles*, Istanbul, Milliyet y., 1976. The author treats the same subject in an article in English: "The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question", in *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926)* (Istanbul, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1984). Şimşir has also published *British Documents on Ottoman Armenians* (Ankara, TTK), and *The Genesis of the Armenian Question* (Ankara, TTK, 1983).

11 Op. cit.

12 Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (NYU Press, 1983). McCarthy also has a very enlightening article, "The Anatolia Armenians, 1912-1922" in *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire...* In this article McCarthy explains that in the 19th century Ottoman "Armenia" existed only in name, that everywhere in Eastern Anatolia they were in a minority, that there were more Armenians in the provinces of Western Anatolia than in the East.

population in Anatolia is 1,500,000. This is important, because Armenian propaganda has continually inflated the figure of those who died in 1915. War-time Entente propaganda estimated the number of that as 300,000. At the end of war, Boghos Noubar Pasha, head of the Armenian National Delegation, in a letter dated December 11, 1918 and addressed to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, estimated that 390,000 survivors were in territories then occupied in allies (Caucasus, Persia, Syria-Palestine, Mossul-Bagdad) that 600,000 to 700,000 persons were transferred that it was unknown how many survivors there were in the desert. Even if we accept this latter category as non-existent, according to Noubar estimates, then, 210,000 to 310,000 Armenians died during the war. Over the years, these figures have been inflated to the point that Armenian propaganda now maintains that 1,500,000 or even 2,000,000 Armenians died in 1915. The latter figure, of course, is an impossibility because there weren't that many Armenians in Anatolia in the first place. The former figure, too, is impossible because if it were true, it would mean that every single Armenian living in Anatolia was evacuated, and that every single one of these Armenians died in the process. This is not true. In the first place, not every Armenian was evacuated. There were no Armenians evacuated in places very far from the front such as İzmir. As to places where they were considered a threat to the conduct of the war, certain Armenians were exempted from evacuation – the families or Armenians serving loyally in the Ottoman army, priests, Protestant and Catholic Armenians, doctors, pharmacists. Secondly, if every single Armenian had died, it would be impossible to account for the Diaspora (Outside Turkey and the Soviet Union) which now numbers about 1,750,000 and who are, largely, the children and grand-children of the survivors of the evacuation.

According to Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, the number of Armenians who died was an estimated 200,000.¹³ Gürün's estimate is a maximum of 300,000.¹⁴ McCarthy has this to say:¹⁵

“We know from reliable statistics that slightly less than 600,000 Anatolian Armenians died in the wars of 1912-22, not 1.5 or 2 million, as is often claimed. Not that 600,000 is a small number. The Armenians suffered a terrible mortality. But when considering the numbers of dead Armenians, one must consider the numbers of dead Muslims. The

13 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II (Cambridge, UP, 1977), p. 316.

14 Gürün, p. 226

15 McCarthy 1984, pp. 23-25. In *Muslims and Minorities* he says, “To find the wartime mortality, one must first estimate the number of Armenian refugees. The problems of counting them precisely are great, perhaps insurmountable.” P. 121.

statistics tell us that 2.5 million Anatolian Muslims died as well, most of them Turks. In the Six Vilayets – the Armenian homeland more than one million Muslims died. These Muslims, no less than the Armenians, suffered a terrible mortality. The numbers do not tell us the exact manner of death of the citizens of Anatolia. Civil War, forced migration of both Muslims and Armenians, inter-communal warfare, disease, and, especially, starvation are listed in the documents of the time as causes of death. The Anatolian mortality was not simply the deaths of soldiers in wartime, but deaths of men, women and children, Armenian and Muslim, who were caught up in international war between Russians and Ottomans and intercommunal war between Armenians and Muslims. We know from both documentary evidence and statistics that intercommunal warfare between Christians and Muslim was a major cause of death. The province of Sivas, for example, was not in the war zone; the Russian army never reached that far. Yet 180,000 of the Muslim of Sivas died. The same was true of the rest of Anatolia... I believe it is time that we consider the events of 1912-22 for what they were, a human disaster. It is time to stop labelling them as a sectarian suffering that demands revenge.”

Heath Lowry is the author of an interesting article,¹⁶ where he explores the Bristol papers (Admiral Bristol was the US high Commissioner in Turkey at the end of the war) and Morgenthau’s memoirs (Morgenthau was the US ambassador in Istanbul during the war and his memories are one of the standard sources for Armenian propaganda) and tries to show that, contrary to the Armenian view, Bristol was not pro-Turkish, but that Morgenthau was definitely Turcophobe, that he hated and despised the Turks.

The question of genocide: Before World War II, mass killings were called massacres. But the mass-killing of 6 million Jews by the Nazis in a cold-blooded, systematic way, under circumstances where the Jews had done absolutely nothing to provoke this treatment, where they had been, in their respective countries, loyal citizens, was judged so horrible by humanity that the old term massacre was considered insufficient to describe this type of action. The result was that the word genocide was proposed and gained general acceptance. In the Nuremberg trials in 1945, the word was used and thus received official recognition. Later, the United Nations prepared and in 1948 accepted a *Convention for the Prevention and the Repression of the Crime of Genocide*. This Convention, which entered into force on January 12, 1951, was signed and ratified by Turkey. Though the initial impetus for the framing of

16 “American Observers in Anatolia ca 1920: The Bristol Papers” in *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire...*

the Convention came from Nazi acts, there were numerous attempts to enlarge the scope of the concept during the preparation of the Convention. In the end, genocide was defined as acts directed against national, ethnic, racial or religious groups with the intent of destroying the group as such, in whole or in part. In other words, the destruction of one person is homicide, homicide on a more or less large scale becomes massacre, if this massacre occurs with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, religious group “as such”, then we have a case of genocide. Thus, to be able to say that there has been genocide, it is necessary to prove the intent to destroy the group as such. Since 1951, therefore, genocide is a legal, well-defined concept, whereas massacre is not.

Nevertheless, there is a lot of loose talk about an Armenian “genocide”, allegedly perpetrated by the Ottoman government in 1915. Armenian propaganda has nowadays forgotten the word massacre. The only word they and their sympathizers use is genocide. A South African who practiced law and later became professor of sociology, Leo Kuper has published a book entitled *Genocide*.¹⁷ It is a book of about 200 pages in small type. Kuper takes up or mentions all sorts of cases – Assyrians warfare, Troy, Carthage, Genghis Khan, Timur Lenk, the Crusades, massacres of Jews (all over Europe), heretical Christians (Albigensian sect, Hussites, Huguenots), American Indians, South West Africa (1904), partition of India, Hiroshima, the Soviet Union, Algeria, Rwanda, Burundi, Bangladesh, Cambodia, etc. Perhaps because of his legal background, Kuper is very careful about labeling this or that case as genocide. As he himself points out, “The inclusion of intent in the definition of genocide introduces a subjective element, which would often prove difficult to establish.” (p. 33). In fact, he introduces a further – to my mind logical – refinement (and limit) to the Convention by assuming “...that the charge of genocide would not be preferred unless there were a ‘substantial’ or an ‘appreciable’ number of victims.” (p. 32). He is so careful that he introduces a further concept, that of “genocidal massacre”. He says he hopes “...that the inclusion of genocidal massacre will reduce controversy over the selection of cases ... (p. 10). Earlier, he warns that “There is a preliminary problem in the choice of cases for inclusion. It involves a judgment that the case is in fact one of genocide. *Inevitably this is a somewhat personal, and sometimes controversial judgment*, since there is no international criminal court to investigate charges of genocide, and the United Nations evades the issue.” (p. 9) (my italics). To the scores of cases that he takes up, from the ancient Assyrians to present-day Cambodia, he scrupulously applies the term “genocidal massacre”. (I have been able to ascertain only one slip – where he speaks of “the Burundi genocide” : p. 162). Expect for two cases – the German

17 Penguin Books, 1981.

genocide against the Jews, and the “Turkish genocide against the Armenians.” I doubt if anybody with any sense of fairness would argue against the first case, but as to the second, I am afraid it is, to use his own words, “Inevitably... a somewhat personal, and sometimes controversial, judgment...”

In the Armenian case, to which he devotes a whole chapter, he has no trouble establishing intent – in spite of the fact that he doesn’t even mention the Andonian telegrams. Basing himself on the ‘classics’ of Armenian propaganda – Lepsius, Morgenthau, Bryce, ‘the war time’ Toynbee – he calmly reaches his conclusion: “... the country-wide distribution of the destruction of Armenian communities, the timing, the general pattern were the product of a central administrative plan.” One is tempted at this point to enumerate all the arguments against premeditation, which are well-known to those who are familiar with the Turkish viewpoint, but in the next sentence he cavalierly and in advance seems to dismiss these (not that he seems to be very aware of their existence): “*It proceeded, however, appreciably by indirection, that is to say not by massacres from the center, but by setting in motion the genocidal process, as a low-cost operation with extensive reliance on local social forces.*” (my italics) Thus Kuper throws all his scruples and discretion to the winds and, perhaps without being quite aware of it, invents a new concept: indirect genocidal intent. I am afraid at this point one cannot help noticing the foremost acknowledgement in Kuper’s preface, which is to Prof. Richard Hovannisian, one of the major proponents of the Armenian cause, without any other name that I am aware of, to ‘balance’ him.

Another source which has championed the use of the term genocide is the so-called Permanent Tribunal of Peoples which ‘tried’ Turkey in Paris (13-16 April 1984) and reached the ‘inescapable’ conclusion of genocide.¹⁸ Inescapable, because Turkey was “tried” in absentia and because the “documents” placed before the court (by whom ? one is tempted to ask) were ‘regular fare’ of Armenian propaganda – Hovannisian, Lepsius, ‘the war-time’ ‘Toynbee, Morgenthau, Bryce, etc. There was also a feeble effort to give the appearance of impartiality – the last document mentioned is the testimony of Prof. T. Ataöv at the Paris court which tried four members of ASALA who had occupied the Turkish Consulate in 1981 in Paris and killed an employee. Actually, the editors were doing a slight ‘injustice’ to the Court, because apparently it also “considered” a booklet (36 pages) entitled *The Armenian Issue in Nine Questions and Answers* published by the Foreign Policy Institute (Ankara, 1982) (pp. 203-252 in the book).

18 *Le Crime de Silence: Le Génocide des Arméniens* (Paris, Flammarion, 1984). Edited by Gérard Chailand, with the assistance of C. Mouradian and A. Aslanian-Samuélian. Chailand is the co-author (with Yves Ternon) of *Le Génocide des Arméniens 1915-1917* (Bruxelles, Complexe, 1980)

The report of Mr. Vandemenlebroucke: The European Parliament has lately looked into the Armenian question. On a motion tabled by Saby, Charzat, Glinne and Fuillent on behalf of the Socialist Group, which noted that the Turkish government, in refusing to acknowledge “the genocide of 1915” had “obliterated the historical reality of Armenia” that this motivated terrorism, and asked that the EEC Council of Ministers, the governments of the countries concerned, and the UN should recognize the Armenian genocide. The question was referred to the Political Affairs Committee. Mr. Vandemenlebroucke, Belgian member of this committee, prepared a *Draft Report on a Political Solution to the Armenian Question* (June 26, 1985). After quoting extensively

As to genocide, this is more of legal term, because besides the facts, you also have to ascertain the element of intent, and you have to do this with the methodology of a penal jurist.

Morgenthau, Chaliand and Ternon, Libaridian, Bryce, “the war-time” Toynbee, Lepsius, Kuper etc., and ‘for balance’ Gürün, he reaches his ‘inevitable’ conclusion of genocide. A few sentences later, however he says “... the Turkish Government can no longer deny the history of the Turkish-Armenian question and the “element of genocide”. Though he dismissed with a cavalier footnote the notion that the Andonian telegrams might be forgeries, here he says “element of genocide” which may not be the same as “genocide”. Then he proclaims that “... recognition (by the Turkish government) would eliminate one of the main reasons for the senseless, desperate and inexcusable acts of terrorism committed by splinter groups from the Armenian diaspora.” That sounds like a promise, but it may also be interpreted as a warning, or even a threat: if the Turkish government does not recognize “genocide”, then the “senseless, desperate and inexcusable” acts of “splinter groups” will continue. Here a very pertinent question can be asked. Generally speaking, ascertaining and recognizing the existence of massacre in this or that situation may not be too difficult, because it is a question of fact. (Though ascertaining the facts may be a very difficult task as well.) As to genocide, this is more of legal term, because besides the facts, you also have to ascertain the element of intent, and you have to do this with the methodology of a penal jurist. Is the Turkish government (or the European Parliament¹⁹) in a position to do this? Or, for that matter, any other government – England (say, in India), France (say in Algeria or as regards the Huguenots), the US (say, in the case of American Indians or in Vietnam), Belgium (in the Congo), Italy (in Libya or Ethiopia), Bulgaria (*vis-à-vis* the Turks), the Soviet Union (say, in Crimea, or in Afghanistan), Japan (in China). I would suppose lawyers and historians, working together,

19 Mr. Vandemeulebroucke himself entitled his report “Political Solution”. Can there be a “Political solution” to a legal problem? And how serious or respectable a “solution” would that be?

might in each case be able to reach a conclusion in this respect. But what if other lawyers and historians disputed such a conclusion? How could a government, with political responsibilities *vis-à-vis* different segments of opinion, decide and act?

Recently the US congress had before it a proposal for a Joint Resolution (H. J. Res. 192) to designate April 24, 1985 (anniversary of the outlawing of Armenian revolutionary committees by the Ottoman government and the arrest of their leaders in 1915) as “National Day of Remembrance of Man’s Inhumanity to Man”. It calls upon the President to issue a proclamation to observe that day as a day of remembrance for “all victims of genocide, especially the one and one-half- million people of Armenian ancestry who were victims of the genocide perpetrated in Turkey between 1915 and 1923, and in whose memory this date is commemorated by al Armenians and their friends throughout the world.” First of all, let me point out that the need for and acceptance of the term of genocide, as I remarked earlier, arose from the extermination of Jews by the Nazis. Apparently, until then, the word and concept of “massacre” had sufficed. The extensions brought to the concept by the Convention cannot blur the fact that the genocide *par excellence* was the Jewish one. It seems almost a disrespect to the supreme tragedy of the Jews, to try to upstage the Armenia case (even though that is also a tragedy, *but* a two- way one), as the resolution attempts to do. The letter that US Secretary of State George Shultz addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, illustrates well the dilemma facing any political body such as parliaments or governments in judging historical events, especially when it involves a legal verdict such as crime of genocide does. Schultz said: “Over 60 of our most distinguished scholars of Turkish and Middle East studies have questioned the historical assumptions of H. J. Res 192. While we do not dismiss the historical tragedy that occurred in Eastern Anatolia 70 years ago, there remain powerful reasons for opposing the resolution. I asked your help in securing its defeat.

Declaration by the European Parliament or by the US Congress can never attain the respectability of impartiality, given the fact that in Europe and in the US, Armenians are a pressure group acting on their respective representative bodies, whereas the Turks are not. Further, to expect legal or quasi – legal verdicts – as a declaration of genocide would be –from political bodies is contrary to the principle of the separation of powers, which Montesquieu discerned to be the very foundation not only of democracy, but also of civilized, decent government. In other words, political bodies should not be in a position to interfere with legal processes, nor, I may add, with history (or sciences in general).

In conclusion, I can say that the attention that the Diaspora Armenians and Armenian propaganda have been able to get from the European Parliament, the US Congress and similar bodies, may be seen as a success for them. However, it is far from certain that they will be able to get exactly what they want. A number of reasons for this may be enumerated. First, the belated attention that pro-Turkish scholarship has given to the history of the Armenian issue over the last ten years has begun to bear fruit. It will become more and more difficult for those who seriously claim impartiality to disregard these works. Secondly, Western public opinion has begun to realize some of the unsavory aspects of Armenian terrorism and its implications. Thirdly, the Turkish image has lately begun improve. Turkey's irrevocable progress towards full democracy is one factor. Another is the economic and administrative consolidation of the independent (and very democratic) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, its conciliatory attitude as regards the prospect of federal union with Greek Cyprus, highlighted by uncompromising, defiant attitude of the latter.

As more balanced views of the Armenian issue become prevalent in Western scholarship, these will gradually filter down to the media and thus in turn influence public opinion. The Armenians of the Diaspora (and those in the Soviet Union), seeing that their exaggerated views are no longer accepted, that they are being subjected to critical examination, will have to climb down from their passionate positions. Perhaps then, a symbolic reconciliation, a scholarly dialogue will be possible.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- A 'Statement' Wrongly Attributed to Mustafa Kemâl Atatürk* SBF, 1984.
- A Brief Glance at the "Armenian Question"* Ankara Chamber of Commerce, 1984.
- Boudière, George. "Notes sur la Campagne de Syrie-Cilicie", *Turcica*, tome IX/2-X, 1978.
- Congrès National, Documents Relatifs aux Atrocités commises par les Arméniens sur la Population Musulmane* Constantinople, 1919.
- Gürün, Kâmuran. *Le Dossier Armenian Triangle*, 1984.
- Le Crime de Silence: Le Génocide des Arméniens* Paris, Flammarion, 1984.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* Oxford, 1968.
- Lowry, Heath W. "American Observers in Anatolia ca. 1920: The Bristol Papers," *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey [1912-1926]*, Bosphorus University, Istanbul, 1984.
- Mayéwski, Général. *Les Massacres d'Arménie* Pétersbourg, Imprimerie Militaire, 1916.
- McCarthy, Justin. *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* NYU Press, 1983.
- Schemsi, Kara. *Turcs er Arméniens devant l'Histoire* Genève, Imprimerie Nationale, 1919.
- Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel K. Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. II Cambridge, UP, 1977.
- Şimşir, Bilal. *British Documets on Ottoman Armenians* Ankara, TTK.
- The Genesis of the Armenian Question* Ankara, TTK, 1983.
- The Andonian "Documents" Attributed to Talat Pasha are Forgeries!* Ankara, SBF, 1984.

The True Nature of the Telegrams Attributed by the Armenians to Talat Pasha,
Ankara, TTK, 1983.

Toynbee, A. J. *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* Boston, Houghton
Mifflin, 1923.

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE FUTURE OF MULTICULTURALISM IN EUROPE: PERİNÇEK V. SWITZERLAND

(TARİH YAZIMI VE AVRUPA'DA ÇOK-KÜLTÜRLÜLÜĞÜN GELECEĞİ:
PERİNÇEK-İSVİÇRE DAVASI)

Tal BUENOS
PhD Candidate
University of Utah

Abstract: *The case of Perinçek v. Switzerland, seen at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), serves as an indication of a civic-integration crisis in parts of Europe. Since 9/11, the academic debate on multiculturalism has become highly politicized and has shifted away from previous postcolonialist sensibilities. The significance of historiography to national identity is currently understated in the relevant studies. Similarly, even though the ECHR recently ruled in favor of Doğu Perinçek, stating that there was no pressing social need to convict him because his speech was of a historical, legal and political nature, the Court did not consider, however, whether there is a pressing social need to ask how historiographical differences due to difference of national heritage stifle civil integration in Europe. The main argument in this paper is that historiographical adjustments toward a harmonious consolidation of historical narratives among groups of different national and ethnic background are a prerequisite for civil integration in Europe. It is a major misconception to think that multiculturalism is the reason for the failing integration of Muslims in Europe, while there are in existence irreconcilable narratives of national and religious history that are foundational in the formation of group identity. The conflicting characterizations of the events in 1915-16 provide a major example of this challenge.*

Keywords: *Perinçek v. Switzerland case, European Court of Human Rights, multiculturalism, integration, historiography*

Öz: *Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nde (AİHM) görülen Perinçek-İsviçre davası, Avrupa'nın bazı kısımlarında toplumsal hayata uyum sağlamada yaşanan krizin bir göstergesidir. 11 Eylül 2001 terör saldırılarından sonra, çok-kültürlülük üzerine olan akademik tartışma son derece siyasileşmiş ve sömürgecilik-sonrası dönemin anlayışından uzaklaşmıştır. Şu anda bu konuyla ilgili yapılan çalışmalarda tarih yazımının, ulusal kimlik için olan önemi üzerinde yeterince*

durulmamaktadır. Yakın zamanda AIHM -konuşmasının tarihsel, hukuksal ve siyasi içeriği olduğu gerekçesiyle, mahkûm edilmesine sebebiyet verecek bir acil toplumsal ihtiyaç olmadığını belirterek- Doğu Perinçek lehine karar vermiş olsa da, Mahkeme ulusal köken sebebiyle ortaya çıkan tarih yazımı farklarının Avrupa 'da nasıl toplumsal yaşama uyum sağlamaya engel teşkil ettiğini sorgulamaya yönelik bir acil toplumsal ihtiyaç olup olmadığı meselesine ele almamıştır. Bu makalenin ana savı, Avrupa'da toplumsal yaşama uyum sağlanması için, değişik ulusal ve etnik kökenler arasındaki tarih anlayışlarının birbirleriyle uyuşması için, tarih yazımında değişiklikler yapılmasının bir önkoşul olduğudur. Grup kimliğinin oluşmasının temel belirleyicilerinden olan ulusal ve dini tarih anlatımlarındaki uyumsuzluk söz konusuysen, Avrupa'da Müslümanların toplumsal yaşama uyum sağlayamamasının sebebinin çok-kültürlülük olduğunu düşünmek ciddi bir yanıldır. 1915-16 olaylarına yönelik birbirleriyle çelişen nitelendirmeler, bu soruna önemli bir örnek teşkil etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Perinçek-İsviçre davası, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi, çok-kültürlülük, toplumsal yaşama uyum sağlama, tarih yazımı*

Historiographical differences are at the very core of court cases, but it is less common for court judges to be asked to settle cases because of inter-national historiographical differences on the characterization of events that took place a century ago during a “world war.” Such was the task before the judges of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) in the case of *Perinçek v. Switzerland*.

Doğu Perinçek, a Turkish national who is a doctor of laws, a politician – as the chairman of the Turkish Workers’ Party – and a journalist, was taken to court in Switzerland and convicted of a crime there after challenging certain local historiographical perceptions while speaking publicly in Switzerland in 2005. More specifically, he refused to characterize the events in which Ottoman Armenians were deported and massacred in 1915-16 as genocide, and described the placing of a genocide label on the events as an “international lie.”

In 2007, following the complaint filed by an association called “Switzerland-Armenia,” the Lausanne Police Court found Perinçek to be guilty of racial discrimination as it is defined in the Swiss Criminal Code. His appeal was dismissed by the Criminal Cessation Division of the Vaud Cantonal Court because – it was held – he was in denial of a proven historical fact that was put in writing and made official by the Swiss legislature in Article 216bis of the Swiss Criminal Code. Such was the decision, even though it was recognized by the judges that Perinçek did not question that the deportations and massacres of the Ottoman Armenians ever happened, but merely disagreed with the characterization of the events as genocide.

After the Federal Court dismissed Perinçek’s final appeal in Switzerland, the matter was brought before the Court in Strasbourg, France, by Perinçek on the grounds that the Swiss decision to convict him constituted a violation of his freedom of expression as stated in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). The Court decided in favor of Perinçek, by a majority of five to two, because Article 17 of the Convention, which is set to prohibit the abuse of rights, gave no basis in this case for the prohibition of Perinçek’s freedom of expression. This highlighted the significance of Article 10 § 2, which states that one’s freedom of expression is to be protected even if the ideas are offensive, shocking or disturbing.¹

1 For the official full version of the Court’s decision in English, see: <http://fatsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/AFFAIRE-PERINCEK-C.-SUISSE-OFFICIAL-ENGLISH-VERSION.pdf>, last accessed on November 8, 2013. For the Press Release in English issued by the Registrar of the Court, see: <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/003-4613832-5581451>, last accessed on November 8, 2013. Interestingly, even though the Court stated that “it was not called upon to rule on the legal characterisation” (pp., 1, 3) of the events, the press release contains eight instances in which

The Court made an important observation regarding Perinçek's conviction in Switzerland, stating that it was essentially based on "the apparent existence of a general consensus, especially in the academic community, concerning the legal characterisation of the events in question."² This idea of "general consensus" was dismissed by the Court for being vague and having no legal merit, but it does convey a view of there being a common perception of history that is in direct and intense conflict with a Turkish – if not Muslim – understanding of world history. While the Court concluded that there was no pressing social need to convict Perinçek because his "speech of a historical, legal and political nature"³ did not pose a threat to public order, its judges did not consider whether there is a pressing social need to ask how inter-national or inter-religious historiographical differences, as exemplified by this case, may affect civic integration in Europe.

Riding the momentum created by *Perinçek v. Switzerland*, this article's main argument is that historiographical adjustments toward a harmonious consolidation of historical narratives among groups of different national and ethnic background are a prerequisite for civic integration in Europe, and that it is a major misconception to think that multiculturalism is the reason for the failing integration of Muslims in Europe while there are in existence irreconcilable narratives of national and religious history that are foundational in the formation of group identity. In other words, it is not multiculturalism but rather an unaddressed multinational and multiethnic tension – upon its historiographical underpinnings – that is stifling Muslim integration throughout Europe, and the court case of *Perinçek v. Switzerland* – upon the exclusion of Turkish historiography in Switzerland – has called attention to it.

The Academic Debate on Multiculturalism and Its Politicization

As observed by Will Kymlicka, "Most countries today are culturally diverse."⁴ The presence of ethnocultural diversity in Western democracies post-World War II (WWII) is an undeniable fact. The public policies regarding this phenomenon have been diverse themselves. The initial push to assimilate or marginalize minority ethnic groups turned in the 1980s and 1990s into a long

the words "Armenian" and "genocide" are coupled together as a phrase. The use of this phrasing is reflective of the pervading tendency in the discourse on the characterization of these events to use a language that pulls historiographical leanings in a certain direction.

2 Ibid., p. 3.

3 Ibid.

4 Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 1.

line of accommodating rights that accepted and recognized unique customs, languages and land-ties. These were the fingerprints of multiculturalism, creating a society in which the unique cultural traits of groups were recognized, accepted and even supported. The main criticism against multiculturalism was that it is not conducive to the creation of social affinity between members of the same state, and the reaction to 9/11 has generated a trend to relate Muslim radicalization to the isolated space that is facilitated by multiculturalism in Western societies.⁵

The discourse on Muslim presence in Western society in the twenty-first century has shown a shift of emphasis from policies that seek to enhance Muslim sense of belonging to endeavors to enhance the sense of protection from Muslims. Not only have the events of 9/11 changed the manner in which Muslims are treated in Western societies,⁶ “terrorism by Muslims” has become the point of departure for academic evaluations of multiculturalist policies. Discussions of immigration and minority rights have been lumped together with security issues in a context that begins “In the wake of 9/11...”⁷ Multiculturalism has been made to seem inadequate once “state-Muslim relations” in the West outgrew the mere considerations of cultural fairness and were suddenly shaped by security concerns that a failure to integrate Muslims would mean that they might maintain solidarity with outside anti-Western entities.⁸

The discourse on Muslim presence in Western society in the twenty-first century has shown a shift of emphasis from policies that seek to enhance Muslim sense of belonging to endeavors to enhance the sense of protection from Muslims.

The theoretical opposition to multiculturalism intensified and became pragmatic, as if proven by the acts of terror. While the Muslim presence in Europe was already perceived in pre-9/11 academic writing as presenting

5 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, “Introduction: Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Setting the Context,” in Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (eds.), *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 1-4.

6 Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 145.

7 Edna Keeble, “Immigration, Civil Liberties, and National/Homeland Security,” *International Journal* 60:2 (2005), p. 359. Even in an effort to produce a work that stresses mutual points between the Islamic and Christian traditions, the discourse begins with reference to 9/11, see: Richard W. Bulliet, *The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. vii.

8 Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 125.

particular challenges to multiculturalism and threats to political unity,⁹ it seems as though the post-9/11 reality, including the terror attacks in Madrid and London, has fixated in the minds of many European societies the perception of the Muslim as an “Other” that is inherently non-European.¹⁰ Public opinion in Western societies held that this Muslim otherness was not changeable, and that action had to be taken to change how Muslims are handled, enabling the transition of multiculturalism from an accepted academic sub-political policy to a much publicized failure whose dismissal promises political capital. This transition was made evident when British Prime Minister David Cameron used the platform of his first speech as prime minister in 2011, in Munich, to declare that “state multiculturalism has failed,” because it encouraged different cultures to lead separate lives, and ignored the “rootless” Western existence of Muslims, who were then attracted to “Islamist extremism.”¹¹

Correspondingly, this amplified sense of an Islamic challenge in Europe has opened up an opportunity to reinterpret the recent history of Muslim immigration to Europe. The Muslim immigration following WWII, which was part of a great recruitment of foreign workers from previously colonized countries to cover the shortage in labor and facilitate Western Europe’s economic expansion,¹² is described in alarmist fashion as one of three Muslim “penetrations” into Europe, in keeping with the Arab conquest of Spain and the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, to issue a warning that the “third penetration is done by immigration, and the demographic inundation of Europe, together with a campaign of *da’wa* (religious propaganda) to help spread Islam, [is] aided by a terrorist wave to intimidate the West.”¹³ Raphael Israeli makes a connection between “the Palestinian hijackings of the 1970s and 1980s” and the events of 9/11 to argue that this is an “era of international terrorism,”¹⁴ thereby associating multiculturalism with “Muslim world terrorism.”¹⁵

Significantly, a policy question that contended with postcolonialist expectations as a result of a history of Western domination had changed into a terror-

9 Adrian Favell, “Multicultural Race Relations in Britain: Problem of Interpretation and Explanation,” in Christian Joppke (ed.), *Challenges to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 322.

10 H. A. Hellyer, *Muslims of Europe: The “Other” Europeans* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 1-3.

11 “State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron,” *BBC News*, February 5, 2011. See: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12371994>, last accessed on November 9, 2014.

12 Fetzer and Soper, *Muslims*, p. 2

13 Raphael Israeli, *The Islamic Challenge in Europe* (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers, 2008), p. 1.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

centered narrative in which the West is depicted as a victim of exploitation and attacks. This reversal blended with a new academic mainstream direction in the debate on multiculturalism when Christian Joppke wrote that there is “a wholesale *retreat* from multiculturalism in Europe.”¹⁶ According to Joppke, “it is logically impossible to recognize all cultures as equal,”¹⁷ and therefore it is sensible for Western liberal states to implement assertive policies to allow liberal values to trump all opposing values. Joppke adds that the notion of values being “forced by the winner (‘master’) upon the loser (‘servant’) of this ‘struggle for recognition’” is in the spirit of G. W. F. Hegel’s thought, perhaps to convince Germans that the argument against multiculturalism is in agreement with modern German philosophy.

Interestingly, in that Munich speech when Cameron followed Joppke’s line of thinking and introduced “muscular liberalism,” a counter-policy to multiculturalism, he was speaking before a German audience:

Now... we must build stronger societies and stronger identities at home. Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism. A passively tolerant society says to its citizens, as long as you obey the law we will just leave you alone. It stands neutral between different values. But I believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it believes in certain values and actively promotes them. Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality. It says to its citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in these things. Now, each of us in our own countries, I believe, must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty.¹⁸

In this speech, Cameron reiterates the post 9/11 narrative according to which the Western liberal states had been passive and tolerant while rights have been abused and European values ignored.

This argument by Cameron summarizes the expectation of civic integration in Western societies: equal rights are given by the state in exchange for a full acceptance by its citizens of the values that inspire these rights. However,

16 Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” *British Journal of Sociology* 55:2 (2004), p. 244.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 242.

18 “PM’s Speech at Munich Security Conference,” *The National Archives*, February 5, 2011. See: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130109092234/http://number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/>, last accessed on November 9, 2014.

Cameron asks for more than civic integration; he argues in the same speech that there is need for “a clear sense of shared national identity that is open to everyone.”¹⁹ An important distinction – that is not articulated by Cameron – must be made between the acceptance of societal values and the acceptance of a national identity. It is not safe to assume that people of different national backgrounds can easily accept another national identity simply because it is available to them. It is problematic to bunch liberalism and national identity together; the rejection of the latter does not reflect an inability to accept the former.

The aftermath of 9/11 disrupted the academic debate over multiculturalism. It politicized the discussion on multiculturalism at the expense of careful study. Therefore, it would be conducive to the restoration of a scholarly discourse on multiculturalism to revisit the theoretical work on pluralist states as it was offered before it became politically fashionable to abandon pre-9/11 policies for new ones. Thus, through an examination of the works that illustrate the guidelines for a successful liberal society, it may become possible to distinguish between the liberal standard and national identity.

Political pluralism, according to David Nicholls in 1975, does not only require the promotion of liberty or the rejection of sovereignty but also “a notion of the real personality of groups.”²⁰ One may read this to mean that an insistence on a national identity that is not aligned with the personality of groups in a nation’s society will likely tear down the pluralist foundations of that society even if there was no direct rejection at all of liberal values. Gianfranco Poggi pointed out in 1978 that “the capitalist economic system” has taken over the “homogenizing and hegemonizing” role that the state used to have in the Hegelian tradition; what used to be a “social mission” to bind together an “inherently fragmented, atomized, and centerless” society has been rendered unnecessary by the processes of economics.²¹ Accordingly, it may be argued that not only is there less urgency for a construct of national identity in modern-day Western liberal states, but also the molding of national identities are likely to interfere with the “homogenizing and hegemonizing” effect of the capitalist economic system if not updated to meet the changes that the system had introduced into the social makeup of states.

The ideal society of multiculturalism is described by John Rex as one “which is unitary in the public domain but which encourages diversity in what are

19 Ibid.

20 David Nicholls, *The Pluralist State* (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 11.

21 Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 121.

thought of as private or communal matters.”²² He cautioned that multiculturalism is challenged whenever there is conflict between beliefs taught in the private or communal realm and the moral values that are being transmitted in the public realm,²³ but for some reason it is supposed that the incongruence revolves around moral values rather than national identity.

As part of a direct critique of multiculturalism just prior to 9/11, Brian Barry illustrated how in certain situations the demands for religious or cultural respect may be in conflict with liberal principles such as the freedom of speech.²⁴ He does not consider how British culture and the possibility of a deeply embedded disrespect for Islam in the formation of Britain’s modern national identity may be a factor that precedes in both sequence and significance the outcomes that show a dissonance between religious cultures and liberal rights. The core of Barry’s claim against multiculturalism is the same as what he considers to be the core of the conception of citizenship in a liberal state, which is the protection of equal rights.²⁵ It therefore follows that, to him, the way to a successful integration in a liberal state is by emphasizing the expectation that every individual citizen is assigned the same legal and political rights, and by reducing the existence of special rights that are based on group membership. Barry was skeptical that a strong religious culture such as that which is associated with Islam would accept a diminished role in the public realm and willingly refrain from actively pursuing the enactment of prohibitions, bans and forms of discrimination that rival existing equal rights.²⁶

However, multiculturalism is neither the gap nor the bridge between the Muslim cultural heritage and Western liberal rights; multiculturalism is a reflection of the cultural and liberal facts of the society. It is the national identity of the state that determines whether different cultures are reconciled with the legal expectations. Thus, Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood challenge the notion that there is a dichotomy between “civic integration” and “multiculturalism” that places the two in a “zero-sum equation;”²⁷ rather, as Modood later wrote, it is the absence of commonality in the United Kingdom that must be remedied.²⁸ What has failed is the attitude of instructing a perceived “Other”

22 John Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 15.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

24 Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 30-31.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

27 Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “The Multicultural State We’re In: Muslims, ‘Multiculture’ and the ‘Civic Re-balancing’ of British Multiculturalism,” *Political Studies* 57:3 (2009), p. 475.

28 Tariq Modood, *Still Not Easy Being British: Struggles for a Multicultural Citizenship* (Stoke on Trent, UK and Sterlin, USA: Trentham Books, 2010), p. 119.

to accept a preexisting national identity, instead of recognizing that the social makeup of the state is not what it was when the identity was more representative of the state's society. To Modood, the highest level of multiculturalism is reached when in addition to "positive minority identities" there is also "a positive vision of society as a whole."²⁹ This high level of multiculturalism will not be reached by multiculturalism itself, but by a state recognition that its existing national identity must be in harmony with a multicultural society.

Also, equal rights on their own do not lead to an optimal civic integration. In the context of efforts to reconcile between multicultural diversity and a common identity, Keith Banting stresses the importance of "diverse narratives, a variety of stories which point to different possible relationships between diversity and redistribution."³⁰ After new civil rights were introduced in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, the people of African heritage were not asked to succeed in their civic integration without an accompanying adjustment to the American national identity upon its historical narratives. According to Michael Lind, the arrival at the "Third Republic of the United States" – namely a "Multicultural America" in which affirmative action is proliferated – came accompanied by "its own national story, its own widely – though not universally accepted – conception of the American nation's identity and destiny," as opposed to the previous "Anglo-American national story told of the providential expansion of an Anglo-American Protestant nation in its destined North American homeland" and "the Euro-American story, of the formation of a new white Christian nation..."³¹

Racism lives in narratives of the past, despite the introduction of rights that show no racial discrimination. An important question to ask is whether the racist narratives of the past are still foundational components of the current national identity. In Canada, which has been heralded as the "'home' of multiculturalism," there were no preexisting historical national narratives that would require state adjustment or "demand renunciation of one's previous identity."³² Being that Canada – as Australia – is a relatively new settler nation, multiculturalism there is "directed at everyone, not only immigrants."³³ In the

29 Ibid., p. 6.

30 Keith G. Banting, "The Multicultural Welfare State: International Experience and North American Narratives," *Social Policy and Administration* 39:2 (2005), p. 112.

31 Michael Lind, *The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), pp. 97-98.

32 Anthony Giddens, *Europe in the Global Age* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 122.

33 Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, "Integrating Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices," in Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska (eds.), *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 12.

United States, while the examination of cultural racist roots has not been exhaustive, the current national narratives purposely negate the legitimization of past perspectives that would be considered offensive to groups of which today's American society is comprised. Significantly, the American responsibility to facilitate the civic integration of Africans has replaced the mentality according to which this was a "Negro problem" rather than an American one.³⁴

Britain's Anti-Muslim Historiography and the National Identity Problem

In Britain, a long national history of imperialist campaigns overseas has produced historical narratives that justified Britain's dominance of colonized and semi-colonized peoples – whose descendants are now British citizens – from racial and religious perspectives. In addition, to this day British national identity is not religion-neutral, but Christian. Having in mind that the Queen of the United Kingdom is crowned by the Archbishop of the Anglican Church to serve as the "Supreme Governor" of the Church, and that Christianity receives preferential treatment in the British school system, Rex argues that "It is hard to see how Britain could fully claim to be a multicultural society so long as the Anglican Church enjoys these privileges."³⁵

Britain's traditional identity as a Christian nation is in tension with Muslim identity, especially if the latter is also regarded as national. For most Muslims, according to Rex, Islam is "a whole way of life," be it in the private domain or the public domain.³⁶ The idea that the public domain is institutionally dominated by the culture of a rivaling proselytizing religion is likely to stand in the way of a Muslim's embrace of the British national identity. Ernest Gellner, in his postmodernist view, sees the Islamic national identity within "the context of the struggle with colonialism."³⁷ In other words, a national narrative that is naturally in conflict with Muslim heritage would strengthen the national aspects of Muslim identity as part of a counteraction. To Gellner, the Muslim identity of the Bosnians serves as a fascinating example of how a national identity as disagreeable as the Yugoslavian national identity was to them could strengthen a Muslim national identity even when the Muslim religion was not practiced and there was no linguistic differentiation.³⁸

34 As Lind points out, Frederick Douglass advocated for this mental transformation. See: Lind, *Next American*, p. 382.

35 Rex, *Ethnic Minorities*, p. 238.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 237.

37 Ernest Gellner, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 15.

38 Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), pp. 71-72. The Bosnian example also challenges the conclusion drawn by Elie Kedourie that "A group speaking the same language is known as a nation." See: Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, (Oxford and Cambridge, MA:

Therefore, it might prove helpful to those who evaluate integration policies in Western liberal states to examine ways to ensure that the existing national identity is not threatening to Muslim identity, and to realize that in order for a national identity to be sustainable it is necessary to establish a membership that Karl Deutsch defined as a “wide complementarity of social communication,” which goes beyond language: “It consists in the ability to

It might prove helpful to those who evaluate integration policies in Western liberal states to examine ways to ensure that the existing national identity is not threatening to Muslim identity, and to realize that in order for a national identity to be sustainable it is necessary to establish a membership that Karl Deutsch defined as a “wide complementarity of social communication”

communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders.”³⁹ History, according to Deutsch, is selective – and thereby changeable – as it is used to reflect the national consciousness,⁴⁰ for which “there must be a minimum, at least, of cohesion and distinctiveness of a people.”⁴¹

In Britain, where the calls against a multicultural approach to Muslim communities have been strong, and where there is a natural state desire to effectively control all of its members, the enforcement of state laws will have to rely heavily on its “machinery of compulsion”⁴² – to borrow another one of Deutsch’s phrases – and become defined by a growing policing burden,

unless a policy is designed to initiate a massive historiographical reformation. Britain may have turned its back on an American styled affirmative action that is set to compensate for harm in the working place,⁴³ but perhaps it should carefully consider introducing affirmative action to qualify the harmful colonialist elements in its historical narratives and present a corrected historiographical basis for national identity.

The historiographical discord between Western and Turkish narratives

Blackwell, 1993 [1960]), p. 62. An emphasis on the learning of the national language as part of an overall effort to promote civic integration may turn focus away from the importance of the historical narratives on which the national identity is based.

39 Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (New York: Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1953), p. 71.

40 Ibid., p. 152.

41 Ibid., p. 147.

42 Ibid., p. 78.

43 Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 230.

regarding the circumstances that led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is at the heart of *Perinçek v. Switzerland*. Even though Perinçek was visiting Switzerland and not its citizen, and regardless of whether he is a practicing Muslim, his characterization of historical events concerning aspects of Turkish, Muslim and Ottoman memory was reflective of the perspectives and attitudes of Muslim communities in Western societies, many of whom are of Turkish descent and many of whom find in the past of the Ottoman Empire a representation of the history of Muslim interaction with the West. The fact that the courts and the government in Switzerland decided that Perinçek's view of history – a product of his identity as a Turk – is illegitimate and even criminal attests to the exclusion of Turkish historiography from the historical narratives that inform the Swiss national identity. It also attests to the arrogant and self-assured certainty with which it was determined that Perinçek's view of history is both inaccurate and harmful.

The Ottoman otherness in Europe had carried over to Western history books, and now it is expected of Turks and Muslims there – while they themselves are considered non-European by many European societies – to see the past existence of their own Ottoman heritage through Western eyes. In other words, the Swiss attempt to press Perinçek to characterize the events of 1915-16 in a Western politicized view of history that runs counter to Turkish historiography is nothing short of institutionalized Orientalism. In Britain, anti-Turkish, anti-Muslim and anti-Ottoman sentiment is intertwined with the influence of makers and authors of modern British history, from William Gladstone to Arnold Toynbee.

Toynbee, one of the West's most influential historians in the twentieth century, was hired by the British government to produce propaganda against the Ottoman Empire during World War I (WWI).⁴⁴ While working for a government at war with the Ottoman state, he wrote that the name Turkey "explains nothing;"⁴⁵ that the Osmanlis came of a clan of Turkish nomads "crossed with the blood of slave-women from half the world;"⁴⁶ and that up to 95 per cent of the Turkish language is "an infusion of Persian and Arabic idioms."⁴⁷ While Toynbee degraded Turkish culture and Ottoman government,

44 Michael L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-18* (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1982), pp. 41, 82; Gary S. Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 39.

45 Arnold J. Toynbee, *Turkey: A Past and a Future* (London, New York and Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), p. 1.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

47 *Ibid.* Oddly, in a footnote, Toynbee admits that the percentage is an exaggeration. Nonetheless, he wanted to present Turkish as an artificial language, which is a clear show of disrespect to Turkish culture.

he argued that the Armenians, along with the Greeks, were “the most energetic, intellectual, liberal elements in Turkey, the natural intermediaries between the other races and western civilisation.”⁴⁸ Britain’s imperialist plan for Anatolia ran through them. Accordingly, Toynbee disseminated the belief that “‘Turkey-in-Asia’ is a transitory phenomenon,”⁴⁹ and that “Turkey... is nothing but an overthrow of the past and an obstruction of the future.”⁵⁰

Already in 1878, Bryce announced Turkey’s death, and presented the plan to cultivate “the growth of a native Christian race” – the Armenians – to the point of establishing “the nucleus of an independent state” – Armenia – whose territories would comprise of Ottoman land in the size of “about three hundred and fifty miles in length by two hundred and fifty in breadth.”

It was in such hostile and biased literature that the Ottoman government was accused of planning a “systematic extermination of the Armenian race in the Ottoman Empire.”⁵¹ The “evidence,” which offered no means of knowing the perspective of the Ottoman government, was based on the gathering of witness accounts that were mainly given by Christian missionaries who had a pronounced agenda in Anatolia. This material was made into an official government Blue Book, titled *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916*, which was edited by Toynbee under the supervision of James Bryce.⁵²

By the time WWI necessitated extensive propaganda efforts in Britain to affect the American public,⁵³ Bryce had already established himself as the most eligible person for the task; even more so, it may be argued that his reputation in the United States is what made the British propaganda objectives there thinkable and possible.⁵⁴ In his preface to the Blue Book, Bryce explains the dire Armenian situation by blaming the Sultan’s leadership during the 1890s while avoiding any mention of his own

48 Ibid., p. 7.

49 Ibid., p. 11.

50 Ibid., p. 79.

51 Ibid., p. 20.

52 In 1967, Toynbee admitted that the purpose of the report on Armenian massacres was to win American support. However, he coupled this acknowledgment with a perplexing claim (if one considers the very nature of his employment and Bryce’s high political stature), namely that had he and Bryce known of its propaganda aims they would have reconsidered their roles in the report. See: Arnold J. Toynbee, *Acquaintances* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 151-153.

53 James M. Read, *Atrocity Propaganda* (New York: Arno Press, 1972 [1941]), p. 189.

54 In an article in the *Washington Post* during the war, it is stated that “No man in Europe commands a more sympathetic audience in America than Viscount Bryce,” see: *Washington Post*, January 28, 1917, p. 4.

involvement.⁵⁵ Decades prior to WWI, Bryce had made a name for himself as a Liberal politician, and an expert in foreign affairs, when in 1876 he raised the Armenian Question as part of the larger Eastern Question during the days of the heated Bulgarian Agitation.⁵⁶

Already in 1878, Bryce announced Turkey's death,⁵⁷ and presented the plan to cultivate "the growth of a native Christian race" – the Armenians – to the point of establishing "the nucleus of an independent state" – Armenia – whose territories would comprise of Ottoman land in the size of "about three hundred and fifty miles in length by two hundred and fifty in breadth."⁵⁸ Between then and WWI, Bryce engaged in many activities to organize the Armenians as a political entity within the Ottoman state that would replace the Ottoman rule.⁵⁹ This was accompanied by the promotion of the conviction that Turks as a race and as followers of Islam were inferior, uncivilized and an obstruction of progress. In the context of rationalizing "cases in which the exclusion of the Backward race seems justified, in the interests of humanity at large,"⁶⁰ Bryce invited his audience to "Conceive what a difference it might make if Islam were within two centuries to disappear from the earth!"⁶¹

Bryce was mentored by Edward Freeman, who later became the Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of Oxford and one of the most prominent historians in the late nineteenth century.⁶² Freeman was considered a spokesperson for Liberal Party ideology during Benjamin Disraeli's premiership,⁶³ when the party was in the opposition. To him, "the people of Aryan and Christian Europe" – the Christian minorities in the European

55 James Bryce, "Preface by Viscount Bryce," in Arnold J. Toynbee (ed.), *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: Documents Presented to Viscount Falldon* (London, New York and Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916), p. xxvii.

56 Herbert A. L. Fisher, *James Bryce*, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 183.

57 James Bryce, "The Future of Asiatic Turkey," *The Fortnightly Review* 29 (1878), p. 927.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 930.

59 This is made apparent through his correspondence with Armenian representatives. See: MSS. Bryce 191-208, Catalogue of the papers of James, Viscount Bryce, 1826-1958, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library.

60 James Bryce, *The Romans Lecture 1902: The Relations of the Advanced and the Backward Races of Mankind* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), p. 34.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

62 Toynbee intimated that it was Freeman's work that inspired him into becoming a historian. See: Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. 1 (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 339.

63 According to Richard Shannon, "Freeman was the natural leader of the Gladstonian historians." See: Richard Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), p. 223.

territories of the Ottoman Empire – were suffering from “The union of the Jew and the Turk against the Christian.”⁶⁴ Freeman was adamant that the Turkish presence in Europe was “artificial” because they “did not belong to the Aryan branch of mankind, and their original speech is not an Aryan speech.”⁶⁵ Interestingly, a passage in which Freeman remarks that “A day will come when the Turkish horde shall be driven back to its native deserts, or else die out, the victim of its own vices, upon the soil which it has too long defiled,”⁶⁶ is described in 1986 by Jonathan Parry simply as a passage in which “Freeman recommended the institution of federal government in the Balkans, which would preserve the independence of the constituent states, and yet would secure the area against attack.”⁶⁷ Meaning, this is an instance in which British historiography has taken a fiery anti-Turkish text that was authored by one of its greatest historians in the Victorian period, and presented it as a mild-mannered scholarly observation, thereby failing to acknowledge the anti-Turkish intensity of the passage and the roots of anti-Muslim sentiment in modern British historiography.

The most glaring representation of historiographical dissonance between British and Muslim identity is embodied by Gladstone, who from the late 1860s to the 1890s was Britain’s most highly regarded politician having been elected as premier on four different occasions, more than any politician in Britain’s history. Gladstone advocated policies against Muslims in Turkey⁶⁸ and Egypt⁶⁹ while claiming that it was done in the name of God,⁷⁰ and for the sake of Christianity⁷¹ and the progress of mankind.⁷² His stated belief in his country’s “moral elevation,”⁷³ is, problematically, both an integral part of Britain’s liberal

64 Edward A. Freeman, *The Ottoman Power in Europe, Its Nature, Its Growth, and Its Decline* (London: Macmillan and Company, 1877), pp. xix-xx.

65 *Ibid.*, pp. 41-43.

66 Edward A. Freeman, *History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893 [1863]), pp. 554-555.

67 Jonathan P. Parry, *Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867-1875* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 188.

68 William E. Gladstone, “The Peace to Come,” *Nineteenth Century* 3 (1878), p. 219; Stephen J. Lee, *Aspects of British Political History, 1815-1914* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 190.

69 William E. Gladstone, “Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East,” *The Nineteenth Century* 2 (1877), pp. 159-160.

70 David W. Bebbington, *William Ewart Gladstone: Faith & Politics in Victorian Britain* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993), p. 171.

71 William E. Gladstone, “The Paths of Honour and Shame,” *The Nineteenth Century* 3 (1878), p. 603.

72 William E. Gladstone, “Right Principles of Foreign Policy,” in Edgar R. Jones (ed.), *Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy, 1738-1914* (London: Humphrey Milford, 1914), p. 382.

73 William E. Gladstone, “England’s Mission,” *The Nineteenth Century* 4 (1878), p. 574.

identity and an insult to those who were colonized by Britain.⁷⁴ The same man who was pivotal in shaping British liberalism is the one who defined the Turk as inherently standing in opposition to it: “It is not a question of Mahometanism simply, but of Mahometanism compounded with the peculiar character of a race... They [the Turks] were, upon the whole, from the black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity.”⁷⁵

How do all of these direct clashes with Turkish and Muslim perspectives compute into the British national identity? How deep have these political texts penetrated British historical narratives? It is the teaching of history that defines national identity. It has been observed that “The nation-state and historiography traditionally have an intimate relationship,”⁷⁶ and that in Western European historiography “the nation is being tendentiously recast in a European framework.”⁷⁷ How does that affect the “non-European” cultures in Europe? To understand the identity crisis of a young African Muslim in Britain, for instance, one must consider that the British state does not actively pursue a reexamination of significant prejudice against Islam and Africans in its historical narratives. Such a reexamination would mean that every nook and cranny of British historiography must be reviewed through postcolonialist eyes. Not only should Gladstone’s place in British history demonstrate an acknowledgement of his Islamophobia, but there should also be full recognition of his father’s slave-ownership and its implications.⁷⁸ It will likely require

74 Such as moralizing Britain’s imperialist hold of India. See: Gladstone, “Aggression,” p. 154. In this context, it is relevant to consider the following comment on how Britain’s national identity perceives the massacres of Indians in 1857: “British historiography on the Mutiny became a sermon, not a science.” See: Sashi B. Chaudhuri, *English Historical Writings on the Indian Mutiny, 1857-1859* (Calcutta: The World Press Private Ltd., 1979), p. 280.

75 William E. Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* (London: John Murray, 1876), pp. 12-13.

76 Yasemin N. Soysal and Hanna Schissler, “Teaching Beyond the National Narrative,” in Hanna Schissler and Yasemin N. Soysal (eds.), *The Nation, Europe, and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005), p. 1.

77 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

78 John Gladstone, William’s father, was one of the wealthiest slave-holders in Liverpool. In his owned plantations in Demarara, “Fifty negroes were hanged, many were shot down in the thickets, others were torn in pieces by the lash of cart-whip.” See: John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, vol. 1 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932 [1903]). In his writings on the subject, John Gladstone argued that just as there were people in the world deprived of Christianity, it is also theologically understandable that there would be slaves deprived of freedom, and he referred to William Wilberforce, the leader of the anti-slavery campaign, as a “mistaken man.” See: The West India Association, *The Correspondence between John Gladstone and James Cropper on the Present State of Slavery in the British West Indies and in the United States of American and on the Importation of Sugar from the British Settlements in India* (Liverpool: The West India Association), pp. 16-17. Nonetheless, there is a historiographical perception that John Gladstone was a philanthropist. For instance, see: Thomas Archer, *William Ewart Gladstone and His Contemporaries: Seventy Years of Social and Political Progress*, vol. 1 (London: The Gresham Publishing Company, 1898), p. xi. Joppke is mistaken when he claims that because Britain had abandoned slavery “early on,” it need not “turn multiculturalism into the retributive

further historical inquiry and corrective publications before it becomes common knowledge that political anti-Ottoman rhetoric since the 1870s is what inspired the wartime propaganda during WWI, which, in turn, is what informs Americans and Europeans to this day about what happened in 1915-16.

Conclusion

Instead of seeking to place institutional constraints on behavior that follows cultural preferences among minority groups, institutions in Western liberal states should reflect the multinationalism and multiethnicity of their citizens. In Perinçek's case, the Swiss failure to establish institutions that reflect such multinational or multiethnic perspectives on history illustrates how important it is to accompany equal rights and state multiculturalism with a broad historiographical awareness that is respectful of the multinational and multiethnic backgrounds in the population. The British avoidance of recognizing that the national historiography is filled with historiographical bias against Muslims plays a great role in the national identity crisis among the Muslim citizens of Britain. While anti-Ottoman elements in British historiography do not come under reexamination and reconsideration, it will be used continuously as the main sources of information on the Armenian issue. The promotion of the claim that multiculturalism is in retreat may be explained by the service of such a claim to the state that refuses to acknowledge a national historiography that is hostile to Turks and Muslims, and prefers to place the burden of change on the Turks and Muslims themselves so that disturbing truths will remain blocked by the existing national narratives. State multiculturalism cannot lead to successful integration if it is not accompanied by a national identity that is complementary to the changed social makeup of the state via historical narratives that are inclusive of different national and ethnic backgrounds, and strive for historical accuracy.

direction of affirmative action" as in the United States. See: Christian Joppke, "Immigration Challenges the Nation-State," in Christian Joppke (ed.), *Challenges to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 36. Rather, it is the lack of historiographical awareness that has prevented the meaning of slavery in Britain from becoming a matter of national agenda.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archer, Thomas, *William Ewart Gladstone and His Contemporaries: Seventy Years of Social and Political Progress*, vol. 1 London: The Gresham Publishing Company, 1898.

Banting, Keith G., "The Multicultural Welfare State: International Experience and North American Narratives," *Social Policy and Administration* 39:2 (2005), pp. 98-115.

Banting, Keith, and Will Kymlicka, "Introduction: Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Setting the Context," in Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (eds.), *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Barry, Brian, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Bebbington, David W., *William Ewart Gladstone: Faith & Politics in Victorian Britain* Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993.

Bryce, James, "The Future of Asiatic Turkey," *The Fortnightly Review* 29 (1878), pp. 925-36.

_____, *The Romans Lecture 1902: The Relations of the Advanced and the Backward Races of Mankind* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.

_____, "Preface by Viscount Bryce," in Arnold J. Toynbee (ed.), *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: Documents Presented to Viscount Fallodon* London, New York and Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1916)

Bulliet, Richard W., *The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization* New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

Chaudhuri, Sashi B., *English Historical Writings on the Indian Mutiny, 1857-1859* Calcutta: The World Press Private Ltd., 1979.

Deutsch, Karl W., *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* New York: Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1953.

Favell, Adrian, "Multicultural Race Relations in Britain: Problem of Interpretation and Explanation," in Christian Joppke (ed.), *Challenges to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Fetzer, Joel S., and J. Christopher Soper, *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Freeman, Edward A., *The Ottoman Power in Europe, Its Nature, Its Growth, and Its Decline* London: Macmillan and Company, 1877.

_____, *History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*. London: Macmillan and Co., 1893 [1863].

Fisher, Herbert A. L., *James Bryce*, vol. 1 New York: Macmillan, 1927.

Gellner, Ernest, *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*. London: Routledge, 1992.

_____, *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.

Giddens, A., *Europe in the Global Age*. Cambridge: Polity, 2007.

Gladstone, William E., *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East*. London: John Murray, 1876.

_____, "Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East," *The Nineteenth Century* 2, 1877.

_____, "The Peace to Come," *Nineteenth Century* 3, 1878.

_____, "The Paths of Honour and Shame," *The Nineteenth Century* 3, 1878.

_____, "England's Mission," *The Nineteenth Century* 4 (1878).

_____, "Right Principles of Foreign Policy," in Edgar R. Jones (ed.), *Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy, 1738-1914* London: Humphrey Milford, 1914.

Hellyer, H. A., *Muslims of Europe: The "Other" Europeans* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

Israeli, Raphael, *The Islamic Challenge in Europe* New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Publishers, 2008.

Joppke, Christian, "Immigration Challenges the Nation-State," in Christian Joppke (ed.), *Challenge to the Nation State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

_____, *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

_____, "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy," *British Journal of Sociology* 55:2 (2004), pp. 237-57.

Joppke, Christian, and Ewa Morawska, "Integrating Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices," in Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska (eds.), *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 1-36.

Keeble, Edna, "Immigration, Civil Liberties, and National/Homeland Security," *International Journal* 60:2 (2005), pp. 359-74.

Kedourie, Elie, *Nationalism*, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993 [1960]

Kymlicka, Will, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

_____, *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Lind, Michael, *The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution* New York: The Free Press, 1995.

Meer, Nasar, and Tariq Modood, "The Multicultural State We're In: Muslims, 'Multiculture' and the 'Civic Re-balancing' of British Multiculturalism," *Political Studies* 57:3 (2009), pp. 473-97.

Messinger, Gary S., *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War* Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1992.

Modood, Tariq, *Still Not Easy Being British: Struggles for a Multicultural Citizenship* Stoke on Trent, UK and Sterlin, USA: Trenthan Books, 2010.

Morley, John, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, vol. 1 New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932 [1903].

- Nicholls, David, *The Pluralist State* London: Macmillan, 1975.
- Parry, Jonathan P., *Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867-1875* Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Poggi, Gianfranco, *The Development of the Modern State* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978.
- Read, James M., *Atrocity Propaganda* New York: Arno Press, 1972 [1941].
- Rex, John, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration* London: Macmillan, 1996.
- Sanders, Michael L., and Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-18* London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1982.
- Shannon, Richard, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876* London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963.
- Soysal, Yasemin N., and Hanna Schissler, "Teaching Beyond the National Narrative," in Hanna Schissler and Yasemin N. Soysal (eds.), *The Nation, Europe, and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition* New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005, pp. 1-9.
- Toynbee, Arnold J., *Turkey: A Past and a Future* London, New York and Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.
- _____, *A Study of History*, vol. 1 London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1935.
- _____, *Acquaintances* London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- MSS. Bryce 191-208, Catalogue of the papers of James, Viscount Bryce, 1826-1958, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library.
- The West India Association, *The Correspondence between John Gladstone and James Cropper on the Present State of Slavery in the British West Indies and in the United States of American and on the Importation of Sugar from the British Settlements in India* (Liverpool: The West India Association).

LAWFARE AGAINST TURKEY: A CASE STUDY ON ARMENIAN CLAIMS ON INSURGENCIES AND OTTOMAN COUNTER-MEASURES DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

(TÜRKİYE'YE KARŞI HUKUK SAVAŞI: BİRİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞI SIRASINDA YAŞANAN AYAKLANMALAR VE OSMANLI DEVLETİNİN ALDIĞI KARŞI-ÖNLEMLER İLE İLGİLİ ERMENİ İDDİALARI ÜZERİNE BİR VAKA ANALİZİ)

Prof. Dr. Sadi ÇAYCI

Director, Centre for Strategic Studies,
Başkent University, Ankara,

Abstract: *As the centennial of the First World War is broadly observed and discussed, there is also a parallel and intensifying effort to revisit the fate of Ottoman Armenians during the same period. Mixing humanity with politics, law with history, and rule of law with lawfare,¹ a well-orchestrated campaign against Turkey is continuing to confuse the minds of common people who do not have clear information and understanding on relevant legal and historical facts.*

Such a course of action does not serve common good. Abusing legal concepts for political objectives does not foster harmonious relations between countries and peoples. Thus, it is necessary to outline the issue of 1915 Armenian insurgencies and their consequences.

Keywords: *Lawfare, Turkey, Armenian, insurgency, history.*

Öz: *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın yüzüncü yılı kapsamlı bir şekilde gözlemleniyor ve tartışılıyor, Osmanlı Ermenilerinin aynı dönemdeki akıbetinin de yeniden tartışmaya açılması yönünde paralel ve yoğun girişimler var. Türkiye'ye karşı insaniyeti siyasetle, hukuku tarihle ve hukukun üstünlüğünü hukuk savaşı ile birbirine karıştıran, çok iyi yönetilen bir kampanya, ilgili hukuki ve tarihi gerçeklikler ile ilgili sarih bilgi ve anlayışa sahip olmayan toplumun aklını karıştırmaya devam ediyor.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Hukuk savaşı, Türkiye, Ermeni, ayaklanma, tarih.*

ARMENIAN INSURGENCIES

Following the French Revolution of 1786, all of the emerging concepts of “nation”, “nation state”, “nationalism” and “nationality principle” had widespread national and political effect on numerous peoples living in different parts of the globe. One major effect was dissolution of empires; such as Austria-Hungary (Habsburgs), Ottomans, and Great Britain. In this context, several peoples, living under the Ottoman rule, and starting with Greeks in as early as 1821, through rebellions, ethnic cleansing and massacre of local Muslim populations, managed to gain their independence to establish their own nation-states. In the process, one must not forget incitement and support provided by third party states to such struggles, which today, are some of the leading countries that accuse the targeted territorial states and / or their successors for all the negative consequences and tragedies, for example, Turkey.

In this overall context, Ottoman Armenians’ rebellion against the Ottoman rule started with massacre of Ottoman Muslims, attacks on belligerent Ottoman Army units and especially their logistics lines, all of which was responded by Ottoman Government. As Ottoman counter-insurgency measures had been effective and initial Armenian successes ended, the rebellion was followed by another tragedy, this time for Armenians themselves. One wonders, even in purely historic context, if there is any kind of similarity between situation of peaceful Jews in Nazi Germany, and bellicose Armenians in Ottoman territory.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: HOW TO TREAT COUNTER-CLAIMS?

In analysing such historic tragedies, first questions relate to the applicable law, and legal basis for legal standing of today’s Armenia to intervene in such a strictly domestic jurisdictional (national security) issue of the Ottoman State. In time of an on-going World War, in which Ottoman State is a belligerent party, and has to counter insurgency.

Armenian or pro-Armenian opinions pretend to overlook the existence of such legal issues, to include prosecution of acts committed by the Ottoman Armenians against their Muslim neighbours, and their hostilities against belligerent Ottoman Armies. This tendency, from the very beginning, results in a zero-sum game and violates the basic minimum standards for a fair inquiry and prevents a sound historical examination of those events.

Such an attitude neglects any possible counter-claims, in other words, overlooks the *other side of the coin*. In fact, possible and equally valid *counter-claims* regarding crimes committed by Armenian rebels and other Armenian individuals – organizations against Ottoman Muslim population and against belligerent Ottoman Army should also have been considered and remedied.

LAWFARE¹ AGAINST TURKEY

In legal context, first of all, one must note that there was no such a crime defined as *genocide* before the well-known United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948. Had it been the case, under its Article IX, *any State Party* to that Convention, *unilaterally*, could bring its case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). No such claim has been lodged at the ICJ.

That is because, examination of those Armenian rebellions and collaboration with enemy, during the First World War, and their negative consequences all relate to history. And in my opinion, any discussion, any submission starting with “Armenian genocide” label, is out of academic sphere. And a legal opinion or a historic finding does not have the effect of a *res judicata*. History cannot create legal right; history only may provide evidence

on related facts, for a valid claim. That is why, the basic Armenian or pro-Armenian strategy is based on building a *political dispute* against Turkey, via developing and / or fabricating political, historic, and –to the extent feasible-legal arguments, to launch a successful lawfare campaign against Turkey.

There was no such a crime defined as genocide before the well-known United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948. Had it been the case, under its Article IX, any State Party to that Convention, unilaterally, could bring its case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). No such claim has been lodged at the ICJ.

POLITICAL AND LEGAL LAWFARE

The first component of the lawfare has been invoking *appropriate* foreign parliaments to make a political declaration recognizing 1915 incidents as an act of genocide against Armenians; and, if possible, ensuring passing of a special - additional piece of legislation, to officially recognize 1915 incidents as genocide; and similarly, if possible, ensuring passing of a special piece of legislation *criminalizing and sanctioning* any acts of denial.

1 As part of a political strategy, political struggle, abuse of law against a targeted state or other entity.

Frequently, for example, some members of the U.S. Congress will submit draft resolutions (i.e., “H. Res. 277”) to recognize and pronounce 1915 incidents as genocide.² In France, the French parliament had passed in 2001 a law that recognized the *Armenian genocide*.³

LEGAL OPINIONS

The second and complementary component of the lawfare has been to obtain legal opinions, rendered through private channels, to complement and support Armenian and pro-Armenian thesis. One typical example is the book by Alfred de Zayas: *The Genocide Against the Armenians 1915-1923 and the Relevance of the 1948 Genocide Convention*.⁴ In the book, one would like to see applicable law issues, nuance between criminal and civil law issues, nuance between State and individual responsibility issues, dealt and elaborated in a convincing and objective manner.

Another example is the report prepared by the International Center for Transitional Justice (“ICTJ”) on a request by the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (“TARC”), a joint civil – private initiative, submitted on 4 February 2003. Its mandate was defined as, “facilitate an independent legal study on the applicability of the 1948 Genocide Convention to events which occurred during the early twentieth century”. The report concluded that, “the Genocide Convention does not give rise to individual criminal or state responsibility for events which occurred during the early twentieth century or at any time prior to January 12, 1951”.

This was the answer to the question posed by the mandate. But, as such an attitude will not produce expected influence, resorting to *obiter dictum*⁵ concept is yet another lawfare tactic applied to substitute direct legal challenges against Turkey. That’s why, in the ICTJ case, the Group could not stop there and continued with an obiter dictum style, additional analysis: “Although the Genocide Convention does not give rise to state or individual liability for events which occurred prior to January 12, 1951, the term ‘genocide’, as defined in the Convention, may be applied to describe such events.”⁶

2 See: Ömer Engin Lütem, “ABD Kongresine Sunulan Yeni Soykırım Tasarısı”, *Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi Bülteni*, Number: 1177, Date: 24.05.2013.

3 See: Gündüz Aktan, “Armenian Problem: Latest Developments”, *Hurriyet Daily News*, 28 April 2005, <<http://hurriyetdailynews.com/gunduz-aktan-armenian-problem-latest-developments.aspx>>.

4 Alfred de Zayas, *The Genocide Against the Armenians 1915-1923 and the Relevance of the 1948 Genocide Convention*, Haigazian University, February 2010, 105pp.

5 Obiter dictum: “A judge’s expression of opinion uttered in court or in a written judgement, but not essential to the decision and therefore not legally binding as a precedent.”

6 See: <<http://www.groong.com/ICTJ-analysis.html>>.

OBITER DICTUM TACTIC

In practice, there are a number of ways to exploit this concept. First is to take legal actions in selected foreign courts, for example, in the U.S., against insurance companies to claim life insurance benefits of the victims and / or their heirs; and presenting those cases as if the case is against Turkey and that the court will decide on the merits of genocide claims against Turkey.

For example, Vazken Movsesian and others filed a class action against Victoria Verischerung AG (“Victoria”), Ergo Verischerungsgruppe AG (“Ergo”), and Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft (“Munich Re”) to seek damages from these companies for breach of written contract and other reasons. At the end of the legal process, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled that Section 354.4 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which extended the statute of limitations until 2010 for claims arising out of life insurance policies issued to Armenian Genocide victims “interfere[d] with the national government’s conduct of foreign relations” and was therefore “preempted.”⁷

Second is to complain any individual who does not serve or share Armenian and / or pro-Armenian perspectives, for prosecution, a common practice resorted in France, against Turkish nationals who, in public, oppose the Armenian claims.⁸

Another area, which is deemed appropriate for the lawfare against Turkey, is found in activities of the European Union, especially in a Framework Decision of 28 November 2008, on racism and xenophobia. Under the decision, the following intentional conduct will be punishable in all EU Member States: “Publicly inciting to violence or hatred ... directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin ... Publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivializing ... crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Court ... directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin, and ... crimes defined by the Tribunal of Nuremberg ... directed against a group of persons or a member

7 See: *ASIL Insight* on Movsesian et al. v. Victoria Versicherung AG et al., August 20, 2009, <<http://www.asil.org/ilib090910.cfm#j1>>.

8 This pillar also includes preventing those individuals in exercising their political rights, or right to education. Typical examples include asking a political party candidate of Turkish origin in elections to publicly support the Armenian case, or, asking a Turkish student to prepare homework or a dissertation in defence of Armenian claims.

of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.”

Some EU member States, to include Greece, prefer to abuse this peace of EU legislation as if it covers history, and with an open ended scope. Under the recently enacted Greek Law, dated 9 September 2014 (the date Izmir was liberated from Greek occupation in 1922), Turkish War of Independence is an act of genocide against Ottoman Greek and Pontus populations.⁹

Third is to put pressure on certain selected Turkish commercial enterprises and banking institutions, either as private entities, or, as organs of the Republic of Turkey. Municipal Courts are ideal for such initiatives, especially U.S. Courts. (See: Jeffrey Davis, *Justice Across Borders – The Struggle For Human Rights in U.S. Courts*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, passim).

Although the applicants, claimants are well aware that they will not be able to be awarded judgments as they wish; in all these initiatives, basic concept is perception-management of the common public, especially causing panic of Turkish authorities and people.

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Lately, European Court of Human Rights has become a new lawfare-battleground. Traditionally, even *res judicata* is subject to any analysis and / or criticism. That is the way law progresses. But when it comes to 1915 events, Armenians and pro-Armenians do not feel a need for a decision or judgment of a proper court, with due jurisdiction. Furthermore, -as if all the facts have been determined- they hate to hear any argument that reflects other facts that are not complementing their claims. All such studies are –without any rationale- categorically rejected. This brings another question to forefront: Freedom of expression, also, academic freedom.

In this regard, Chamber Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of *Perinçek v. Switzerland* (17 December 2013) has been a turning point to clear the way for free discussion of the relevant issues. However, on requests by Armenia and later by France, the case is pending a final decision by the Grand Chamber. If approved, there will emerge a new atmosphere where like any other subject, relevant forums will have to be open for all conflicting opinions.

9 Ömer Engin Lütem, “Yunanistan’da Soykırım Kanunu”, *Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi*, 19 September 2014, http://www.avim.org.tr/analiz_print/tr/3636

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the on-going and intensifying anti-Turkish lawfare in Armenian question, still, one must keep in mind that all such efforts will not have any legal consequences because as there is no legal dispute, there is no authority, no forum to make a legally binding determination on the issue.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alfred de Zayas, *The Genocide Against the Armenians 1915-1923 and the Relevance of the 1948 Genocide Convention*, Haigazian University, February 2010.

ASIL Insight on Movsesian et al. v. Victoria Versicherung AG et al., August 20, 2009, <http://www.asil.org/ilib090910.cfm#j1>

Gündüz Aktan, “Armenian Problem: Latest Developments”, Hurriyet Daily News, 28 April 2005, <http://www.hurriyetaailynews.com/gunduz-aktan-armenian-problem-latest-developments.aspx>

“ICTJ Legal Analysis on Applicability of UN Convention on Genocides prior to January 12, 1951” prepared by International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) for The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) <http://www.groong.com/ICTJ-analysis.html>

Ömer Engin Lütem, “ABD Kongresine Sunulan Yeni Soykırım Tasarısı”, *Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi Bülteni*, Number: 1177, Date: 24.05.2013.

FROM SEVRES TO LAUSANNE: THE ARMENIAN QUESTION (1920-23)

(SEVR'DEN LOZAN'A: ERMENİ SORUNU (1920-23))

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevtap DEMİRCİ
Boğaziçi University,
The Atatürk Institute for Modern History

Abstract: *From the mid 19th century until the beginning of the First World War the Ottoman Empire called the “sick man of Europe” faced multiple crises afflicting the Empire most of which resulted in the loss of territory and subjects. The Eastern Question –the question of what should become of the Ottoman Empire- changed its character and final liquidation of the Ottoman Empire in Europe soon followed its collapse in Anatolia. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire the Armenian issue in Anatolia -as in the case of the Christian subjects of the Empire in the Balkans- was brought to the forefront of the diplomatic forums in the international political system. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War the Allies were prepared to give the Armenian nationalists most of their demands over Turkey. With the Sevres Treaty (August 10, 1920) the Allies endorsed the Armenian claims to East Anatolia in return for the latter’s services to their cause during the First World War. However, the Nationalist victories both against the Armenians in the East and against the Greeks in the West made the treaty a dead letter and compelled the Allies to meet the victorious Turks on equal terms at Luasanne (24 July 1923). In other words, three years later when the Lausanne Treaty was signed, the text did not contain any reference whatsoever to an Armenian National home, let alone a state. In short, the Lausanne Treaty put an end to the centuries old Eastern Question as well as the Armenian Question which became the integral part of it.*

Keywords: *First World War, Ottoman Empire, Eastern Question, Treaty of Sevres, Treaty of Lausanne, the Armenian Question*

Öz: *19. Yüzyılın ortalarından Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın başlangıcına kadar, “Avrupa'nın hasta adamı” olarak anılan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, çoğu toprak ve tebaa kaybıyla sonuçlanmış pek çok krizle karşılaşmıştır. Doğu Sorununun, yani Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na ne olacağı sorusu, niteliği değişmiş ve Anadolu'daki çöküşünden kısa süre sonra Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun nihai tasfiyesi başlamıştır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun*

çöküşü ile beraber, İmparatorluğun Balkanlar'daki Hristiyan tebaalarıyla ilgili gerçekleşmiş olduğu gibi, Anadolu'daki Ermeni Meselesi uluslararası siyasi sistemdeki diplomatik tartışmaların gündeminin ön sıralarına getirilmiştir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndaki yenilgisini takiben Müttefikler, Ermeni milliyetçilerine Osmanlı İmparatorluğu üzerine olan taleplerinin çoğunluğunu elde etmelerine izin vermeye hazırıldılar. Sevr Antlaşması (10 Ağustos 1920) ile beraber, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda kendilerine vermiş oldukları hizmete karşılık Müttefikler, Ermenilerin Doğu Anadolu'ya yönelik taleplerini onaylamıştır. Ancak Milli Mücadele sırasında Türklerin Doğu'da Ermenilere, Batı'da ise Yunanlılara karşı elde etmek olduğu zaferler Sevr Antlaşmasını butlan bir belge haline getirmiş ve Müttefikleri Lozan'da (24 Temmuz 1923) Türklerle eşit konumda bir araya gelmeye zorlamıştır. Diğer bir deyişle, Sevr Antlaşmasından üç sene sonra Lozan Antlaşması imzalandığında, bırakın bir Ermeni devletini, antlaşmanın metni Ermenilerin milli topraklarından dahi hiçbir şekilde bahsetmemiştir. Kısacası Lozan Antlaşması, hem geçmişi yüzyıllara dayanan Doğu Sorununu, hem de bunun ayrılmaz bir parçası haline gelmiş olan Ermeni Meselesine bir son vermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Doğu Sorunu, Sevr Antlaşması, Lozan Antlaşması, Ermeni Meselesi*

Historical Background

The Ottoman Empire, which participated in World War I (1914-18) on the side of the Central Powers, was defeated by the Allies and compelled to sign the Mudros Armistice on October 30, 1918. This agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Britain (representing the Allied Powers) was signed aboard the British battleship *The Agamemnon*, which was docked at Mudros bay. Britain was represented by Admiral Calthorpe, whilst the Ottoman Empire was represented by its Minister for Naval Affairs Rauf Bey, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Resad Hikmet Bey, and Staff Colonel Sadik Bey. The Armistice was confirmatory proof that the once mighty Ottoman Empire had come to an end.

Under the terms of the armistice, which in its final form was composed of twenty-five articles, the Ottomans surrendered their remaining garrisons in Mesopotamia, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica (Libya), Syria, Yemen, and the Hejaz. The Ottoman Army was demobilised and its ports, railways, and other strategic points were made available for use to the Allies. Moreover, the Allies were to occupy the Straits, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and also acquired the right to occupy 'in case of disorder' the six provinces in the eastern part of Anatolia, where the Armenian population lived. Finally, they were also granted the right to seize 'any strategic points' in case of a threat to Allied security.

Article 24 of the Armistice¹, the one that empowered the Allies with the power to intervene in territories in which the Armenian population resided, proved to be the most controversial. The Ottoman delegation opposed the article on the grounds that it would encourage Armenian dissent and create a chaotic situation in the area by undermining the central authority of the government. The British delegate, Admiral Calthorpe, maintained that this would put an end to news about the Armenians, which had been circulating until then, while also mitigating negative British and American public opinion. Not only was the Ottoman insistence on the removal of the article in return for British control of the region turned down, but American participation in this control force was also imposed. The Ottoman proposal to at least keep the article a secret, - borne of a fear of a possible Armenian uprising - was also rejected by the British delegation. It was only after Admiral Calthorpe promised to consult his government and seek advice on the issue that the signing of the Armistice was assured. While Turkish historians consider the whole issue a significant step towards the disintegration of the Empire, Armenian scholars hold the view that it far from secured the rights of the Armenian population (Hovanissian,

1 Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasî Tarih Metinleri: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları*. (Ankara: 1953) Cilt I, s. 520, 524.

Toynbee). What was certain was that the British had managed to secure the routes to their dominions and prevent an Ottoman military attack on the Caucasus by utilising the Armenians and their situation.²

Within two months of the Armistice being signed, the British made a less than surprising move. On January 2, 1919, Admiral Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner in Istanbul, suggested to London that he be authorised with the power “to demand immediate arrest and delivery” to the British military authorities of such Turks against whom there appeared to be “*prima facie* good case”. “No action” he said, “would be better calculated to impress upon the Turks in the interior of the country that they had been beaten and that the Armenians must be respected”.³ Some 144 Ottoman dignitaries (the grand vizier, the Grand Mufti, ministers, speaker of the Ottoman Parliament, some deputies, intellectuals and officials) were transferred and imprisoned in Malta on allegations of genocide. The prime motives behind this act were to break any possible resistance to the Armistice, to prevent a reaction to the upcoming peace treaty at Sevres, and to hold the Unionists responsible for prolonging the war by allying with Germany. This move forced the British – for the first time in their history – to conscript soldiers from their dominions.⁴

Searches in the Ottoman archives by the British, with the help of Turkish-Armenian experts, did not result in any damning or incriminatory documents. The British had hoped to find documents in the US archives to bring charges against the Ottoman detainees. However, reports prepared in the light of foreign councils proved that the charges made against those Turks held as prisoners of war were invalid. In a telegram sent to Curzon from Washington in July 13, 1921 Craigie wrote the following:

I regret to inform your Lordship that there was nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are at present being

2 Selçuk Ural, *Mondoros Mütarekesi ve Doğu Vilayetleri*. (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008). pp.52-55; Nurcan Toksoy, *Revanda Son Günler: Türk Yönetiminden Ermeni Yönetimine*. (Ankara: Orion Yayınevi, 2007). pp. 191-201; John Fisher, *Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East 1916-1919*. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), pp. 238-243.

3 Bilal N.Şimşir “Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question” in *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926)*, (İstanbul: Bogazici University Publications, 1984), p.26; Ferudun Ata, “Divan-ı Harbi Örfi Mahkemesinde yapılan Tehcir Yargılamaları, Ermeni Soykırımı İddialarına bir Delil Olabilir mi?” in *Türk Ermeni İlişkilerinin Gelişimi ve 1915 Olayları Uluslar arası Sempozyumu*, (Ankara: Gurup Matbaacılık, 2006),(yay. Haz. Hale Şıvgın) p.277.

4 Bilal Şimşir, “Malta Sürgünleri ve Ermeni İddiaları” in *Türk Ermeni İlişkilerinin Gelişimi ve 1915 Olayları Uluslararası Sempozyumu*. (yay. haz. Hale Şıvgın), (Ankara: Gurup Matbaacılık, 2006), pp.267-268; Pulat Tacar and Maxime Gauin; “State Identity, Continuity, and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide: A Reply to Vahagn Avedian” *The European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 23 no. 3, (2012), pp. 828-829.

detained at Malta...no concrete facts being given which could constitute satisfactory incriminating evidence...the reports in question do not appear in any case to contain evidence against these Turks which would be useful even for the purpose of corroborating information already in the possession of His Majesty's Government.⁵

As a result, the prisoners held in Malta were released in 1922 without any charges even having been made or trials being held.⁶

However this was not the only way in which the Allies took advantage of the weak and defenceless Ottoman position. While the Mudros Armistice was in the process of being signed, the political situation in the Caucasus was bleak. At Mudros, Admiral Calthorpe demanded the withdrawal of Ottoman forces from the Caucasus. The Ottoman officials in turn protested, claiming that the *Elviye-i Selase* (three *sanjaks*, namely Kars, Ardahan and Batum) were ceded to Turkey via the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.⁷ Ottoman protests on the basis of this treaty, which was signed between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers on March 3, 1918, fell on deaf ears and the Ottomans were forced to withdraw their forces, thus totally changing the balance of power in the region to the detriment of the Soviets and placing the British and the British-backed Armenians in an advantageous position. Following the withdrawal of the Ottoman military forces from the Caucasus, General Thomsen of the British armed forces issued a memorandum stating that a Greater Armenia was to be founded in the area that spanned eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan, and the

5 Bilal Şimşir "Malta Sürgünleri" p. 275; A. Christian Van Gorder "Armenian Christians and Turkish Muslims: Atrocity, Denial and Identity." *Christianity and Human Rights Conference*, (November 12-13, 2004), Samford University, Birmingham AL. p.7

6 The only document provided about the Armenian allegations came from one source, namely Ambassador Henry Morgenthau who was asked by the president Wilson and State Secretary Lansing to provide "documentary evidence to convince the US Congress" to take a decision to join World War I for "ethical humane values". For a critique of Morgenthau, see: Şükrü Server Aya, *Preposterous Paradoxes of Ambassador Morgenthau: A Factual Story about Politics, Propaganda and Distortions*. (Belfast: Athol Books, 2013).

7 In March 1918 the Bolshevik government of Russia negotiated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in which they surrendered large territories within Georgia and Armenia to the Ottoman Empire. The Transcaucasian delegation refused to accept the Brest-Litovsk provisions and the Ottoman in response launched a successful offensive in the spring of 1918, forcing the Transcaucasian Federation which united three Caucasian states, to sever all relations with Russia. As the Transcaucasian Federation disintegrated into the independent states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, a conference was held at Batumi that ended in the signing of three agreements. The first made peace between the Ottoman Empire and Georgia and guaranteed the frontiers set by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The second was made with Armenia after its declaration of short-lived independence on May 28, acknowledging the pre-1878 Ottoman-Russia frontier (Kars, Ardahan, and Batum returned to the Ottomans) thus reducing Armenia to Ottoman vassalage as it granted the Turks a significant part of Armenian territory and compelled Armenia to disband its army and rely solely on Turkish forces to maintain peace domestically and to guarantee the religious and cultural freedom of Muslims.

Caucasus.⁸ This would be the most rational way of dismembering the Empire: by finalising the Eastern Question and preventing a Russian advance into the south.

The Allied victory in the Great War and their support for the Armenian cause unquestionably encouraged the Armenians and strengthened their faith in Allied policies. Their hopes were not unfounded. At the peace Conference convened in Paris on January 18, 1919, to establish the terms of the post-war peace, the Allies conveyed the Armenian delegation's proposals to the Ottomans.⁹ The Armenians were represented in the Conference by two delegations: Avetis Aharonyan (the leader of the Dashnaktsution Revolutionary Party and chairman of the Armenian National Assembly) on behalf of the Armenian Republic and Boghos Nubar Pasha (chairman of the Armenian National Delegation) on behalf of the Ottoman Armenians. Both parties put forward territorial claims against the Ottoman Empire. These territorial claims were unacceptably large and were viewed as trying to establish – as the newspaper *Le Temps* called it – an “Armenian Empire”. After having given details of Armenian support to the Allied cause, Aharonian and Bogos Nubar Pasha stated that:

8 Nurcan Toksoy, *Revanda Son Günler*, p.209.

9 Ahmet Hulki Saral, *Ermeni Meselesi*, (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basımevi, 1970) s. 258. Each of the Great Powers had a reason on its own to stand by the Armenian claims: The British foreign policy from Paris 1919 until the signature of the Treaty of Sevres was designed to draw a set between Russia and Turkey by establishing a mandate under the supervision of the United States. Britain's main concern was Kurds upon which it planned to set up a mandate thus extending its zone of influence up to Mesopotamia and Iran. By establishing an autonomous Kurdish state it would prevent Turks control the area between Armenia and Mesopotamia and be able to use the Kurds not only against the Turks and Iranians but also the Arabs. Suat Akgül, “Paris Konferansından Sevr'e Türkiye'nin Paylaşılması Meselesi”. (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi), Journal no.23;

Britain was in favour of the American mandate in Armenia since it was unwilling to take military and financial responsibilities. With Wilson principles USA entered into the world politics pursuing an ‘open door’ policy it would enter into the Middle East economically and trade wise and Armenia could provide a stepping stone in this respect. To quote Lepp “Wilson and the State Department believed that after the war, the Berlin-Baghdad axis must be broken to avoid German domination of Central Europe and the Middle East. Breaking the axis required not only defeat of Germany, but the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, in the view of American planners, the Turks would maintain control of part of Anatolia, but would lose the control of all territories of the Empire in Europe. This plan required that an independent Armenian Republic would be established in eastern Anatolia, while Arab lands would be placed under some form of European tutelage, creating regimes friendly to the West”. John W. Vander Lippe; The “Other” Treaty of Lausanne: The American Public and Official Debate on Turkish-American Relations” in *The Turkish Yearbook*, 1993 Vol.XXIII., p39.

As to the French, throughout the Paris Peace Conference they followed, to quote French general Gourad, an ‘Armenian policy’ in Cilicia. They were also in favour of American mandate in Armenia. But France was not satisfied with the limited concession allocated to it in Sevres and changed its attitude and tried to come to an understanding with the Kemalists.

“the voice of all Armenians dead and alive must be heard! It is true that the Armenians do not constitute the majority of the population in Armenia but they do constitute the plurality of the population. But number should not be the determining factor in the fixing of the boundaries of our future state.”

In their final statement, they jointly stressed the responsibility of the Allies in the matter by stating that:

“the Armenian Question was not essentially a local and national question; it concerned the peace of Europe, and upon its solution shall depend the pacification, the progress and prosperity of the Near East”.

However, there were also some Armenians in the Armenian Parliament (Vahan Minakhorian) who voiced their criticism against the preposterous demands of the extremists, declaring “Armenian chauvinism” a danger. Additionally “the partitioning of Turkey and the contribution of the Armenians in this partitioning, by playing the leading role in the scenario, could only mean serving the interests of imperialism.”¹⁰ However, these protests, too, were unheeded. Upon the incessant endeavour of the joint delegation, the Armenians managed to secure the desired outcome from the Conference and were officially notified that the Peace Conference had recognised Armenia as a sovereign state. Moreover, the propaganda carried out for some time by the Armenians had produced the expected effect by winning over public opinion in Britain, America, and various European circles, and had gathered sympathy for their cause. The Porte would finally yield to this pressure. Damat Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman government, would promise an autonomous Armenian Republic upon his meeting with Admiral Calthorpe in March, less than a month after the conference in Paris.

The successful propaganda campaign carried out by the Armenians eventually led to American involvement in the issue. Acting under heavy pressure from Armenian institutions, such as the church, the media and missionary groups,

The Allied victory in the Great War and their support for the Armenian cause unquestionably encouraged the Armenians and strengthened their faith in Allied policies. Their hopes were not unfounded. At the peace Conference convened in Paris on January 18, 1919, to establish the terms of the post-war peace, the Allies conveyed the Armenian delegation's proposals to the Ottomans.

10 Mim Kemal Öke, *The Armenian Question*. (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2001), p.147.

President Wilson sent a memorandum to Grand Vizier Damat Ferid Pasha on the 21st of August 1919, shortly after the National Struggle had begun in Anatolia under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and had started to gain momentum with the Erzurum Congress of July 23, 1919. The memorandum stated that:

“Unless the massacres of the Armenians in Caucasus and other areas are prevented, the sovereignty recognized by the Wilsonian Principles of Article 12¹¹ will be retaken from the Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire and peace terms will be altered to the detriment of Turkey”.

With the authority vested in him as arbitrator, Wilson also decided on establishing an independent inquiry with General James G. Harbour at the helm. ¹² The inquiry commission consisted of 46 members that toured Anatolia and the South Caucasus for 30 days before reaching the conclusion that

“the Turk and the Armenian when left without official instigation have hitherto been able to live together in peace. Their existence side by side on the same soil for five centuries unmistakably indicates their interdependence and mutual interest...

Even before the war the Armenians were far from being in the majority in the region claimed as Turkish Armenia, excepting in a few places...

11 Article 12 runs as follows: “The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.” John W. Vander Lippe; The “Other” Treaty of Lausanne, .pp.31-63.

12 In the summer on 1919 -prior to General Harbour’s visit- Captain Emory Niles and Arthur Sutherland visited on horse the Eastern Anatolia (1450 km in one month) and prepared a report directly blaming Armenian volunteers for their massacres of Moslems and destruction of villages and cities. See: McCarthy, *The Report of Niles and Sutherland*, XI. Turk Tarih Kongresi (1990) 1809, at 1850; A month later a larger delegation under General James Harbour arrived and visited the area. For General Harbour’s detailed report see: Galip Baysan “Sevr’de Ermeni Meselesi Nasıl Sonuçlandı?” in *Antalya Bugün* (online newspaper, 8, August, 2014); Seçil Akgün, “Kurtuluş Savaşı Başlangıcında Türk Ermeni ilişkilerinde A.B.D.’nin Rolü.”, in *Tarih boyunca Türklerin Ermeni Toplumuna İle İlişkileri*, (Ankara: 1985), s.338. Seçil Akgün, “General Harbord’un Anadolu Gezisi ve (Ermeni Meselesi’ne Dair)Raporu.” in *Kurtuluş Savaşı Başlangıcında Türk- Ermeni İlişkilerinde ABD’nin Rolü*. İstanbul 1981, s. 133-158; Fahir Armaoğlu, “Amerika Sevr Antlaşması ve Ermenistan Sınırları”., *Belleten*, cilt:LXI, (Ankara: 1997), s.135.

Wilsonian principles; article 12 runs as follows: “The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.”

On the Turkish side of the border where Armenians have returned they are gradually recovering their property, and in some cases have received rent for it, but generally they find things in ruins, and face winter out of touch with the American relief, and with only such desultory assistance as the Turkish Government can afford. Things are little if any better with the peasant Turks in the same region. They are practically serfs equally destitute, and equally defenseless against the winter. No doctors or medicines are to be had. Villages are in ruins, some having been destroyed when the Armenians fled or were deported; some during the Russian advance; some on the retreat of the Armenian irregulars and Russians after the fall of the Empire. Not over 20 per cent of the Turkish peasants who went to war have returned. The absence of men between the ages of 20 and 35 is very noticeable. Six hundred thousand Turkish soldiers died of typhus alone, it is stated, and insufficient hospital service and absolute poverty of supply greatly swelled the death lists.”¹³

An independent Armenia was out of the question and the public was of the opinion that if a mandate was to be set up, it had to be under the governance of the United States. Despite the objections of the British and the French, who wanted the United States to be the mandatory power for the new Armenia, the United States Senate was against it.¹⁴ “A power which should undertake a mandatory for Armenia and Transcaucasia without control of the contiguous territory of Asia Minor—Anatolia—and of Constantinople, with its hinterland of Roumelia,” wrote General Harbord in his report, “would undertake it under most unfavorable and trying conditions, so difficult as to make the cost almost prohibitive, the maintenance of law and order and the security of life and property uncertain, and ultimate success extremely doubtful.”¹⁵

When the League notified the Allied representatives at the San Remo Conference in April 1920 that it could not undertake the responsibility of a mandate but was prepared to give its moral support, British Prime Minister Lloyd George suggested appealing to the United States to undertake responsibility for Armenia and invited President Wilson to draw the boundaries of Armenia – something even the Allies had failed to do – even if the proposal of being a mandatory power was rejected. Thereby Wilson determined the

13 Major General James G. Harbord, *Conditions in the Near East: Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 10.

14 In the original program of the State Department seven issues were listed, including the “maintenance of the capitulations; the protection of American philanthropic, educational and religious institutions; an “open door” for commercial enterprises; indemnity for losses suffered by Americans during the war; provisions for the protection of minorities; assurances of the freedom of the Straits, and opportunity for archeological research.”.John W. Vander Lippe, “The Other Treaty of Lausanne”, p.45

15 James Harbour, *Conditions in the Near East*,p.15.

borders of Armenia while the League of Nations undertook a number of resolutions concerning the Armenians threatened by the successful advance of the Turkish armies on the Eastern Anatolian front. In September of 1920, the League adopted the following proposal:

“The Assembly invites the Council to take into immediate consideration the situation in Armenia, and to submit to the examination of the Assembly proposals to meet the danger which actually threatens the life of the Armenian race, and to establish a stable and permanent state of things in that country”

In November of 1920 the Assembly passed the following resolution:

”The Assembly, desirous of collaborating with the Council to put an end, within the shortest possible time, to the horrible Armenian tragedy, invites the Council to effect an understanding with the Governments to the end that one Power be charged with the task of taking necessary measures to bring to a termination the hostilities between Armenia and the Kemalists, and, further, charge a commission of six members to examine the measures, if any, to be taken to put an end to the hostilities between Armenia and the Kemalists, and report to the present Assembly.”

The aforementioned resolutions by the League were enough to prove that the British Foreign Secretary’s earlier remarks at the first London Conference in February of 1920, to the effect that “Allies were pledged to constitute an independent Armenia”, had obviously produced the desired effect. At the Conference, Lord Curzon had précised the British view to the French and Italians, stating that the Allies had recognised Armenia in Paris and it was now the time to decide whether they would insist on a ‘Greater Armenia’, or whether they would merely add the six provinces to the Armenian Republic in Yerevan, or, alternatively, in the case of neither of the above being applicable, whether Armenia should be placed under the protection of League of Nations.

In accordance with these developments, the Allied representatives finalised the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire and the “considerations of past pledges, moral responsibility, honour and public opinion, especially in the United States, induced the representatives of the Allied Powers to decide on the transfer of territory in the eastern villages to the Republic of Armenia.”¹⁶ The conditions

16 Akaby Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question 1915-1923*. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984), p.181; Suat Akgül, “Paris Konferansı’ndan Sevr’e Türkiye’nin Paylaşılması Meselesi” ATAM Journal, 23.

of the peace treaty, which would be imposed upon the Empire, were finally agreed upon.

The Allied Solution: Sevres Peace Treaty

The Allies were of the opinion that the time was ripe for an immediate peace – drafted in line with the Allies’ wartime secret agreements – that would be imposed upon the Ottoman delegation. Decisions taken earlier on in various meetings had to be officially put into practice. The treaty, or in other words, “the death warrant of the Empire”, was a clear indicator of the (proposed) Allied solution to the centuries-old Eastern Question. The Treaty of Sevres¹⁷ territorially carved up the entity described by Russian Tsar Nicholas I in 1853 as the ‘sick man of Europe’. The consequent disappearance of the Empire from the political arena meant that the envisaged partition plan had come to a successful end. The decline of Ottoman power in Europe as manifested in the Balkan Wars (1912-13), and later in Anatolia and the Middle East with the Great War (1914-18), had, with this treaty, reached its final and terminal stage in 1920.

With the Treaty of Sevres, the Allies endorsed Armenian claims to Eastern Anatolia in return for the latter’s services to their cause during the First World War. As admitted by Bogos Nubar Pasha, the Armenians not only ‘spied upon, sabotaged, and rose up in arms against Turkish forces, but they also formed regular battalions within the Russian army in the Caucasus, within the British Army in Palestine, and within the French Army in Cilicia’.¹⁸ The Armenians insisted that, in addition to the already existing Armenian Republic, an independent Armenian state had to be established in the six *vilayets* in the eastern part of the Empire. The treaty contained a number of articles related to the Armenians (88-93),¹⁹ one of the most important being article 88, in Part III, under the section of Political Clauses:

17 The official title of the peace treaty signed at Sevres in August 10, 1920, was “The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey. Principal Allied Powers being Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Allied powers being Armenia, Belgium, Greece, the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Czechoslovakia.

18 Sean Mc Meekin, *The Russian Origins of the First World War*. (Cambridge Massachussts: The Belknap Press and Harvard University Press, 2011), Süleyman Beyoğlu, “Sevr ve Lozan’da Ermeni Sorunu”. *Akademik Bakış*, cilt: II, sayı.3, 2008 p. 125. For the full text of the speech see: The Times, January 30, 1919; Stanford Show, “The Ottoman Holocaust” in *Türk Ermeni İlişkilerinin Gelişimi ve 1915 Olayları Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, pp389-391; Robert Farrer Zeidner, *Tricolor over the Taurus, The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922*. (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Utah: 1991)

19 For the articles see: Seha L. Meray-Osman Olcay, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Çöküş Belgeleri*, (Ankara: 1997), s.117; Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku*, s. 559-560; Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin, “Lozan Konferansında Ermeni Meselesi: İtilaf Devletlerinin Diplomatik Manevraları ve Türkiye’nin Karşı Siyaseti”, s. 7

“Turkey in accordance with the action already taken by the Allied Powers, hereby recognises Armenia as a free and independent state.” Article 89 “Turkey and Armenia, as well as other high contracting parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarisation of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier.”

Other clauses concerning the Armenians were articles 144 under part IV, related to abandoned properties:

“The Turkish Government recognises the injustice of the law of 1915 relating to Abandoned Properties (Emval-i-Metroukeh) and the supplementary provisions thereof, and declares them to be null and void, in the past as in the future...The Turkish Government solemnly undertakes to facilitate to the greatest possible extent the return to their homes and re-establishment in their businesses of the Turkish subjects of non-Turkish races who have been forcibly driven from their homes by fear of massacre or any other form of pressure since January 1, 1914. It recognises, that any immovable or movable property of the said Turkish subjects or of the communities to which they belong, which can be recovered, must be restored to them as soon as possible in whatever hands it may be found”.

Articles 226-230 under Part VII, in the Penalties Section, stated:

“The Turkish government recognises the right of the Allied Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Turkey or in the territory of her Allies.”²⁰

In fact, the Treaty of Sevres, with its inflated frontiers for Armenia, proved to be “a document of provocation” and it did, to quote Nassibian, “nothing but infuriate the Turks.”²¹ The ongoing military offensive by the Nationalists in

20 Temuçin F. Ertan, Ayastefanos'tan Lozan'a Siyasal Antlaşmalarda Ermeni Sorunu., *Yeni Türkiye, Ermeni Özel Sayısı*, (Ankara: 2001), Sayı:37, s.253;

21 Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*, p.189; Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1970), (çev. Metin Kıratlı), s. 247, 252.

the Eastern front seemed to be producing satisfactory results, thus altering the previous plans. The Armenians' urgent appeals and Aharonian's inconclusive visits to the British Foreign Office asking for effective help were left unanswered, due to Curzon's view that "no reply need be returned."²² The Armenians were seen 'as pawns in the struggle to contain Bolshevism' and the independence of the Caucasian Republics would 'prevent an alliance between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists and would also serve as a barrier against the Bolshevik advance on Persia, a very key position in British imperial defence.'²³ Moreover, Britain would not have trouble in India and Egypt by pleasing the Muslim population there.

The French were no different from the British. As De Fleuriau, the French ambassador, stated, "no useful discussion was possible while the boundaries were still unsettled and Armenia was an unknown quantity." To quote Nassibian, "The Allies lacked the effective means – the will and the forces – to implement the Treaty of Sevres"²⁴

In fact, the Treaty of Sevres, with its inflated frontiers for Armenia, proved to be "a document of provocation" and it did, to quote Nassibian, "nothing but infuriate the Turks."

Not to mention the fact that, from the Ankara government's point of view, the Sevres Treaty signed by the Istanbul government – but not ratified by the Ottoman Parliament – was legally void, as were the Armenian claims. As early as June 7th, 1920, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted a resolution which held that any kind of agreement signed by the Istanbul government since March 16, 1920 – the date Istanbul came under Allied occupation – was null and void unless approved by parliament. In November 1, 1922 three weeks before the Lausanne Conference convened, this act would be reinforced by a declaration that the office of the Sultan had ceased to exist, that the fundamental law of the Caliph was vested in the house of Osman but that the Caliph must now be elected by the Assembly, and that the Turkish state was the support on which the caliphate rested. It also declared that the Turkish Grand National Assembly, formed on

22 Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*, p. 213.

23 Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*, p. 190.

24 Nassibian p.183. The break-up of the German, Austria Hungarian, Russian and Turkish (Ottoman) Empires, the defeat of the Central powers and the withdrawal of the United States from Europe in 1919 had created for the victorious Allies, and especially for Britain, a vast political vacuum. The Allied and especially the British leaders suddenly found themselves with unprecedented world-wide responsibilities shaping the destinies of millions of people and settling the frontiers of a host of countries. The insistence of Lloyd George on forcing the Armenian question onto the United States of America, despite common knowledge that there was not much hope, reflected political expediency which was irresponsible to no small extent. In June 1920 the American Senate decisively rejected the Armenian mandate. President Wilson however, consented to arbitrate on the boundaries. pp. 187-188.

April 23, 1920 was the sole sovereign body in Turkey, that the people recognised no other government, and that the Istanbul government had ceased to exist as of the 16th of March 1920.

This of course meant that when the British forces withdrew from Transcaucasia during the spring and early summer of 1920, the Armenian Republic found itself isolated, facing the revolutionary expansionism of the Russian Bolsheviks on one side and the pressures of Mustafa Kemal's nationalists on the other. The Armenian government felt that it had no option but to negotiate the peace with the Nationalists, whose precondition was Armenian renunciation of the Treaty of Sevres. The Treaty of Alexandropol (Gümrü) was signed on December 2nd, 1920, but soon after its signing, Armenia was annexed by Soviet Russia and new treaties had to be signed between Turkey and the Soviet Republics, namely the Treaty of Moscow March 16, 1921 (articles 1 and 2) and the Treaty of Kars on October 13, 1921 (articles 2 and 4), which established the new borders between the two states. Even if the Treaty of Sevres and Treaty of Alexandropol had been duly approved and ratified, they would have been invalid in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty of Moscow and Article 1 of the Treaty of Alexandropol.²⁵

As a matter of fact, neither the Italians nor the French wanted the terms of the Treaty of Sevres implemented.²⁶ After the collapse of the Caucasian Republics, a pro-Turkish orientation was considered more profitable as Turkey constituted the only possible barrier in the east against Soviet Russia. The Nationalist victories against the Armenians in the East and against the Greeks in the West made the Treaty of Sevres a dead letter and compelled the Allies to meet the victorious Turks on equal terms in order to conclude a new peace at Lausanne.

25 Gündüz Aktan, "Lozan Barış Antlaşması ve Ermeni Sorunu" in *Ermeni Sorunu: Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler* (derleyen. Ömer Engin Lütem) (Ankara: Ermeni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü)

Article I of the Treaty of Alexandropol runs as follows: "The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Governments of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia consider as null and void the treaties concluded between the governments which have previously exercised sovereign rights over territory actually forming part of the territory of the Contracting Parties and concerning the above-mentioned territories, as well as the treaties concluded with third states concerning the Transcaucasian Republics. It is understood that the Turkish-Russian Treaty signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921 (1337) will be exempted from the terms of this article."

Article 6 of the Treaty of Moscow runs as follows: "The Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics considers any capitulatory regime to be incompatible with the unhindered national development of any country, as well as with the full realisation of its sovereign rights. Thus the government of Soviet Socialist Republics considers null and void any acts or entitlements, bearing any relation to said regime."

26 With the Franklin-Bouillion Treaty (October 20, 192), the French handed over territory in Cilicia to the Nationalists (Kemalists). Italy also backed the Nationalists for prospective economic concessions in Anatolia.

It should not be forgotten that there was also one last conference convened in London where the Armenian Question was raised, prior to the negotiations at Lausanne. The London Conference, which took place between February 21st and March 12th 1921 and which met to deal with the problems resulting from the peace treaties that ended the Great War, once again witnessed a presentation of Armenian demands. On February 26th, the Armenian representatives Bogos Nubar Pasha and Aharonian were heard and both insisted that the Treaty of Sevres be observed in its entirety. Despite all the efforts of the Armenian representatives, Article 9 of the London Conference made the following change in the terms of the Sevres Treaty in regard to Armenian independence:

“The present terms of agreement guaranteed to the Armenians may be amended by recognising the right of the Armenians to a national home near the eastern borders of Asiatic Turkey in accordance with the resolution of the League of Nations for securing the resettlement of the Armenians in a suitable and acceptable place.”

As a result of the Turkish military victories in the west and east of Anatolia, it was not surprising to see that the terms of Article 88 of the Sevres Treaty that called for a ‘free and independent Armenia’ were replaced by a vague and indefinite commitment for a ‘national home’. Under the new circumstances, the need for an Allied front had been recognised by Britain. Believing that it was necessary to restore Allied unity to make the Turks accept the Allies’ terms, Curzon suggested a preliminary meeting between Poincare, Mussolini and himself prior to the Lausanne Peace Conference in order to formulate a concerted policy.²⁷ The Paris Ministerial Conference of 1922 also witnessed the discussion of the Armenian position, which was later published in an official report:

“The situation of the Armenians deserves special care on account of the terrible sufferings they have undergone and also because of their support for the Allied Powers during the War. Consequently we request the League of Nations that, in addition to the measures considered for the protection of minorities, every effort should be made to help the Armenians to establish a national home, thus putting an end to their sufferings.”

This was a clear indication that the Lausanne Peace Conference would bear witness to the Armenian Question being brought back to the fore to be used as a bargaining chip to further the Great Power’s interests.

27 Sevtap Demirci, *Strategies and Struggles: British Rhetoric and Turkish Response: The Lausanne Conference 1922- 1923*. (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2005), p.51.

The Final Settlement: Lausanne

The Lausanne Peace Conference convened on November 20, 1922, provided a platform whereby age-old accounts could be settled. Turkey went to Lausanne to secure its prime objective, namely the *National Pact*, which came to represent the Nationalists' demands and formed the basis of all negotiations with the Allies. On two of these national goals, the Nationalists were resolute, to the point of being ready to go to war. These two points were of course the capitulations and the possible establishment of an Armenian state within the national borders of Turkey. If the need arose, Ismet Pasha, Foreign Minister and head of the Turkish delegation, had full authorisation to break off the negotiations without consulting Ankara since the Nationalists on many occasions publicly proclaimed that they would only make peace on the basis of the *National Pact*, a pact that stood for the complete political, economic, financial and juridical independence of Turkey. The status of the minorities was also determined in the National Pact. Mustafa Kemal stated, "the rights of the minorities will be guaranteed by us within the framework of the principles contained in the treaties made by the victor states, some of their allies and their enemies...provided that the Muslims in the neighbouring countries will enjoy the same rights."²⁸

The Armenian National Delegation and the delegation of the Armenian Republic jointly participated in the Conference to make their voice heard. The Armenian situation, however, was also discussed in the Paris meeting of the British, French and Italian foreign ministers in March of 1922. The Armenians' productive attempts to draw the attention of the foreign ministers and the secretary of the League of Nations to the role they played in the First World War and the stipulations in the Treaty of Sevres proved successful:

"The situation of the Armenians deserves special care on account of the terrible disasters they have undergone and also because of their support for the Allied Powers during the War. Consequently, we request the League of Nations that, in addition to the measures considered for the protection of minorities, every effort should be made to help the Armenians to establish a national homeland, thus putting an end to their suffering."

In November of 1922, the united Armenian Delegation submitted a

28 İlhan Akın, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1983), p.174; Erdal İltter, "Ermeni İstekleri Karşısında Millî Teşekküllerin Tutumu (1919-1922)." *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*. 27-28, (May-November, 2001), pp. 299-319.

memorandum²⁹ to the Conference which highlighted their support for the Allies in the Great War, the promises made them by the Great Powers, their sufferings and, finally, their demand for a wider Armenian Republic which encompassed territory from eastern Anatolia with an outlet to the sea along with the region of Cilicia. Moreover, the establishment of a national home for the Armenians would be subject to the arbitration of President Wilson, with its borders determined by his office. Shortly after the presentation of the memorandum, the members of the Delegation (Aharonian, Khatisian and Noradunghian) set up a bureau with the purpose of establishing contact with the Allies and enlisting their support for the Armenian case.

Before the official negotiations on the minority questions had begun, an exchange of telegrams took place between Ismet Pasha and Prime Minister Rauf Bey concerning the strategy that should be followed on the Armenian issue. The main issue in these telegrams was the idea of a national home and the exchange of Armenian and Turkish populations.³⁰ Ismet Pasha also expressed his concern about the work of American missionaries as well as various Armenian groups.

The official negotiations on the minority issues started on 12 December, 1922. Before the conference, Curzon brought up the question of an Armenian national home. In Curzon's view it was 'natural for Armenians to long to live in their own lands', implying eastern Anatolia. Therefore "a national home" for Armenians was imperative.³¹ He concluded his speech by suggesting the formation of a sub-committee that would make a thorough study of the question. The French and Italian representatives, Barrere and Garroni respectively, spoke along the same lines, to which Ismet Pasha responded with a long speech placing his argument in a historical perspective. He emphasized that, like the other minority communities in the Empire, the Armenians had lived in peace, security and prosperity within the *millet* system together with their Turkish neighbours, but that these good relations were destroyed because of the interference of states that had imperialistic designs on the Middle East. He also stated that the Armenians had rebelled against the Sublime Porte

29 Gaffar Çakmaklı Mehdiyev, "Ermenice Basında Lozan Barış Antlaşmasının İptali Talepleri ve Yeni Ermeni İddiaları". (Ankara: 90. Yılında Lozan ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Uluslararası Sempozyumu, 13-15 Kasım, 2013), (Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu and Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü)

30 Bilal Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları I*, (Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey), November 25, 1922, no.27, pp128-129; (Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey) November 26, 1922, no.31, pp. 130-131; Ismet Pasha to Rauf Bey) December 6, 1922, no. 86, p.172 ; (Hüseyin Rauf to İsmet Pasha) December 7, 1922, no.90, p.174; (Hüseyin Rauf to Ismet Pasha) December 7, 1922, no.93, p.17.

31 Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar-Belgeler, Birinci Takım, I/I, s.180-184; Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin, *Lozan Konferansında Ermeni Meselesi*, p. 9.

because of the incitements of foreigners, subjected the Muslim people to massacres, and that this is why Istanbul was forced to defend itself against such actions. He went on to say that Armenians who wanted to stay in Turkey could live like brothers with the Turkish citizens who had favourable feelings for them and who were willing to forget the past.³² Furthermore, Turkey had already concluded treaties and established good neighbourly relations in accordance with international law and had established international political practices with the existing independent Armenia (the Yerevan Soviet Republic). To hold that another Armenia existed was contrary to the treaties concluded. Curzon, after having sat through Ismet Pasha's three hour speech, soon became bored and sarcastically commented that Ismet Pasha in the past had been known as a general and a diplomat, whereas he was now acting like a history professor.³³ In order to alienate Ismet Pasha and to bring him into line with his argument, Curzon made every effort to include the Americans – who participated in the conference as observers – in the debate. On December 12, Lord Curzon threatened an early rupture of the gathering over the issue of the national home, but two days later seemed placated by Turkey's pledge to join the League of Nations. His later pleas for a national home were obviously mellowed by his enthusiasm for Ankara's blossoming friendship with the West. When the proposed minorities section of the treaty was drafted on December 21, neither the Armenians nor the national home were mentioned. Officially, the State Department included the national home among its seven primary interests at Lausanne, but on November 22, 1922, Grew and Child were already prepared to declare the plan hopeless.

In addition to the French, the Italians and the Americans, other Allies such as the Serbians (Spalaikovitch) and the Greeks (Venizelos) spoke in favour of Armenian claims. Ismet Pasha's reaction to Venizelos's remarks supportive of the Armenian case was noteworthy:

“Mr. Venizelos apparently lost sight of the fact that the Greek occupation of Asia Minor had been a new cause of suffering and misfortune for the poor Armenians. That unhappy people had been forcibly conscripted and incorporated into ranks of the Greek army... The Armenians were sent to the front and forced to fire on the Turks... After the rout, endless devastation was done and the Greek authorities started falsehood propaganda with a view putting the blame for these crimes on the Armenians. It was therefore clear that the last government in the world

32 Mim Kemal Öke, *The Armenian Question*, p. 204.

33 M. Cemil Bilsel, *Lozan II*, (Istanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1933)p. 274; Durdu Mehmet Burak, “Lozan'da Ermeni Meselesi Tartışmaları” ATAM DERGİSİ SAYI 62.

which should dare to express publicly its pity for the fate of the Armenians was the very government which had been the direct cause of their misfortunes.”

The debate was to continue the next day, on December 13, 1922 at the meeting during which minority issues were discussed. The session turned out to be a war of words between Ismet Pasha and Curzon, who vigorously defended the Armenian case by citing statistics regarding the Armenian population in Turkey, asking the reason behind the reduction in these figures and also whether it was impossible to find a corner for the Armenians in a country as large as Turkey.³⁴ On December 14, after having contested the numbers given by Curzon, Ismet Pasha stated that there were other powers whose possession covered an area incomparably greater than that of Turkey. Moreover the regions quite recently detached from Turkey were enormous and the territory that was left to Turkey was inhabited by a Turkish majority. Each part of the leftover territory formed an indivisible whole.³⁵ It was a war of attrition between the two that made the atmosphere tense and the discussions more contentious than ever. Curzon attacked Ismet Pasha by saying that, “Great Britain did not fear the League of Nations because her hands were clean”, to which the Pasha replied that there had never been any question of Turkey fearing the League of Nations either and that hands of the Turks, now at work in their own country, which had been devastated by foreign invasion, were particularly clean. “Those hands never violated, invaded, or devastated any foreign country and could without fear sustain comparison with any other hands.”³⁶

The pressure on Ismet Pasha increased with each passing day. The Americans and a committee led by a Swiss professor also placed their support behind the British arguments in favour of a national home for Armenians. In a private conversation with the professor, Ismet Pasha remarked:

“You propose to dismember my country. We, after fighting for four years throughout the First World War in order to prevent the dismemberment of Turkey, struggled for another four years to keep it intact. Your organisation’s efforts are nothing compared to the states we defeated and the difficulties we overcome.”³⁷

34 For Ismet Pasha’s speech see: Bkz. *Lozan Baris Konferansı Tutanaklar-Belgeler*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi) (çev. Seha L. Meray) Takım, I/I, s.209-212;

35 *Lozan Baris Konferansı, Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, Birinci Takım, (1970) I/I, pp.221-222.

36 Command Papers (Cmd.) 1814, XXVI, p.219

37 İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar*, (Bilgi Yayınevi), p.82.

Curzon knew that it would be impossible to induce the Turks to accept any form of servitude or supervision in regard to the Armenians or any other Christian and Muslim minorities. He was well aware of Ismet Pasha's difficulties in regard to the rigidity of his instructions and would try to exploit it to the very end. The Turkish telegrams that they intercepted – the Eastern line used by the Turks was under British control – contributed a great deal to the British assessment of the Turkish position during the negotiations. The British were well aware that the Turks would not budge on two points: the capitulations and the possible establishment of an Armenian state. Curzon knew all too well that Ismet Pasha had full authorisation to break off negotiations without consulting Ankara. The Nationalists had, after all, announced on many occasions that they would only make peace on the basis of the earlier explained National Pact.

British archival documents prove that the question of the minorities was not of prime interest to Britain but constituted a useful tool for Curzon in his attempts to bring the Turks into line when their attitude on the issue of Mosul proved too intransigent. Other than using it as a bargaining chip, he had no intention of carrying the demand for a territorial home through to its concrete conclusion.

British archival documents prove that the question of the minorities was not of prime interest to Britain but constituted a useful tool for Curzon in his attempts to bring the Turks into line when their attitude on the issue of Mosul proved too intransigent. Other than using it as a bargaining chip, he had no intention of carrying the demand for a territorial home through to its concrete conclusion. It was, to quote Ryan, 'a 'put up' merely for window dressing'.³⁸ Ismet Pasha was assured that the conference would not break up over the Armenian question, and the British delegate stressed the fact that Turkey's

worries were unfounded. "Over the years" he said, "we committed ourselves by making so many promises, therefore it was natural that we should protest vigorously"³⁹ The Americans were aware of the British approach on the Armenian national home. "I have known all along," wrote Child in his memoirs, "(that) he plainly intends to abandon the idea."⁴⁰

Despite having been aware of the fact that any attempt to press on the Turks the question of assigning a tract of territory in Turkey for a national home for the Armenians was bound to fail, the Allies insisted that the issue should be taken up and debated in the subcommittee on the Minorities. The Turkish

38 Sevtap Demirci, *The Struggles and Strategies..* p.97.

39 İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar*, p.85.

40 Child R. Washburn, *A Diplomat Looks at Europe.* (NewYork: Duffield and Co. 1925), p. 117.

position was that the Armenians who desired to remain in Turkey would be able to live peacefully with their Turkish compatriots. Additionally, the claims made by the Armenians were rejected by the Turkish delegation and they exposed the invalidity of the arguments made for establishing a sovereign state on Turkish soil that had previously never existed. Heated discussions took place on the 23rd and 24th of December, 1922, and Turkey's determination to reject any compromise with regard to the Armenian national home was finally vindicated by Rıza Nur's behaviour during the course of the discussions held by the sub-commission.⁴¹ On January 6, 1923, the Turkish plenipotentiary left the meeting room, refusing to listen to Armenian claims that were raised with the permission of the Allies. He also criticised the policies of the Allies in Egypt, Tunisia, India, Morocco and even Ireland and stated that if these countries were given back their freedom and land seized by the Great Powers, Turkey would immediately do the same for the Armenians.⁴² The British were greatly disturbed and described it as "the most insolent scene"⁴³

The very last meeting of the sub-commission on the Armenian Question took place on January 9, 1922, when a report related to amnesty, the protection of minorities and the exemption of minorities from military service were discussed. The stubbornly resolute attitude of the Turkish delegation as well as the fact that the question of the minorities was not the primary interest of the Allies determined the fate of the issue. The Allies chose to drop the whole issue.⁴⁴ Before leaving Lausanne just after the suspension of the Conference in February 1923, the Armenian delegation submitted a declaration to the Great Powers in which they openly admitted that the "the Armenian cause had been abandoned by the Entente Powers." As Kajaznuni rightly put it, "the Treaty of

41 *Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, Birinci Takım, I/II, s.156-157; Bilal Şimşir, *Lozan Telgrafları I*, (İsmet Pasha to Rauf Bey) December 17, 1922, no.165, s.236; İsmet Pasha to Rauf Bey) December 24, 1922, no.204, s.272.

42 Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatıratım*. (İstanbul: Altındağ Yayınevi, 1968), Cilt III p. 1060-1064.

43 FO800/240 Ryan Papers, (Rumbold to Curzon) January 8, 1923; *Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar, Belgeler, Birinci Takım, I/II*, s.278-279; Joseph C Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years 1904-1945*. (London: Hammond and Co. 1953), s.73; Bilal Simsir, *Lozan Telgrafları I*, (İsmet Pasha to Rauf Bey) January 7, 1923, no. 296, s.345-346;

44 *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar-Belgeler*, Birinci Takım, I/I, s.304, 307; Bkz. Simsir, *a.g.e.*, s.360; For M. Montagna's report to Curzon on 7 January 1923, see: *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar-Belgeler*, Birinci Takım, I/I, s.309-314.

The Allied front had already been broken by the Franklin-Bouillon agreement signed between the Kemalists and the French in 1921, well before the Lausanne Conference started as well as by the treaty of friendship signed with the Italians in the same year. As the negotiations progressed Britain, after the awareness of the diverging attitude of its allies, possible unrest in its own Empire (Indian Muslims), the sovietisation of the Caucasus, the determination of the Turkish delegation and last but not the least the strong possibility of securing the oil-rich Mosul vilayet of which was a vital part of the National Pact, dropped the Armenian claims for a national home.

Sevres had dazzled the eyes of all of us, restricted our power to think, and clouded our consciousness of reality.”⁴⁵

In the second half of the conference, which lasted from the 23rd of April to the 24th of July 1923, the question was almost not even addressed since the Allies could not afford to break up the conference over an issue that was not a direct threat to their interests. The united Armenian delegation was quick to realise that the Allies had not kept their promise in providing a national home for the Armenians. Even the State Department began to explore avenues of rapprochement with Turkey. “Non-interference” was accepted as the best policy toward the Armenian problem and cleared the way for the signing of a Turco-American pact on August 6.

Conclusion

The First World War left the Ottoman Empire in ruins. Soon after the signature of the humiliating Mudros Armistice October 30, 1918 a peace treaty drafted by the Allies was imposed upon the defeated Empire. The Treaty of Sevres, August 10, 1920 envisaged an independent Armenian state within the eastern provinces of the Empire providing it with wide boundaries at the expense of Turkey. Inflated frontiers as well as an establishment of an independent Armenian state were contrary to the National Pact, which came to represent the Nationalists’ desiderata. The Pact clearly expressed that under no circumstances an independent Armenian state was acceptable. In other words, the Treaty of Sevres, promising so much, became, in Kajaznuni’s word, “a kind of blue bird”, “intangible and inaccessible”.⁴⁶

Furthermore, from the Nationalists’ point of view, the Treaty of Sevres was a dead document as in March of 1920, they had already declared the Istanbul government invalid and illegitimate, a stand which consequently rendered any agreement signed by the Sultan’s government – thus including the Treaty of Sevres – as null and void from the Kemalists’ perspective. Additionally, a few months before the Treaty of Sevres was signed, the Assembly was shut down by the Sultan, which meant the Treaty was never formally approved and ratified by the Assembly. Furthermore, according to the 7th article of as per the changes made on the 8th of August 1909 to the *Kanuni-Esasi*, any peace treaties that were signed required the signaturate of the Assembly. Thus, in strictly legal terms, the treaty could not be considered valid.

Having determined the boundaries of the Armenian state with the Treaty of

45 Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*, p.181

46 Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question*, p. 223

Sevres in 1920, the Allies moved on to the London Conference of 1921. However, in the face of a sequence of Turkish military victories, as well as the collapse of the Caucasian Republics, meant the Allies were forced to revise the policies at the conference and they therefore decided to press for a “national home” for the Armenians in the eastern provinces of Turkey rather than a full-blown independent Armenian state. As Turkey was the only means of hindering the advance of Bolshevism in the east and south, the worst was yet to come for the Armenians. At their Paris meeting in 1922, the Allies stated that particular attention should be paid to the situation of the Armenians, for whose contribution to the war effort the Allies owed a debt of gratitude. The League of Nations would ensure this for the Armenians.

Lausanne was the final phase in the Allies’ policy shift. The success of the Turkish National Struggle had averted the fulfilment of the Mudros Armistice and was replaced by a new agreement in October of 1922. The Mudania Armistice which ended the war between the Turks and the Greeks paved the way for new peace negotiations at Lausanne. The Allied representatives and their so called “little ally”, the Armenians, aimed for a peace agreement on the basis of the Mudros accords and the succeeding Treaty of Sevres, whereas the Turkish delegation hoped to finalise a deal on the basis of the Mudania agreement and the articles and aspirations of the National Pact.

The handling of the Armenian Question in the years between Sevres and Lausanne took on a different course, in that it would now fall within the wider issue of the protection of minorities instead of being treated as an issue in isolation. The prior classification of minorities based on religious grounds would change in the period of transition from Empire to Republic, as national and ethnic classifications came under renewed consideration. The laws protecting citizens in Lausanne were to overrule prior arrangements, whereby citizens were protected by their respective states’ laws. One universal form of protection, regardless of these prior distinctions, was to be offered to Non-Muslim Turks. The extent of protection afforded to this social group, in addition to freedoms to practice their own cultural and religious customs and practices, would be equal to those of the Muslim Turkish population.

Although the Conference witnessed heated discussions, when the Lausanne Treaty was finally signed, the text did not contain any reference whatsoever to an Armenian National Home, let alone a state;⁴⁷ it merely included provisions that protected non-Muslim minorities, with a special focus on property rights, religious freedom and practices and communal education.

47 Mim Kemal Öke “The Responses of Turkish Armenians to the ‘Armenian Question’, 1919-1926”, in *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* 1912-26. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1984), p.71.

In the Lausanne Treaty, non-Muslim minorities were regularly separated from the rest of the Muslim-majority population, whereas no such separation was found in the Sèvres Treaty, in which all minorities possessed the same rights, whether they be Christian or Muslim⁴⁸. In the Lausanne Treaty, such rights were reserved only for non-Muslim minorities – the vast majority of whom had already been eliminated.⁴⁹The rights for the non-Muslim minorities in the Lausanne Treaty were codified under a section headed ‘Protection of Minorities’, covering articles 37 to 44. Embedded within the latter – article 44 – was the caveat that declared the protection of minorities an international obligation. Therefore, the claims that the Armenian State in eastern Anatolia were still legally in force were misguided if not/or false and did not take into account the fact that the Treaty of Lausanne has superseded and replaced that of Sevres.

To sum up, politically the Armenian case was forsaken by the Allies, who used the issue merely as “window dressing”. Faced with both a lack of genuine support from the Allies and a determined Turkish delegation, the Armenians seemed doomed to leave Lausanne empty-handed. To quote Churchill, “in the Treaty of Lausanne, history will search in vain for the word ‘Armenia’.”⁵⁰ Kachaznuni, similarly, wrote, “Turkish Armenia does not exist anymore; neither as a government nor as a homeland, nor even as an international issue. The cause was killed and buried at Lausanne”.⁵¹ In Aharonians words, the Treaty of Lausanne had turned into “a treaty of betrayal” for the Armenians, whilst in the words of Bogos Nubar Pasha, “It reduced the Armenian Question to a matter of minority rights”⁵² Lloyd George’s comment on the issue, however, would seem to most succinctly express the final playing out of events: “Sevres to Mudania was a retreat. Mudania to Lausanne was a rout”. In short, the Lausanne Peace Conference provided a platform on which the Armenian Question, with no provisions being made in the Treaty, came to an end.

48 As defined in article 145 and article 147 of Sèvres, “all minorities as Turkish nationals – irrespective of race, religion or language – possess the right to establish charitable, religious and social institutions, schools for primary, secondary and higher instruction, with the right to use their own languages”

49 In this respect, article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty states: “Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instructions and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religions freely therein”. Article 42 of Lausanne states: “As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language.”

50 Winston S. Churchill, *The Aftermath 1918-1928*. (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1929), vol. V, p.408

51 Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*. Istanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988), p. 1002.

52 *Bogos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question 1915-1918: Documents*. (Watham: Mayreni Publishing, 1996) (edt. and translated by Vtche Ghazarian), p.xxxiii

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akgül, Suat. “Paris Konferansından Sevr’e Türkiye’nin Paylaşılması Meselesi”. Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Journal no.23.
- Akgün, Seçil Karal. “General Harbord’un Anadolu Gezisi ve (Ermeni Meselesi’ne Dair) Raporu.” in *Kurtuluş Savaşı Başlangıcında Türk- Ermeni İlişkilerinde ABD’nin Rolü*. İstanbul 1981, s. 133-158; Fahir Armaoğlu, “Amerika Sevr Antlaşması ve Ermenistan Sınırları”., *Belleten*, cilt: LXI, Ankara: 1997.
- Akgün, Seçil Karal. “Kurtuluş Savaşı Başlangıcında Türk Ermeni ilişkilerinde ABD’nin Rolü.”, in *Tarih boyunca Türklerin Ermeni Toplumu İle İlişkileri*, Ankara: 1985.
- Akın, İlhan. *Türk Devrim Tarihi*. İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1983.
- Aktan, Gündüz “Lozan Barış Antlaşması ve Ermeni Sorunu” in *Ermeni Sorunu: Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler* (derleyen. Ömer Engin Lütem) Ankara: Ermeni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü.
- Aya, Şükrü Server. *Preposterous Paradoxes of Ambassador Morgenthau: A Factual Story about Politics, Propaganda and Distortions*. Belfast: Athol Books, 2013.
- Baysan, Galip, “Sevr’de Ermeni Meselesi Nasıl Sonuçlandı?” in *Antalya Bugün* (online newspaper, 8, August, 2014);
- Beyoğlu, Süleyman. “Sevr ve Lozan’da Ermeni Sorunu”. *Akademik Bakış*, cilt: II, sayı.3, 2008
- Bilgin, M. S., “Lozan Konferansında Ermeni Meselesi: İtilaf Devletlerinin Diplomatik Manevraları ve Türkiye’nin Karşı Siyaseti” *Belleten*, LXIX, 254, (2005)
- Bilsel, M. Cemil. *Lozan II*, İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1933.
- Bogos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question 1915-1918: Documents*. (Watham: Mayreni Publishing , 1996) (edt. and translated by Vtche Ghazarian)
- Burak, Durdu Mehmet. “Lozan’da Ermeni Meselesi Tartışmaları” *ATAM Dergisi* No: 62.

Churchill, Winston S. *The Aftermath 1918-1928*. London: Thornton Butterworth, 1929, vol. V.

Demirci, Sevtap. *Strategies and Struggles: British Rhetoric and Turkish Response: The Lausanne Conference 1922- 1923*. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2005.

Erdal İlter, “Ermeni İstekleri Karşısında Millî Teşekküllerin Tutumu (1919-1922).” *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*. 27-28, (May-November, 2001).

Ertan, Temuçin F. “Ayastefanos’tan Lozan’a Siyasal Antlaşmalarda Ermeni Sorunu” *Yeni Türkiye, Ermeni Özel Sayısı*, Ankara: 2001, Sayı:37.

Ferudun Ata, “Divan-ı Harbi Örfi Mahkemesinde yapılan Tehcir Yargılamaları, Ermeni Soykırımı İddialarına bir Delil Olabilir mi?” in *Türk Ermeni İlişkilerinin Gelişimi ve 1915 Olayları Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, Ankara: Gurup Matbaacılık, 2006. (yay. Haz. Hale Şıvgın)

Fisher, John. *Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East 1916-1919*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999.

Gorder, A. Christian Van “Armenian Christians and Turkish Muslims: Atrocity, Denial and Identity.” *Christianity and Human Rights Conference*, (November 12-13, 2004), Samford University, Birmingham AL.

Grew, Joseph C. *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years 1904-1945*. London: Hammond and Co. 1953.

Harbord, Major General James G. *Conditions in the Near East: Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920.

İnönü, İsmet. *Hatıralar*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987.

Lewis, Bernard *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1970, çev. Metin Kıratlı.

Lippe, John W. Vander “The Other” Treaty of Lausanne: The American Public and Official Debate on Turkish-American Relations” in *The Turkish Yearbook*, 1993 Vol. XXIII.

- Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar-Belgeler*, Birinci Takım, I/I , (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi) (çev. Seha L. Meray)
- McCarthy, Justin. *'The Report of Niles and Sutherland'*, XI. Turk Tarih Kongresi (1990).
- McMeekin, Sean. *The Russian Origins of the First World War*. Cambridge Massachussts: The Belknap Press and Harvard University Press, 2011.
- Mehdiyev, Gaffar Çakmaklı “Ermenice Basında Lozan Barış Antlaşmasının İptali Talepleri ve Yeni Ermeni İddiaları”. (*Ankara: 90. Yılında Lozan ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, 13-15 Kasım, 2013), (Atatürk Kültür Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu and Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü)
- Meray, Seha L. and Osman Olcay. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Çöküş Belgeleri*, Ankara: 1997.
- Nassibian, Akaby *Britain and the Armenian Question 1915-1923*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1984.
- Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasî Tarih Metinleri: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları*. Cilt I, Ankara: 1953.
- Nur, Rıza, *Hayat ve Hatıratım*. Cilt III, İstanbul: Altındağ Yayınevi, 1968.
- Öke, Mim Kemal. “The Responses of Turkish Armenians to the ‘Armenian Question’, 1919-1926”, in *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. 1912-26. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1984.
- Öke, Mim Kemal. *The Armenian Question*. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2001.
- Ryan Papers, FO800/240
- Saral, Ahmet Hulki *Ermeni Meselesi*, (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basımevi, 1970).
- Shaw, Stanford J. “The Ottoman Holocaust” in *Türk Ermeni İlişkilerinin Gelişimi ve 1915 Olayları Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, (yay. haz. Hale Şıvgın), Ankara: Gurup Matbaacılık, 2006.

Şimşir, Bilal N. “Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question” in *Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926)*, İstanbul: Bogazici University Publications, 1984.

Şimşir, Bilal N. “Malta Sürgünleri ve Ermeni İddiaları” in *Türk Ermeni İlişkilerinin Gelişimi ve 1915 Olayları Uluslararası Sempozyumu*. (yay. haz. Hale Şıvgın), Ankara: Gurup Matbaacılık, 2006.

Şimşir, Bilal N. *Lozan Telgrafları I, 1922-23*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1990.

Tacar, Pulat and Maxime Gauin; “State Identity, Continuity, and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide: A Reply to Vahagn Avedian” *The European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 23 no. 3, (2012).

Toksoy, Nurcan. *Revanda Son Günler: Türk Yönetiminden Ermeni Yönetimine*. Ankara: Orion Yayınevi, 2007.

Ural, Selçuk. *Mondoros Mütarekesi ve Doğu Vilayetleri*. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2008.

Uras, Esat. *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*. İstanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988.

Washburn, Child R. *A Diplomat Looks at Europe*. NewYork: Duffield and Co. 1925.

Zeidner, Robert Farrer, *Tricolor over the Taurus, The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Utah: 1991.

THE ARMENIAN FORCED RELOCATION: PUTTING AN END TO MISLEADING SIMPLIFICATIONS

(ERMENİ ZORUNLU GÖÇÜ:
ALDATICI BASİTLEŞTİRMELERE SON VERMEK)

Maxime GAUIN

Specialist at the Center for Eurasian Studies

Abstract: *This paper studies three aspects of the Turkish-Armenian conflict. First of all, contrary to what the main Armenian and pro-Armenian affirm, there were hundreds of thousands, likely 500,000 Armenians, who were exempted of relocation, particularly in Istanbul, Western and Central Anatolia as well as in the Arab provinces. Then, the policy of the Ottoman government vis-à-vis the Armenian exiles was a protective ones, even if this protection failed in a considerable number of cases. The orders from Istanbul are clear. In particular, it is false to assert that the Ottoman government did not provide food and opposed the foreign relief. Such accusations are based on manipulation of evidence and neglect Ottoman as well as American and German sources. The relocation of 1915-16 is also misrepresented if described as the only reason for the losses of the Ottoman Armenian community between 1914 and 1922. In fact, the Russian relocation and the flow of refugees have to be considered, as well as the direct responsibilities of the Armenian extremists in the emigration of Armenians from Cilicia during the French withdrawal and the Greek scorched earth policy in 1922, which included the forced exile of the Christians from Western Anatolia.*

Keywords: *Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Committee of Union and Progress, Greece, Social Democratic Hunchakian Party, Ottoman Empire, racism, Russia, Turkish War of Independence.*

Öz: *Bu makale Türk-Ermeni ihtilafının üç konusunu incelemektedir. İlk olarak, Ermeniler ve Ermeni yanlılarının iddia ettiği aksine, özellikle İstanbul, Batı ve Orta Anadolu ve ayrıca Arap vilayetlerinde, sayıları yaklaşık olarak 500.000'i bulan çok sayıda Ermeni sevk ve iskândan muaf tutulmuşlardır. Ayrıca, Osmanlı hükümetinin Ermeni sürgünlere yönelik politikası, çok sayıda vakada bu politika başarısız olmuş olsa dahi, koruyucu bir politikadır. İstanbul'dan gelen emirler çok açıktır. Özellikle,*

Osmanlı hükümetinin yiyecek sağlamadığı ve yabancı yardımlarını engellediği gibi suçlamalar kesinlikle asılsızdır. Bu tür suçlamalar tahrif edilmiş kanıtlara dayandırılmaktadır ve Osmanlı olduğu kadar Amerikan ve Alman kaynaklarının da göz ardı edilmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Eğer 1915-1916 sevk ve iskânı, Osmanlı Ermenilerinin 1914-1922 yılları arasında yaşadığı kayıpların asıl sebebi olarak sunuluyorsa bu gerçeğe aykırıdır. Aslında, Rusların gerçekleştirdiği sevk ve mülteci akını olduğu kadar Ermeni radikal gruplarının Fransızların çekilmesi sırasında Kilikya Ermenilerinin göç ettirilmesindeki sorumluluğu ve Rumların 1922'deki yakma politikası ile Batı Anadolu'daki Hristiyanların zorla göç ettirilmesi de göz önüne alınmalıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Ermeni Devrimci Federasyonu, İttihat ve Terakki Partisi, Yunanistan, Hınçak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, ırkçılık, Rusya, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı.*

The Armenian question in general and the issue of the 1915-16 relocations led to countless misinterpretations, and even to use of certified forgeries. Prof. Xavier de Planhol observed that this issue is subject of an “immense literature, which contains frequently considerable historical distortions, which takes away any value to it.”¹ Worse, the lowest part of this literature “generated an authentic anti-Turkish racism.”² It also inspired Armenian terrorism from 1973 to 1997 and more recently Anders Breivik.³ The goal of this paper is not to discuss the background of the relocations, namely the decades-long fight of the Armenian nationalist organizations against the Ottoman state,⁴ or the security reasons at the origin of the decision taken by the Committee Union and Progress (CUP) cabinet in May 1915.⁵ It is instead to study three important topics, less discussed until now than the two previous ones: namely, the exemptions of relocation, the conditions of the relocated Armenians and the real effect of the exile to the Armenian population of Anatolia.

Indeed, the insufficient emphasis on these aspects led to regrettable distortions and errors. Not surprisingly, highly partisan authors such as Taner Akçam, Peter Balakian, Vahakn N. Dadrian and Yves Ternon are at the forefront for this oversimplification of history. However, some interesting historians who actually contributed to the advancement of our knowledge on the framework of 1915, the security concerns, the war crimes of the Armenian volunteers fighting in the Russian army and, more generally, the Russian policy vis-à-vis

1 Xavier de Planhol, *Minorités en Islam*, Paris : Flammarion, 1997, n. 144, p. 450.

2 Gilles Veinstein, “Trois questions sur un massacre”, *L’Histoire*, April 1995, p. 41. Also see Bernard Lewis, *Notes on a Century. Reflections of a Middle East Historian*, London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012, p. 290 ; Vincent Monteil, *Les Musulmans soviétiques*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1982, p. 215; and Turgut Tuncel, *Armenian Diaspora: Diaspora, State and the Imagination of the Republic of Armenia*, Ankara: Terazi Publications, 2014, pp. 42-45.

3 See the references to Peter Balakian in the manifesto of Anders Breivik: <https://publicintelligence.net/anders-behring-breiviks-complete-manifesto-2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence/> I searched if Mr. Balakian made any comment on the reference to his book by Anders Breivik, but I found nothing.

4 William Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951; Justin McCarthy, Cemalettin Taşkıran and Ömer Turan, *Sasun: The History of an 1890s Armenian Revolt*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2014; Garabet Mouldjian, “Rebels With a Cause — Armenian-Macedonian Relations and their Bulgarian Connection, 1895-1913,” in Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi (ed.), *War and Nationalism. The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, and their Sociopolitical Implications*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013, pp. 131-175; Jeremy Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878-1896*, London-Portland: Frank Cass, 1993.

5 Edward J. Erickson, *Ottomans and Armenians. A Study in Counter-Insurgency*, New York-London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013 (more particularly pp. 97-212); Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernity. A History, 1789-2007*, New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2010, pp. 209-211; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 356; Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005, pp. 90-109; Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taşkıran and Ömer Turan, *The Armenian Rebellion at Van*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006; Stanford Jay Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I*, Ankara: TTK, volume II, 2008, pp. 859-965 and 979-991.

the Armenians seem like afraid of their own courage and their description of the course of the relocation is far from showing the same level of accuracy than their analysis of the context. The two most obvious examples in this regard are Michael A. Reynolds and Sean McMeekin.

The Armenians exempted of relocation

Istanbul and Izmir

The place of Armenians in the Ottoman administration *during* the First World War is an issue ignored by the supporters of the “Armenian genocide” label and not sufficiently stressed by most of the scholars who criticize it. Yücel Güçlü recalled us the cases of Hrant Abro, legal advisor of the Ottoman ministry of Foreign Affairs during the whole war, member of the Ottoman delegation to negotiate peace with Bolshevik Russia in 1918; and Bedros Hallaçyan, minister from 1909 to 1912, member of the central committee of the CUP from 1913 to 1915, representative of the Ottoman Empire at The Hague from 1915 to 1916 and eventually chairman of the commission in charge to rewrite the Ottoman code of commerce.⁶ Feroz Ahmad rediscovered Artin Boşgezenyan, CUP deputy of Aleppo from 1908 to 1918, still influential in the party in 1918.⁷ More regrettably, the only monograph on Berç Keresteciyan, deputy general manager (until 1914) and general manager (1914-1927) of the Ottoman Bank, who finished his public life as a deputy of Afyon at the Turkish national assembly (1935-1946), is an unpublished master thesis.⁸

Beyond such individual cases, it is particularly important to notice that most of the Armenians of Istanbul and Izmir were not relocated.⁹ However, not afraid to deny well-established facts with non-scholarly arguments and a non-scholarly wording, Taner Akçam pretends that the absence of relocation from Istanbul and Izmir is a “denialist argument,” nothing less.¹⁰ It could be sufficient to notice that, in this regard, Mr. Akçam is more “nationalist Armenian” than U.S. ambassador (1913-1916) Henry Morgenthau and his

6 Yücel Güçlü, *The Holocaust and the Armenian Case in Comparative Perspective*, Lanham-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth: University Press of America, 2012, pp. 79-84 and 86.

7 Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2014, p. 93.

8 Semi Ertan, *An Armenian at the Turkish Parliament in the Early Republican Period: Berç Türker Keresteciyan*, master thesis, Sabancı University, <http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2007/03/1473-armenian-at-parliament-in-early.html>

9 Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks...*, pp. 81 and 85; Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, pp. 203-205.

10 Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity*, Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012, pp. 399-410.

ghostwriters (his secretary, Hagop S. Andonian, his dragoman Arshag Schmavonian and a journalist, Burton J. Hendrick). Indeed, in the book signed by Morgenthau but in fact largely written by Hendricks, Andonian and Schmavonian, it is explained that “Of the larger cities, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo were spared [...]”¹¹ Correspondingly, in his diary, there is no trace of any significant “deportation” of Armenians from any of these three cities.¹² Regardless, we shall see what sources are used by Taner Akçam to support his wrong assertion.

He quotes the Memoirs of Armenian patriarchate in Istanbul. Not only this clergyman was a Turkophobe, who has lost his position in 1922 as a result of the Kemalist victory, but what he writes in his Memoirs, is contradicted by the estimations of the Armenian Delegation to the Peace Conference in 1919. Indeed, this delegation concluded that there were no significant losses for the Armenians Istanbul, Izmir and Syria: they estimated the Armenian population in these three parts of the Ottoman Empire to be around 230,000 in 1914 and yet gave the same figure for 1918.¹³ Without any reserve, Mr. Akçam also presents us as evidence a “letter, written on 28 October 1915 by the Balkan branch of the Dashnaktsoutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation).”¹⁴ The fact that the ARF was at the vanguard of the fight against the Turks does not seem relevant for Taner Akçam in this regard. However, he may have understood that such sources are not convincing at all, and tries to find Ottoman documents, but they do not prove any of his claims. Taner Akçam writes that “there are examples of those deported for their membership in certain political organizations, such as ‘Serki, son of Kirkor [who was] deported from Istanbul to Konya when it was learned that he was a member of the Dashnaktsoutiun Armenian Committee.’”¹⁵ Nobody ever denied that members of the ARF, a revolutionary-terrorist organization working for the victory of Russia, were expelled from Istanbul.¹⁶ Incidentally, it may be noted that Taner Akçam argues that the goal of the “genocide” was to eliminate the Armenian people from

11 Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, New York: Doubleday, Page & C°, 1918, p. 309. It is perfectly true that this book is, as a whole, dishonest (Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, New York-Toronto-London: MacMillan, 1928, volume II, pp. 167-182; Heath Lowry, *The Story Behind "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story"*, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1990); but precisely, each concession to the reality in such a book is remarkable.

12 Ara Sarafian (ed.), *United States Diplomacy on The Bosphorus: The Diaries of Ambassador Morgenthau 1913-1916*, London: Gomidas Institute/Taderon Press, 2004.

13 A. A. Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture—and After*, London: Methuen & C°, 1937, p. 53.

14 Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks'...*, p. 401.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 405.

16 For details: Yusuf Sarımay, “What Happened on April 24, 1915? The Circular of April 24, 1915, and the Arrest of Armenian Committee Members in Istanbul,” *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, XIV-1 & 2, Fall 2008, pp. 75-101, http://www.turkishcanadians.com/wp-content/uploads/april_-24.pdf

Anatolia, and regardless gives the example of an Armenian sent from Istanbul... to Anatolia.

On İzmir, Taner Akçam is able to find only 256 expelled Armenians, who, according to an Ottoman document he quotes, were members of the revolutionary organizations.¹⁷ The same figure (256) is used in the list published by Yusuf Halaçoğlu.¹⁸ In 1914, the Armenian population in the city was about 13,000 and in the province, around 25,000.¹⁹ So, these 256 arrested revolutionaries represented 1% of the whole.

It is sometime difficult to distinguish, in publications supporting the “Armenian genocide” label, errors attributable to ignorance from deliberate distortions, including as far as İzmir is concerned.

Non-Turkish documents confirm the absence of relocations from Istanbul and Izmir. Reporting on the general conditions of the Ottoman Empire on 1st January 1918, Lewis Heck, secretary of the American embassy in İstanbul, wrote: “The Armenian population of Constantinople and Smyrna continued unmolested.”²⁰ In a letter sent after the armistice to General Townshend, Charlton Wittal, a businessman and “a representative of one of the oldest British families resident in Turkey” testified that “in the province of Smyrna,” “Armenians lived in peace and received a fair treatment.”²¹ These observations are confirmed by at least two reports of the French Navy’s intelligence service, written in 1919 and 1920. One noticed that in İzmir, there was not serious problem for the Armenian community during the war, and another one observed that the “one thousand Armenian families” of Ödemiş, in the province of İzmir, “prospered, even during the war, because they were unmolested.”²² Correspondingly, Willy Sperco (1887-1978), a leading Levantine journalist, recalls that in Istanbul and Izmir, “Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, French, English and Italians” attended theater plays together, during the Dardanelles battle, namely in 1915.²³

17 Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks’...*, p. 410.

18 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *The Story of 1915. What happened to the Ottoman Armenians?*, Ankara: TTK, 2008, p. 56.

19 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, p. 204; Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities. The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, New York-London: New York University Press, 1983, p. 80.

20 Report from Berne, Switzerland, dated 7 February 1918, p. 23, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park (Maryland), RG 59, M 353, reel 7 (867.00/813).

21 Letter dated 10 February 1921, The National Archives, Kew Gardens (London), FO 371/6499/2265.

22 S.R. Marine, Turquie, 16 décembre 1920, Service historique de la défense, Vincennes (SHD), 7 N 3211 ; S.R. Marine, Turquie, n° 833, 14 juin 1919, SHD, 1 BB7 232.

23 Willy Sperco, *Turcs d’hier et d’aujourd’hui*, Paris, Nouvelles éditions latines, 1961, p. 16.

It is sometime difficult to distinguish, in publications supporting the “Armenian genocide” label, errors attributable to ignorance from deliberate distortions, including as far as Izmir is concerned. Especially, Yves Ternon writes, without providing any source: “in the sanjak of Ismid [Izmit], the deportation is organized by the ‘responsible secretary,’ Djemal [sic] Bayar.”²⁴ So, not only this author (a surgeon without any real education in history) is wrong on the first name of the future Turkish president, but he wrongly places him in Izmit during the First World War: Celâl Bayar was in Izmir. Dr. Ternon should stick to medicine.

Other parts of Anatolia and Arab provinces

The exemption for Istanbul and Izmir are no exception. The most remarkable case is probably the vilayet of Konya. As noticed the French Navy’s intelligence service, the Armenians never suffered because of the Turks in this province. There was no massacre during the reign of Abdülhamit II or during the CUP years.²⁵ Even an American report written for the Peace Conference of Paris, and largely based, as far as populations are concerned, on the conclusions of Dr. W. Post—an American missionary working in Konya and who made no secret of his dislike for the Turks—explains that the Armenians were more numerous in this province in 1917 than in 1914, because “the number of exiles introduced to the vilayet is much greater than that of the emigrants [from Konya].”²⁶ Correspondingly, the exemption for the Armenians of Kütahya (more than 5,000)²⁷ is generally not denied, even by the supporters of the “Armenian genocide” label, but is frequently attributed to the sole action of the *kaimakan* (sub-governor).²⁸ In fact, no Ottoman document ordering, or considering, the relocation of the Armenians from Kütahya was ever found.²⁹ The exemption for the Armenians of Antalya³⁰ (about 800) is generally not contested but simply ignored on the Armenian side of the controversy.

Another case, interesting both in itself and by the treatment he receives in a

24 Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens, histoire d'un génocide*, Paris : Le Seuil, 1996, p. 280.

25 S.R. Marine, Turquie, n° 1351, 25 novembre 1919, SHD, 1 BB7 235.

26 O. J. Campbell, Report on the Vilayet of Konya, p. 8, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (California), Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920), U.S. territorial section, box 4.

27 Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and...*, p. 80.

28 Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens, histoire...*, p. 280. Surprisingly, the same inaccuracy is present in Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks and the Ottoman...*, p. 82, and Yücel Güçlü, *The Holocaust and...*, p. 66.

29 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *The Story of...*, p. 91, n. 220.

30 Telegram of Talat to the governorate of Antalya, 17 August 1915, *TACD*, p. 213.

book of Taner Akçam, is Kastamonu. Mr. Akçam relies on the “written deposition of Kastamonu governor Reşid Pasha,” in 1919, relating that

“In his statement, the governor recounted that he had at one point received a memo from Bahaeddin Şakir (signed ‘Head of the Special Organization’) announcing that the Armenians of Kastamonu were to be deported and informing him that he was being removed from his position for noncompliance with this order.”³¹

Besid the fact that the “testimony” of Reşid was never submitted to cross-examination but simply written and read during a hearing a trial in front a military tribunal in Istanbul, there are at least two big problems with this source. Firstly, Şakir was never the “head of the Special Organization” and could not have signed any “memo” with such a title.³² Secondly, even after the removal of Reşid, Minister of Interior Talat wrote to the new governorate of Kastamonu, in October 1915: “There is no need, for the time being, to remove the Armenians living in your province.” Months after this telegram, a part of the Armenians of Kastamonu were “randomly distributed to the villages and districts where no Armenians or the people of other nations are living” to leave space for refugees “coming from the 4th Army region.”³³

According to a draft written in 1917 by a secretary of Talat, between 350 and 400,000 Armenians were not relocated and Edward J. Erickson estimates that the actual figure may have attained 500,000.³⁴ This last figure is the most credible, for two reasons: The draft does not include the exempted Armenians of Istanbul and Thrace; and there are several instances of underestimations, for example about the provinces of Izmir and Konya.

As a result, it is wrong to allege, as does Michael A. Reynolds without providing any source “that deportation orders were applied not just to Armenians in militarily sensitive areas but to virtually all Armenians outside Istanbul, Edirne, Izmir and the Arab provinces.”³⁵ That having been said, at least Dr. Reynolds mentions the Arab provinces. Armenian propagandists

31 Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks* ‘...’, p. 416.

32 Yücel Güçlü, “Mislabeling Genocide?”, *The Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2006, pp. 67–68, <http://www.meforum.org/969/the-great-game-of-genocide>

33 Telegrams of Talat to the governorate of Kastamonu, 23 October 1915 and 20 April 1916, *TACD*, pp. 341 and 439.

34 Edward J. Erickson, *Ottomans and Armenians*..., pp. 216-218.

35 Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires. The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russia Empires, 1908-1918*, New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 149. Sean McMeekin’s account is more subtle, but yet inaccurate: *The Russian origins of the First World War*, Cambridge (Massachusetts)-London: Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 171-172.

regularly use a photograph showing, according to them Armenians hanged in Jerusalem. In fact, this photo represents Ottoman soldiers executed for desertion—indeed in Jerusalem—, in June 1916.³⁶ It also bears noting that in his extremely tendentious and inaccurate description of the events in the province of Aleppo,³⁷ Yves Ternon never mentions the fact that, except six or seven families, the 22,000 Armenians of Aleppo city were not relocated at all.³⁸

Special Categories

Another fact contradicting the “genocide” charge, and even more the baseless comparisons with the Holocaust, is the exemption of relocation for Catholic and Protestant Armenians, and well as for artisans and employees of the railroad and the Ottoman Bank.³⁹ Once again, trying to deny such facts, Mr. Akçam manipulates his sources. In particular, he alleges:

“On 18 September 1915 cables sent from Kayseri, Eskişehir, Niğde, Diyarbakır, report that all the Armenians had been deported from these provinces and that none remained.”⁴⁰

Except the cable sent from Diyarbakır, these documents do not say what Mr. Akçam pretends they say. The telegram from Kayseri explicitly refers to 4,911 Armenians who were not relocated. Correspondingly, the cable from Niğde mentions “an Armenian population of 221 persons, consisting of Catholics and Protestants” allowed to stay in the sancak (district). Eventually, the telegram sent from Eskişehir explains that “the number of Armenians required to be removed [from the sancak] amounted to 7,000” and that all of them were actually expelled.⁴¹ Interpreting such a formulation as a proof that “all the Armenians had been deported from these provinces and that none remained” is impossible. Indeed, according to the Ottoman census, there were 8,807 Armenians in the district according to the Ottoman census—about 10,000 according to the British estimate and according to Justin McCarthy.⁴² Considering the necessity to update the figures of the Ottoman census, it is fair

36 <https://bokertovyerushalayim.wordpress.com/2014/05/30/la-porte-de-yafo/>

37 Yves Ternon, *Les Arméniens, histoire...*, pp. 284-289.

38 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, p. 191.

39 Kemal Çiçek, *The Great War and the Forced Migration of Armenians*, Belfast: Athol Books, 2011, pp. 78-81.

40 Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act...*, p. 177.

41 İsmet Binark (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915-1920)*, Ankara, 1995, pp. 94-97.

42 Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities...*, p. 80 ; Meir Zamir, “Population statistics of the Ottoman empire in 1914 and 1919,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, XVII-1, January 1981, pp. 100 and 104.

to conclude that about 3,000 Armenians were exempted in the district of Eskişehir only.⁴³

Taner Akçam also manipulated a telegram sent by Talat on August 29, 1915: this “new order was emphatically not retroactive but solely applied to ‘the Armenians who were not [already] uprooted and deported.’” The word “already,” added by Taner Akçam into brackets, has no basis at all in the text. The full text of this document is indeed the following (my emphasis):

“Objective of the transfer of the Armenians from the places they are currently living to the certain determined regions is to prevent their attempts and activities against the government and to render them unable to pursue their national goal of establishing an Armenian government. *Since there is no intention like the complete destruction of the Armenians* it is absolutely necessary to protect the lives of the individuals being transferred in convoys and to take every measure to provide their food supplies regularly during their travel, the cost of which to be met from the immigrants fund. It is also necessary for the government that, with the exclusion of those who were decided to be relocated, *the Armenians, particularly the families of the army members, as mentioned in the previous notice, as well as artisans and those belonging to the Protestant and Catholic sects will be left at their current place of residence.* About those who attack the convoys and seize their properties and dare to rape the Armenians by acting on bestial instincts, as well as the officials and gendarme members who act as the initiator of such acts, the legal investigation shall be started immediately for their severe punishment, without showing any mercy on them. Such officials shall be immediately dismissed from the service and brought before the military court. Furthermore, their names should be reported. In case similar attacks are repeated, the administration of the province where such attacks occur shall be held responsible.”⁴⁴

The addition of “already” is even less possible by considering that even a staunchly anti-Turkish testimony, the one of Abraham H. Hartunian—used by Taner Akçam himself⁴⁵—, mentions the case of 700 Protestants, as well as 200 Catholics and Gregorians, who were initially sent to the road of relocation and

43 On Eskişehir, also see SR Marine, Turquie, n° 1376, 1er décembre 1919, SHD, 1 BB7 234 ; Ahmet Refik (Altınay), *Two Committees, Two Massacres*, Firodil, 2006, p. 40; Edward J. Erickson, *Ottomans and Armenians...*, p. 216.

44 *TACD*, p. 235.

45 Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks'...*, p. 314.

went back after “only a few hours,” in August 1915 precisely.⁴⁶ Not only the word “already” is a misleading interpolation, but the warning “Since there is no intention like the complete destruction of the Armenians it is absolutely necessary to protect the lives of the individuals being transferred in convoys and to take every measure to provide their food supplies regularly during their travel” is conveniently neglected by Mr. Akçam.

Regarding the Protestants, one of the most interesting Western documents is the report of the French Navy’s intelligence service on Afyon, explaining that the Armenians here “got away with it,” first of all because a significant part of them were Protestants and so not relocated. The report adds that a part of the Gregorians were exempted as well and that even the expelled ones suffered less than in other parts of Anatolia. According to this document, about 7-8,000 Armenians were still in Afyon in 1919.⁴⁷

The possibility to escape relocation by conversion to Islam⁴⁸ is rarely denied, even in the Armenian nationalist literature, but this exemption is often misrepresented. In particular, Vahakn N. Dadrian alleges that a “statement about the forced mass conversion of Armenian orphans is verified by the writer Halidé Edib, who denounced it as ‘wrong’”.⁴⁹ This summary is inaccurate, as a checking in the text shows (my emphasis):

“There were a large number of Turkish orphanages in Anatolia *filled with Turkish children whose parents had been the victims of the Armenians*. These orphanages had taken Armenian children as well and made them Moslems (which was wrong). The rest of the Armenian orphans were taken by the Americans. Apart from this, some Turkish families had taken Armenian children out of kindness and pity *without any desire to make them Moslems*: for the Moslem Turks do not have the missionary instincts of the Christians of the West. [...]

An international committee for the separation of the Armenian children was formed under the patronage of Colonel Heathcote Smythe. It rented a house in Shishli, and the central committee which had to separate the

46 Abraham H. Hartunian, *Neither to Laugh nor to Weep. A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1976, pp. 66-68 (first edition, 1968; manuscript written in Armenian at the end of 1930s and translated by Vartan Hartunian, the son of the author).

47 SR Marine, Turquie, n° 747, 6 juin 1919, SHD, 1 BB7 232.

48 Kemal Çiçek, *The Great War...*, p. 83.

49 Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, XVIII-3, August 1986, p. 353, n. 78.

children were mostly Armenians. Nezihe Hanum, the general secretary of the women's section of the Red Crescent, was asked to represent the Turks. She went three times a week for nearly two months, but resigned afterward. She used to say that her presence did not in any way help *the Turkish children, who were being Armenianized daily*. The children who were brought to the association were left in the care of the Armenian women, and *these Armenian women, either by persuasion or threats or hypnotism, forced the Turkish children to learn by heart the name of an Armenian woman for their mother and the name of an Armenian man for their father.*⁵⁰

It is clear that the source used by Mr. Dadrian does not mention any “mass conversion” or any use of force by Muslims to convert an unknown number of Armenian orphans to Islam. On the contrary, Edip unequivocally described attempts to convert Turkish children to Christianity by force.

The actual conditions of life of the relocated Armenians

The displacement

After 1919, Arnold Toynbee abandoned one of his main war-time charges against the Ottoman government, admitting that the relocation as such was a “legitimate security measure” against a “fifth column” and the Armenian nationalist claims “had not been legitimate” because “they could not be fulfilled without doing grave injustice to the Turkish people itself.” However, Toynbee maintained that the way this relocation took place was criminal, and that the crimes were state-sponsored.⁵¹ This position is shared by various writers until today, with more or less nuances. To answer this biased analysis, it must be stressed, to begin, that the massacres were never systematic, geographically or during the time of the forced resettlement. Basing his conclusions on German and American sources, Guenter Lewy concludes that “in the absence of a large Kurdish population no massacre took place in Cilicia.”⁵² This is confirmed, with U.S. and Ottoman documents, by the research of Yücel Güçlü.⁵³ Cilicia was not an exception. For example, in a report of the French Navy's intelligence service on the Armenians repatriated to Bursa in 1919, there are

50 Halidé Edib (Halide Edip), *The Turkish Ordeal*, New York-London: The Century C°, 1928, pp. 16-17.

51 Arnold Toynbee, *Acquaintances*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 241-242.

52 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, pp. 183-187 and 252 (quotation p. 252).

53 Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 78-83.

certainly critiques against the CUP's relocation policy, but not a single reference to any massacre.⁵⁴

Then, it must be noted that no authentic order from Talat, Enver or any top leader of the CUP requests the killing of Armenians. On the contrary, both the documents conserved in the Ottoman archives⁵⁵ and those seized by the British army after the armistice (which are now in the British National Archives and were published by Salâhi Sonyel during the 1970s)⁵⁶ explicitly forbid violence. After the publication of such documents, Armenian American sociologist Vahakn N. Dadrian invented by mid-1980s a conspiracy theory: Talat was supposed to have written dozens of documents only to mislead future historians; real orders had cancelled the ones published by Turkish historians. To support this thesis, Mr. Dadrian relied on the Memoirs signed by Ambassador Morgenthau (he “reveals another feature of Talat's cover and informal methods of transacting party and/or government business that is not mentioned anywhere else,” namely a “telegraphic equipment in the privacy of his home”) and a book written by Falih Rıfık Atay, a collaborator of Talat during the war, who is supposed to describe the minister of Interior as regularly sending telegrams cancelling previous ones.⁵⁷ Recently (2012), Taner Akçam has repeated the same arguments.⁵⁸ The problem is that, between these two publications, Heath Lowry has demonstrated that the “telegraphic equipment” is a pure invention of Morgenthau, Ara Sarafian has published the full text of Morgenthau's diary, facilitating the verification of this conclusion, and Erman Şahin has explained—without being answered—how the words of Atay were distorted.⁵⁹

It must be noted that no authentic order from Talat, Enver or any top leader of the CUP requests the killing of Armenians. On the contrary, both the documents conserved in the Ottoman archives and those seized by the British army after the armistice (which are now in the British National Archives and were published by Salâhi Sonyel during the 1970s) explicitly forbid violence.

54 SR Marine, Turquie, n° 1504, 30 décembre 1919, SHD, 1 BB7 234.

55 For example: Regulations, 30 May and 10 June 1915; telegrams of Talat to the governorate of Erzurum and Elazığ, 26 June 1915 and to the governorate of Urfa, 8 September 1915, *TACD*, pp. 80-81, 101-103, 115-117 and 255; Stanford Jay Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, volume II, 1978, p. 316.

56 Salâhi Sonyel, *The Displacement of Armenians: Documents*, Ankara: TTK, 1978.

57 Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Naim-Andonian...”, pp. 328 and 339-340.

58 Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime...*, pp. 382-383.

59 Heath Lowry, *The Story behind...*, pp. 47-50; Ara Sarafian (ed.), *United States Diplomacy...*, entry 3 November 1914; Erman Şahin, “A Scrutiny of Akçam's Version of History and the Armenian Genocide,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVIII-2, August 2008, p. 314. Also see Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks'...*, p. 83.

Regardless, there is more. Taner Akçam pretends that the telegram dispatched by Talat Pasha to Ankara's province on August 29, 1915, is remarkable evidence that "the policies adopted against the Armenians were aiming at their annihilation." In an inaccurate translation, Mr. Akçam quotes only the two first sentences of this text: "The Armenian issue in the Eastern Provinces has been resolved. There is no need to sully the nation and the government[*'s honor*] with *further* [my emphasis] atrocities."⁶⁰ Let's see now the full text, in an accurate translation (italics added):

"The Armenian issue pertaining to the Eastern provinces has been solved. *Therefore*, there is no need to harm the reputation of our nation and government by conducting *unnecessary* cruelties. Particularly the recent attack conducted on the Armenians at a place close to Ankara has caused great regret of the Ministry, considering its way of occurring, the obvious incompetence of the officials charged with supervising the transfer of Armenians, and audacity on part of the gendarmes and the local people who acted on their bestial instincts to rape and rob the Armenians. The transfer of Armenians, which is desired to be carried out in an orderly and prudent manner, should henceforth never be left to the individuals having fanatical feelings of enmity, and that *the Armenians, whether or not they are subject to relocation, will be definitely protected against any assault and attack*. At the places where such a protection could not be provided, the transfer of Armenians should be postponed. From now on, all of the officials in charge shall be held responsible with respect to their ranks for any attack, which may occur and shall be brought before the military courts. It is necessary to give very strict orders to the relevant personnel in this regard."⁶¹

Taner Akçam also presented "the thesis that the Armenian genocide was not implemented solely as demographic engineering, but also as destruction and annihilation, and that the 5 and 10 percent principle was decisive in achieving this goal." He presents the following reasoning. He uses as a basis the draft published by Murat Bardakçı, assumes that all the 924,158 missing Armenians were relocated by the Ottoman armed forces and to the Arab provinces; relying on the Blue Book of Toynbee and to a publication of Johannes Lepsius, he elevates the number to "around 1.2 millions." And he concludes that, considering the Muslim population of the provinces where these "1.2 millions" Armenians were relocated, the application of the 10% rule (the Armenians

60 Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks* '...', pp. 203-204.

61 Hikmet Özdemir and Yusuf Sarınoy (ed.), *Turkish-Armenian Conflict Documents*, Ankara: TBMM, 2007 (hereafter *TACD*), p. 235.

cannot represent more than 10% of the general population) could be achieved only by extermination.⁶² There are several problems with this way of reasoning. The estimation published by Mr. Baradakçı is a sum, including the Armenians relocated to Arab provinces, the ones resettled inside Anatolia and those who were taken by Russian forces to the Caucasus in 1915-16 (their number is estimated to be about 300,000).⁶³ Neither Toynbee nor Lepsius, who published propaganda books and not historical studies,⁶⁴ had any way to know the exact figure and their estimations seem inflated. Indeed, as the Ottoman Armenian population was about 1,700,000/1,750,000 individuals in 1914,⁶⁵ as around 500,000 were not relocated at all, tens of thousands relocated inside Anatolia, 300,000 resettled by the Russian army, as 50,000 others fled to Iran⁶⁶ and dozens of thousands joined the Russian army,⁶⁷ how “1.2 millions” could have remained to be displaced to the Arab provinces? Regarding now the 10% rule itself, it was valid for the pre-existing towns and villages only, not for the provinces; new agglomerations, with a mostly Armenian population, were planned by the Ottoman government.⁶⁸ So, the reasoning of Taner Akçam is once again invalid.

Relief for relocated Armenians

According to legend that can be found even in the scholarly literature, “the deportees were generally treated very harsh during their marches to the Syrian desert and those who survived the march were interned in camps along the Euphrates river, without any provisioning whatsoever.”⁶⁹ Outside the scholarly

62 Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks* '..., pp. 242-263 (quotes pp. 242 and 258).

63 Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1967, p. 67.

64 Justin McCarthy, “Wellington House and the Turks,” in *The Turks*, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002, volume V, pp. 457-467; James Morgan Read, *Atrocity Propaganda. 1914-1919*, New Haven-London: Yale University Press/Oxford University Press, 1941, p. 221 ; Frank G. Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent. Germany, Austria and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance. 1914-1918*, Ithaca (NY)-London: Cornell University Press, 1970, pp. 151 and 216.

65 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, pp. 234-235; Justin McCarthy, “The Population of the Ottoman Armenians,” in Türkaya Ataöv (ed.), *The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period*, Ankara: TTK/TBMM, 2002, pp. 65-85.

66 Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities...*, p. 126.

67 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *Facts on the Relocation of Armenians (1914-1918)*, Ankara: TTK, 2002, pp. 105. Also see Rafael de Nogales, *Four Years Beneath the Crescent*, New York-London: Charles Scribner's, 1926, p. 45.

68 Fuat Dündar, “Taner Akçam'ın Son Kitabı Vesilesiyle %10 Katliam Sorunu: Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuş mudur?,” *Toplumsal Tarih*, June 2008, pp. 181-183.

69 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History*, London-New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 117. David Fromkin (*A Peace to End All Peace*, New York: Owl Books, 2001, p. 212) even alleges, also without footnote, that “Those who were not killed at once were driven through mountains and deserts without food, drink or shelters.”

field, Taner Akçam went a step further, alleging that “the distribution of aid to the [Armenian] deportees was absolutely forbidden. Humanitarian workers and the government officials who closed their eyes to these distributions were to be ‘severely punished.’”⁷⁰

These accusations have simply nothing to do with the reality.⁷¹ Mr. Akçam bases his allegation on a “Communication from interior minister Talat to the Command of the Ottoman Army, dated 25 March 1916,” but in fact, the content is entirely different. Not only this is not Talat personally who uses the words “several punished” (he forwards a document where this wording appears) but these “punishments” had a quite narrower scope: “the heavy penalties given to the officials who allow *the secret distribution of money* [my emphasis] among the Armenians.” Neither the distribution of money under the control of Ottoman officials nor the in-kind help is forbidden; on the contrary, it is explicitly written that the distribution of money under the control of the Ottoman officials is legal. This is confirmed by American documents, for instance a letter of an American relief worker, Annie Allen, to William W. Peet, treasurer of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), where she explains how she is distributing money to relocated Armenians, without evoking any problem.⁷²

Indeed, the Americans involved in the relief for Armenians did not pretend having face blockade in their activities, still less after autumn 1915. In March 1916, William W. Peet, the treasurer of the American Board of Commissioners for Missions Abroad (ABCFM) stated that “the relief already received has worked wonders.” In June of the same year, the American missionaries’ representatives told the U.S. Congress that “the situation from the point of view of human life is not quite so black as it seemed.”⁷³ Correspondingly, on 30 April 1916, the Minister of Interior, Talat, sent a telegram to 19 governors (with a copy for minister of War Enver), ordering to use “the immigrants’ fund” for the “need for food” of Armenians who stayed in Anatolia, “whose males had either been relocated or taken into the army, and therefore left without anyone to take care of them.”⁷⁴

70 Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks* ‘...’, pp. 277-278.

71 For an overview: Kemal Çiçek, *The Great War*..., pp. 87-233.

72 American Board of Commissioner for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) archives, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Houghton Library, 16.10.1, box 8. The letter is dated “September 16”. The year is not provided, but, considering the dates of the documents before and after in the box, it must be 1915 or 1916.

73 *Relief of Armenians. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, Washinton: Government Printing Office, 1916, pp. 12-13.

74 *TACD*, p. 443. Also see, p. 481, the telegram of the ministry of Interior to the governor of Samsun, in the same sense, dated 12 November 1916.

Leslie A. Davis, U.S. consul in Elazığ, frequently quoted as a “witness of the Armenian genocide” testified in a letter to the American Committee for Armenians and Syria Relief, dated 3 October 1917 that “for the past two years [1915-1917] systematic relief has been regularly give by American missionaries and myself to more than 6,000 in the vicinity of Harpout [Elazığ] alone.” Even more remarkable is the letter sent on 5 October 1917 by Abram Elkus, ambassador of America to İstanbul fom 1916 to 1917, to Charles Vickrey, general secretary of the ABCFM. This letter was sent with the explicit approval of the State Department:

“When I left Constantinople owing the breaking of the diplomatic relations with Turkey, the work of relief carried on by the American Committee for Armenian and Syria Relief was so thoroughly organized that arrangements were easily made for continuing that work in every department, even in the absence of the Embassy and United States consuls at different points in the country. *The work is now being carried on effectively at all of the centers under increasing friendliness on the part of the Turkish officials* [my emphasis] and with a need that is constantly growing greater as the winter approaches. A letter from the American representative now in Constantinople, date August 17 1917, which has just reached me, confirms that.”⁷⁵

The content of this letter is largely confirmed by a retrospective report written in 1918 by Jesse Jackson, U.S. consul in Aleppo until 1917:

“And so relief was being carried on when diplomatic relations were severed between the United States and Turkey in April, 1917. I thereupon arranged to have all relief funds thereafter sent to Mr. Emil Zollinger, a prominent Swiss gentleman of Aleppo, who is intensely interested in philanthropic work, and who receives and pays the committees the money necessary for the monthly distribution.

Aside from about 50,000 persons dependent on relief in Aleppo, there are twice that many more in the surrounding towns and villages all of whom receive relief through the committees that were organized under my supervision before my departure in May, 1917. [...] The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian relief, No. 1, Madison Avenue, New York City, is in touch with the committees in Aleppo through the medium of Mr. Zollinger, and *from last accounts the work is progressing very satisfactorily* [my emphasis].”⁷⁶

75 These two letters are in Library of Congress, manuscript division, W. Wilson papers, reel 337.

76 Report dated March 4, 1918, reproduced in Ara Sarafian (ed.), *United States Official Documents on the Armenian Genocide*, Princeton-London: Gomidas Institute, 2004, p. 595.

As late as December 1917, the chief clerk replacing the U.S. ambassador in Istanbul, as a result of the severance of the diplomatic relations, observed: “the funds which have been, and are still being forwarded from the United States to Turkey have been very welcome and have accomplished a great deal of good. No attempt has been made by the Turkish authorities to prevent the distribution of this relief money — at least no attempt of a serious nature.”⁷⁷

Does it mean that, having wittingly decimated the Armenians by famine in 1915, the Ottoman government eventually allowed a foreign help for the survivors? Once again, the archival documents answer no. The regulation dated 30 May 1915, signed by Talat himself, stipulates, in its article 4, that “protecting the lives and property of the Armenians, *providing food to them* [my emphasis], and facilitating the rest on their journey to places of resettlement are under the responsibility of the officials of the locate administrations located along the transfer route.”⁷⁸ The circular dated 28 August 1915, also signed by Talat, orders (article 9): “The necessary food for the emigrants while on their journey until they reach their destination must be assured. The cost of the food for poor emigrants must be borne by the open credit for the service of the installation of the emigrants.”⁷⁹ These orders were not empty words. Indeed, “a total of 2,250,000 krş was assigned [in summer 1915] to meet the needs of the deportation,” and, as early as November 1915, “600,000 krş” were “allocated to the province of Aleppo” by the Ministry of Interior, and 200,000 others to the governorate of Eskişehir.⁸⁰

There is also first-hand evidence that Americans were allowed to provide relief to Armenians as early as 1915 (in addition to the letter of Leslie Davis already quoted). For example, the archives of the ABCFM contain lists of hundreds of Armenians with their names and the amount of money forwarded to them during the whole year 1915. They also contain a letter from Antep (today’s Gaziantep) to William Peet, dated 13 August 1915, explaining that “the helpful activities of the native Christians as well as the American missionaries surpasses anything the home churches can dream of.”⁸¹ And in a retrospective report written in 1918, Henry Riggs, a U.S. missionary who worked in Elazığ

77 Report to the secretary of State, dated 5 December 1917, NARA, RG 59, M 353, reel 7, 867.00/809.

78 *TACD*, p. 80.

79 FO 371/9158/5523 (original in Ottoman Turkish and translation by the British High Commissioner’s staff; this document was seized by the British army at the end of 1918). Salâhi R. Sonyel published all the seized documents of the file FO 371/9158: *The Displacement of the Armenians: Documents*, Ankara: TTK, 1978.

80 Yusuf Halaçoğlu, *The Story of...*, pp. 73-75.

81 ABCFM, 16.10.1, box 8.

until 1921, explains that he and his associates could provide food to Armenians as early as 1915.⁸²

The Ottoman leader who was the most involved in these relief activities was Cemal Paşa, the number 3 of the CUP regime from 1913 to 1918 and the strong man for the Near East. Cemal did not so much that he got congratulations from American and German personalities who had no particular friendship towards the Turkish people, such as James L. Barton, Ambassador Paul von Wolf-Metternich, or Consul Walter Rössler, and also from relocated Armenians, particularly Hagop Sarkissian, who later migrated to the U.S. and took the name of James K. Sutherland.⁸³ Taner Akçam is forced by his own sources to admit: Cemal “had indeed tried [...] to ease the situation for the Armenian deportees”⁸⁴ but he does not provide any development on this crucial issue in *A Shameful Act, The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity*, or any other publication I read.

Hilmar Kaiser offered the most subtle description of Cemal’s actions written by a supporter of the “Armenian genocide” charge.⁸⁵ Certainly interesting, this description of the efforts made, as early as 1915, by Cemal, presents, however, a fundamental flaw: To save the “genocide” or “extermination” charge, Dr. Kaiser invents an opposition between the policy of Talat and the one of Cemal, without providing any evidence—particularly when Hilmar Kaiser writes, without providing any source: “Talaat’s claim that the deportations should be undertaken in a humane fashion probably applied to some general ideal and not actual policy.”⁸⁶ Actually, Dr. Kaiser showed us concrete cases proving the coherence between these two CUP leaders. The clearest example is the following:

“These sources provide a wealth of details, including a number of 4th Army documents, about opposition by Ahmed Djemal Pasha against Ottoman central government policies concerning Armenians. This data might have been utilized for a more careful analysis. For instance, in the case of Zohrab’s murder Djemal secured the arrest and execution of the two main perpetrators who were important CUP operatives.”⁸⁷

82 Henry Riggs, *Days of Tragedy in Armenia*, Ann Harbord: Gomidas Institute, 1997, p. 158.

83 Yücel Güçlü, *The Holocaust and the...*, pp. 68-79; Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, pp. 196-198 and 218-220.

84 Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act...*, p. 186.

85 Hilmar Kaiser, “Regional resistance to central government policies: Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the governors of Aleppo, and Armenian deportees in the spring and summer of 1915,” *Journal of Genocide Research*, XII-3/4, 2010, pp. 173-218.

86 *Ibid.*, p. 194.

87 *Ibid.*, p. 175.

These quoted lines are not based on any archival document, but on two second-hand sources, written well after 1915. A telegram of Talat, published and translated years before the publication of Mr. Kaiser's article, proves that the minister of Interior ordered to send these criminals to Cemal:

“Ahmet from Siroz and his friend Halil have been sent to Konya today, to be prosecuted by the Military Court of the 4th army for the crimes of murdering Armenians and usurping their possessions. The said individuals should definitely not be permitted to escape and they should be kept imprisoned in Konya, until receiving the request and written note of Cemal Paşa in that regard.”⁸⁸

Considering the extremely clear stance of Cemal on the criminals who killed, raped or expropriated Armenians, and his preference for the gallows to fix this kind of problems, Talat could not ignore that sending such persons to Cemal was sending them to death.

Considering the extremely clear stance of Cemal on the criminals who killed, raped or expropriated Armenians, and his preference for the gallows to fix this kind of problems,⁸⁹ Talat could not ignore that sending such persons to Cemal was sending them to death.

The 1915-16 relocations are not the only reason of the Armenian losses

The scorched earth policy of the Armenian nationalists in Eastern Anatolia (1917-1918)

After the collapse of the tsarist regime and the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian army withdrew from eastern Anatolia. As a result, the Armenian nationalist organizations decided to leave to the Turks a desert only. The war crimes perpetrated by these groups began as early as the end of 1914 and had attained a highpoint during the revolt of Van. However, if a part of the Russian officers (particularly Cossaks) cooperated with the Armenian volunteers in this work of ethnic cleansing, another part opposed these practices, above all because these crimes made extremely difficult the occupation of eastern Anatolia, inhabited by a majority of Muslims.⁹⁰ However, in 1917-1918, there was no effective Russian opposition, for the simple reason that the last officers who were against such practices did not possess anymore the manpower able

88 Telegram of Talat to the governorate of Konya, 9 September 1915, *TACD*, p. 261.

89 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres...*, pp. 112-113.

90 Maxime Gauin, “The Convergent Analysis of Russian, British, French, and American Officials Regarding the Armenian Volunteers (1914-1922),” *International Review of Turkish Studies*, I-4, pp. 18-25; Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires...*, pp. 156-158.

to curb such violence. This is not the place here for a general study of these crimes, so only some examples shall be provided.

Russian lieutenant-colonel Tverdokhlebov explained: “More than 800 unarmed innocent Turks were massacred [in Erzincan]. [...] They slaughtered the people as if they were sheep.” The slaughter continued in the countryside: “The Armenian mobs retreating from Erzincan to Erzurum exterminated all the Muslim villagers they met on their way. [...] All of those who could not manage to flee from Ilica were massacred. The Army Commander [General Odichelitzé] said he saw lots of corpses belonging to children whose throats were butchered with blunt knives, and bodies cut into thin and long strips.” And, as it is well-known, thousands of Turks were massacred systematically in Erzurum itself, in February 1918: about 3,000 during the bloodiest night only.⁹¹ This campaign of physical destruction was not limited to the Erzincan and Erzurum area.⁹² Indeed, a Turkish investigation carried out in 1921 showed that thousands other Muslims were exterminated at the beginning of 1918, between Erzurum and Van. In the village of Söylemez, the victims were burned alive.⁹³ Correspondingly, the official investigators of the U.S. government concluded in 1919:

“In the entire region from Bitlis through Van to Bayezit we were informed that the damage and destruction had been done by the Armenians, who, after the Russians retired, remained in occupation of the country and who, when the Turkish army advanced, destroyed everything belonging to the Musulmans. Moreover, the Armenians are accused of having committed murder, rape arson and horrible atrocities of every description upon the Musulman population. [...]

Although it does not fall within the exact scope of our investigation one of the most salient facts impressed on us at every point from Bitlis to Trebizond was that in the region which we traversed the Armenians committed upon the Turks all the crimes and outrages which were committed in other regions by Turks upon Armenians. At first we were most incredulous of the stories told us, but the unanimity of the testimony of all witnesses, the apparent eagerness with which they told of wrongs done them, their evident hatred of Armenians, and, strongest of all, the

91 Vladimir N. Tverbokhlebov, *Gördüklerim Yaşadıklarım/I Witnessed and Lived Through/Ce que j'ai vu et vécu moi-même*, Ankara: ATASE, 2007, pp. 51-56 (quotation pp. 51 and 52). Also see Ahmet Refik (Altnay), *Two Committees, Two Massacres*, Firodil, 2006, pp. 67-76.

92 For a general description: Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*, Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995, pp. 196-202.

93 Yusuf Sarımay (ed.), *Ermeniler Tarafından Yapılan Katliam Belgeleri*, Ankara, 2001, volume II, pp. 1039-1041.

material evidence on the ground itself, have convinced us of the general truth of the facts, first, that Armenians massacred Musulmans on a large scale with many refinements of cruelty, and second that the Armenians are responsible for most of the destruction done to towns and villages.”⁹⁴

In these conditions, it is not difficult to understand why 50,000 Armenians who had remained in eastern Anatolia left to the newly autonomous (soon independent) Armenia during the first months of 1918. Some were directly involved in the massacres; some applauded without having personally touched a gun or a knife; and others (very likely the majority) did not desire such crimes, but did not think to possess sufficiently rhetorical talents to convince an infuriated Muslim population that they were really innocent. As a result, the number of refugees in Armenia attained once again 200,000 (the 150,000 survivors of the Russian resettlements and these new refugees), but was once again reduced to 150,000⁹⁵ because of the epidemics in Armenia 1918-1919⁹⁶—a drama certainly due to the general, terrible context, but also to the incompetence of the Dashnak administration.⁹⁷

Beyond the particular case of the new refugees, the massacres and destructions of 1917-1918 prevented any reconciliation and made the post-1918 schemes of repatriation impossible. Remarkably, Richard G. Hovannisian had mentioned the massacres in his doctoral dissertation, in clear terms: “The intrepidity of such groups slightly mitigated the widespread impression of the distressing cowardice of the Armenian soldier. The frenzied troops and bands retreating from Erzurum killed any Moslem falling into their hands and burned the Turkish villages that lay in their path.”⁹⁸ However, fifteen years after the publication of this work, the same Richard G. Hovannisian felt free to discuss, in 20 pages, the projects of repatriation without saying anything on these crimes.⁹⁹ At least Mr. Hovannisian did not try to misrepresent these annoying

94 Justin McCarthy, “The Report of Niles and Sutherland—An American Investigation of Eastern Anatolia after World War I”, in *XI. Türk Tarih Kongresi*, Ankara: TTK, 1994, volume V, pp. 1828-1829 and 1850.

95 Colonel Chardigny, « La question arménienne », 30 octobre 1919, SHD, 16 N 3187, dossier 4.

96 Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, volume I, *The First Year, 1918-1919*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1971, pp. 44 et 128-147.

97 On this incompetence: A. A. Lalaian, *The Counter-Revolutionary Role of the Dashnagzoutiun Party (1914-1923)*, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007.

98 Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the...*, p. 135.

99 Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, volume II, *From Versailles to London, 1919-1920*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, University of California Press, 1982, pp. 42-61. This is not the only case of selection of facts in this volume. See, especially, Heath Lowry, “Richard G. Hovannisian on Lieutenant Robert Steed Dunn. A Review Note,” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, V, 1985, pp. 209-252, http://english.isam.org.tr/documents/_dosyalar/_pdfler/osmanli_arastirmalari_dergisi/osmanli%C4%B1sy5/1986_5_LOWRYHW.pdf

facts, unlike other Armenian authors.¹⁰⁰ It can even be noticed that his words were distorted by Peter Balakian. Trying to excuse the massacres against Turks and other Muslims in 1918, Mr. Balakian alleges that “the Turks” “massacred Armenian civilians” in 1917-18 and that the Armenian perpetrators “were attempting to avenge the atrocities of 1915.”¹⁰¹ The only source Mr. Balakian gives is the published version of Mr. Hovannisian’s doctoral dissertation. Verification shows that, in this source, there is actually no mention of “massacres” by Turks during the years 1917 and 1918, and no attempt to excuse the killing of Muslims by the “atrocities of 1915.”¹⁰²

The Armenian nationalists prevent the coexistence in Cilicia (1918-1922)

As early as 1915, Armenian nationalists claimed an “integral Armenia” from the Black sea to the Mediterranean sea,” a demand strongly reiterated in 1919.¹⁰³ The possession of the province Adana was considered indispensable for the future Armenian state, and even after the collapse the Armenian Republic, projects continued to be submitted for “Armenian national home” in this part of Anatolia.¹⁰⁴ These claims paved the way for particularly difficult relations with the occupying power of this part of southern Turkey, namely France.

As the Turks were in majority on these lands before the First World War, the repatriation of the relocated Armenians by the French in 1919 was not enough to secure an Armenian, or even a Christian majority. Thousands of Armenians of central Anatolia—particularly from Kayseri—were requested to come to Adana by their extremist coreligionists.

As the Turks were in majority on these lands before the First World War, the repatriation of the relocated Armenians by the French in 1919 was not enough to secure an Armenian, or even a Christian majority. Thousands of Armenians of central Anatolia—particularly from Kayseri—were requested to come to Adana by their extremist coreligionists (of United States, Izmir and, of course, Adana itself). They actually went, but it was a self-inflicted exile: There was

100 For an overview: Maxime Gauin, “The Convergent Analysis...”, p. 30.

101 Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris. The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response*, New York: Perennial, 2004, p. 320.

102 Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the...*, pp. 114-115 and 134-135.

103 A. Tchobanian, Les aspirations arméniennes, 7 avril 1915, in Hasan Dilan (ed.), *Franşız Diplomatik Belgelerinde Ermeni Olayları 1914-1918/Les Événements arméniens dans les documents diplomatiques français, 1914-1918*, Ankara : TTK, 2005, volume II, pp. 152-167 ; Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar, *The Armenian Question Before the Paris Peace Conference*, Paris : Imprimerie Dupont, 1919.

104 Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the...*, pp. 102-188.

no threat against them, which could justify this migration.¹⁰⁵ After the French administration had formally rejected the projects of an Armenian Cilicia and lost any trust in the Armenian nationalist organizations in Cilicia, these authorities expelled to Syria the migrants arrived from central Anatolia.¹⁰⁶

Only from 28 December 1918 to 15 February 1919, French sources mention 15 Turks assassinated by Armenian legionnaires or civilians, almost thirty cases of hold-ups or plunder, one affair of death threats against the inhabitant of a whole quarter and one case of racket followed by rapes.¹⁰⁷ In spite of the purges, violence continued during the years 1919 and 1920. Since this article is not a monograph on Cilicia, only two other cases are studied here: Maraş and Adana.

At the end of October 1919, the British army was replaced in Maraş by French officers, soldiers and Armenian legionnaires. The officer in charge, Captain André, was misled by his Armenian drogman and completely failed to understand the situation. A group of one hundred Armenian legionnaires burned villages surrounding the city, and other legionnaires murdered Turks in the city itself. The behavior of the Armenian Legion in other places left no illusion: There crimes were not abnormal, but what the local population should expect regularly. That is why the Turks of Maraş organized an uprising as early as January 1920.¹⁰⁸ The insurrection led to a particularly violent fight, but, contrary to a legend, spread until today by propagandists such as Gerard J. Libaridian—who presents a typical mixture of Francophobia and Turkophobia¹⁰⁹—, there was no massacre of unarmed Armenian civilians. After a systematic verification, Admiral Ferdinand de Bon, chief of the French Navy

105 Report of operations for week ending November 23, 1919, LC, Bristol papers, container 1, file November 1919; Commandant Labonne, « Le mouvement nationaliste » n° 11, 16 novembre 1919, 7 N 3210, dossier 1; Lettre du lieutenant Lemaigre-Dubreuil au haut-commissaire français à Istanbul, 13 septembre 1919, Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), 36 PO/1/10.

106 Télégramme du ministre des Affaires étrangères à l'ambassadeur à Londres, 14 octobre 1920, Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE) La Courneuve, P 16674 ; Compte-rendu de la visite de Mme Portoukalian au chef de bataillon Hasslier (Adana), 16 septembre 1920, p. 4, CADN, 1SL/1V/222.

107 CADN, 36 PO/1/9 ; Gustave Gautherot, *La France en Syrie et en Cilicie*, Courbevoie : Librairie indépendante, 1920, pp. 146-150.

108 Renseignement, n° 10, 2 février 1920, Archives nationales, Pierrefitte, 594 AP 4 ; SR Marine, Turquie, n° 1327, 20 novembre 1919, SHD, 1 BB7 234; Turkish military reports dated 13 and 20 November 1919, translated in Stanford Jay Shaw, "The Armenian Legion and its Destruction of the Armenian Community in Cilicia," in Türkaya Ataöv (ed.), *The Armenians in...*, pp. 159-160. Also see Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the...*, p. 121; and Nejla Günay, "Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Maraş Yöresinde Sosyal Yapı Değişimleri ve bu Değişimde Ermeni-Franız Rolü," in *XX. Yüzyılda Maraş (Ermeniler, Türkler, Müslümanlar). Makaleler*, Karamanmaraş: Ukde, 2012, pp. 95-115.

109 See his arrogant speech pronounced in Paris on 17 June 2000: <http://www.collectifvan.org/article.php?r=0&id=51772>

in Mediterranean Sea: “As a result, so far, it is impossible to say that there was somewhere massacres of Armenians. It is widely discussed, but no one could provide me with a safe and accurate indication. [...] Armenians have participated in [this] action and suffered losses as all fighters. A serious study of the figures suggests that the Armenian losses did not exceed one thousand.”¹¹⁰ It is true, however, that, in addition to the clashes, the snow killed 2 or 3,000 Armenians, out of the 5,000 who left the city with the French army, in February.¹¹¹

Far from having renounced to violence after this episode, the Hunchak Party organized riots, murders and arsons in Adana, from June to August 1920. Completely exasperated, Colonel Édouard Brémont, who was a friend of the Armenian people all his life (he was recalled to Paris in September because of his biases), ordered in July to crush this violence by hanging Armenian criminals *without trial*—an order applied until the beginning of August. These extreme measures, added to the suppression of the Armenian Legion, the courts cases against other murderers and plunderers, the expulsions of Armenian nationalists leaders after the departure of Brémont and the internal conflicts among Armenian nationalists,¹¹² virtually eliminated the Armenian violence in this part of Anatolia.

General Henri Gouraud, the French High Commissioner in Beirut, summarized concisely in a note answering questions from the British government (November 1920):

“Previously arms had been indeed distributed to the Armenians, either to defend their villages or so that they could form auxiliary units attached to the French columns operating in Cilicia. In each instance, the Armenians have taken advantage of this retreat to treat the Turks exactly as the Armenians claim they have themselves been treated, looting and burning villages and massacring unarmed Muslims.”¹¹³

110 Télégramme du président du Conseil, ministre des Affaires étrangères, à l’ambassadeur français à Londres, 7 mars 1920, AMAE, P 16673. Also see SR Marine, Turquie, n° 2353, 10 octobre 1920, AMAE, P 16674.

111 Georges Boudière, « Notes sur la campagne de Syrie-Cilicie. L’affaire de Maras (janvier-février 1920) », *Turcica*, X, 1978, p. 160. Also see Maxime Bergès, *La Colonne de Marach et quelques autres récits de l’armée du Levant*, Paris, La Renaissance du livre, 1924, pp. 106-108.

112 Décision du colonel Brémont, 10 juillet 1920, CADN, 1SL/1V/139 ; Tommy Martin, Renseignements, n° 398, 13 octobre 1920, CADN, 1 SL/1V/222 ; Jugement n° 148/263, 16 juillet 1920; Jugement n° 175/290, 14 août 1920, SHD, 11 J 3202 ; Paul Bernard, *Six mois en Cilicie*, Aix-en-Provence : éditions du Feu, 1929, pp. 32 and 49-110.

113 Quoted in Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile...*, p. 207.

Needless to say, all these actions undermined the possibilities for reconciliation between Armenian and Turks in this region. However, Armenian nationalists went a step further and provoked the exile of most of their coreligionists from the province of Adana during the French withdrawal (November 1921-January 1922).¹¹⁴ Indeed, the report of the French commission of evacuation explains:

“The events that followed confirmed that this was a slogan coming from outside, and the implementation of which no one dared to escape. On December 9, heads of the [Gregorian, Catholic, and Protestant] communities explained to Mr. Franklin-Bouillon that even those Christians who were willing to stay were forced to flee, because their life was threatened.”¹¹⁵

More particularly, the Armenian nationalists-terrorists undermined the work of the joint commissions established in November 1921 by the French and the Kemalists to take care of Christian property and to concentrate the Christian population in city centers.¹¹⁶ The Armenians who wished to be members of these commissions were threatened to death by their extremist coreligionists.¹¹⁷

The Greek scorched earth policy in Western Anatolia and the Izmir fire (1922)

Since the first day of its landing in Western Anatolia, the Greek army committed committing all kind of crimes: pillages, rapes, assassinations, massacres.¹¹⁸ As a result of the pressure of the Western representatives, especially the French ones, the Greek high command was forced to put on trial a significant number of perpetrators of the crimes committed in İzmir itself during the first days. Among these culprits, twelve Armenians were sentenced, together with 48 Greeks, by the Greek military courts in 1919.¹¹⁹

114 Maxime Gauin, “How to Create a Problem of Refugees: the Evacuation of Cilicia by France and the Flow of Armenian Civilians (1921-1922),” *Review of Armenian Studies*, n° 25, 2012, pp. 65-101.

115 Rapport d'ensemble sur les opérations de la commission, mars 1922, p. 6, AMAE, P 17787. Also see Bulletin périodique n° 37 (5-20 novembre 1921), p. 5, SHD, 6 N 190.

116 The original of the regulations of these commissions is in: Bulletin de renseignements n° 285, 11-13 décembre 1921, SHD, 4 H 61, dossier 3. I translated this text into English in “How to create...”, p. 81.

117 « L'émigration des Arméniens », *Le Temps*, 30 décembre 1921, p. 2.

118 SR Marine, Turquie, n° 717, 740, 20 mai, 24 mai 1919, SHD 1 BB7 232; Cuthbert Francis Dixon-Johnson, *The Greeks in Asia Minor*, London: Cole & C°, 1919, <http://www.tallarmeniantale.com/c-f-dixon-Greek-book.htm> ; Berthe Georges-Gaulis, *Angora, Constantinople, Londres. Moustafa Kémal et la politique anglaise en Orient*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1922, pp. 58 and 80.

119 Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, London-Bombay-Sydney: Constable & C°, 1922, p. 401.

Both war crimes and Armenian participation to these crimes continued regardless. For example, to appease the Turkish population, in 1920, several hundreds of other Armenian volunteers were fired by the Greek General Paraskevopoulos because of their aggressive attitude vis-à-vis the Turks in western Anatolia; ten were sentenced to death and executed by the Greek military justice, according to the French Navy's Intelligence Service.¹²⁰ The Greek regular army also remained passive in August 1920, when a Turkish unit annihilated an Armenian gang notorious to have committed "the worst excesses" against the Turkish civilians, including the villages that had been previously hostile to the Kemalist movement.¹²¹ In Yalova peninsula, Armenians participated to the Greek "systematic plan of destruction of Turkish villages and extinction of the Moslem population"¹²² and the Greek army apparently abandoned once again its Armenian volunteers: at least some of them were put on trial in İstanbul, in front of an Ottoman martial court.¹²³ Other Armenian gangs put fire to Turkish villages around Bursa and killed at least dozens of inhabitants in July 1921.¹²⁴ Businessman Elzéar Guiffroy, the elected head of the French community in Izmir since 1914, was requested by Paris to make a report about the Greek atrocities. Adding his proper findings to the ones of his compatriots, he submitted his notes to the MFA on July 27, 1922. Guiffroy considered that "without exaggeration," the number of Turks killed by the Greek forces and their Armenian volunteers since May 1919 was in excess of 150,000, "without counting the deported persons, estimated to be 300,000."¹²⁵

As it is well-known, during its final retreat (August-September 1922), the Greek army "did take time to set fire to the many Turkish villages and grain fields—and anything else that would burn."¹²⁶ French engineer C. Toureille, a resident in İzmir at that time, confirmed, in a very detailed report (this document seems to be based on Toureille's personal diary): "In the Turkish houses, the inhabitants were, as far as the flying soldiers could, burned alive, merciless: men, women, children."¹²⁷ What is much less known is the fact that

120 SR Marine, Affaires arméniennes, 15 novembre 1920, AMAE, P 16674.

121 SR Marine, Turquie, Dans la région d'Ismid, 10 août 1920, SHD, 7 N 3211.

122 Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question...*, p. 284 (quoting the report of an Entente's commission). Also see Maurice Gehri, *Mission d'enquête en Anatolie (12-22 mai 1921)*, Geneva, 1921 ; and *Atrocités grecques en Turquie. Second livre*, İstanbul : Ahmed Ihsan & Cie, 1921, pp. 9-22, http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/atrocites_grecques_en_turquie.pdf

123 Corps d'occupation de Constantinople — Bulletin de renseignement des 8 et 9 mai 1921, SHD 20 N 1082.

124 Rapports du capitaine Renaudineau, 18 et 19 juillet 1921, SHD, 20 N 1101.

125 AMAE, P 1380.

126 Lynn A. Scipio, *My Thirty Years in Turkey*, Rindge, Richard R. Smith Publisher, 1955, p. 179.

127 C. Toureille, *Prise de Smyrne par Moustafa Kemal — Incendie de Smyrne par les Grecs et les Arméniens*, pp. 1-2, AMAE, P 1380. Also see, in the same microfilm, *Extraits de lettres reçues de Smyrne*, septembre 1922.

the Greek army forced both Greek and Armenian civilians, including the majority who was not involved in these crimes, to leave. In the case of Eskişehir, we have the excellent report of Father Ludovic Marseille, chief of the French catholic mission in this city, who explained not only that the Greek army destroyed the city without any military reason, but also that the Christians were forced by this same leave without any security concern justifying this exile: The Turkish army had previously left the city in 1921 without doing any harm. Father Marseille's findings and conclusions were supported by General Maurice Pellé, High Commissioner in Istanbul.¹²⁸ The absence of Kemalist misdeeds in July 1921 in Eskişehir is confirmed by a report of Captain Renaudineau,

The culmination of this policy was the fire of Izmir. Prepared by the Greek army, it was primarily carried out by Armenian nationalists, because the presence of European and American ships prevented the Greek high command to order and supervise the arson openly.

Inspector of the Ottoman gendarmerie, dated 23 July 1921.¹²⁹ American documents confirm this situation for Western Anatolia in general: U.S. High Commissioner Mark Bristol wrote that “[Greek] villages were burned by the Hellenic Greeks as they retreated making it impossible for refugees to be returned to their homes even after conditions grow quite” and he was informed by U.S. Navy that “Greek refugees all tell same story: ‘Ordered evacuate by Greek military or priests. Saw towns in flames after departures.’ Say fault lies with Hellenic Greeks who burned their villages.”¹³⁰

The culmination of this policy was the fire of Izmir. Prepared by the Greek army, it was primarily carried out by Armenian nationalists, because the presence of European and American ships prevented the Greek high command to order and supervise the arson openly. Both Paul Grescovich, the chief of the Izmir fire brigade, and Mark O. Prentiss, an U.S. relief worker who conducted a personal investigation on this catastrophe, concluded that the main responsibility was an Armenian one.¹³¹ Correspondingly, the special envoy of *Le Petit Parisien* also put the blame on “Armenians and Greeks” as a result of his investigation in İzmir.¹³² In a masterpiece of concision and Cartesian

128 Télégrammes du général Pellé au ministère des Affaires étrangères, 8 et 17 septembre 1922 ; Rapport du père Ludovic Marseille, 15 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1380.

129 SHD, 20 N 1101.

130 Mark L. Bristol, Report of operations for week ending 10 September, 1922, part four; War diary, 19 September 1922; USS Litchfield to Bristol, September 7, 1922 Corrected copy, LC, Bristol papers, containers 4 and 76, File Smyrna, Navy Messages Received 1922.

131 *Report of Mr. Grescovich Commander of the Smyrna Fire Brigade on the Great fire in Smyrna, İstanbul, 1922*; “Armenians, Not Turks, Set Smyrna Ablaze Relief Worker Declares,” *The San Antonio Express*, January 22, 1923.

132 « Une journée dans les ruines de Smyrne », *Le Petit Parisien*, 28 septembre 1922, p. 3.

reasoning, Admiral Charles Dumesnil, head of the French Navy in the Near East, concluded that the Turkish regular army was entirely innocent, that the Turkish irregulars certainly committed plunder but had nothing to do in the fire, and if Greek arsonists took part to the fire, Armenian ones were very probably the main perpetrators.¹³³

A full article, and even a full book, should be written on the sensitive issue of the Izmir fire. Since it is not the only, or even the main subject of this paper, I am giving only two striking examples on the use of sources by those who accuse the Turkish army. Marjorie Housepian—who is a retired professor of English, without any degree in history—alleges that American Vice-Consul Barnes “had seen Turkish soldiers pouring gasoline liberally along the street in front of the consulate, was meanwhile working feverishly to save the consular records.”¹³⁴ The compilation of American reports by U.S. Navy officer A. J. Hepburn actually indicates:

“The fire continued to burn throughout the night though considerably diminished. Several separate fires were observed to start in locations distant from the general conflagration, plainly indicating incendiarism. The Passport office, located upon the North pier of the inner harbor, burned after midnight with many heavy explosions, probably caused by gasoline, as a number of drums had been observed in and near this building a day or two previously. This building was only a few hundred yards from the ‘Litchfields’ anchorage, and the actions of the person that fired it were plainly observed by Vice-Consul Barnes from the forecandle, although the distance was too great to allow of any sort of identification. A number of Turkish troops were stationed at the inshore end of the building at the time.”

Vice-Consul Barnes also sent this self-explanatory cable, conveniently not used by Ms. Housepian:

“American press accounts of the Smyrna irregularities arriving here contain gross exaggerations and untruths. Impossible to say definitely number of Greeks and Armenians killed—perhaps 2,000. Atrocities committed in the interior by Greeks and Armenians outstrip those committed by the Turks in Smyrna in savagery and wanton destruction. Majority of the Americans here believe Smyrna fired by Armenians.”¹³⁵

133 Qui sont les auteurs de l’incendie ?, 28 septembre 1922, AMAE, P 1380.

134 Marjorie Housepian, *Smyrna 1922. The Destruction of a City*, New York: Newmark Press, 1998, pp. 168 and 262.

135 Heath Lowry, “Turkish History: On Whose Sources Will it Be Based? A Case Study on the Burning of Izmir,” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, IX, 1989, pp. 12-14, http://english.isam.org.tr/documents/_dosyalar/_pdfler/osmanli_arastirmalari_dergisi/osmanli%C4%B1_sy9/1989_9_LOWRYHW.pdf

French Armenian “historian” Hervé Georgelin took similar liberties with the reports of French Consul general Michel Graillet. Mr. Georgelin alleges: “all reports signed by Graillet affirm, on the contrary” a responsibility of “the Turks.”¹³⁶ This accusation is entirely false. First of all, there is no document signed by Consul Graillet definitely accusing the Turks. He actually mentioned this possibility in his first reports, without going yet to a definitive conclusion. Secondly, after having rested (Graillet did a huge and particularly tiresome relief effort during the fire) and finished his investigations with Admiral Dumesnil, he concluded that the fire was put by “Armenian and Greek” arsonists, and explicitly rejected the accusations against the Turkish army. In his telegram dated 22 September 1922, Graillet wrote, dismissing the “testimonies” who accused the Turkish army: “Lies and fantasy can nothing against the reality of the facts, and imagination is even more vivid since these are people who promptly fled Smyrna.” And in his report sent four days later, he insisted:

“By my telegram n° 87 of 22 September [the one previously quoted], I demonstrated that the Armenians and the Greeks must be charged. If the Turks of Smyrna participated, it is quite possible, and an affair of revenge. But definitely the Kemalist army has nothing to do with that. Quite the contrary, it fought the disaster, with its weak ways.”¹³⁷

Reading the footnotes of Mr. Georgelin’s book proves that he worked in the microfilm where these documents are, and it is extremely difficult, to say the very least, to imagine that he could have missed them. I showed on Facebook a photo of one of these documents to Mr. Georgelin. He only answered: “You should publish about that.” So I did.

Conclusion

The CUP never conducted a policy aiming to wipe out the Ottoman Armenian policy. There was no general expulsion of the Armenians, as proved by the exemptions of hundreds of thousands, and no policy of extermination against the resettled ones. After having forced the CUP government to carry out a counter-insurgency policy in an exceptionally difficult context, the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries continued their devastating policy, killing Turks once again and worsening the demographic losses of their own people in Anatolia after 1918. As long as the mainstream Armenian (and pro-Armenian)

136 Hervé Georgelin, *La Fin de Smyrne*, Paris, CNRS, 2005, <http://books.openedition.org/editions-cnrs/2528>

137 AMAE, P 1380.

authors will refuse to admit these responsibilities, as long as most of them will continue to use fake documents (such as the “Andonian telegrams”), to slander their contradictors (called “denialists”) and to willingly distort sources, the very idea of a Turkish-Armenian dialogue will remain a dangerous illusion in most of the cases, and will be possible only with a small minority of honest and courageous specialists from the Armenian side. The problem is definitely not the divergences of interpretation—debates and controversies are only normal in history—, but the absence of intellectual honesty.

Unpublished archives

American Board of Commissioner for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) archives, Harvard University, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Houghton Library, 16.10.1, box 8.

Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), La Courneuve, microfilms P 1 380, P 16673, P 16674, P 17787.

Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), 1 SL/1V/139 ; 1 SL/1V/222 ; 36 PO/1/9 ; 36 PO/1/10.

Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (California), Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920), U.S. territorial section, box 4.

Library of Congress, manuscript division, W. Wilson papers, reel 337 ; Mark Bristol papers, containers 1, 4, 76.

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park (Maryland), RG 59, M 353, reel 7.

Service historique de la défense, Vincennes (SHD), 1 BB⁷ 232, 234, 235 ; 4 H 61 ; 11 J 3202 ; 6 N 190 ; 7 N 3211 ; 16 N 3187 ; 20 N 1101.

The National Archives, Kew Gardens (London), FO 371/6499.

Published archives

Binark, İsmet (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915-1920)*, Ankara, 1995.

Dilan, Hasan (ed.), *Fransız Diplomatik Belgelerinde Ermeni Olayları 1914-1918/Les Événements arméniens dans les documents diplomatiques français, 1914-1918*, Ankara : TTK, 2005, volume II.

McCarthy, Justin. "The Report of Niles and Sutherland—An American Investigation of Eastern Anatolia after World War I", in *XI. Türk Tarih Kongresi*, Ankara: TTK, 1994, volume V, pp. 1809-1852.

Özdemir, Hikmet and Yusuf Sarıнай. *Turkish-Armenian Conflict Documents*, Ankara: TBMM, 2007.

Sarafian, Ara (ed.) *United States Diplomacy on The Bosphorus: The Diaries of Ambassador Morgenthau 1913-1916*, London: Gomidas Institute/Taderon Press, 2004.

Sarafian, Ara (ed.) *United States Official Documents on the Armenian Genocide*, Princeton-London: Gomidas Institute, 2004.

Sarıнай, Yusuf (ed.) *Ermeniler Tarafından Yapılan Katliam Belgeleri*, Ankara, 2001, volume II, pp. 1039-1041.

Sonyel, Salahi. *The Displacement of Armenians: Documents*, Ankara: TTK, 1978.

Printed sources

Refik (Altınay), Ahmet. *Two Committees, Two Massacres*, Firodil, 2006.

Atrocités grecques en Turquie. Second livre, İstanbul : Ahmed Ihsan & Cie, 1921, pp. 9-22,
http://louisville.edu/a-s/history/turks/atrocites_grecques_en_turquie.pdf

Bergès, Maxime. *La Colonne de Marach et quelques autres récits de l'armée du Levant*, Paris, La Renaissance du livre, 1924.

Bernard, Paul. *Six mois en Cilicie*, Aix-en-Provence, éditions du Feu, 1929.

Halidé Edib (Halide Edip), *The Turkish Ordeal*, New York-London: The Century C°, 1928.

Gautherot, Gustave. *La France en Syrie et en Cilicie*, Courbevoie : Librairie indépendante, 1920.

Gehri, Maurice. *Mission d'enquête en Anatolie (12-22 mai 1921)*, Geneva, 1921.

Grescovich, Paul. *Report of Mr. Grescovich Commander of the Smyrna Fire Brigade on the Great fire in Smyrna*, İstanbul, 1922.

Lalaian, A. A. *The Counter-Revolutionary Role of the Dashnagzoutiun Party (1914-1923)*, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007.

Hartunian, Abraham H. *Neither to Laugh nor to Weep. A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1976.

Morgenthau, Henry. *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, New York: Doubleday, Page & C°, 1918.

Nogales, Rafael de. *Four Years Beneath the Crescent*, New York-London: Charles Scribner's, 1926.

Prentiss, Mark O. "Armenians, Not Turks, Set Smyrna Ablaze Relief Worker Declares," *The San Antonio Express*, January 22, 1923.

Relief of Armenians. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916.

Riggs, Henry. *Days of Tragedy in Armenia*, Ann Harbord: Gomidas Institute, 1997.

Tverbokhlebov, Vladimir N. *Gördüklerim Yaşadıklarım/I Witnessed and Lived Through/Ce que j'ai vu et vécu moi-même*, Ankara: ATASE, 2007.

"Une journée dans les ruines de Smyrne", *Le Petit Parisien*, 28 septembre 1922.

Bibliography

Aharonian, Avetis and Boghos Nubar, *The Armenian Question Before the Paris Peace Conference*, Paris : Imprimerie Dupont, 1919.

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2014.

Akçam, Taner. *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity*, Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Balakian, Peter. *The Burning Tigris. The Armenian Genocide and America's Response*, New York: Perennial, 2004.

Çiçek, Kemal. *The Great War and the Forced Migration of Armenians*, Belfast: Athol Books, 2011.

Dadrian, Vahakn N. "The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I

- Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, XVIII-3, August 1986, pp. 311-360.
- Dixon-Johnson, Cuthbert Francis. *The Greeks in Asia Minor*, London: Cole & C°, 1919,
- Dündar, Fuat. “Taner Akçam’ın Son Kitabı Vesilesiyle %10 Katliam Sorunu: Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuş mudur?,” *Toplumsal Tarih*, June 2008, pp. 181-183.
- Erickson, Edward J. *Ottomans and Armenians. A Study in Counter-Insurgency*, New York-London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.
- Ertan, Semi. *An Armenian at the Turkish Parliament in the Early Republican Period: Berç Türker Keresteciyan*, master thesis, Sabancı University, <http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2007/03/1473-armenian-at-parliament-in-early.html>
- Fay, Sidney Bradshaw. *The Origins of the World War*, New York-Toronto-London: MacMillan, 1928, volume II.
- Findley, Carter Vaughn. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernity. A History, 1789-2007*, New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2010.
- Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace*, New York: Owl Books, 2001.
- Gauin, Maxime. “How to Create a Problem of Refugees: the Evacuation of Cilicia by France and the Flow of Armenian Civilians (1921-1922),” *Review of Armenian Studies*, n° 25, 2012, pp. 65-101.
- Gauin, Maxime. “The Convergent Analysis of Russian, British, French, and American Officials Regarding the Armenian Volunteers (1914-1922),” *International Review of Turkish Studies*, I-4, pp. 8-43.
- Georgelin, Hervé. *La Fin de Smyrne*, Paris, CNRS, 2005.
- Georges-Gaulis, Berthe. *Angora, Constantinople, Londres. Moustafa Kémal et la politique anglaise en Orient*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1922.
- Güçlü, Yücel. “Mislabeling Genocide?,” *The Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2006, pp. 67–68, <http://www.meforum.org/969/the-great-game-of-genocide>

Güçlü, Yücel. *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia (1914-1923)*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010.

Güçlü, Yücel. *The Holocaust and the Armenian Case in Comparative Perspective*, Lanham-Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth: University Press of America, 2012.

Günay, Nejla. *XX. Yüzyılda Maraş (Ermeniler, Türkler, Müslümanlar). Makaleler*, Karamanmaraş: Ukde, 2012.

Halaçoğlu, Yusuf. *Facts on the Relocation of Armenians (1914-1918)*, Ankara: TTK, 2002.

Halaçoğlu, Yusuf. *The Story of 1915. What happened to the Ottoman Armenians?*, Ankara: TTK, 2008.

Housepian, Marjorie. *Smyrna 1922. The Destruction of a City*, New York: Newmark Press, 1998.

Hovannisian, Richard G. *Armenia on the Road to Independence*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1967.

Hovannisian, Richard G. *The Republic of Armenia*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, volume I, 1971, and II, 1982.

Kaiser, Hilmar. "Regional resistance to central government policies: Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the governors of Aleppo, and Armenian deportees in the spring and summer of 1915," *Journal of Genocide Research*, XII-3/4, 2010, pp. 173-218.

Langer, William. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Lewis, Bernard. *Notes on a Century. Reflections of a Middle East Historian*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Lewy, Guenter. *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005.

- Lowry, Heath. "Richard G. Hovannisian on Lieutenant Robert Steed Dunn. A Review Note," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, V, 1985, pp. 209-252, http://english.isam.org.tr/documents/_dosyalar/_pdfler/osmanli_arastirmalari_dergisi/osmanl%C4%B1_sy5/1986_5_LOWRYHW.pdf
- Lowry, Heath. "Turkish History: On Whose Sources Will it Be Based? A Case Study on the Burning of Izmir," *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, IX, 1989, pp. 12-14, http://english.isam.org.tr/documents/_dosyalar/_pdfler/osmanli_arastirmalari_dergisi/osmanl%C4%B1_sy9/1989_9_LOWRYHW.pdf
- Lowry, Heath. *The Story Behind "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story"*, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1990.
- McCarthy, Justin, Cemalettin Taşkıran and Ömer Turan, *Sasun: The History of an 1890s Armenian Revolt*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2014.
- McCarthy, Justin, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taşkıran and Ömer Turan, *The Armenian Rebellion at Van*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006.
- McCarthy, Justin. "The Population of the Ottoman Armenians," in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), *The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period*, Ankara: TTK/TBMM, 2002, pp. 65-85.
- McCarthy, Justin. "Wellington House and the Turks," in *The Turks*, Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002, volume V, pp. 457-467.
- McCarthy, Justin. *Muslims and Minorities. The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, New York-London: New York University, 1983.
- Moumdjian, Garabet. "Rebels With a Cause — Armenian-Macedonian Relations and their Bulgarian Connection, 1895-1913," in Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi (ed.), *War and Nationalism. The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, and their Sociopolitical Implications*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013, pp. 131-175.
- Pallis, A. A. *Greece's Anatolian Venture—and After*, London: Methuen & Co, 1937.
- Planhol, Xavier de. *Minorités en Islam*, Paris : Flammarion, 1997.

Read, James Morgan. *Atrocity Propaganda. 1914-1919*, New Haven-London: Yale University Press/Oxford University Press, 1941.

Şahin, Erman. "A Scrutiny of Akçam's Version of History and the Armenian Genocide," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVIII-2, August 2008, pp. 303-319, <http://tc-america.org/files/news/pdf/Erman-Sahin-Review-Article.pdf>

Salt, Jeremy. *Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878-1896*, London-Portland: Frank Cass, 1993.

Sarıнай, Yusuf. "What Happened on April 24, 1915? The Circular of April 24, 1915, and the Arrest of Armenian Committee Members in Istanbul," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, XIV-1 & 2, Fall 2008, pp. 75-101, http://www.turkishcanadians.com/wp-content/uploads/april_-24.pdf

Scipio, Lynn A. *My Thirty Years in Turkey*, Rindge, Richard R. Smith Publisher, 1955.

Shaw, Stanford Jay and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, volume II, 1978.

Shaw, Stanford Jay. "The Armenian Legion and its Destruction of the Armenian Community in Cilicia," in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), *The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period*, pp. 155-206.

Shaw, Stanford Jay. *The Ottoman Empire in World War I*, Ankara: TTK, volume II, 2008.

Sperco, Willy. *Turcs d'hier et d'aujourd'hui*, Paris : Nouvelles éditions latines, 1961.

Ternon, Yves. *Les Arméniens, histoire d'un génocide*, Paris : Le Seuil, 1996.

Toynbee, Arnold *Acquaintances*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Toynbee, Arnold J. *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, London-Bombay-Sydney: Constable & C°, 1922.

Tuncel, Turgut Kerem. *Armenian Diaspora: State and the Imagination of the Republic of Armenia*, Ankara: Terazi Publications, 2014.

Veinstein, Gilles. "Trois questions sur un massacre", *L'Histoire*, April 1995, pp. 40-41.

Weber, Frank G. *Eagles on the Crescent. Germany, Austria and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance. 1914-1918*, Ithaca (NY)-London: Cornell University Press, 1970.

Zamir, Meir. "Population statistics of the Ottoman empire in 1914 and 1919," *Middle Eastern Studies*, XVII-1, January 1981, pp. 85-106.

Zürcher, Erik Jan. *Turkey. A Modern History*, London-New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004.

THE RISE AND FALL OF ASALA AND ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION TERRORISM

(ASALA VE EDF TERÖRİZMİNİN
ORTAYA ÇIKIŞI VE ÇÖKÜŞÜ)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Christopher GUNN
Coastal Carolina University,
Department of History

Abstract: *Between 1973 and 1988, Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) waged a campaign of violence against Turkey and its citizens. These terrorist organizations killed approximately 90 individuals and wounded hundreds more through a combination of attacks that spanned North America, Europe, the Middle East and the south Pacific and targeted ethnic Turks, assets of the Turkish government, and Turkish business interests. By the early 1980s, these two organizations earned reputations as the most dangerous, savage and mysterious terrorist groups in existence. Armenian terrorism, however had virtually no chance of reaching its publicly stated goals. ASALA and the ARF demanded acknowledgement of the Armenian genocide; reparations for the families of the victims; and possession of eastern Anatolia. Contrary to their aims, the Turkish government was not going to revise their history, and the prospect of violating the territorial sovereignty of the Turkish Republic was inconceivable. Yet, Armenian terrorism thrived for over a decade before abruptly fading away in the second half of the 1980s. Making use of the primary documents now available, this work will analyze the reasons why ASALA and the ARF took up arms in 1975, how they sustained themselves, and why they suddenly disappeared. It will argue that Armenian terrorism was the end result of a policy of aggressive nationalism based on anti-Turkishness that was introduced in 1959 and used for short-term and local political gains. Recognizing the success of this new policy, the ARF continued to promote anti-Turkishness throughout 1960s and early 1970s. After witnessing the positive response to the increasing violence and the emergence of favorable international conditions, the ARF embraced violence as means to obtain their ultimate political goal: eastern Anatolia. At the very same time, three Armenian intellectuals and a young Armenian terrorist with experience in various Palestinian organizations were creating a new terrorist organization of their own, ASALA. ASALA and the ARF/JCAG operated for over a decade, and were able to sustain themselves because of the steadfast support of the Armenian diaspora for a terrorist campaign that killed Turks. The campaigns finally ended after the violence not only became an end in itself, but had turned the two groups against each other in an inter-group struggle that decimated their ranks.*

Keywords: *Cold War, Terrorism, Armenian Terrorism, Armenian Diaspora, Armenia, Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Dashnak, Melkonian, Tehlirian, Yanikian, ASALA, Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide*

Öz: 1973 ile 1988 seneleri arasında, ASALA ve Ermeni Devrimci Federasyonu (EDF) Türkiye ve vatandaşlarına karşı bir şiddet kampanyası sürdürmüştür. Bu terör örgütleri gerçekleştirdikleri saldırılarla –Kuzey Amerika, Avrupa, Orta Doğu ve güney Pasifik'i kapsayacak şekilde- yaklaşık olarak 90 kişiyi öldürmüş ve daha yüzlercesini de yaralamış ve etnik Türkleri, Türk hükümetinin mallarını ve Türk işyerlerini hedef almıştır. 1980'lerin başına gelindiğinde, bu iki örgüt var olan en tehlikeli, vahşi ve gizemli terör örgütü olma unvanını elde etmiştir. Ancak Ermeni terörünün alenen beyan ettiği hedefleri ulaşmasının neredeyse imkânsızdı. ASALA ve EDF sözde Ermeni soykırımın tanınmasını, mağdurların ailelerine tazminat ödenmesini ve doğu Anadolu'ya sahip olmayı talep ediyordu. Hedeflerinin aksine, Türk hükümetinin tarihini gözden geçirmeye niyeti yoktu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin toprak bütünlüğünün ihlal edilmesi düşünülemezdi bile. Ancak Ermeni terörizmi, 10 seneden fazla bir süre içerisinde kuvvetlenerek varlığını devam etmiş, 1980'lerin ikinci yarısında sonra ise ansızın sönüp gitmiştir. Artık erişilebilir olan birincil kaynak niteliğindeki belgeler sayesinde bu makale; ASALA ve EDF'nin 1975'de neden silahlandıklarını, varlıklarını nasıl sürdürdüklerini ve bir andan neden ortadan kaybolduklarını inceleyecektir. Makale; Ermeni terörizminin 1959'da ortaya atılan, Türk karşıtlığı üzerine kurulu olan, bir saldırgan milliyetçilik politikasının sonucu olduğunu ve kısa dönemli ve yerer siyasi kazanımlar için kullanıldığını belirtecektir. Bu yeni politikanın başarısının farkına varan EDF, 1960'lar ve 1970'leirn başı boyunca Türk karşıtlığını teşvik etmeye devam etmiştir. Artan şiddete yönelik olumlu tepkilere ve uygun uluslararası koşulların ortaya çıkışına tanıklık eden EDF, esas siyasi hedefleri olan doğu Anadolu'yu elde etmek için şiddeti bir araç olarak benimsemiştir. Aynı sıralarda ise, üç Ermeni entelektüeli ve bir takım Filistin örgütlerinde tecrübe elde etmiş olan genç bir Ermeni terörist, kendileri için ASALA adında yeni bir terör örgütü kuruyorlardı. ASALA ve EDF/JCAG, 10 seneden uzun bir süre faaliyet gösterdiler ve Ermeni diasporasının Türkleri öldüren bir terör kampanyasına olan sebatkâr desteği sayesinde varlıklarını sürdürdüler. Bu terör kampanyası; uygulanan şiddet bir araçtan amaca dönüştüğünde ve iki grubun birbirine düşman hale geldiği ve mensuplarının karşılıklı olarak yok edilmesine sebep olan bir gruplar arası çatışma sonucunda son buldu.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Soğuk Savaş, terörizm, Ermeni terörü, Ermeni diasporası, Ermenistan, Ermeni Devrimci Federasyonu, EDF, Taşnaklar, Melkonian, Tehlirian, Yanikian, ASALA, Ermeni Soykırımı için Adalet Komandoları, JCAG*

Between 1973 and 1988, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the armed wing of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), first as the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and later as the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) led one of the most unique terrorist movements to emerge out of the eastern Mediterranean during the early 1970s. Their terrorists killed approximately 90 individuals and wounded hundreds more through a combination of assassinations, bombing campaigns and violent assaults that spanned North America, Europe, the Middle East and the south Pacific and targeted ethnic Turks, assets of the Turkish government, and Turkish business interests.

Before fading in the late 1980s, ASALA and the JCAG/ARA were linked to various militant Palestinian factions, as well as other international terrorist organizations, international narcotic trafficking, international extortion rings and even to the USSR, Libya, Syria, Greece and Cyprus.¹ In a geographical and temporal environment where the Armenian organizations had to compete with such groups as the Italian Red Brigades, the German Red Army Faction, the Irish Republican Army, the Basque ETA, and the PLO for media exposure and government attention, the Armenians managed extremely well. In the early 1980s, various U.S. government officials described Armenian terrorists as the most dangerous, savage and mysterious group in existence, and in 1981 they actually accounted for the highest number of documented international terrorist attacks in the world.²

The groups' most ignominious acts were the murders of Turkish diplomats and their immediate family members, which took 31 lives between 1973 and 1984, and included the 1980 assassination of the Turkish administrative attaché to Greece and his 14-year old daughter by Monte Melkonian, a native Californian and an honors graduate of the University of California, Berkeley.³ What made

1 For just a sampling see Andrew Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," in Department of State Bulletin Vol. 82, No. 2065 (August 1982), 35; Michael Gunter, "Pursuing the Just Cause of their People": A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986); Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, *ASALA—Irrational Terror or Political Tool* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 39-52; Paul Henze, *GOAL: Destabilization: Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability and Terrorism in NATO South* (Marina del Rey, CA: European Institute for Security Research, 1981), 36; Andrew Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 12; Marvin Howe, "Turks Blame Cypriots for Attacks in Name of Armenians," *New York Times*, February 28, 1980; E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Armenian Terror: Tangle of Motives," *New York Times*, August 1, 1983; and *Armenian Terrorism, Its Supporters, the Narcotic Connection, the Distortion of History* (Ankara, Turkey: Ankara University, 1984).

2 "Armenian Terrorists," January 10, 1983, CIA, CIA-RDP88-01070R000100520004-4; "Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981," *Department of State Bulletin* Vol. 82, No. 2065 (August 1982): 16; and Gunter, "Pursuing the Just Cause of their People", 1.

3 Bilal N. Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız* (1973-1994), Vol. 2, (Ankara, Turkey: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), 967-968; and Markar Melkonian, *My Brother's Road: An American's Fateful Journey to Armenia*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 84.

the Armenian terrorist campaign unique, however, was neither the diversity nor barbarity of its ideologues, nor had the sudden and violent reemergence of the Armenian Question five decades after it been settled by the international community with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, but that it had virtually no chance of reaching its publicly stated goals.

ASALA and the ARF wanted first, to force the Turkish government to acknowledge that the ethnic conflict in eastern Anatolia in 1915 was an Ottoman-sponsored and directed genocide against the Armenians; second, to pay reparations to the families of these victims; and third, to return the

ASALA and the ARF wanted first, to force the Turkish government to acknowledge that the ethnic conflict in eastern Anatolia in 1915 was an Ottoman-sponsored and directed genocide against the Armenians; second, to pay reparations to the families of these victims; and third, to return the provinces of eastern Anatolia to the Armenians.

provinces of eastern Anatolia to the Armenians. Contrary to the aims and aspirations of the terrorists, however, Turkey's government was not going to revise their country's history to adopt the Armenian version of 1915. By extension, therefore, discussions over reparations were meaningless. Finally, the prospect of violating the territorial sovereignty of the Turkish Republic, especially along the longest NATO border with the USSR during the height of the Cold War, was quixotic at best. Yet, Armenian terrorism not only continued, it thrived for over a decade before abruptly fading away in the second half of the 1980s, despite an upsurge in terrorism at the exact same time.⁴

This essay will analyze earlier research on

ASALA and ARF terrorism before summarizing what can be learned from a much broader review of the sources and the context within which Armenian terrorists operated, along with recently declassified documents from the U.S. State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Historiography

The literature and historiography of the broader fields with which Armenian terrorism is tangential: the Armenian diaspora; the Armenian Question; terrorism and the more familiar terrorist organizations of the late 20th century: the IRA, PLO, ETA, and the Red Brigades; U.S.-Soviet détente; and Turkish political history; are more mature and developed. What does exist tends to

4 "Terrorism Review," CIA, Dec. 14 1989, CIA Doc No/ESDN: 0000258747, CREST.

focus on the glorification and analysis of the ARF's Operation Nemesis during the early 1920s. This operation was designed to facilitate the ARF's decision to assassinate a number of prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the last political organization to hold real power in the Ottoman Empire, and the government of Azerbaijan who were held responsible for the Armenian massacres of 1915 and beyond.⁵

The literature in English on ASALA, the ARF's JCAG/ARA, and their campaign of violence against Turkey to achieve the recognition of the Armenian genocide, the lands of eastern Anatolia, and reparations for the massacres of 1915, is comprised of essentially two books, "*Pursuing the Just Cause of their People*": *A Study of Contemporary Armenian* by Michael Gunter and *ASALA—Irrational Terror or Political Tool* by Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari.⁶ Both of these books were written in the mid-1980s, before it was clear that their campaigns had essentially run their course, and were primarily concerned with the origins of the groups. This material, by necessity, relied heavily on an account published by Monte Melkonian, one of the former key members of ASALA, who broke with ASALA's leader and created his own faction. While the information does provide important insight, its content was obviously slanted towards Melkonian's version, or desired version, of events. Over the past two and a half decades, these two small books on the subject have been supplemented by only a handful of Turkish government publications, a conference publication, a few scholarly articles, many of these by Gunter, a picture book to accompany a documentary, and a dissertation.⁷ Research that

5 Edward Alexander, *A Crime of Vengeance: An Armenian Struggle for Justice* (New York: Free Press, 1991); Lindy V. Avakian, *Cross and the Crescent* (Phoenix, AZ: USC Press, 1989); Jacques Derogy, *Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of the Turkish Leaders Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990); Arshavir Shiragian, *The Legacy: Memoirs of an Armenian Patriot* (Boston: Hairenik Press, 1976); Vartkes Yeghiayan, *The Case of Soghomon Tehlirian*, 2nd Edition (Glendale, CA: Center for Armenian Remembrance, 2006); and *The Case of Misak Torlakian* (Glendale, CA: Center for Armenian Remembrance, 2006). At least three new publications on Operation Nemesis are being released in the spring of 2015. See Marian Mesrobian MacCurdy, *Sacred Justice: The Voices and Legacy of the Operation Nemesis* (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2015); Eric Bogosian, *Operation Nemesis: The Assassination Plot that Avenged the Armenian Genocide* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015); and the graphic novel by Josh Blaylock, *Operation Nemesis: A Story of Genocide and Revenge* (Devil's Due Entertainment, 2015).

6 Gunter, "*Pursuing the Just Cause*,"; and Kurz and Merari, *ASALA*. An academic book in French and a recent publication in Dutch also exist. See Gaïdz Minassian, *Guerre et Terrorisme arméniens* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002); Paul Moussault and Barbara Sahakian, *ASALA, de Nemesis voor de Armeense genocide - Stadsguerrilla tegen Turkije (1975-1988)* (Netherlands: Papieren Tijger, 2015).

7 *Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism: Testimonies of Witnesses* (Washington, DC: Assembly of Turkish American Associations, 1997); Ankara University, *Armenian Terrorism*; Laura Dugan, et. al., "Sudden Desistance from Terrorism: The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide," in *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* Vol. 1, No. 3 (November

intersects, or overlaps, this period of Armenian political violence in broader studies, either devotes minimal attention to the topic, replete with careless or intentional misinformation, downplays its significance, or, simply outright ignores it.⁸ It should be acknowledged, however that additional scholarship on ASALA and the JCAG/ARA in the twenty-five years since the organizations have ceased operations were most likely impeded by four factors.

First, unlike, for example, the Red Brigades and the Red Army Faction, none of the Armenian operatives from either organization who were ever captured or detained were part of the leadership group. Furthermore, the ASALA and JCAG/ARA members who were caught refused to cooperate publicly with the arresting authorities, and so provided very little insight or information into the organizations, gave no interviews after they were released, and none have published detailed memoirs in the intervening years.⁹ Second, the headquarters of both ASALA and the JCAG/ARA were located in Beirut from 1975 until, at least in the case of ASALA, the Israeli invasion in 1982. Even if the operational leadership of ASALA maintained their own records, which is doubtful, it is unlikely that they survived the chaos of civil war and their subsequent relocation to Damascus, later Athens, after the Israeli invasion. While the ARF does maintain the organization's archive in Boston, MA, it is rarely opened for researchers and doubtful that the activities of JCAG/ARA were documented.

The third factor is that most of primary documents of these organizations would be in Armenian, and scholars with Armenian language skills have avoided the topic. This is the case with the *Spurk* archive at the U.S. Library of Congress.

2008): 231-249; Erich Feigl, *A Myth of Terror Exposed: Armenian Extremism, its Causes and its Historical Context* (Freilassing, AT: Edition Zeitgeschichte, 1987); Michael M. Gunter, "Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (Winter 2007): 109 – 128; "Transnational Armenian Activism," in *Beyond the Soviet Union: the Fragmentation of Power*, edited by Max Beloff (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997), 23-57; "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism," *Terrorism: An International Journal* Vol. 8, No. 3 (1986): 213-252; "Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism," *Journal of Conflict Studies* Vol. V, No. 4 (Fall 1985): 31-52; and Michael J. Kelly, "The Media and Terrorism: An Examination of News Coverage of Armenian Terrorism in Canada," PhD Diss., Carleton University, 1987.

8 Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars* (London: Hurst & Company, 2006), 310-311; Melkonian, *My Brother's Road*; Michael Bobelian, *Children of Armenia: A Forgotten Genocide and the Century-Long Struggle for Justice* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 158-160; Thomas de Waal, *Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); and Melanie Toumani, *There Was and There Was Not: A Journey Through Hate and Possibility in Turkey, Armenia, and Beyond* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014).

9 The exception being the ASALA agent who revealed the critical information regarding Hagop Hagopian's residence in Athens, Greece in the fall of 1987 to the FBI.

Spurk was a leftist Armenian weekly published in Beirut whose owners and editors were two of the four founding members of ASALA. Undoubtedly rich in primary source material, over 80 percent of the archive is in Armenian. Finally, Turkish government documents on this most recent phase of Armenian terrorism either have not been declassified, or remain inaccessible to researchers, and only very recently have U.S. government documents on ASALA and the JCAG/ARA become available.¹⁰ Of those, the U.S. State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have released considerably more than the Central Intelligence Agency.

ASALA & the ARF's JCAG/ARA

The former narrative explaining the violent re-emergence of the “Armenian question” in 1975 cites three specific events that occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s that galvanized and strengthened Armenian public opinion, and triggered their decision to act on their grievances against the Turkish government. The first event was the commemorations and anti-Turkish demonstrations held to mark the 50th anniversary of the events of 1915 on April 24, 1965 in both Beirut, Lebanon and Yerevan, Soviet Armenia.¹¹ The concurrent demonstrations in Lebanon are attributed with establishing April 24 as the official day of commemoration of the Armenian Massacres,¹² while the latter, which developed into a boisterous demonstration that was eventually suppressed by the Soviet authorities, extracted concessions from the Soviet government allowing for the annual commemoration of April 24th with public demonstrations and permission to construct a memorial to the victims and territories lost to Turkey in 1915 in Yerevan.¹³

The most commonly held belief is that the Armenian people spontaneously “awoke” during these commemorations: after fifty years, the Armenians were no longer willing to tolerate the indifference, apathy and political machinations of the Western governments that betrayed them between 1915 and 1923. They began to protest, demonstrate, and advocate for their cause, and demanded that the world, and particularly the Republic of Turkey, acknowledge that the massacres and relocations Armenians endured at the hands of the Ottoman Empire constituted genocide, and they wanted the Turkey to pay for the crimes of their predecessor. What this meant for the most vocal Armenian groups in

10 This author began submitting Freedom of Information Act Requests in the spring of 2010. Prior to that date, very little had been released.

11 Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause*, 31-32.

12 *Ibid.*, 31.

13 Bobelian, *Children of Armenia*, 5.

the mid-1960s, was an admission of guilt from Turkey, a formal apology, punishment (i.e. international condemnation), reparations, and the return of the historic Armenian homeland that they had lost some five centuries ago, or, at a minimum, the Armenia that President Wilson had drawn for them during the First World War.

The next major event occurred in January 1973, when a 78-year old ethnic Armenian-American named Gourgen Yanikian lured both the Turkish Consul General and Consul of the Los Angeles to lunch at a Santa Barbara hotel. Instead of returning a painting which had been stolen from the Ottoman Sultan's residence that he claimed to be in possession of, Yanikian shot and killed both men at point-blank range inside his hotel room. While Yanikian unsuccessfully attempted to turn his murder trial into an indictment of the Turkish government for the events of 1915, the proceedings stimulated the increasingly violent nationalism of not only the Armenian communities of California, but throughout the diaspora. While the subsequent investigation concluded that Yanikian carried out the murders on his own, his act became the model and inspiration for the assassination of Turkish diplomats around the world over the ensuing decade.¹⁴

The final act occurred in 1974, when a paragraph specifically labeling the events of 1915 as the "first case of genocide in the twentieth century" was deleted from a report on the prevention of genocide that was submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights.¹⁵ Perhaps on its own, this deletion would have gone unnoticed, or at least uncontested, but in conjunction with the rising assertiveness of the various Armenian diaspora since 1965, and the relatively well publicized murders of the Turkish diplomats in 1973, the deletion caused indignation and exasperation on the part of Armenians worldwide. According to their political leadership, not only was their just demands 'ignored', but the international community was allied with Turkey in the mid-1960s and early 1970s to frustrate their 'peaceful and justified political demands' and thwart their efforts in the United Nations.

The Armenian youth, disappointed with the incompetence and inactivity of the Armenian diaspora's traditional parties, and inspired by the actions of Yanikian, took matters into their own hands. Eschewing non-violence, they adopted the 'language' of the times, and like the Palestinians, Irish, Basques, and radical Marxist-Leninist groups in West Germany, Italy and Japan, and embraced international terrorism as a means to give voice to their frustrations, ideals and

14 Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause*, 36-37; Kurz and Merari, 3; and Bobelian, 148-158.

15 Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause*, 36-37; and Kurz and Merari, 62.

demands. By 1975, these factors led to the emergence of two groups based in a hostile, violent and politically deteriorating Beirut: the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), an Armenian terrorist organization that, ironically, carried out its first attack against the World Council of Churches, an institution helping Armenian refugees in Lebanon.¹⁶ Fearful that this new organization would undermine its position in the diaspora, and draw Armenian youth away from its ranks, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) activated an armed wing, known first as the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG).¹⁷ While the specifics of ASALA's origins were, until recently, unclear, the ARF is one of the original and most powerful modern era Armenian political parties, whose origins date to 1890.¹⁸

Although ASALA was a Marxist organization, and the JCAG leaned to the right, they were nearly unanimous in the goals they sought to achieve through their violent attacks: first, to force the Turkish government to recognize and admit that the forced relocations and Armenian deaths in eastern Anatolia in 1915 constituted an act of genocide; second, to force the Turkish government to make financial reparations to the survivors and, if necessary, their descendants, of 1915; and third, to liberate the Armenian provinces of eastern Turkey. The two groups differed, however, was over what the third aim actually entailed. The ARF appears to have envisioned a relatively ambiguous, independent Armenia carved out of eastern Turkey.¹⁹ ASALA sought an independent Armenia that encompassed all of the historic lands of the ancient kingdom, which inevitably meant some form of either collaboration, or conflict, with the Soviet Union and Soviet Armenia.²⁰ Due to

Due to their Marxist ideology, most observers believed that ASALA aimed at unifying Turkey's eastern provinces with Soviet Armenia. Agreements or disagreements over the details of their specific aims, though, turned out to be a relatively moot point. Not only did they ultimately fail to achieve their goals, but even contemporary (and subsequent) observers, during the height of the campaign, saw virtually no chance for the Armenian terrorists to force recognition, financial compensation or territory from the Turkish government.

16 Corsun, *Armenian Terrorism*, 31, 34; Popular Movement for the ASALA, ASALA Interviews (Great Britain, April 1982), 9; Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause*, 33; and Kurz and Merari, 21. Melkonian provides one of the more accurate descriptions of ASALA's creation, but does not relate the entire story.

17 Corsun, 32; Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause*, 55-56; and "Terrorism Review," CIA, July 29, 1985, 15.

18 Corsun, 33; Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause*, 55; Kurz and Merari, 17; and "Terrorism Review, CIA, July 29, 1985, CREST.

19 Corsun, 33.

20 ASALA Interviews, 31; Kurz and Merari, 1.

their Marxist ideology, most observers believed that ASALA aimed at unifying Turkey's eastern provinces with Soviet Armenia.²¹ Agreements or disagreements over the details of their specific aims, though, turned out to be a relatively moot point. Not only did they ultimately fail to achieve their goals, but even contemporary (and subsequent) observers, during the height of the campaign, saw virtually no chance for the Armenian terrorists to force recognition, financial compensation or territory from the Turkish government.²²

Furthermore, in a recent study on the history of terrorism, the author admits that the Armenian terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s defy normal categorization, simply because these movements had “no hope of success.”²³ Other motivations have been suggested, including the desire to raise global awareness to the events of 1915, to “re-awaken” the dormant, or sleeping Armenian nationalism of the diaspora or even more simply, that the Armenian groups just wanted to murder Turks, and felt justified in doing so, in revenge for the massacres of 1915.²⁴ The JCAG, however, came out on at least one occasion to publicly to dispel this notion.²⁵ The reasons for the sudden disappearance of ASALA and the ARF's JCAG/ARA in the mid-1980s has also largely been left out of the narrative.

While the story will not be truly complete until all the relevant Turkish, Armenian, French, Cypriot and Greek documents are available to scholars, a closer look at the relevant sources and the voluminous amount of material declassified and released by the U.S. Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, the Ronald Reagan Library, and the Spurr archive, have shed a tremendous amount of light on the campaign of Armenian political violence between 1973 and 1988. Although the broad strokes provided by Gunter, Kurz, Merari and other early analysts are still largely valid, the new material provides an opportunity to fill in the many gaps that exist on the emergence of Armenian political violence in 1975, and, just as important, the reasons for its sudden disappearance in the mid-1980s.

21 Metin Tamkoç, “International Terrorism: The Russian Connection,” in *Armenian Terrorism, Its Supporters, the Narcotic Connection, the Distortion of History* (Ankara, Turkey: Ankara University, 1984), 64.

22 Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause*, 36; *Terrorism Review*, 16; and Kurz and Merari, 19.

23 Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, eds., *The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda*, Kindle Edition (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2007), location 3046.

24 Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause*, 36; Kurz and Merari, 3; and Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror*, 11.

25 Corsun, 34.

Towards A Broader Narrative of Armenian Political Violence

The rather strait forward and simplistic narrative described above conceals much of the truth and many of the nuances that make the story of Armenian political violence between 1975 and 1988 so tragic. First, the ‘re-awakening’ of the Armenian people in 1965, was not a spontaneous event, but rather the culmination of a deliberate attempt by the ARF and elements within the Armenian SSR to separate the massacres and deportations of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire from the much more convoluted “Armenian Question” in order to implement an aggressive policy of anti-Turkishness throughout the Armenian diaspora and the Armenian SSR. One of the most tragic components of this period, and one which would have severe ramifications for the period of Armenian political violence, was the successful transfer of responsibility for the crimes of 1915 to the entire, collective population of modern Turkey. For many Armenians, the ‘Turks’ of 1915 were no different from the modern citizens of the Turkish Republic: guilty, and worthy of whatever punishment came their way. The plan to instigate tension and encourage animosity between Armenians and Turks, however, was simply carried out in order to achieve political gains inside the Armenian diaspora. The ARF, the Armenian SSR, and the Soviet Union never had any intention of following through with the demands being made by Armenians around the world with anything other than empty promises.

The ARF continued its policy of anti-Turkishness for the remainder of the 1960s and early 1970s, and implored Armenians everywhere to help publicize the details of the Armenian Cause and the crimes of the Turkish government. Many in the diaspora heeded the call, and devoted their time and energy to publications, erecting monuments, organizing community events, and demonstrating, protesting and advocating for the Armenian Cause. The anti-Turkishness promoted by the ARF was embraced by the Armenian diaspora, particularly by the Armenian youth in the United States, where student activism was burgeoning in response to the Civil Rights Movement and anti-Vietnam war activity. Protests and demonstrations against the Turkish government became increasingly more aggressive in nature and acts of violence against Turkish government facilities occurred. The radicalization of Armenian youth in the United States did not go unnoticed by Turkey’s apprehensive diplomatic staff posted to the U.S., but the U.S. government and local authorities largely disregarded their concerns.

Tragically, their worst fears were realized in January 1973, when a deranged elderly Armenian named Gourgen Yanikian shot and killed the Turkish Consul General of Los Angeles, Mehmet Baydar, and his assistant Consul, Bahadır

Demir. Linking his act of murder to the actions of the most revered Armenian assassins, Soghomon Tehlirian, Yanikian urged the Armenian diaspora to take up arms against the Turkish government and to slaughter its representatives. Although unnoticed at the time, Yanikian's efforts to equate his murders with Tehlirian's assassination of Talat provided modern Armenian terrorists, and their supporters in the diaspora, with all of the justification they needed to carry out their crimes. Yanikian proved that the diaspora would support the assassination of any Turkish government official, and for those who carried the executions, adulation and glory waited. In only a few short years after the Yanikian murders, death sentences for Turks came to be expected, and would extend even to the spouses and children of Turkish civil servants.

Although there would be no assassinations between January 1973 and October 1975, 1974 was an important year for political developments and activity among Armenians worldwide, and in particular Armenian-Americans. While their efforts to have the events of 1915 labeled as "the first genocide of the twentieth century" indeed languished in the UN, the Turkish government's decision to lift the ban on domestic poppy production in mid-1974, and the Turkish intervention on Cyprus in July 1974, caused a deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations. These events provided Armenians with an unexpected political boost, as they found no shortage of U.S. Congressmen who were willing to both propagate their anti-Turkish rhetoric and promote the Armenia Cause. An alliance with the much more powerful and established Greek lobby, which was also virulently anti-Turkish, especially during the Cyprus dispute, also greatly enhanced their political power and influence in Washington.

Despite the political progress being made by Armenians through non-violent and political efforts, in early 1975 two groups within the Armenia diaspora decided to pick up arms and embrace terrorism to advocate their demands for justice. While ASALA was a new voice that represented a new minority faction with the diaspora, the ARF was one of the oldest and most powerful organizations in the Armenian diaspora. While ASALA may have posed a very minor threat to the *ARF's* rhetoric in Beirut, it was in no position to challenge the ARF's traditional authority in the diaspora. Instead, the ARF's decision to activate an armed wing can only be viewed as a product of the violent anti-Turkishness it had propagated since 1965, and the opportunities provided by the advantageous international climate of 1975 in regards to Armenian interests. Unlike most terrorist organizations, the ARF did not turn to violence because of political weakness or a lack of viable non-violent or traditional methods. Instead, when the ARF deployed terror as means for a political end it attacked from a position of strength and deliberate choice.

For the next decade, ASALA and the ARF competed viciously for the financial and moral support of the Armenian diaspora through propaganda, intimidation and violence. While many dismissed their campaigns as hopeless, it must be acknowledged that after their seventh assassination in four years, the Turkish government appears to have been willing to engage the Armenian diaspora leaders in dialogue and discussion for the first time in over sixty years. This was by no means a minor accomplishment, and something that the traditional representatives of the diaspora had never achieved. The actions of the ARF representative at the meeting made it clear, however, that as far as ARF was concerned, resolution for the Armenian Cause did not mean dialogue and reconciliation with Turkey, but rather the imposition of their own historical narrative and terms through terror, force or international pressure. Another attempt the following year, this time from the Turkish private sector, also failed.

The primary impediment to talks in the late 1970s was land. The ARF and ASALA wanted eastern Anatolia, and it was inconceivable that Turkey was going to willingly cede territory to the Armenian diaspora or the terrorist organizations that represented it. Tragically, a chance at reconciliation and a cessation of the terror was lost. Ironically, the wider diaspora

was not overly concerned with taking eastern Anatolia, and it became clear that the ARF did not speak for the entire diaspora. Likewise, ASALA, through their intimidation and attacks on Armenians and international relief organizations working to facilitate Armenians out of the Soviet Union and Beirut, proved that they too, did not speak for the diaspora. But while the larger diaspora did not agree entirely with the political platforms of the ARF and ASALA, it tacitly approved the means by which these two violent organizations were advocating the cause on their behalf, even when the violence was turned on non-Turkish academics. And by not speaking out unequivocally against terrorism, the Armenian diaspora helped prolong the existence of both groups.

Armenian political violence dramatically escalated between the fall of 1979 and the summer of 1983. During that period, assassinations, armed assaults and bomb attacks killed 19 Turkish officials, dependents and employees, as well as French, American, Italian, Yugoslav, Swiss and German nationals. There were also at least eight failed assassinations against Turkish officials

Armenian political violence dramatically escalated between the fall of 1979 and the summer of 1983. During that period, assassinations, armed assaults and bomb attacks killed 19 Turkish officials, dependents and employees, as well as French, American, Italian, Yugoslav, Swiss and German nationals.

that left two of the victims paralyzed for life. There was no dialogue or negotiations between the Armenian militant groups and the Turkish government during this period, only death, destruction and Turkish incredulity at the world's indifference to international terrorism. ASALA even began to broaden their scope, and attack non-Turkish targets in order to bring more awareness to the Armenian Cause and to secure the release of the increasing number of captured ASALA operatives. The ARF responded to the challenge, and increased the frequency of their assassinations.

As the violence continued, however, sympathy for the Armenian Cause waned while concern for the Turkish victims increased. First in the United States, after assassinations and bombing attempts in Los Angeles, Boston and Philadelphia, and then in Europe after a particularly brutal series of attacks in Brussels, Paris and Lisbon. For Europeans, it was a bombing attack at the Orly Airport outside of Paris that killed eight and wounded over sixty that turned them against the Armenian terrorism. Despite these attacks, the Armenian diaspora continued to support the violent campaign against Turkey until the very end, even after it became increasingly apparent that the violence was not the means through which to achieve the realization of the Armenian cause, but rather an end in and of itself.

Armenian terror was never the same after Orly. The United States, Canada and Turkey began to cooperate closely on counterterrorist measures aimed at ending Armenian terrorism, and the U.S., in particular, embarked on firm position against international terrorism. Even countries that were previously reluctant to condemn Armenian terrorism and go after ASALA and the ARF, like France and the Soviet Union, changed their policies. Those countries which did not speak out, or who maintained connections with ASALA and/or the ARF were put on warning. The Armenian diaspora, though, did not waiver in their commitment to their radical youth, and continued to defend, glorify and honor political violence. This support enabled ASALA and the ARF to temporarily weather the storm produced by the controversial attacks in Europe, and they continued their campaign of violence for two more years. Their ability to induce fear in Turkey, Western Europe and North America lingered on much longer and was a testament to their prowess as terrorist organizations. By the time the leader of *ASALA*, Haroutiun Takoushian, was assassinated in Athens in April 1988, however, Armenian terrorism had run its course.

While there are multiple theories as to why Armenian terrorism faded away in the mid-1980s, the evidence available suggests that in addition the new international political climate brought on by the New Cold war and the subsequent collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

that left little room for international terrorist organizations, both ASALA and the ARF experienced violent internal dissension at the highest levels of the organizations' leadership, right before both groups engaged each other in a brutal street war on the streets of Beirut for political control of the Armenian diaspora. By the time the 'war' was over, the ideological, political, logistical and financial sources of support that had sustained the Armenian groups, and ASALA in particular, had enjoyed disappeared over night. Even its strongest supporter, the Armenian diaspora, had abandoned them for a greater cause: the liberation of the Armenian SSR and the war with Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Many of the veterans of ASALA and, to a lesser extent, the JCAG/ARA who survived the internal violence in Beirut were eventually able to bring their violent skills to that emerging conflict in the Caucasus. At least one former prominent ASALA member, Monte Melkonian, was able to redeem himself and obtain a place reserved for only the most revered heroes of the Armenian nation for his efforts in the Karabakh war after his death on a Caucasian battlefield in 1993.

Conclusion

It is no small irony that 20th century Armenian terrorism begins and ends with the two greatest Armenian heroes of the twentieth century, Soghomon Tehlirian and Monte Melkonian, who took completely reverse paths to glory. Born in eastern Anatolia, but living in Yugoslavia, Tehlirian left the relative safety of Belgrade to volunteer to fight for the Armenian Irregulars in the Russian army. After proving himself an able soldier, he was selected and trained to be the ARF's greatest assassin: the man who killed Talat Pasha. After his death, Tehlirian was buried under a monument constructed in his honor in Fresno, California. Monte Melkonian, left California and the comfortable confines of Berkeley to become an ASALA assassin, only to end up idolized as the great Armenian military commander who helped 'liberate' Nagorno-Karabakh. Melkonian was buried with full military honors, and in the presence of the President of Armenia, in Yerevan's Yereblur cemetery. Tehlirian, the soldier-assassin, was born in the Caucasus and buried in California; and Melkonian, the assassin-soldier, was born in California and buried died the Caucasus.

In the end, the Armenian campaign of political violence between 1973 and 1988 is yet another example of the catastrophic dangers inherent in inciting an extreme nationalism based almost entirely on the dehumanization and hatred of the 'other', cloaked in unimpeachable self-righteousness and historical justification. It was also, by any measure, a complete failure. Despite the violence, fear, terror, and murder of innocent men, women and children,

ASALA and the ARF never came closer to achieving their goals than the alleged meeting between the Turkish Foreign Minister and the heads of ARF, Hunchaks and Ramgavars in 1977. Tragically, that opportunity was wasted. Instead, the drastic increase in attacks between 1979 and 1983, the indifference of its Western allies to the violence, coupled with sympathy for the Armenian Cause, and the relentless pressure from an unrepentant diaspora that refused to unequivocally denounce terrorism, forced the Turkish government and its citizens into an aggressive defense that still largely persists today.

Some claim that the terrorist attacks brought unprecedented attention to the Armenian Cause in the international media and academia, but considering the gains being made in the early 1970s in this regard before violence, this is a difficult argument to make. Judging by commentaries and interviews in the press during the attacks, many in the diaspora believed that any assassination of a Turkish official was a victory for the Cause. Even if this true, however, one must ask: at what cost? More Armenians were killed by ASALA and the ARF than Turks, even if we include those who were not employed by the Turkish government, and if the non-Turkish victims are added to the Armenian lives lost, the disparity is even greater. An observation or acknowledgement not found on the Facebook pages dedicated to Gourgen Yanikian, Monte Melkonian and Hagop Hagopian (Haroution Takoushian), or on the web page of the Hrair Maroukhian Foundation.²⁶

The only success obtained by ASALA and the ARF is that very few, even in the Armenian diaspora, seem to be aware that Armenian terrorist organizations existed, that they were staffed by hundreds of young Armenians, and that one of the most prominent, powerful, legitimate organizations in the diaspora, and now in Armenia, was involved. While these organizations were comparable in nearly every way to many of their contemporary international terrorist organizations like Baader-Meinhof, the Red Brigades, Black September and the PFLP, very few remember or discuss ASALA or the ARF's JCAG/ARA. And while the nearly 40 Turkish citizens murdered by these two organizations is not in any way comparable to the Armenian and Turkish civilians who died over the course of events in World War I, an open discussion and recognition of the havoc wrecked by ASALA and the ARF would undoubtedly contribute to the reconciliation process between Turkey, Armenia and the Armenian diaspora.

26 For Yanikian see: <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Gourgen-Yanikian/106348076081281>; For Melkonian see: <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Monte-Melkonian/142005402522448>; for a selection of iphone covers and t-shirts see: http://society6.com/araaslanyan/monte-melkonian_iphone-case; For Haroutian Takoushian (Hagop Hagopian) see: <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Hagop-Hagopian/265312296878835>; For the Hrair Maroukhian see: <http://www.maroukhianfoundation.org/english/about-us/hrayr-maroukhian-a-visionary-leader>.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

“Armenian Terrorists,” January 10, 1983, CIA, CIA-RDP88-01070 R000100520004-4

“Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981,” *Department of State Bulletin* Vol. 82, No. 2065 (August 1982):

“Terrorism Review, CIA, July 29, 1985, CREST.

“Terrorism Review,” CIA, Dec. 14 1989, CIA Doc No/ESDN: 0000258747, CREST.

“Terrorism Review,” CIA, July 29, 1985

Secondary Sources

“Contemporary Armenian Terrorism” *Terrorism: An International Journal* Vol. 8, No. 3 (1986)

“Transnational Armenian Activism,” in *Beyond the Soviet Union: the Fragmentation of Power*, edited by Max Beloff, Brookefield, VT: Ashgate, 1997.

“Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism,” *Journal of Conflict Studies* Vol. V, No. 4 (Fall 1985)

Alexander, Edward. *A Crime of Vengeance: An Armenian Struggle for Justice*, New York: Free Press, 1991.

Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism: Testimonies of Witnesses, Washington, DC: Assembly of Turkish American Associations, 1997.

Armenian Terrorism, Its Supporters, the Narcotic Connection, the Distortion of History, (Ankara, Turkey: Ankara University, 1984.

Avakian, Lindy V. *Cross and the Crescent*, Phoenix, AZ: USC Press, 1989.

Blaylock, Josh .*Operation Nemesis: A Story of Genocide and Revenge*, Devil’s Due Entertainment, 2015.

Bobelian, Michael. *Children of Armenia: A Forgotten Genocide and the Century-Long Struggle for Justice*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009.

Bogosian, Eric. *Operation Nemesis: The Assassination Plot that Avenged the Armenian Genocide*, New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015.

Chaliand, Gerard and Arnaud Blin, eds. *The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda*, Kindle Edition, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2007.

Corsun, Andrew. "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," in *Department of State Bulletin* Vol. 82, No. 2065 (August 1982)

Derogy, Jacques. *Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of the Turkish Leaders Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990.

Dionne, E.J. Jr., "Armenian Terror: Tangle of Motives," *New York Times*, August 1, 1983.

Dugan, Laura et. al., "Sudden Desistance from Terrorism: The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide," in *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* Vol. 1, No. 3 (November 2008)

Feigl, Erich. *A Myth of Terror Exposed: Armenian Extremism, its Causes and its Historical Context*, Freilassing, AT: Edition Zeitgeschichte, 1987.

Gunter, Michael M. "*Pursuing the Just Cause of their People*": *A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986.

Gunter, Michael M. "Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (Winter 2007)

Henze, Paul. *GOAL: Destabilization: Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability and Terrorism in NATO South*, Marina del Rey, CA: European Institute for Security Research, 1981.

Howe, Marvin. "Turks Blame Cypriots for Attacks in Name of Armenians," *New York Times*, February 28, 1980.

Kelly, Michael J. "The Media and Terrorism: An Examination of News Coverage of Armenian Terrorism in Canada," PhD Diss., Carleton University, 1987.

Kurz, Anat and Ariel Merari. *ASALA—Irrational Terror or Political Tool*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.

MacCurdy, Marian Mesrobian. *Sacred Justice: The Voices and Legacy of the Operation Nemesis*, Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2015.

Mango, Andrew. *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone*, New York: Routledge, 2005.

Melkonian, Markar. *My Brother's Road: An American's Fateful Journey to Armenia*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007.

Minassian, Gaïdz. *Guerre et Terrorisme arméniens*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002.

Moussault, Paul and Barbara Sahakian. *ASALA, de Nemesis voor de Armeense genocide - Stadsguerrilla tegen Turkije (1975-1988)*, Netherlands: Papieren Tijger, 2015.

Panossian, Razmik. *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars*, London: Hurst & Company, 2006.

Shiragian, Arshavir. *The Legacy: Memoirs of an Armenian Patriot*, Boston: Hairenik Press, 1976.

Şimşir, Bilal N. *Şehit Diplomatlarımız (1973-1994)*, Vol. 2, Ankara, Turkey: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000.

Tamkoç, Metin. "International Terrorism: The Russian Connection," in *Armenian Terrorism, Its Supporters, the Narcotic Connection, the Distortion of History*, Ankara, Turkey: Ankara University, 1984.

Toumani, Melanie. *There Was and There Was Not: A Journey Through Hate and Possibility in Turkey, Armenia, and Beyond*, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014.

Waal, Thomas de. *Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Yeghiayan, Vartkes. *The Case of Misak Torlakian*, Glendale, CA: Center for Armenian Remembrance, 2006.

Yeghiayan, Vartkes. *The Case of Soghomon Tehlirian*, 2nd Edition Glendale, CA: Center for Armenian Remembrance, 2006.

A CENTURY LATER: TOWARDS TURKISH-ARMENIAN RAPPROCHEMENT?

(YÜZYIL SONRA: TÜRK-ERMENİ UZLAŞMASINA DOĞRU?)

Prof. Dr. Michael M. GUNTER
Tennessee Technological University

Abstract: *This article examines various attempts that have been made to begin the process of reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia including the TARC, Joint Committees of Experts proposals, Sarafian-Halaçoğlu initiative, and WATS. However, the main emphasis is on the Soccer diplomacy that began in 2008 and led to the two Zurich Protocols that were signed on October 10, 2009. These two protocols would have established an intergovernmental commission to examine problems between the two states and diplomatic relations between them. However, the optimism over this achievement quickly faded when nationalist elements in both states blocked the ratification of these two protocols. However the very fact that Turkey and Armenia signed the Protocols to establish diplomatic relations, open their borders, and create a Historical Commission to examine their history illustrates that progress is being made even if ratification is not presently possible. What is more, track-two diplomacy between the two ancient enemies continues and is clearly beyond the point of no return. Turks and Armenians will continue to work through civil society contacts and exchanges that will lessen negative stereotypes and construct new confidences. The article ends with recommendations for the future.*

Keywords: *Turkey, Armenia, Armenian massacres, TARC, David Phillips, Joint Committees of Experts, Ara Sarafian-Yusuf Halaçoğlu Initiative, WATS, Ragnar Naess Initiative, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Switzerland, Abdullah Gul, Serzh Sarkisyan, Soccer Diplomacy, Zurich Protocols, Jennifer Lind, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, genocide, büyük felaket/mets yeghern*

Öz: *Bu makale aralarında TARC, Ortak Uzmanlar Komiteleri önerileri, Sarafyan-Halaçoğlu İnisiyatif, ve WATS'ın da bulunduğu ve Türkiye ile Ermenistan arasında uzlaşma süreci başlatmayı öngören çeşitli girişimleri incelemektedir. Ancak, öncelikle 2008 yılında başlatılan ve 10 Ekim 2009'da iki Zürih Protokolünün imzalanması ile sonuçlanan Futbol*

Diplomasisi sürecine odaklanmaktadır. Bu iki protocol iki devlet arasındaki sorunların incelenmesi için iki hükümetlerarası komisyonun kurulmasını ve diplomatic ilişkilerin başlatulmasını sağlayabilecekti. Ancak, her iki ülkedeki aşırı milliyetçi kesimlerin protokollerin onaylanmasını engellenmesi sonucu bu başarıyla yakalanan iyimserlik gözden kayboldu. Yine de günümüzde bu protokollerin onaylanması mümkün olmasa da Türkiye ve Ermenistan'ın bu protokollere diplomatic ilişkileri kurmak, sınırları açmak ve ortak bir Tarih Komisyonu kurarak tarihsel inceleme yapmak amacıyla imza atmış olması dahi kaydedilen ilerlemeyi göstermektedir. Ayrıca, iki kadim hasım arasındaki ikincil diplomasi süreci devam etmektedir ve artık dönüşü olmayan bir seviyeye gelmiştir. Türk ve Ermeniler sivil toplumlar arasındaki iletişim yoluyla birlikte çalışmaya ve olumsuz önyarguları kırarak yeni güven ilişkileri kurmaya devam edeceklerdir. Makalenin sonunda geleceğe dönük öneriler sunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Türkiye, Ermenistan, Ermeni katliamları, TARC, David Phillips, Ortak Uzmanlar Komiteleri, Ara Sarafyan-Yusuf Halaçoğlu İnisiyatifi, WATS, Ragnar Naess İnisiyatifi, recep Tayyip Erdoğan, İsviçre, Abdullah Gül, Serj Sarkisyan, Futbol Diplomasisi, Zürih Protokolleri, Jennifer Lind, Dağlık Karabağ, Azerbaycan, soykırım, büyük felaket/metz yeghern*

As the 100th anniversary of the tragic Armenian massacres in World War I nears, many have wondered if finally a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement might be reached on the definition and continuing meaning of this event which still poison their relations, might be possible. For example, Turkey and Armenia have no diplomatic relations, and the border between them has been closed since 1993 due to the fighting that had occurred in Nagorno Karabakh. However, in 1992 Turkey did not oppose Armenia joining the then newly-established Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) based in Istanbul. Since 2001, Armenia also has maintained a senior ambassador accredited to the BSCE in that city. This connection has facilitated a steady flow of visiting foreign, transport, and energy ministers, among others, between the two states despite their formal lack of diplomatic relations.

Nevertheless, the hopes that have risen for the normalization of relations have proven premature. Both sides must take blame for this situation. For example, in September 2005, a Turkish court ruled that a controversial conference on the Armenian question should be suspended.¹ The academic conference had been scheduled to examine critically the official Turkish approach to what had happened during World War I. It was the second time the conference had been called off. The first attempt to hold it had been postponed in May 2005 when Turkey's minister of justice had called it an attempt to stab Turkey in the back. However, while the opposition to the conference had been spearheaded by a group of nationalistic lawyers, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called the court decision undemocratic.

A little more than a year later, however, the Turkish government invited Armenian officials and representatives of the Armenian diaspora to participate in Hrant Dink's funeral ceremony in January 2007,² but no visible reconciliatory developments ensued. The attitude of Harut Sassounian, the publisher of the *California Courier*, is instructive. In a recent interview, Sassounian took umbrage over the *Los Angeles Times* publishing the transcript of a meeting with the Assembly of Turkish American Associations in which that Turkish group questioned the validity of Armenian claims about genocide: "Any group, no matter who they are, that denies any genocide or holocaust, I can not with a clear conscience call them a respectable group. They lose

1 Sarah Rainsford, "Turkey Bans 'Genocide' Conference," BBC News, September 22, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4273602.stm>, accessed September 15, 2008. This article is an updated and somewhat altered version of the final chapter in my recently published book, *Armenian History and the Question of Genocide* (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2011).

2 Hrant Dink was a Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor murdered by a Turkish ultra-nationalist outside his office in Istanbul under still disputed circumstances.

respectability when they deny genocide.”³ In reply to a query about establishing a fact-finding mission to determine what actually happened, Sassounian replied: “I’m not the one who needs fact-finding. . . . I don’t need to find out what happened. I know what happened.”⁴ With such a self-righteous attitude, no wonder rapprochement efforts have proved so difficult.

TARC

Nevertheless, in recent years there have been several very tentative attempts to bring representatives of the two sides together. On July 9, 2001, for example, the US Department of State helped establish the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) to employ track-two or civil society, non-governmental, person-to-person diplomacy in an attempt to initiate a dialogue between Turks and Armenians. TARC’s terms of reference were:

Terms of Reference are agreed to on this 9th day of July 2001 between Armenians and Turks from civil society who, working in an individual capacity, agree to establish the *Reconciliation Commission*.

The *Reconciliation Commission* grew out of meetings held at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna.

The *Reconciliation Commission* seeks to promote mutual understanding and good will between Turks and Armenians and to encourage improved relations between Armenia and Turkey.

The *Reconciliation Commission* hopes, through its efforts, to build on the increasing readiness for reconciliation among Turkish and Armenian civil societies including members of Diaspora communities.

The *Reconciliation Commission* supports contact, dialogue and cooperation between Armenian and Turkish civil societies in order to create public awareness about the need for reconciliation and to derive practical benefits.

The *Reconciliation Commission* will directly undertake activities and catalyze projects by other organizations.

3 Cited in “The Armenian Question, 2008: Harut Sassounian on Realpolitik and Genocide,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 24, 2008.

4 *Ibid.*

A Century Later: Towards Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?

The *Reconciliation Commission* will develop recommendations to be submitted to concerned governments.

The *Reconciliation Commission* will support collaborative Track Two activities in the fields of business, tourism, culture, education and research, environment, media, confidence building, and other areas which are to be determined.

The *Reconciliation Commission* will secure expertise based on project requirements, and may include specialists on historical, psychological and legal matters, as well as other topics.

The *Reconciliation Commission* will review progress after one year.⁵

David L. Phillips, a senior conflict-solving facilitator, served as TARC's neutral chairman. Founding members from the Turkish side included Ilter Turkmen, a former Turkish foreign minister; Gunduz Aktan, a former Turkish ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva; and Ozdem Sanberk, a former Turkish ambassador to the United Kingdom, among others. Founding members for the Armenian side included Van Z. Krikorian, a New York attorney and representative of the Armenian Assembly of America since 1977; David Hovhanissian, a former Armenian ambassador to Syria and minister-at-large for regional issues; and Alexander Arzoumanian, a former Armenian foreign minister and ambassador to the United Nations.

According to David L. Phillips, TARC's chairman:

TARC's detractors accused it of negotiating whether the Armenian genocide actually occurred. They also maintained that TARC's existence was used to deter international criticism of Turkey. In addition, TARC was attacked as a pawn of the U.S. government, and TARC members were labeled traitors. [Armenian] President [Robert] Kocharian's political opponents used TARC to impugn his leadership. Instead of standing by its commitments [to support TARC] the Kocharian government ran for cover.⁶

The Dashnaks (an ultra-nationalist Armenian party founded in 1890) opposed

5 Cited in David L. Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005), pp. 57-58. See also Douglas Frantz, "Unofficial Commission Acts to Ease Turkish-Armenian Enmity," *New York Times*, July 10, 2001; and "A Historical Step for Turks and Armenians," *Turkish Daily News*, July 12, 2001.

6 Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 61.

TARC because “first and foremost Dashnaks use genocide recognition to solicit money from the Armenian Diaspora... To Dashnaks, TARC was an insidious device undermining their reason for being... If reconciliation occurs, they have no reason to exist.”⁷ Phillips also noted the “Diaspora members are typically more hard-line. Having reaped the benefits from peace and prosperity, they have the luxury to assert uncompromising positions.”⁸

TARC tried to focus initially on culture in an attempt to “personalize Turkish-Armenian relations.”⁹ Indeed, according to Phillips “cultural events had the desired effect by generating positive media coverage and helping to reduce negative stereotypes.”¹⁰ Indeed, “prior to TARC, Armenian issues were virtually taboo in Turkey. TARC helped break the ice and a plethora of civil society initiatives ensued.”¹¹

Although the Turks thought that normalizing the visa regime between Turkey and Armenia was a major achievement, TARC’s Armenian members did not agree. TARC also failed to establish a policy working group.

However, problems soon aroused. Although the Turks thought that normalizing the visa regime between Turkey and Armenia was a major achievement, TARC’s Armenian members did not agree. TARC also failed to establish a policy working group. While Armenians wanted to see more results, the Turks wished to go slower. Thus, an

expectation gap existed between the two sides that hindered positive momentum. The lack of a secretariat slowed any progress. Merely documenting discussions provided problems as did negotiating the text of joint or chairman’s statements. Some TARC members made premature statements to the press, which were seen as breaches in confidentiality that dissipated goodwill. Other TARC members tended to put aside their unofficial capacities and began to act like state officials. “As criticism intensified, TARC’s inability to address the genocide issue raised doubts about the usefulness of continuing the process.”¹²

Nevertheless, TARC’s chairman felt that “significant . . . advances have been more visible in the field of civil society, where the most difficult barriers to direct contact are no longer present and the reconciliation process is not only underway but has assumed courses independent of TARC and official relations

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 79.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 75.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 107.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 108.

... exactly what TARC was designed to achieve.”¹³ Upon its conclusion in 2004, TARC’s chairman listed the following recommendations: 1.) Official contacts should be further improved. 2.) Opening of the Turkish Armenian border should be announced and implemented. 3.) The two governments should publicly support civil society programs focused on education, science, culture, and tourism. 4.) Standing mechanisms for cooperation on humanitarian disaster assistance and health care should be established. 5.) Security and confidence building measures between Turkey and Armenia should be enhanced. 6.) Religious understanding should be encouraged. 7.) The Turkish and Armenian people need to develop more confidence. Despite these tentative beginnings, one must conclude that TARC’s success was modest.

Joint Committees of Experts.

In 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent a letter to Armenian president Robert Kocharian in which Erdogan proposed a joint committee of Turkish and Armenian experts to study the Armenian allegations of genocide.¹⁴ The Armenians, however, hesitated, replying the committee should instead be composed of governmental officials. In a speech in Baku, Erdogan reiterated his position that conducting historical research was not an issue for politicians: “Let historians, political scientists, archeologists, lawyers and historians of art study this issue.”¹⁵ He then speculated that the Armenians were not replying because then they would have to answer for the Khojali massacre in which 683 Azeri civilians were killed by Armenians on February 25-26, 1992 during the fighting over Nagorno Karabakh: “There is still no answer because then they will have to face the Hocali [Khojali] massacre.” However, the Turkish Prime Minister then declared that “if it is eventually understood that there is a grievance, then we will do what we’re supposed to do.” In other words, Erdogan seemed to be saying that Turkey would admit wrongdoing if the evidenced so proved. This then was truly an amazing declaration that should encourage the Armenians to put aside their pretense of complete innocence and refusal even to discuss anything but a Turkish admittance of unilateral guilt.

Indeed on the 99th anniversary of the Armenian massacres in 1915, the Turkish prime minister expressed his condolences to the grandchildren of those killed at that time and called what had occurred then “inhumane” and our “shared

13 *Ibid.*, p. 151.

14 The following discussion is largely based on “PM Erdogan Attends Turkish Diaspora Meeting in Baku,” *Briefing* (Ankara), March 12, 2007, pp. 4-5.

15 This and the following citations were taken from *ibid.*, p. 4.

pain.”¹⁶ Orhan Dink, the brother of the murdered Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink referred to above, welcomed Erdogan’s statement as “a very important step. . . . Some may say that it came late, but the important thing is that this first step was made.” However, Aram Hamparian, the executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America simply dismissed Erdogan’s words as “cold-hearted and cynical. . . . Ankara is repackaging its genocide denials.”

Sarafian-Halaçoğlu Initiative

A few years earlier, another possibility of joint Turkish-Armenian research on the issue fell through. In February 2005, Ara Sarafian, the founding director of the Gomidas Institute¹⁷ in London, originally had accepted the proposal of Yusuf Halaçoğlu,¹⁸ the chairman of the Turkish Historical Society, to discuss what had happened on the Harput Plain (where many Armenians had lived in eastern Anatolia) and how many people had died there during the Armenian deportations. Soon afterwards, however, Sarafian indicated that he was not willing to proceed with such a study since certain Ottoman records would not be available. The Armenian scholar was apparently referring to Halaçoğlu’s remarks during a television interview in which he said that Sarafian might not be able to discover what he was seeking in the Ottoman archives. Hacacoglu asked Sarafian to reveal exactly what he was looking for and then added that he thought the Armenian scholar had come under heavy criticism from the Armenian diaspora because of his initial willingness to work with Turkish scholars. The Turkish scholar also indicated that Sarafian was disturbed by the Turkish request to study the Dashnak archives.

In reply, Sarafian stated:

Primary sources outside of Turkey indicate that the 1915 deportation of Armenians and the liquidation of their properties were regulated by Ottoman state authorities. Armenians were deported under the auspices of Ottoman officials. And most deportees were killed through privations

16 These and the following citations were taken from Constanze Letsch, “Turkish PM Offers Condolences over 1915 Armenian Massacre,” *The Guardian*, April 23, 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/23/turkey>. . . , accessed August 8, 2014.

17 The Gomidas Institute republishes English translations of Armenian texts related to the events of World War I which would not otherwise be readily available. Turkish institutes have carried out similar roles in recent years. During the 1990s, Sarafian, along with Hilmar Kaiser, had conducted demographic research in the Turkish Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives.

18 Yusuf Halacoglu is the author of *The Story of 1915: What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2008).

and outright massacres on their way or in their places of exile (most notably Der Zor). Our sources indicate that there never was a resettlement program as historians defending the official Turkish thesis suggest. . . . [Sarafian then asked Hacacoglu to] explain why he thinks that the Ottoman deportation and resettlement registers the Gomidas Institute requested do not exist—especially those on Harput and its environs.¹⁹

On a related matter, Halaçoğlu also announced that he had agreed with David Gaunt, a historian from Soderntorn University in Sweden, to conduct joint research on opening recently discovered mass graves in Nusaybin in the southeastern Anatolian province of Mardin. Armenian historians have said that these graves might contain the remains of victims from the massacres in 1915. Halaçoğlu declared that he was confident that these graves were from ancient times and not related to the Armenian accusations.

WATS

In addition, there have been five Workshops for Armenian/Turkish Scholarship (WATS) held at the University of Chicago in 2000, the University of Michigan in 2002, the University of Minnesota in 2004, Salzburg in 2005, and New York University in 2006. These Workshops have been directed by Professors Muge Gocek of the University of Michigan, Gerard J. Libaridian of the University of Michigan, and Ronald Grigor Suny of the University of Chicago. They have sought to investigate through scholarship the history and politics of the deportations and massacres of Armenians in the late Ottoman Empire and related questions, but consisted mainly of Armenian and pro-Armenian scholars joined by a few Turkish ones. Thus, these Workshops were not neutral venues in which both sides were given equal opportunities to make their case.

Ragnar Naess Initiative

In May 2008, Ragnar Naess, a concerned Norwegian academic, invited nine or ten Turkish and Armenian scholars to Oslo, Norway to unofficially discuss the situation.²⁰ The workshop was financed by The Norwegian Association for Freedom of Expressin. Hilmar Kaiser read an interesting paper for the Armenians, while Garabed Moumjian, who knows Ottoman Turkish, and

¹⁹ Cited in *Briefing* (Ankara), March 12, 2007, p. 5.

²⁰ The following discussion is largely based on information I obtained from an Armenian participant in the Oslo meeting who preferred to be anonymous.

Khatchig Mouradian, the current editor of the Dashnak newspaper in the United States *The Armenian Weekly*, also made substantive contributions. Dennis Papazian, a retired professor and reasonable interlocutor, announced on arrival that he was not interested in discussing whether or not there had been an Armenian genocide but would be pleased to discuss any other aspects of Armenian-Turkish relations. On the Turkish side, Justin McCarthy, an American professor of Turkish studies known for his pro-Turkish position, was a prominent participant. Baskin Oran, a noted Turkish professor who has studied ethnic identities in Turkey, read a good paper, which did not please the more conservative Turks. Kemal Cicek, a member of the Turkish Historical Society, presented the Turkish point of view, doing so with a pleasant demeanor. Yavuz Baydar also made a favorable impression. The conference participants agreed not to discuss specifics in public, but did issue a joint statement that said little besides announcing their meeting, discussion of important things, and agreement to meet again.

One Armenian participant said that he did not hold out much hope for the Oslo meeting at present because the issue of genocide was now a political issue between Armenia and Turkey. Once a governmental agreement would be reached, however, academics would be called upon to vouch for its accuracy. At the present time, no Turkish scholar wanted to stick his neck out, but unless there would be good representation from Turkey, further talks would be difficult. Although the participants expressed a desire for a follow-up meeting, the sponsoring Norwegian Association declined to do so. In an email to this author, Ragnar Naess, speculated that “probably the Norwegian genocide scholars had a hand in this.”²¹

Further Developments

Nevertheless, some 200 Turkish intellectuals used the phrase *Buyuk Felaket* [Great Catastrophe] in an apology issued in December 2008, and also signed online by about 29,500 others: “My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologize to them.”²² Although this apology was criticized to varying degrees by the Turkish

21 Ragnar Naess, email to Michael Gunter, December 3, 2013. Naess added that since 2008, he had been lecturing annually on the Turkish-Armenian question at The Institute for Political Science at the University of Oslo and was concluding a 250-page book manuscript entitled “A Genocidal Age and Its Aftermath: Notes on the Question of the Armenian Genocide?”

22 See Ozur Diliyorum, www.ozurdiliyorum.com, accessed August 18, 2009. This Turkish term for Great Catastrophe is a virtual translation of the frequently used Armenian phrase employed to describe the events of 1915, *Mets Yeghern*.

prime minister, president, armed forces general staff, conservative retired diplomats, and nationalist newspapers, the reaction was much less than would have occurred only a few years earlier. Indeed, the Ankara Chief Prosecutor's Office decided not to prosecute the signers, which in the past would have been unthinkable. Thus, the "Great Apology" demonstrated how some modern Turkish opinion was willing to move beyond the earlier sterile denials of any wrongdoing.

Similarly, in January 2009, Murat Bardakci, a Turkish scholar, published Armenian population figures in Turkey from a long-lost record left by Talaat Pasha, indicating that nearly a million Armenians who had been living in the Ottoman Empire before 1915 had disappeared by 1917.²³ Although few in the Turkish media commented about this finding, it was still a token of Turkey's growing democratic maturity that these figures could even be revealed. Bardakci himself stated that "I could never have published this book 10 year ago. I would have been called a traitor. The mentality has changed."²⁴

In addition, following the ground breaking work of the TARC in 2001-2002 more than a dozen other track-two projects have tried to ameliorate relations including joint concerts in Istanbul and Yerevan, art exhibitions, student exchanges, a youth summit, a Turkish-Armenian women's magazine, reciprocal visits between think-tank officials, and photography exhibits. On March 17, 2009 approximately 40 Turkish and Armenian NGO activists met in a large conference in Yerevan and agreed on the necessity for an unconditional normalization of links.²⁵ Although these track-two initiatives have had only mixed results, they still manifest a momentum that would have been impossible to even conceive of earlier.

Thus, over the past decade, a new, more liberal Turkey has been emerging. Under the stewardship of the *Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi* (AKP) government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has sought greater democratization, while its European Union (EU) accession bid has led to the harmonization of many of its laws with those of the EU.²⁶ This process of democratization has led to more emphasis on Turkey's soft power²⁷ and the

23 Murat Bardakci, ed., *Talat Pashanın Evrak-i Metrukesi* [The Papers Talat Pasha Left Behind] (Istanbul: Everest yayinlari, 2009). See my discussion at the end of Chapter 2 for the pro-Turkish response to these figures.

24 Cited in Sabrina Tavernise, "Nearly a Million Genocide Victims, Covered in a Cloak of Amnesia," *New York Times*, March 8, 2009.

25 See Civil Society Institute, www.csi.am, accessed August 18, 2009.

26 For a cogent analysis of the AKP and its ground-breaking attempts at reform, see M. Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

27 Meliha Benli Altunisik, "The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East," *Insight Turkey* 10 (April 2008), pp. 41-54.

desire to pursue a new foreign policy of zero problems with its neighbors.²⁸ The AKP's massive electoral victories over determined military and Kemalist opposition in July 2007 and again in June 2011, on-going Ergenekon investigation of reputed military coup attempts, large sympathy demonstration in Istanbul for Hrant Dink, and removal of hard-line Yusuf Halaçoğlu as the chairman of the Turkish Historical Society, among numerous other developments, further indicates this new current of thought.

The Swiss Role

After two years of closed talks in Switzerland; Turkey, Armenia, and Switzerland announced on April 22, 2009 that they had reached a road map to normalize Turkish-Armenian relations:

This process of democratization has led to more emphasis on Turkey's soft power and the desire to pursue a new foreign policy of zero problems with its neighbors.

Turkey and Armenia, together with Switzerland as mediator, have been working intensively with a view to normalizing their bilateral relations and developing them in a spirit of good-neighborliness, and mutual respect, and thus to promoting peace, security and stability in the whole region.

The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road map has been identified. This agreed basis provides a positive prospect for the on-going process.²⁹

This road map then led quickly to further negotiations and the signing of two Protocols before the year was out.

Soccer Diplomacy

The Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia that began on August 8, 2008,

28 Bulent Aras, "The Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Insight Turkey* 11 (Summer 2009), pp. 127-42.

29 "Joint Statement of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Armenia and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs," Press Release No. 56, April 22, 2009, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no-56-22april-2009-press-release-regarding-the-turkish-armenian-relations.en.mfa>, accessed October 5, 2009.

also contributed to the momentum by showing Turkey how vulnerable its communication and energy routes through Georgia were. New incentives had been created for opening the border with Armenia as a way to construct necessary alternative routes. In addition, Russia now looked more favorably upon a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement given its reasserted prominence in the region. The United States and the European Union were already on board as approving, and Turkey was willing to satisfy them in return for being seen as willing to mend fences with Armenia.³⁰

Thus, on September 6, 2008, Turkish president Abdullah Gul accepted an invitation from his Armenian counterpart Serzh (Serge) Sarkisyan (Sarkisian) and journeyed to Yerevan, Armenia to watch Turkey and Armenia play against each other in a World Cup qualifying soccer match. Gul's visit was the first ever by a Turkish president and sparked speculation that "soccer diplomacy" might initiate reconciliation between the two historical enemies as "ping-pong diplomacy" had 35 years earlier between the United States and China. In addition to the Turkish president, some 5,000 Turkish fans also traveled to the soccer match on special visas issued by the Armenian government. For its part, Turkey already had permitted free travel for Armenians to Turkey since 1995. Indeed, as many as 40,000 Armenian passport holders are now believed to be working in Istanbul without official permits, but with the tacit approval of Turkish authorities.³¹ In the case of Gul's visit to Armenia, Sarkisyan had invited him the previous July and at that time had expressed a desire for "a new phase of dialogue with the government and people of Turkey, with the goal of normalizing relations and opening our common border."³²

For their part senior Turkish foreign ministry officials revealed that they had been meeting secretly with their Armenian counterparts in Switzerland for some time to arrange further initiatives³³ Despite the Armenian parliament referring to Turkey's eastern provinces as "western Armenia" in its declaration of independence on August 23, 1990, Turkey had recognized Armenian independence earlier than most other states and had also invited Armenia to join the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization as a founding member

30 For further analysis, see Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergey Minasyan, "Pragmatic Policies vs. Historical Constraints: Analyzing Armenia-Turkey Relations," Caucasus Institute Research Papers #1, Yerevan, Armenia, January 2010.

31 *Today's Zaman*, January 29, 2009.

32 Cited in "We Are Ready To Talk To Turkey," *Wall Street Journal*, July 8, 2008.

33 Jeremy Bransten and Charles Rechnagel, "The Outbreak of 'Football Diplomacy,'" Radio Free Europe, September 5, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/Outbreak_Football_Diplomacy/1196718.html, accessed October 9, 2008.

in 1992 even though it did not have any border on that body of water.³⁴ Turkey also had been providing energy to Armenia when it faced serious energy shortages during the 1990s, as well as donating 100,000 tons of wheat to it then. In addition, flights between Yerevan and Istanbul continue to run despite the closed border. Turkey even allows in thousands of illegal Armenian workers. In the wake of the brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, Turkey offered Armenia membership in its new project, The Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform. Apropos to the initiation of soccer diplomacy, Turkey also had been permitting Armenian soccer (football) teams to organize preparation camps in Antalya, a large Turkish city on the Mediterranean Sea.

Gul's office stated that his visit "will be an opportunity to overcome obstacles and prepare a new ground to bring the two people together."³⁵ Sarkisyan declared that "without forgetting the past, we must look to the future. If there is a dialogue, we can discuss any, even the most difficult questions. We must shape a mutually beneficial agenda and begin contacts without preconditions."³⁶ Mark Parris, the former US ambassador to Turkey and currently a scholar at the Brookings Institution, said: "Both capitals have wanted to find a solution for some time, but third parties—including Azerbaijan, in the case of Turkey, and the Armenian diaspora, in the case of Yerevan—have militated against one."³⁷

Nevertheless, in Yerevan, Gul's motorcade passed hundreds of protesters calling for Turkey to admit its role in the Armenian massacres. His visit, however, enabled him to confer with Sarkisyan, talks which Gul characterized as heralding a breakthrough in relations: "Everything will move forward and normalize if this climate continues. I believe my visit has destroyed a psychological barrier in the Caucasus."³⁸ Suren Sureniants, a senior Republic Party member in Armenia, seemingly concurred by stating: "The visit of the Turkish president is the most important political event for Armenia. The visit will have an indirect influence not only on our foreign, but also on domestic

34 The following discussion is based on Bulent Aras and Fatih Ozbay, "Turkish-Armenian Relations: Will Football Diplomacy Work?" No. 24, *SETA Policy Brief* (Ankara), September 2008, pp. 2, 4.

35 Cited in Andrew Purvis, "Can Soccer Heal Turkey-Armenian Rift?" *Time* (in partnership with CNN), September 5, 2008, <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1839199,00.html>, accessed September 10, 2008.

36 Cited in *ibid.*

37 Cited in *ibid.*

38 Cited in Mark Bentley, "Turkey Says Armenia May Re-establish Relations, Trade," *Bloomberg.com*, September 10, 2008, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=aFUwZ222syYc&refer=>, accessed September 10, 2008.

policy and will lead to the start of new relations.”³⁹ Levon Ter-Petrosian, the former Armenian president and current opposition leader, agreed: “We should establish normal, good-neighborly relations with Turkey without preconditions.”⁴⁰ Ter-Petrosian elaborated that “when I said this [earlier], they [Armenian government officials] would say what treachery it is. And now, they keep repeating it [positively what Ter-Petrosian had said] night and day.”⁴¹ Alexander Iskandarian, a political analyst at the Caucasus Media Center in Yerevan, said that there was strong political support in Armenia for détente with Turkey for economic reasons. He explained that Armenia’s hope was that better relations would lead to a permanent reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border. Currently, Armenia had no rail links to the West despite the fact that some 70 percent of its trade balance was with Europe.⁴²

Elmar Mammadyarov, the foreign minister of Azerbaijan, added that Azeris “welcome this initiative positively.”⁴³ Most centrist Turkish media outlets were also supportive of Gul’s trip, while EU officials declared that it had enhanced political stability in the region. Important too was the support of Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, the chief advisor on foreign policy to the Turkish prime minister and subsequently the Turkish foreign minister. Mustafa Akyol, the deputy editor of the *Turkish Daily News*, felt it significant that the politically-influential Turkish military was not objecting to Gul’s initiative: “Right now, the nationalist parties in the parliament are more nationalist than the military on some issues. And probably on this one, I think the military is not disturbed because the military understands that Turkey needs to secure its Caucasus borders and needs to have good relations. So probably the military is not a big obstacle on this issue.”⁴⁴

Following Gul’s visit, the foreign ministers of the two states held additional talks. Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Armenian president Sarkisian then met briefly at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2009. Sizing up the results of Gul’s visit and its aftermath, The International Crisis Group concluded: “Since then, barely a week goes by

39 Cited in Marianna Grigoryan, “Armenia, Turkey Put Differences Aside for Soccer,” *Eurasia Insight*, October 9, 2008, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav090508.shtml>, accessed October 9, 2008.

40 Cited in *ibid.*

41 Cited in *ibid.*

42 Bransten and Rechnagel, “Outbreak of ‘Football Diplomacy.’”

43 Cited in Grigoryan, “Armenia, Turkey Put Differences Aside for Soccer.” On the other hand, I have been told by many Azeris that they were very wary of any understanding between Turkey and Armenia that would sacrifice Azeri interests.

44 Cited in Bransten and Rechnagel, “Outbreak of ‘Football Diplomacy.’”

without senior officials meeting. Armenia and Turkey ‘have never been closer’ to normalising relations.”⁴⁵

Not all parties, however, were as pleased with these sudden developments. The Dashnaks vowed to carry out protests against Gul’s visit. Ruben Safrastian, the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Armenian National Academy of Sciences, felt that Turkey would not deviate in any meaningful way from its current policy towards Armenia. Gul had come to Armenia due to regional tensions connected to Russia’s war against Georgia and because of a possible upcoming debate in the US Congress over yet another pro-Armenian resolution: “There may be some small change that will result in some thaw between the two countries, however, Gul will try to use the visit to strengthen his positions in the region. The Turks will use this visit to prove their goodwill. However, in reality, they will do everything to use it in their interest.”⁴⁶

Nationalistic Turkish leaders felt that the trip bordered on the betrayal of their country; the opposition leader of the Republican Peoples’ Party in Turkey Deniz Baykal sarcastically opined that Gul should lay a wreath at the Yerevan genocide monument.⁴⁷ Devlet Bahcheli’s Nationalist Action Party also criticized Gul’s initiative.⁴⁸ The genocide issue had not even been directly broached. A careful Turkish think-tank study concluded: “There is not much change in the Armenian attitude overall.” Despite Sarkisyan’s “mild tone . . . , it is doubtful . . . whether such an approach alone will solve the direct problems between Turkey and Armenia.”⁴⁹

The Breakthrough

Following the soccer diplomacy initiative, the confidential talks alluded to above between Turkey and Armenia in Switzerland gained new impetus. On April 22, 2009, the parties arrived at a “roadmap” document towards establishing diplomatic relations. At first, however, the roadmap seemed to founder as both sides renewed hard-line positions. Turkey’s desire to promote

45 International Crisis Group, “Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders,” Europe Report No. 199 (Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, April 14, 2009), p. 1. For further background, see Aybars Gorgulu, “Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?” *Insight Turkey* 11 (Spring 2009), pp. 19-29.

46 Cited in Grigoryan, “Armenia, Turkey Put Differences Aside.”

47 “Turkish-Armenian Soccer Diplomacy,” Reuters, September 5, 2008, <http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2008/09/05/turkish-armenian-soccer-diplomacy/>, accessed October 9, 2008.

48 Aras and Ozbay, “Will Football Diplomacy Work?”

49 *Ibid.*

its “zero-problems” policy in the Middle East and further its EU candidacy, especially while its supporter Sweden held the rotating presidency however, encouraged it towards an accommodation. For its part, Armenia, badly in need of economic stimuli and a breakout from its geographic isolation, finally agreed to two major concessions: the establishment of an historical commission to analyze the events of 1915 and acceptance of the present borders. The perception that Armenian president Sarkisyan would not be able to reciprocate Turkish president Gul’s attendance at the World Cup qualifying soccer match between the two on October 14, 2009 unless progress had been made served as an immediate catalyst.⁵⁰

Finally, on August 31, 2009, the two sides issued a joint statement that they had agreed “to start political negotiations” aimed at establishing diplomatic relations.”⁵¹ After six more weeks of internal political negotiations and with the Swiss government’s assistance, Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Armenian foreign minister Edward Nalbandian finally signed two separate protocols at Zurich University in Zurich, Switzerland: 1.) Protocol on Development of Relations; and 2.) Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. However, what UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon termed an “historic decision”⁵² only occurred after a last-minute dispute over the final statements each would make was solved by agreeing that there would be no oral statements that might be construed as deal-breaking reservations. US secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton, US diplomat for Europe Philip Gordon, and Swiss foreign minister Micheline Calmy-Rey aided in clearing this last-minute hurdle.

When the problem regarding statements first aroused, Clinton abruptly left the ceremony venue where the signing was to occur. She spoke from a sedan in her hotel parking lot three times with the Armenians and four times with the Turks. Escorted by a Swiss police car with lights and siren blazing, a Turkish diplomat finally arrived with a new draft of his state’s statement. Clinton and Nalbandian then met in person at the hotel and drove back to Zurich University where the signing finally took place three hours later than originally scheduled. Along with the individuals already mentioned, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, the EU high representative for common foreign and security policy Javier Solana, and Slovenian foreign

50 For background, see Gallia Lindenstrauss, “The Historic Accord between Turkey and Armenia: What Lies Ahead? *INSS Insight* No. 136, October 12, 2009.

51 Sebnem Arsu, “Armenians and Turks Agree on Ties,” *New York Times*, September 1, 2009.

52 Cited in Matthew Lee, “Turkey and Armenia Sign Historic Accord Establishing Diplomatic Relations,” October 10, 2009, accessed at www.huffingtonpost.com, October 17, 2009. The following discussion is largely based on this source.

minister Samuel Zbogar also attended the signing. Significantly perhaps for Turkey's EU hopes, Solana thanked Turkey and declared: "This is an important cooperation, no doubt, of Turkey, to solve one issue that pertains to a region which is in our neighborhood."⁵³ In Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Turkey was demonstrating its "goodwill" and added that it also was keen on seeing Armenian troops withdrawn from Nagorno Karabakh. He added that "we are trying to boost our relations with Armenia in a way that will cause no hard feelings for Azerbaijan." Armenian president Serge Sarkisyan said that his state was taking a "responsible decision" in normalizing relations with Turkey, despite what he maintained were "the unhealable wounds of genocide." He added that "there is no alternative to the establishment of relations with Turkey without any precondition. It is the dictate of time."

Four days later, the Armenian president journeyed to Turkey where the Turkish president hosted him in the ancient Ottoman capital of Bursa for a final round of soccer diplomacy. There Sarkisyan specifically explained that his recent meeting with representatives of the powerful but skeptical Armenian diaspora was merely a briefing process, and that he was not "seeking permission"⁵⁴ from them to reconcile with Turkey. Turkish president Gul declared: "We're not writing history, we're making history."

In the first protocol on the "Development of Relations," the two sides agreed to open their "common border within 2 months after the entry into force of this Protocol."⁵⁵ They also agreed to establish an "intergovernmental commission and various sub-commissions at ministerial level" on political consultations; transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks; legal matters; science and education; trade, tourism and economic cooperation; environmental issues; and historical dimension "in which Turkish, Armenian as well as Swiss and other international experts shall take place." A working group headed by the foreign minister of the two parties was tasked "to prepare the working modalities" of these different bodies. Specific time tables of one, two, and three months were established for their implementation. Both protocols had to be ratified by the respective parliaments of the two new partners/parties.

53 This and the following citations were taken from *ibid.*

54 This and the following citation were taken from Suzan Fraser, "Armenia, Turkey Pursue 'Soccer Diplomacy,'" October 15, 2009, accessed at <http://www.ArmeniaDiaspora.com>, October 16, 2009.

55 The following data and citations were gleaned from "Protocol on Development of Relations Between The Republic of Turkey and The Republic of Armenia," Turkish Embassy, Washington, DC, October 11, 2009, accessed at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/protocol-on-development> October 16, 2009.

Aftermath

Given the ancient history of bad will between Turks and Armenians, the Zurich Protocols they signed on October 10, 2009 initially seemed to hold the distinct possibility of being of major historic significance. However, this soon proved not to be the case as the historical antagonisms again reared up. Indeed, Jennifer Lind has shown how attempts at apologies sometimes can be a risky tool for well-meaning peacemakers, causing more harm than good.⁵⁶ For example, post-World War II attempts at Japanese contrition have triggered domestic backlash resulting in conservative politicians, intellectuals, and patriots either justifying or denying past Japanese atrocities. Apologies can impugn wartime leaders, veterans, and those who died fighting for their country. Even in Britain, proposed apologies for former actions in Ireland as well as complicity in the slave trade sparked backlash. In the United States, a proposed Smithsonian exhibit to discuss the horrors of Hiroshima and question the necessity of using the atomic bomb triggered widespread backlash from Congress, veterans' groups, and the media.

On the other hand, both Britain and the United States established close relations with West Germany without apologizing for firebombing German cities. Japan and the United States built a positive postwar relationship despite neither side apologizing for their wartime actions. West Germany and France reconciled soon after World War II despite very little initial apologies from the former. Bonn's fulsome expressions of contrition only came later. German apologies did not provoke much backlash largely because of the unique strategic circumstances in which Germany found herself regarding her need to reassure NATO and the West and thus earn their protection from the Soviet Union.

The West German-French approach offers a non-accusatory strategy of shared catastrophes. Instead of singling out German brutality, the Franco-German memorial at Rheims cathedral and cemetery at Verdun highlight the suffering that militarism and ultra-nationalism brought both sides and thus emphasized their need for unity. Such multilateral approaches focus beyond blaming only one side by considering atrocities committed by many states in numerous wars. Since such multilateral themes do not accuse just one side, they are less likely to elicit backlash. Of course, if one side continues to see itself as uniquely innocent and requiring retributive justice, such multilateral approaches remain premature.

56 The following discussion is largely based on Jennifer Lind, *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics* (Cornell University Press, 2008).

In the matter of the attempted Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, several problems remained. First, as already mentioned, their agreements in Zurich needed to be ratified by their respective parliaments before they could take effect. By the summer of 2010 it had become clear that strong nationalist opposition in both states had scuttled the Zurich Protocols. On January 12, 2010, for example, the Armenian Constitutional Court struck a blow at the rapprochement by ruling that the Protocols signed in October 2009 could not override the 1990 Armenian declaration of independence, which had declared that Armenia would seek international recognition of the genocide. Some would interpret this court ruling as preventing any further discussion with

Once both sides would have to listen to the other's position instead simply of preaching to the choir, it was possible that some type of agreement gradually would emerge.

Turkey over this issue, one of the main reasons Turkey signed the Protocols in the first place and whose discussion Turkey argued it was guaranteed by the Protocols.⁵⁷ In addition, the Armenian court implied that the protocols could not have any bearing on the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. The Turkish foreign ministry immediately released a statement that Armenia was creating unacceptable preconditions that undermined

the very reason for negotiating the protocols.⁵⁸

In addition, Turkey seriously miscalculated the Azeri reaction to the Protocols as the seemingly intractable Nagorno Karabakh issue led Azerbaijan to pressure Turkey against ratification.⁵⁹ Indeed, Azerbaijan even hinted that it might reconsider its earlier commitment to deliver gas to Turkey. Rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia might drive Azerbaijan into the Russian hands.⁶⁰ By not dealing with the Nagorno Karabakh issue, Turkish nationalists also saw the Protocols as betraying their Azeri kin.⁶¹ Finally, even if an historical commission were to be established to study what happened in 1915, it was difficult to see how it would be able to convince both sides whether genocide

57 See Semih Idiz, "The Turkish-Armenian Debacle," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), p. 14; and Sergey Minasyan, "Prospects for Normalization between Armenia and Turkey: A View from Yerevan," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), p. 28.

58 Emil Danielyan, "Turkish-Armenian Deal Threatens to Unravel," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 (January 27, 2010); and Barcin Yinanc, "Turkey Asks for Guarantee from Bern, Washington on Behalf of Armenia," *Hurriyet* (Turkey), January 27, 2010.

59 Elhan Mehtiyev, "Turkish-Armenian Protocols: An Azerbaijani Perspective," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 41-47.

60 Piotr Zalewski, "Abnormalisation: The Bumpy Road to Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement," Centre for European Policy Studies, (Brussels, December 17, 2009).

61 Elhan Mehtiyev, "Turkish-Armenian Protocols: An Azerbaijani Perspective," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 41-47.

had occurred or not. The on-going dispute simply would move to this commission.

However, once both sides would have to listen to the other's position instead simply of preaching to the choir, it was possible that some type of agreement gradually would emerge.⁶² As mentioned above, the two sides might be able to forego employing the word genocide, in favor of the term *Buyuk Felaket/Mets Yeghern* or Great Catastrophe. Finally, some have suggested that Armenia could turn to Iran for the economic support it needs and which drives it to accept the rapprochement with Turkey.⁶³ However, given Iran's own economic malaise and continuing problems with the West, it is questionable how much the Islamic Republic can help Armenia.

Given this seeming impasse, there are some who now argue that the supposed rapprochement has actually made matters worse between Turkey and Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and even Turkey and the United States. In addition, Turkey's attempt to assume the role of a regional problem solver has been botched, while Armenia remained economically isolated. Washington's hopes to revive its deteriorating relationship with Ankara have been frayed, while U.S. calculations that the protocols could reduce Armenia's dependence on Russia dashed. Only Russia would seem to have benefited by continuing its delicate balancing strategy in the region: Armenia remained tied to Russia, Russian ties with Azerbaijan have been fostered while Turkish and Azeri relations soured, relations with Turkey over regional and energy issues continued, and the United States prevented from becoming too successful in its initiatives.⁶⁴

On the other hand, the very fact that Turkey and Armenia signed the Protocols to established diplomatic relations, open their borders, and create a Historical Commission illustrates that progress is being made even if ratification is not presently possible. Important governmental precedents have been set and institutions created. As soon as the diplomatic winds shift, as they usually do, the basis to pick up and continue to the finishing line already will have been established. What is more, track-two diplomacy between the two ancient enemies continues and is clearly beyond the point of no return. Turks and Armenians will continue to work through civil society contacts and exchanges

62 See, for example, the recent discussion in Ronald Grigor Suny, "Truth in Telling: Reconciling Realities in the Genocide of the Ottoman Armenians," *American Historical Review* 114 (October 2009), pp. 935 ff.

63 Emil Danielyan, "Armenia Showcases Iran Ties, as Talks with Azerbaijan and Turkey Falter," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 (February 11, 2010).

64 For background, see Igor Torbakov, "Russia and Turkish-Armenian Normalization: Competing Interests in the South Caucasus," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 31-39.

that will lessen negative stereotypes and construct new confidences. Of course, only time will tell whether these continuing attempts at a rapprochement would lead to a cordial peace or only to a cold peace as has existed between Israel and Egypt since their peace treaty was signed in 1979.

Recommendations

Given the initial breakthrough and rapprochement in Turkish-Armenian relations that occurred in October 2009 but the impasse currently reached, what roads should Turkey now take? This, of course, is a most difficult question and surely there are behind-the-scenes contacts occurring of which this author is unaware. Nevertheless, based on what has been discussed above, the following might be considered besides simply waiting for the diplomatic winds to shift in favor of ratification of the Protocols. If denial fuels continuing fear and revenge, while unilateral contrition risks backlash and subsequent demands for reparations, how can peacemakers confront the past?

In such a situation, Turkey should differentiate between the independent state of Armenia and the Armenian diaspora.⁶⁵ There are more opportunities for progress with Armenia because it needs to deal immediately with its severe economic problems, and Turkey is in a strong position to help. The more affluent Armenian diaspora, on the other hand, does not need any economic aid. Rather, it remains concerned primarily with its allegations of genocide, which has the effect of disengaging it from the immediate economic reality of Armenia.

Indeed, one study found that diaspora communities in general tend to be more radical concerning the foreign policy of their homeland and associated conflicts than their kin who actually live in the homeland.⁶⁶ By helping Armenia with its economic problems, Turkey may begin to split the two Armenian actors.⁶⁷ According to an estimate from Kaan Soyak, the director of the Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABC), opening the border could more than double Turkish-Armenian trade.⁶⁸ Such action could also boost foreign direct investment in Armenia by reducing the perception of its risk and

65 The following recommendations are largely based on the discussion in Aras and Ozbay, "Will Football Diplomacy Work?" pp. 5-7.

66 C. Christine Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11 (April 2005), pp. 125-56.

67 In a mirror image of this splitting strategy, however, Armenia undoubtedly would like to separate Turkey and Azerbaijan by convincing Turkey to open its borders to Armenia, an increasingly possible demarche given the perceived sterility of keeping the borders closed. Armenia would also like to split Turkey and Azerbaijan on the Nagorno Karabakh issue.

68 *Today's Zaman*, February 16, 2009.

isolation. In addition, open borders would appreciatively reduce Armenian transport costs now dependent on expensive, low capacity, and vulnerable rail and road links through Georgia and its Black Sea ports. Although the much larger Turkish economy does not stand to gain nearly as much, open borders still would help develop such isolated Turkish towns as Kars, Igdir, Trabzon, and Erzurum, among others.

As for the genocide allegations, Turkey should continue to advocate a joint commission of historians to undertake an objective analysis. Since much of the Armenian diaspora opposes this approach as questioning the authenticity of its version of history, once again Turkey is presented with an opportunity to portray the Armenian diaspora as obstructionist, take a constructive diplomatic stance that will please the West, while dividing the diaspora from the state of Armenia. Such a proactive instead of defensive approach would also strengthen Turkey's regional profile in the Caucasus, opening new possibilities for it to pursue roles as a mediator and facilitator in keeping with its recent position as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.

At the same time, however, Turkey should remain sensitive to Azeri concerns regarding Nagorno Karabakh. This remains a very emotional issue, for which the OSCE Minsk initiative and UN-authored attempts have not produced any solution. Once again, Turkey's Caucasian initiatives involving Armenia might offer new possibilities. Russia and to some extent even Iran, of course, will be key actors in all this, and must be convinced that the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement will not threaten their interests. Although Russia may subtly benefit if the rapprochement falters, it is not likely that Russia will actively attempt to hamstring its revival as Moscow too could benefit by increased political and economic stability in the Caucasus. Iran's position is not as clear, but certainly not hostile. Finally, Turkey should remain susceptible to continuing track-two, civil society dialogues. As documented above, even in the Armenian diaspora there are those who should be willing to discuss discreetly all contentious matters. This will not be an easy process, and there is no guarantee of success. However, the long, arduous journey has already begun, and many Turks and Armenians have committed themselves to an eventual rapprochement.⁶⁹

69 For a series of further even-handed and cogently reasoned recommendations on how the parties might proceed, see International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Armenia," pp. ii-iii. These proposals were released in April 2009. For additional policy proposals and recommendations, see Aybars Gorgulu, Alexander Iskandaryan, and Sergey Minasyan, "Turkey-Armenian Dialogue Series: Assessing the Rapprochement Process," TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), Istanbul, May 2010, pp. 22-23. Finally, see on the website maintained by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) in Berlin www.esiweb.org "Turkey-Armenia: The Great Debate," August 2009; and "Turkey-Armenia Manual: Information and Contacts to Persons and Institutions Working on Turkey-Armenia Relations," August 2010.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“A Historical Step for Turks and Armenians,” *Turkish Daily News*, July 12, 2001.

“Joint Statement of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Armenia and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs,” *Press Release* No. 56, April 22, 2009, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no-56-22april-2009-press-release-regarding-the-turkish-armenian-relations.en.mfa> accessed October 5, 2009.

“PM Erdogan Attends Turkish Diaspora Meeting in Baku,” Briefing, Ankara, March 12, 2007.

“Protocol on Development of Relations Between The Republic of Turkey and The Republic of Armenia,” Turkish Embassy, Washington, DC, October 11, 2009, accessed at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/protocol-on-development> . . . October 16, 2009.

“The Armenian Question, 2008: Harut Sassounian on Realpolitik and Genocide,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 24, 2008.

“Turkey-Armenia Manual: Information and Contacts to Persons and Institutions Working on Turkey-Armenia Relations,” *European Stability Initiative (ESI)* in Berlin www.esiweb.org, August 2010.

“Turkey-Armenia: The Great Debate,” *European Stability Initiative (ESI)* in Berlin www.esiweb.org, August 2009.

“Turkish-Armenian Soccer Diplomacy,” Reuters, September 5, 2008, <http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2008/09/05/turkish-armenian-soccer-diplomacy/> accessed October 9, 2008.

“We Are Ready To Talk To Turkey,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 8, 2008.

Altunisik, Meliha Benli. “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East,” *Insight Turkey* 10 (April 2008).

Aras, Bulent and Fatih Ozbay. “Turkish-Armenian Relations: Will Football Diplomacy Work?” *SETA Policy Brief* No. 24, (Ankara), September 2008

Aras, Bulent. “The Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Insight Turkey* 11 (Summer 2009).

- Arsu, Sebnem. "Armenians and Turks Agree on Ties," *New York Times*, September 1, 2009.
- Bardakci, Murat (ed.) *Talat Pasanın Evrak-i Metrukesi* [The Papers Talat Pasha Left Behind] Istanbul: Everest yayinlari, 2009.
- Bentley, Mark. "Turkey Says Armenia May Re-establish Relations, Trade," *Bloomberg*, September 10, 2008, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=aFUwZ222syYc&refer=>, accessed September 10, 2008.
- Bransten, Jeremy and Charles Rechnagel. "The Outbreak of 'Football Diplomacy,'" *Radio Free Europe*, September 5, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/Outbreak_Football_Diplomacy/1196718.html, accessed October 9, 2008.
- Danielyan, Emil. "Armenia Showcases Iran Ties, as Talks with Azerbaijan and Turkey Falter," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 February 11, 2010.
- Danielyan, Emil. "Turkish-Armenian Deal Threatens to Unravel," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 January 27, 2010.
- Fair, C. Christine. "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11 (April 2005)
- Frantz, Douglas. "Unofficial Commission Acts to Ease Turkish-Armenian Enmity," *New York Times*, July 10, 2001.
- Fraser, Suzan. "Armenia, Turkey Pursue 'Soccer Diplomacy,'" October 15, 2009, accessed at <http://www.ArmeniaDiaspora.com>, October 16, 2009.
- Gorgulu, Aybars "Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?" *Insight Turkey* 11 (Spring 2009)
- Gorgulu, Aybars et. al "Turkey-Armenian Dialogue Series: Assessing the Rapprochement Process," *TESEV* (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), Istanbul, May 2010.
- Grigoryan, Marianna. "Armenia, Turkey Put Differences Aside for Soccer," *Eurasia Insight*, October 9, 2008, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav090508.shtml>, accessed October 9, 2008.

Halaçoğlu, Yusuf. *The Story of 1915: What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?* Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2008.

Idiz, Semih. "The Turkish-Armenian Debacle," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010)

International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders," Europe Report No. 199 Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, April 14, 2009

Iskandaryan, Alexander and Sergey Minasyan. "Pragmatic Policies vs. Historical Constraints: Analyzing Armenia-Turkey Relations," *Caucasus Institute Research Papers* #1, Yerevan, Armenia, January 2010.

Lee, Matthew. "Turkey and Armenia Sign Historic Accord Establishing Diplomatic Relations," *Huffington Post* October 10, 2009, accessed at www.huffingtonpost.com, October 17, 2009.

Letsch, Constanze. "Turkish PM Offers Condolences over 1915 Armenian Massacre," *The Guardian*, April 23, 2014.
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/23/turkey...> accessed August 8, 2014.

Lind, Jennifer. *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics* Cornell University Press, 2008.

Lindenstrauss, Gallia. "The Historic Accord between Turkey and Armenia: What Lies Ahead?" *INSS Insight* No. 136, October 12, 2009.

Mehtiyev, Elhan. "Turkish-Armenian Protocols: An Azerbaijani Perspective," *Insight Turkey* 12 Spring 2010.

Minasyan, Sergey. "Prospects for Normalization between Armenia and Turkey: A View from Yerevan," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010).

Phillips, David L. *Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation* New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005.

Purvis, Andrew "Can Soccer Heal Turkey-Armenian Rift?" *Time* (in partnership with *CNN*), September 5, 2008,
<http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1839199,00.html>, accessed September 10, 2008.

- Rainsford, Sarah. "Turkey Bans 'Genocide' Conference," *BBC News*, September 22, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4273602.stm>, accessed September 15, 2008.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor. "Truth in Telling: Reconciling Realities in the Genocide of the Ottoman Armenians," *American Historical Review* 114 October 2009.
- Tavernise, Sabrina. "Nearly a Million Genocide Victims, Covered in a Cloak of Amnesia," *New York Times*, March 8, 2009.
- Torbakov, Igor. "Russia and Turkish-Armenian Normalization: Competing Interests in the South Caucasus," *Insight Turkey* 12 Spring 2010.
- Yavuz, M. Hakan. *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Yinanc, Barcin "Turkey Asks for Guarantee from Bern, Washington on Behalf of Armenia," *Hurriyet* (Turkey), January 27, 2010.
- Zalewski, Piotr. "Abnormalisation: The Bumpy Road to Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement," *Centre for European Policy Studies*, Brussels, December 17, 2009.

THE MALTA TRIBUNALS

(MALTA YARGILAMALARI)

Uluç GÜRKAN
Journalist, Author

Abstract: *There is no national or international court ruling characterizing the 1915 events as genocide. On the contrary, there is an international court ruling in hand which refutes the genocide claims. By the end of the First World War, 144 Ottoman officials were arrested by the British on the grounds that they had “perpetrated mass killings against Armenians,” and a legal investigation was initiated on Malta conducted by Britain’s highest legal prosecution authority, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in London. Despite the British government’s every effort to try and sentence the Turkish detainees on Malta, the CPS inquiry resulted in no charges being filed, on the grounds that “it was unlikely that such charges could be proven in a British court of law.” The Malta Tribunals, with their judicial and historical findings that refute the Armenian genocide claims as a whole, constitute an important chapter in our history. Yet it is a chapter that we have forgotten and were made to forget.*

Keywords: *UN 1948 Genocide Convention, Ottoman Tribunals, Malta Tribunals, Crown Prosecution Service, Sevres Treaty*

Öz: *1915 olaylarını soykırım olarak nitelendiren ulusal veya uluslararası bir mahkeme kararı bulunmuyor. Tam aksine, soykırım iddialarını çürüten bir uluslararası mahkeme kararı vardır. Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonu itibarıyla, 144 Osmanlı görevlisi İngilizlerce “Ermenilere yönelik toplum katliamlar” yapmak suçlamasıyla tutuklanmış ve Malta’da Britanya’nın en yüksek hukuki otoritesi olan Londra’daki İngiliz Kraliyet Başsavcılığı’na bir soruşturma yürütülmüştür. İngiliz hükümetinin Malta’daki Türk tutukluları yargımaya ve mahkum ettirebilmek için verdiği tüm uğraşlara rağmen, İngiliz Kraliyet Başsavcılığı’nın yürüttüğü soruşturma “bir İngiliz mahkemesi önünde bu tür suçlamaların kanıtlanması mümkün değildir” gerekçesiyle hiçbir suçlama yapılmadan sonuçlanmıştır. Ermeni soykırımı iddialarını hukuki ve tarihi açıdan tamamıyla çürüten bulguları ile Malta yargulamaları tarihimizde çok önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Ancak bu ya unuttuğumuz ya da bize unutturulmuş bir olaydır.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *BM 1948 Soykırım Sözleşmesi, Osmanlı Yargulamaları, Malta Yargulamaları, İngiliz Kraliyet Başsavcılığı, Sevr Anlaşması*

The Crime of Genocide and the Reality of Malta

The Island of Malta is imprinted in our minds as a story of exile. However, this is untrue. What took place on Malta was a trial.

After the First World War, the British arrested 145 Ottoman officials, the majority of them Unionists (*members or sympathizers of the Committee of Union and Progress*) and sent them to Malta. The objective was “*to try and sentence the Turks.*”¹

A judicial investigation was opened into the Unionists, who were detained on Malta for more than two years, to look into the accusation of “*mass killing of Armenians.*”² The investigation was conducted by the British CPS in London.

The prosecution’s investigation was based on Articles 230 and 231 of the Treaty of Sèvres on “*Armenian massacre*” allegations³. Along with the Ottoman archives transported to London after being seized during the invasion, every document deemed to be in America was examined,⁴ and proof of the “*Armenian massacre*” was sought in Egypt, Iraq, and Caucasia. Despite all these efforts, no evidence was found that a British court would consider sufficient proof.

Consequently, the British Foreign Ministry asked the prosecution to “*initiate political charges*”⁵ against the Turks on Malta, “*if judicial ones cannot be initiated,*” but failed to convince the prosecution. The British CPS, in a document dated 29 July 1921, announced without question to the British government that, with the “*evidence in hand*” none of the Turks on Malta could be prosecuted on the grounds of the Armenian massacre.⁶

Thus, the British government had to release the Turks being held on Malta.⁷

1 FO 371/4172: Cypher telegram from the Foreign Ministry to Admiral Calthorpe, British High Commissioner at Constantinople, very urgent No. 33, London, 05.02.1919

2 FO 371.4174.129560: CPS report dated 07.08.1919 enclosed in a letter from British FM to British Chief Prosecutor. No. 1270 of 10.07.1919

3 *Bilal Şimşir, Malta Sürgünleri*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985-2. edition), pp. 213-214 (Malta Deportees)

4 FO 371/6504/E.8519:- Letter from Craigie, British Charge d’Affaires at Washington to Lord Curzon, No. 722 of 13.07.1921

5 FO 371/6502/E.5845: FM’s letter to His Majesty’s Procurator-General’s Department, 31.05.1921

6 FO 371/6504/E.8745: From Dept. of H.M. Procurator General to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 29.07.1921

7 FO 371/6504/E.10662: Telegram from Curzon to Rumbold. Tel. No. 539 of 27.09.1921 - FO 371/6505/E.10870: Telegram from Rumbold to Curzon. Tel. 639 of 29.09.1921 - FO 371/6505/E.11011: Telegram from Rumbold to Curzon. Tel. No 645 of 04.10.1921 - FO 371/6505: From Plummer to War Ministry, No.4133(A) of 29.10.1921

Malta refers to a prosecution process during which the “Armenian genocide” (a current term) allegations were investigated. This prosecutorial process on Malta shares an international judicial atmosphere similar to that of the Nuremberg Tribunals, the trial concerning the Holocaust after the Second World War. The Malta investigations were conducted in order to establish a court similar to the “international court” later formed in Nuremberg to put Germans on trial for the Holocaust, if the process had not been halted due to lack of evidence.⁸

The establishment phase of the international court where the unionists were supposed to be put on trial was also discussed by the League of Nations, the post-First World War predecessor to the United Nations. During its sessions, among the topics that were discussed were the methods to use to establish a court⁹ which would carry out such prosecutions and an “Advisory Board” was formed for this purpose.¹⁰

The Malta investigations were conducted in order to establish a court similar to the “international court” later formed in Nuremberg to put Germans on trial for the Holocaust, if the process had not been halted due to lack of evidence.

These preparations were not realized, as the CPS declared that no charges could be filed due to a “lack of evidence” and announced that no penal action could be taken even if charges were filed. The CPS’s decision to dismiss the Armenian massacre accusations for “lack of evidence” corresponds in modern law to a “dismissal.”

It goes without saying that the judicial conclusions of the Malta Tribunals completely refute the “Armenian genocide” allegations. According to UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention, in order for an incident to be considered genocide, a court ruling is required.

There is no national or international court ruling characterizing the 1915 events as genocide. However, there is a court ruling declaring the opposite, a court ruling saying that no massacre that can be defined as genocide took place. As the prosecution’s inquiry constitutes the first step of a legal procedure, we therefore have in hand a judgment stating that the Armenian genocide does not exist. This judgment is the Malta Tribunals, commonly known to Turks as the “Malta exile,” which the CPS declared dismissed.¹¹

8 Uluç Gürkan, *Ermeni Sorunu'nun Anlamak*, (İstanbul: Destek Yayınları, 2012-2.baskı) p. 83-85 (Understanding the Armenian Question)

9 New York Times, “*League invites Wilson to Mediate for Armenians: Root Court Plan modified*”, 26.11.1920, p.1, column 5.

10 Uluç Gürkan, *Malta Yargılaması*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 214) s. 14 (The Malta Tribunals)

11 *idem*, p. 15

The Malta Tribunals constitute an important chapter in our history. However, it is a chapter that we have forgotten and indeed were made to forget. Remembering these tribunals and embracing their reality will make the Armenian genocide lobby, which at every turn calls on us to “face our history,” face the documented realities of history.

British governments seem to have faced this reality.

The British tried to use every opportunity to try and sentence every Turk they arrested for the “killing of local Christian people” during the years of WWI years and afterwards. However, as the country that knows best what happened during these days, they clearly state that the events of 1915-1916 cannot be described as genocide.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, when Western parliaments were recognizing Armenian genocide claims, the UK was also asked to do the same. British Spokesperson of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale rejected such demand in a speech dated 14 April 1999 delivered on behalf of the British government:

*“...in the absence of unequivocal evidence to show that the Ottoman administration took a specific decision to eliminate the Armenians under their control at the time, British governments have not recognised the events of 1915 and 1916 as ‘genocide.’ ...we do not believe it is the business of governments today to review events of over 80 years ago with a view to pronouncing on them... These are matters of legal and historical debate.”*¹²

Despite this statement, the Armenian genocide lobby has maintained its pressure on the UK, ultimately resulting in the Armenian genocide allegations being addressed during a Holocaust commemoration ceremony held in London on 27 January 2001.

In a press conference held in Ankara on 22 January 2001, Britain’s Beverley Hughes, then parliamentary under-secretary of state in the department of the environment, transport and the regions, stated that only the Holocaust would be addressed during the ceremony¹³ and made the following declaration in Istanbul:

¹² <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldhansrd/vo990414/text/90414-09.htm>

¹³ Milliyet, 23 January 2001

*“A while ago, the British government reviewed evidence put forth on the Armenian allegations and examined documents on the events of 1915-1916. The decision is that these events do not correspond to what is defined as genocide by the UN. This is the attitude of the British government, and this will never change.”*¹⁴

In a response to a question on this matter, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Baroness Scotland told the House of Lords on 7 February 2001:

*“The Government, in line with previous British Governments, have judged the evidence relating to events in eastern Anatolia in 1915-1916 not to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events should be categorized as genocide as defined by the 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide.”*¹⁵

The UN Convention on Genocide

Genocide is an international crime as described in the 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide.¹⁶

The definition of the crime is given in Article 2 of this 19-article convention as follows: *“Acts of killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”* committed *“with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”*

This definition is binding. Its scope or meaning can neither be expanded upon nor narrowed arbitrarily.

Besides the commission of such acts, to be entirely clear, the existence of the material element alone is not sufficient for the crime to occur. In addition to the material element, the moral element has to be present as well. This moral element makes the crime of genocide very special.

14 Hürriyet Daily, 25 January 2001

15 “Letter dated 29 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General” United Nations General Assembly, Security Council <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a551008.pdf>

16 Full text in Turkish: <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/pdf01/33-36.pdf>

The moral element of the crime is the intent to “*destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.*” This is a special intent. “*Beyond the intent of killing, the acts have to be committed with the intent to destroy a group.*”¹⁷

In the literature of law, the special intent called *dolus specialis* is necessarily sought in genocide accusations. Articles 187, 188 and 189 of the International Court of Justice’s Bosnia ruling explicitly state “*a separate notional element must be present*” in order to define an act as genocide. This notional element is also present in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) Kupreskic case as “*the need for the presence of intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group.*”¹⁸

According to the UN Convention on Genocide, which defines the crime of genocide and establishes its legal framework, real persons – not legal ones – should also be charged with such crimes.

Forcing a group to migrate and related deaths are not sufficient for the crime of genocide to occur, according to international courts. For example, in its Krstic ruling, the Yugoslavia War Crimes Appeal Court ruled that the forced migration of women, children and elderly people of Srebrenica, although doing so bears a high risk of critical casualties, cannot be considered as genocide but instead an element that should be considered as part of the whole.

This view was also confirmed in the Blagojevic decision.

According to the UN Convention on Genocide, which defines the crime of genocide and establishes its legal framework, real persons – not legal ones – should also be charged with such crimes. Articles 3 and 4 of the convention on “*punishable acts*” are related to the individual criminal responsibility for the crime of genocide.

Despite this judicial reality, “Armenian genocide” accusations are usually levelled at Turkey and the Turkish people, rather than real persons, thereby gaining a quality of “hate speech.”¹⁹

Both the timing and reasons for turning the “genocide” allegations into some sort of hate speech against Turkey are notable. The Armenian genocide allegations gained new momentum in the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet system and the end of the Cold War. They gained a new international

17 Pulat Tacar, *Doğu Perinçek-İsviçre Davası*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2002) p. 99 (Doğu Perinçek-Switzerland Case)

18 *idem*, p. 99-100

19 *Ermeni Sorunu’nu Anlamak*, p. 14 (Understanding the Armenian Question)

dimension, incorporated in the “New World Order” shaped around the “*Clash of Civilizations*” where Samuel Huntington emphasizes religious differences. Thus they have become part of contemporary politics rather than a historical issue.²⁰

Another important element distinguishing the crime of genocide from other crimes is establishing, through competent courts and appropriate proceedings, the commission of the acts and whether the accused real persons had specific intent while committing them. This element is defined in Article 6 on the “*trial of persons charged with genocide*” as “*by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was committed*” and “*an international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.*”

Another reality that we should recall and relate to the “genocide lobby” is that more than 1,000 people accused of harming the Armenians during the deportations of 1915 were tried and sentenced by the Ottoman Courts-Martial after the First World War.

While the CPS’s investigation on Malta corresponds to the UN Genocide Convention’s “*international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction*” criteria, the Ottoman 1915 Courts-Martial fulfill the quality of “*a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was committed*” provided for in the UN Genocide Convention.

Documents relating to the Ottoman trials of 1915-1916 and Malta trials of 1919-1921 should be revealed and not be forgotten on the dusty shelves of history. These documents have judicial findings that completely refute the “Armenian genocide” allegations.²¹

Discrediting Malta

The “genocide lobby” realizes that the Malta Tribunals are the beginning of the end for the genocide allegations. This is why the lobby is making great effort to discredit them. The aim is to create the illusion that Malta did not entail actual legal proceedings. They take recourse to a series of historic and legal falsehoods:

- The Malta proceedings were nothing but a show. The actual goal was an “exchange of captives.”

²⁰ *Idem*, p. 45-47

²¹ *Malta Yargılaması*, ss. 20-21 (The Malta Tribunals)

- As the liberation movement in Anatolia gained strength, the British gave up on Malta.
- No charges were filed, and the international court provided for in Sèvres was not established.
- Sèvres was never entered into force and with the signing of Lausanne, the Malta proceedings were abandoned.
- The investigations carried out on Malta were not about “genocide.” Therefore the judgment cannot constitute a reference against “genocide” allegations.²²

Exchange of captives

Allegations suggesting that the Malta Tribunals were not taken seriously by the British, as they rather considered them a “captive exchange project,” are wholly unconvincing. Proceedings conducted over an “Armenian massacre” are documented in the British archives. Despite that, the “genocide” lobby shamelessly falsifies Malta.

The Malta Tribunals did not end with an exchange of captives. On the contrary, they ended with a “dismissal” declared by the British CPS, and the exchange of captives issue arose thereafter. The British did not include the Turks on Malta who were deemed “arrested” until the declaration of the “dismissal,” and especially those accused with the “Armenian genocide” in this exchange of captives.

It is true that an exchange of captives agreement was signed in London on 16 March 1921 between Bekir Sami Bey, the foreign minister of the Grand National Assembly government which led the War of Independence in Anatolia, and the government of Britain. However, not all the Turks held on Malta fall within the scope of this agreement. The scope of the envisaged captive exchange was the release of all British captives by the Turks in exchange for “*the return of the Turks who have not harmed or abused Armenians or British captives,*” by the British.

The British organized the Conference of London with their allies when they were compelled to accept the War of Independence under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership and the government of the Grand National Assembly, after the First

²² *Idem*, s. 112

İnönü Victory of January 1921. The aim here was to partially soften the Sèvres agreement and convince Ankara to accept it.

It was after the Conference of London that Bekir Sami Bey signed the captive exchange agreement, but Ankara did not ratify the softened Sèvres or the limited-scope captive exchange agreement signed by Bekir Sami Bey, who then was dismissed from his duty as FM.

The detention of Turks on Malta on the grounds of an Armenian massacre ended with the CPS's declaration of dismissal of "Armenian massacre" allegations due to the absence of evidence on 29 July 1921. Therefore, the release of Turks whose "detention" turned into "political captivity" is documented in the British archives.²³

Upon the dismissal declaration by the CPS, British Foreign Minister Lord Curzon sent a memo on 10 August 1921 to Sir Horace Rumbold, Britain's high commissioner in İstanbul, mentioning "*the obligation to make a general agreement.*"²⁴ The response of the high commissioner can be summarized as follows: "*Since no adequate evidence was found to convince a British Court of Law, all Turks should be included in the exchange of captives to avoid losing more reputation.*"²⁵

Thus began the negotiations for exchange which ultimately led to an agreement.

The Struggle for Independence

Another falsification aimed at discrediting the Malta Tribunals suggests that British attempts to reconcile with the National Struggle movement influenced the CPS' dismissal. Such falsification does not reject the proceedings which took place on Malta but attempts to discredit them by giving them a political character, which is at odds with historical reality.

The CPS declared its dismissal decision regarding the "Armenian massacre" on July 29, 1921, a time when the national liberation movement was weak. The Greek Army had captured Kütahya and Eskişehir on July 17 and 19 respectively which led to the retreat of the national liberation forces to the east of the Sakarya River. The sound of Greek shells targeting Polatlı were heard

23 *Idem*, p. 112-114

24 FO 371/6504/E.8745: Telegram from FM to Rumbold. Tel. No 851 of 08.10. 1921

25 FO 371/6504/E.10023: From Harrington to Rumbold, 08.24. 1921

from Ankara, and there were debates over relocating the Grand National Assembly (Parliament) from Ankara to Kayseri.

Britain had no initiative for reconciling with Ankara which would affect the CPS. On the contrary, the British government was dreaming of dealing a deadly blow to Ankara.²⁶

The National Independence Movement's recovery and establishing a balance with the Greek forces took place two months after the CPS's decision to dismiss.

A Non-Established Court

Those seeking to discredit the Malta Tribunals argue that no competent international court was established as required by the Treaty of Sèvres and therefore no proceedings took place in line with the UN Convention on Genocide.

It is true that no court was established, because there was no need for it.

It is not that proceedings weren't conducted on Malta due to the lack of a court. The proceedings actually started upon completion of the legal investigation, but no charges were filed, which means no "prosecution" before a court was initiated.

The reason is that, by the end of the CPS-led investigation which constituted the first phase of the proceedings, no evidence suggesting "*the mass killing*" of Armenians and Christian Ottoman citizens was found, which would lead to "*filing charges in a court of law.*" Thus the dismissal decision and dismissal of the "Armenian massacre" accusations led to the case being closed.

It is known that if any evidence capable of proof was found, charges would have been filed and a trial would have been carried out by an international court designated by the League of Nations. This is why the establishment of such a court was among the topics discussed by the League of Nations.²⁷

26 *Malta Yargılaması*, p. 115 (The Malta Tribunals)

27 *İdem*, p. 116-117

Remission by Lausanne

The Malta falsification that the “Armenian genocide” lobby relies on the most is as follows: “*Since Sèvres never went into force, with the signing of Lausanne, the Malta proceedings were granted amnesty and closed.*”

It is true that Ottoman Sultan Vahdettin didn’t sign Sèvres, despite its signature by the Turkish side. However, this does not mean that it didn’t go into force. First of all, the invasion led by the British and allies was in line with Sèvres’ map. Likewise, the justification for the illegal invasion of Istanbul came from Sèvres.

Saying that the Malta proceedings were granted amnesty by Lausanne is a time travel trick mocking human intelligence.

The Malta proceedings came to an end on July 29, 1921, and Lausanne was signed two years later, on July 24, 1923. At that time, no proceeding existed that could be linked to Malta. The files were closed and archived.

The most important agent of this time travel between Lausanne and Malta is renowned British genocide law specialist Geoffrey Robertson. In a report entitled “*Was there an Armenian genocide?*” presented to the British Parliament in October 2009, Robertson writes that the CPS investigation initiated on Malta after WWI into the “Armenian massacre” “*was closed with the establishment of the new Turkish Republic under the leadership of Ataturk, and therefore is of no judicial value.*”²⁸

Written by Robertson in exchange for money from the Armenian diaspora, this report aims to make the British Parliament accept the “genocide” allegations. Believing that the failure of British governments and Parliament to make a move in this regard is due to their sensitivity to the Malta Tribunals, the “genocide” lobby attempted to overcome this problem through Robertson’s work.²⁹

Reference to Genocide

The last falsification of the “Armenian genocide” lobby targeting Malta suggests, “*The Malta proceedings did not include genocide, as at that time such a crime had not yet been defined. Therefore, the CPS decision cannot*

28 Full text: <http://groong.usc.edu/Geoffrey-Robertson-QC-Genocide.pdf>

29 *Malta Yargılaması*, p. 118 (The Malta Tribunals)

constitute a judicial reference today as to the nullity of the Armenian genocide claims.”

Such an allegation is contradictory. If the Malta proceedings are to be declared null and void on the grounds that no such “genocide” definition existed at that time, such an accusation also cannot be done today using the contemporary notion of “genocide,” for the events took place at a time when no such notion existed.

It means practicing double standards to reject the Malta Tribunals’ judicial findings today and attempting to apply the contemporary crime of “genocide” to the past. This is the result of a sick political culture. Besides, no matter what theoretical judicial reasons are used to defend it, it is not in line with the realities of life.

If the Malta proceedings are to be declared null and void on the grounds that no such “genocide” definition existed at that time, such an accusation also cannot be done today using the contemporary notion of “genocide,” for the events took place at a time when no such notion existed.

International Jurisdiction

Although pressures to impose the “Armenian genocide” allegations as an “undeniable reality” have been reflected in the court rulings of several foreign countries, they remained ineffective on international judicial authorities such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ),

European Court of Justice (ECJ), European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the French Constitutional Council.

The ECtHR and the French Constitutional Council ruled that a law forbidding declaration of the “*non-existence of the Armenian genocide*” and related penalties violate the right to “*freedom of expression.*” The ECJ ruled that parliamentary decisions recognizing “the Armenian genocide” are of “*a political nature and can produce no judicial outcome.*” As for the ICJ, it points out that “*proceedings initiated by local courts in foreign countries against others are in violation of international law.*”

It is no coincidence that the decisions of international judicial authorities are in line with Turkey’s position on “genocide.” Such decisions mean that historic and judicial realities do not confirm the “genocide” allegations.

ECtHR Decision³⁰

In its Perinçek-Switzerland decision of December 17, 2013, the ECtHR ruled that the condemnation of Doğu Perinçek by Swiss courts on the grounds of his remarks suggesting that “*the treatment of Armenians during WWI cannot be interpreted as genocide*” violated Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights on freedom of expression. The clear meaning of this ruling is that “*expressing that the 1915 Armenian deportation is not genocide cannot and will not constitute a basis for condemnation.*”

According to the ECtHR, declaring that “*the Armenian genocide does not exist*” falls under the scope of the freedom of expression and cannot be subject to prosecution.

This ECtHR decision is a clear shield protecting freedom of expression against the insistence that “*the Armenian genocide is an undeniable historical fact,*” thus paving the way for free debate. However, it should not be viewed only within the limited context of freedom of expression. Its meaning and importance go beyond that.

According to the ECtHR:

- The widespread impression created by the “Armenian genocide” lobby that “*there is a general international consensus characterizing the 1915 events as genocide*” is not true. There is no such consensus which would mean “ultimate acceptance” of the “genocide” allegations. Out of a total of 190 states, there are only 20 that recognize the “Armenian genocide.”
- Not characterizing the 1915 events as genocide “*does not encourage hatred against Armenians,*” “*nor does it humiliate them.*” Therefore, saying that “*the Armenian genocide does not exist*” cannot be an “*abuse of the right to debate.*” Likewise, the contrary legal action “*does not mean protecting Armenians.*”
- There is a “*common good in debating*” whether the 1915 events are “genocide” or not. Restricting such debate by law is not at a country’s discretion, as this would tend to limit the common good.
- “Genocide” is a clearly defined crime which can be proven under clear circumstances. International jurisprudence confirms this. The 34th

30 ECtHR Perinçek-Switzerland decision (Official French and unofficial Turkish): <http://www.avim.org.tr/analiz/tr/AIHM-PERINCEK-ISVICRE-KARARI—RESMI-FRANSIZCA-VE-RESMI-OLMAYAN-TURKCE-METIN-/3066>

General Interpretation of the UN Human Right Committee states that “*legal norms penalizing the expression of opinion on historical matters are not in line with the UN Civil and Political Rights Convention.*” The relevant convention states that declarations about past events cannot be prohibited, no matter whether they are judged true or false.

- The 1915 events against Armenians are both historically and legally different from the Holocaust. No link can be established between the Ottoman Armenians and German Jews. There is ample evidence recognized by competent international courts proving that genocide was committed in Nazi Germany against Jews. Therefore the Jewish genocide is an undisputable historical fact. However, the “Armenian genocide” claims are open to debate, and there is no court ruling on the issue. It cannot be considered the same way as the Holocaust.

The Constitutional Council of France

On February 27, 2012, the French Constitutional Council rejected the shameful law approved by the French Senate and Chamber of Deputies that criminalized denial of the “Armenian genocide.” In its decision, the council stated that “*the law in question violates the ‘freedom of expression and communication’*,” and underlined that “*the freedoms of thought and expression*” are guaranteed by Articles 18 and 19 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which both have roots in the 1789 Declaration of Human Rights.

Allegations of certain ministers, defending the shameful law on behalf of the government in the French Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, suggesting that “*freedom expression can be restricted by the law*,” under paragraph two of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, were rejected in the Constitutional Council’s written opinion.

French law on the “Armenian genocide” allegations is by no means in line with conditions paving the way for restrictions on the freedom of expression by virtue of paragraph two of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, the ECtHR, as confirmed by its Perinçek-Switzerland decision, interprets laws restricting freedom of expression as strictly as possible.

In its decision, the French Constitutional Council also ruled that “*Parliament’s request for prosecution for the denial of a crime defined by Parliament itself*”

is unconstitutional.” It says, “*No parliament can function as a court relating to a crime defined by itself.*”³¹

The European Court of Justice (ECJ)

In 2003 and 2004, the ECJ characterized recognition of the “Armenian genocide” by the European Parliament as “*a political measure with no judicial value.*” It also ruled that allegations suggesting that Turkey, with recognition of the “genocide,” cannot be granted candidate status to the EU “*have no value in terms of international law.*”

The decision rejected the plaintiffs’ request for compensation on the grounds that both the “genocide” and “*sustained loss*” allegations were not proven. Ultimately, the court ruled that court expenses totaling €30,000 be covered by the plaintiffs.

The rejection of compensation on such grounds established a precedent for cases involving territory and compensation filed against Turkey.

The story of the ECJ case – which we have forgotten, just like the Malta Tribunals, even though it took place recently – is as follows:

Based in Marseille, France, the Association Euro-Arménie and two French citizens of Armenian origin filed a case against the EU Council with the ECJ granting Turkey the status of candidate country on December 10-11, 1999 in Helsinki. The plaintiffs claimed that although the 1915 events were not considered “genocide,” “*conferring the status of candidacy to Turkey is in violation of EU law,*” and that with this decision, the EU’s decision-making body, the EU Council, had caused them harm.

The plaintiffs, basing their allegations on a June 18, 1987 EU Parliament decision stipulating that Turkey’s EU membership “*depends on its recognition of the Armenian genocide,*” argued that the EP’s decision is a binding one for the EU and requested “*moral compensation.*”

In a December 17, 2003 decision (docket no. T-346/30), the ECJ’s Court of First Instance rejected the case. Confirming the ruling, the plaintiffs’ subsequent appeal was also rejected in an April 17, 2004 decision (docket no C-18/04P).

31 *Malta Yargılaması*, pp. 128-130 (The Malta Tribunals)

ECJ decisions are binding for EU countries. For non-EU countries, they serve as precedents. Therefore, countries such as France which approve the “Armenian genocide” allegations are clearly violating EU law.³²

The International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The ICJ in The Hague – the highest judicial body of the UN, competent to hear war crime cases, including genocide – ruled on January 3, 2012: “*Proceedings initiated by local courts against other countries have no judicial value; on the contrary, they are in violation of international law.*”

This ruling was made in a case that Turkey was not party to. However, it is also of particular concern to Turkey. It is important to the extent that it prevents Armenians from filing cases on the grounds that they incurred damages in 1915.

The ICJ case that Turkey is compelled to analyze on a legal basis developed as follows:

Germany applied to the ICJ on the grounds that cases filed in Italian local courts for “*crimes against humanity*” during WWII are in violation of the law.

Italy stated in its defense that the cases in question began with applications filed by persons whose right to life was denied by the German state during WWII as well as the relatives of persons who were taken to Germany by force and forced to work without being granted the status of prisoners of war.

The ICJ found in Germany’s favor, underlining, “*In crimes against humanity, the act of a one state cannot be subject to proceedings in a different country.*”³³

War Crimes

Although historical and legal realities and international court rulings favor Turkey, unabated “genocide” pressure is still being applied on the country. Turkey is being asked “*to officially apologize*” if not “*to recognize the Armenian genocide.*”

32 *idem*, p. 130-131

33 *Idem*, p. 131-133

Furthermore, there are suggestions that the “genocide” claims might be replaced with arguments stressing “crimes against humanity.” While some believe that the “genocide” will not be accepted by Turkey, others assert that the events of 1915 cannot be exactly defined as “genocide.”

Another reason for abandoning the term “genocide” and referring to it as “crimes against humanity” lies in international court decisions characterizing what happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina as “war crimes” instead of “genocide.”

Former Ambassador Pulat Tacar, a prominent Turkish researcher on the genocide issue, has long been drawing attention to this development. “*This move to shift the debate over genocide towards crimes against humanity will be the most important issue we will have to deal with in the future,*” he says.³⁴

Developments Abroad

The September 2011 issue of *Middle East Critique* showed one leg of efforts to put the “Armenian genocide” allegations into the category of “crimes against humanity.” In an article entitled “Crimes Against Humanity as a Paradigm for International Atrocity Crimes,” Prof. William Schabas, an expert on genocide law, proposes putting the events of 1915 into the “crimes against humanity” category.³⁵

This proposal represents a sharp shift in opinion for Schabas, who in his 2009 book *Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes* (Cambridge University Press) included the “Armenian genocide” along with “Jewish, Romani and Rwandan genocides” as the four genocides that the world has witnessed.

Putting aside why he changed his view, could Schabas be right? Could the 1915 events be considered “crimes against humanity” or “war crimes”?

To answer this question properly, we are compelled to briefly review documents to see whether the Ottoman government’s decision to deport Armenians was motivated by a “criminal intent.”

The deportation decision was taken for “military” and “security” reasons during a period in which successive Armenian riots were taking place,

34 *Idem.* p. 150

35 William A. Schabas, “Crimes Against Humanity as a Paradigm for International Atrocity Crimes,” *Middle East Critique*, (Vol. 20, No. 3, 20.11.2011) p. 253-269.

ultimately leading to the invasion of the eastern city of Van. However, although this decision was by no means motivated by criminal intent, several crimes were committed against Armenians during its execution.³⁶

Many Ottoman officials and citizens who perpetrated these crimes were sentenced by Ottoman courts in 1915-1916. The chief crimes included: “killing, injury, damage to the properties of Armenians, theft, seizing money or property by force, bribery, pillage and pickpocketing, marriage with Armenian girls without permission, and abuse of power.”³⁷

These are the crimes perpetrated individually. Among these crimes, “killing” can be associated with crimes against humanity such as murder, mass destruction, exile, torture, or the death penalty based on religious motives. However such an association does not reflect the will of the Ottoman state or government. The act of “killing” does not involve the intent of “mass killing” and is not compatible with the Ottoman Empire’s war plans.

Finally, the CPS’s July 29, 1921 decision to file no charges, along with the decision not to prosecute the Turkish detainees on Malta due to lack of evidence, makes no reference to the existence of a “war crime against humanity.” On the contrary, the CPS ruled that there was no proof of “Armenian-Christian massacre” accusations that could be associated with these crimes.

Developments in the Country

The Ottoman, British and American archives clearly explain the reality that the 1915 events can neither be characterized as “genocide” nor “war crimes against humanity,” and that they were instead a “war tragedy” involving mutual grievances, as described by renowned historian Prof. Bernard Lewis.³⁸ Despite this fact, certain self-styled “liberal intellectual” circles in Turkey as well as several “conservative circles” seek to “*put the blame on the leaders of the Union and Progress Party and so end the genocide debate.*” They argue that the genocide allegations should not be subjected to such ambiguous arguments

36 Edward J. Ericson, *Ottomans and Armenians*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) p. 161-222

37 Yusuf Sarımay, “Ermeni Tehciri ve Yargılamalar: 1915-1916”, *Türk-Ermeni İlişkilerinin Gelişimi ve 1915 Olayları Uluslararası Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, Ankara, 11.23-25. 2005, s. 257-265. (*Armenian deportation and proceedings: 1915-1916*, “*Declarations of International Symposium on the Course of Turco-Armenian relations and 1915 events*)

38 *Le Monde*, January 1, 1994; *Ermeni Sorunu’nu Anlamak*, p. 180 (Understanding the Armenian Question)

as *“The Turks did it, the Ottomans did it”* and instead should focus on the argument that *“Union and Progress did it,”* adding that Union and Progress did not represent the traditional Ottoman order.

This is a trap that no one should fall into, especially conservatives. Likewise, republicans should also avoid a trap *“putting the blame on the Ottomans, so therefore the Republic played no part in this.”*

This dream is futile. It is vain to hope to put the blame on the “Unionists” or “Ottoman leaders” rather than “Turks” for the 1915 events and so transform the “genocide” debate into one over “war crimes against humanity.”

The fact that the “Armenian genocide” allegations target Turkey’s territory and nation is related to the New World Order’s plans for religious wars between Muslims and Christians. Under this plan, as long as the New World Order does not change, Turkey will always be a target.³⁹

The fact that the “Armenian genocide” allegations target Turkey’s territory and nation is related to the New World Order’s plans for religious wars between Muslims and Christians. Under this plan, as long as the New World Order does not change, Turkey will always be a target.

Furthermore, other accusations of “genocide” or allegations of “crimes against humanity” will be brought up. *Armenian Weekly*, a key US Armenian diaspora media outlet, says, in addition to publishing a related list, that genocide is part of “Turkish culture,” and adds:

*“(…) as a genocider society, Turkey attacks its imaginary enemies and seeks new targets. Armenians who are still living in Turkey are on the top of this list as the remnants of Turkey’s last unfinished genocide. Of course, Kurds are also on this list as the next victim of Turkey...”*⁴⁰

What should be done in the face of the lobbying of such “Pontus, Assyrian and even Greek genocide” allegations, along with “Kurdish genocide” allegations? Will Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, Celal Bayar and Fevzi Çakmak be targeted by hiding behind Dersim and *“putting the blame on the Unionist mindset of the Republic”*?

Let us cast off such futile dreams. The “genocide” allegations are completely

39 *Malta Yargılaması*, p. 153 (The Malta Tribunals)

40 Aram Hamparian, *Confronting a Pre-Genocidal Turkey*, *Armenian Weekly*, 02.09. 2012 - <http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/02/09/hamparian-confronting-a-pre-genocidal-turkey>

baseless prejudices. The historical roots of this prejudice, based on a hatred known simply as “Turcophobia,” are quite old. It is impossible to tackle this scourge by making concessions. The only way to do it is to nullify the “genocide allegations” based on historical and legal realities.⁴¹

Overcoming Prejudices

Deportation was doubtlessly a painful period for Ottoman Armenians. The deportation, planned as “a military precaution” to head off an Armenian uprising against the Ottoman state with volunteer troops on the battlefield and gangs behind military lines, during the Russian occupation of Eastern Anatolia, created many victims. What happened during this period cannot be considered solely the grief of the Armenians who were harmed. It should be the grief of us all. Pain should be shared and, when required, mourned together.

However, in today’s Turkey, efforts to share this pain face two important obstacles.⁴²

The first is the way that the sensitivity shown towards non-Turks and Muslims is not shown towards Muslims, either Turkish or Kurdish. However, the Ottoman state was fighting on many fronts and the “human tragedies” of the war should be considered as a whole, without discrimination based on race or religion. The perception of common grief can only be ensured if both Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman people share their experiences together.

The second is the way the emphasis on tragedies somehow outweighs historical and legal realities. While sharing the pain of the victims of the Armenian deportation is a human necessity, this does not excuse ignoring the historical and legal dimensions of the issue, for “genocide” is a legal notion. Characterizing a historical event as genocide is not something done through personal decisions but only through legal ones. In other words, the acceptance of pain endured does not change the scope of historical realities.

The prejudices constituting both obstacles should be overcome.

Prejudices feed attitudes based on double standards and discrimination. Overcoming prejudices can be achieved through adopting historical and legal realities by abandoning subjective memory patterns that are currently being turned into some sort of fetish of conscience. Historical and legal realities will

41 *Malta Yargılaması*, p. 153 (The Malta Tribunals)

42 *Ermeni Sorunu’nu Anlamak*, pp. 9-10 (Understanding the Armenian Question)

demonstrate the existence of grey areas in everything, instead of simple black and white. As far as the 1915 Armenian deportation is concerned, this grey area will demonstrate that while the legitimate reasons for the deportation do not “legitimize” the pain endured, on the other hand, neither does this pain eliminate the legitimate reasons for deportation.

This is a grey area free of hatred, paving the way for tolerance. Historical and legal realities give us an opportunity to meet on common ground.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

“Letter dated 29 June 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General” United Nations General Assembly Security Council
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a551008.pdf>

FO 371.4174.129560: CPS report dated 07.08.1919 enclosed in a letter from British FM to British Chief Prosecutor. No. 1270 of 10.07.1919

FO 371/4172: Cypher telegram from the Foreign Ministry to Admiral Calthorpe, British High Commissioner at Constantinople, very urgent No. 33, London, 05.02.1919

FO 371/6502/E.5845: FM’s letter to His Majesty’s Procurator-General’s Department, 31.05.1921

FO 371/6504/E.10023: From Harrington to Rumbold, 08.24. 1921

FO 371/6504/E.10662: Telegram from Curzon to Rumbold. Tel. No. 539 of 27.09.1921 –

FO 371/6504/E.8519:- Letter from Craigie, British Charge d’Affaires at Washington to Lord Curzon, No. 722 of 13.07.1921

FO 371/6504/E.8745: From Dept. of H.M. Procurator General to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 29.07.1921

FO 371/6504/E.8745: Telegram from FM to Rumbold. Tel. No 851 of 08.10. 1921

FO 371/6505/E.10870: Telegram from Rumbold to Curzon. Tel. 639 of 29.09.1921 –

FO 371/6505/E.11011: Telegram from Rumbold to Curzon. Tel. No 645 of 04.10.1921 –

FO 371/6505: From Plummer to War Ministry, No.4133(A) of 29.10.1921

Full text in Turkish: “Soykırım Suçunun Önlenmesine ve Cezalandırılmasına

Dair Sözleşme” (Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide)

<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/pdf01/33-36.pdf>

Official website of the UK Parliament, House of Lords debates, Publications and Records, 14 Apr 1999: Column 823

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldhansrd/vo990414/text/90414-09.htm>

“Was there an Armenian Genocide: Geoffrey Robertson’s QC Opinion” Policy Memorandum, Foreign & Commonwealth Office to Minister Full text: <http://groong.usc.edu/Geoffrey-Robertson-QC-Genocide.pdf>

ECtHR Perinçek-Switzerland decision (Official French and unofficial Turkish): <http://www.avim.org.tr/analiz/tr/AIHM-PERINCEK-ISVICRE-KARARI—RESMI-FRANSIZCA-VE-RESMI-OLMAYAN-TURKCE-METIN-/3066>

Secondary Sources

Ericson, Edward J. *Ottomans and Armenians*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Gürkan, Uluç. *Ermeni Sorunu’nun Anlamak*, İstanbul: Destek Yayınları, 2012-2. baskı (Understanding the Armenian Question)

Gürkan, Uluç. *Malta Yargılaması*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2014. (The Malta Tribunals)

Hamparian, Aram “Confronting a Pre-Genocidal Turkey”, *Armenian Weekly*, 02.09. 2012 - <http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/02/09/hamparian-confronting-a-pre-genocidal-turkey>

Sarıнай, Yusuf. “Ermeni Tehciri ve Yargılamalar: 1915-1916”, *Türk-Ermeni İlişkilerinin Gelişimi ve 1915 Olayları Uluslararası Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, Ankara, 11.23-25. 2005. (Armenian deportation and proceedings: 1915-1916,” Declarations of International Symposium on the Course of Turco-Armenian relations and 1915 events)

Schabas, William A. “Crimes Against Humanity as a Paradigm for International Atrocity Crimes,” *Middle East Critique*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 20.11.2011.

Şimşir, Bilal. *Malta Sürgünleri*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985-2. Edition.
(Malta Deportees)

Tacar, Pulat *Doğu Perinçek-İsviçre Davası* İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2002.
(Doğu Perinçek-Switzerland Case)

ARMENIAN TERROR DURING THE CHANGE IN THE PERCEPTION OF AND REACTION TOWARDS TERRORISM

(TERÖR ALGISININ VE TERÖRE KARŞI VERİLEN
TEPKİLERİN DEĞİŞİM SÜRECİNDE ERMENİ TERÖRÜ)

Prof. Dr. Birsen KARACA

Ankara University
Faculty of Languages, History and Geography

Abstract: *This paper aims to see in entirety the picture in which Armenian terrorism and the Armenian terrorists spring to life. To that end, the characteristics and the targets of Armenian terrorism were determined with the methods of research and analysis of literary science. The data thus gathered was evaluated using a comparative method. It has been observed that the French revolution was a turning point in the history of terrorism. The revolutionary slogans and symbols, while lighting a fire under freedom, also led the way for terrorist acts. In recent periods, the countries around the world lean towards cooperation with the maturity of accumulation of knowledge and experience of hundreds of years. The common reaction shown towards the terrorist attacks in France on 7 January 2015 can be considered as a signal of this tendency. In this picture, the phenomenon that is determined by keeping track of the phases of progress and transformation the Ottoman Empire experienced from its period to today is that Armenian terrorism was resistant to a great extent and had a mutation depending upon changing conditions.*

Keywords: *French Revolution, terrorism, Armenian terrorist organizations, Nemesis, ASALA, National United Party*

Öz: *Bu çalışmanın amacı Ermeni terörü ve teröristlerinin hayat bulduğu tabloyu bütün olarak görebilmektir. Bu amaçla terörün tarihi fonunda Ermeni terörünün karakteristik özellikleri ve hedefleri edebiyat biliminin araştırma ve inceleme yöntemleriyle tespit edildi. Toplanan veriler karşılaştırma yöntemi kullanılarak değerlendirildi. Görüldü ki, Fransız Devrimi terör tarihi için bir dönüm noktası olmuş. Devrimin sloganları ve sembolleri özgürlük ateşini yakarken terör eylemlerine de öncülük etmiş. Dünya ülkeleri son dönemlerde, yüzlerce yıllık bilgi birikimi ve*

deneyimin verdiđi olgunlukla terörle mücadele konusunda işbirliđi yapma eğilimindedir. 7 Ocak 2015 tarihinde Fransa'da yaşanan terör olayına verilen ortak tepki bu eğilimin işareti olarak okunabilir. Bu tablo içinde, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu döneminden bugüne geçirmiş olduđu gelişim ve dönüşüm evrelerini takip ederek tespit edilen olgu, Ermeni terörünün son derece direngen olduđu ve deđişen koşullara bađıl olarak mutasyon geçirdiđiydi.

Anahtar sözcükler: Fransız Devrimi, terörizm, Ermeni terör örgütleri, Nemesis, Asala, Ulusal Birlik Partisi.

Armenian Terror During the Change in the Perception of and Reaction Towards Terrorism

This article is devoted to a 14 year-old child, Neslihan Özmen, who lost her life due to the terrorist act by ASALA on 31 July 1980 in Athens, and to all victims of terrorism.

*

“A terrorist cannot be a national hero”

Aleksandr Remigaylo

*

“Of all the passions capable of enslaving man’s will, none is more incompatible with reason and liberty than religious fanaticism.”

Robespierre

*

“Shoulder to Shoulder Solidarity in Paris against Terrorism”

Source: Hürriyet/12 January 2015

Aleksandr Remigaylo, whom I cited for the epigraph, was a part of the team which investigated the terrorist act¹ that took place in Moscow on 8 January 1977 and resulted in the deaths of 7 people and serious injury of 37 people. Ten months later, at the end of a careful study, the terrorists Agop Stepanyan, Zaven Bagdasaryan, and Stepan Zatikyan, who are members of National United Party of Armenia (Ազգային Միացյալ Կուսակցություն) were determined.² The court condemned the three defendants to death and

1 Note: There were three explosions in Moscow on 8 January 1997. The first bomb was in the train going from the Izmaylovskaya station to Pervomayskaya on 17.33. As a result, seven passengers, of which the majority were children, pregnant women, and old women died, and thirty seven got seriously wounded. The second explosion took place in a store at 18.05 on 25 Oktyabrya street (called Nikolskaya today). The third explosion took place in a waste bin near the Archives Institute on the same street. Please see the following for details: Леонид Каневский, Армянский терроризм, взрыв в Московском метро (НТВ), <http://portall.zp.ua/video/armjanskijj-terrorizm-vzryv-v-moskovskom-metro/id-jCwgQ5iO-B0.html> ve <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPjtD5vB-O0> (19.02.2015)

2 ФСБ России, Бомба в метро (документальный фильм), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZQAK1POXtg>; Армянские Террористы в Московском Метро (Armenian Terrorists in Moscow Metro), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZWB5GZU-k> (19.02.2015).

executions were carried out. Since the incident took place in the technical conditions of the day and behind the Iron Curtain of the USSR, it was almost impossible to get hold of information about the incident and the organization that carried out the act; to observe the public opinion; and even to immediately hear about the event. As a matter of fact, the archival documents were brought to the public attention only after thirty years following the incident. In addition, in this incident, it is now possible to reach the petition³ organized by the Moscow Helsinki Group dated 1 February 1979 that protested not the terrorists and their act, but the punishment of the terrorists who stated in the court that they left their promise of revenge as a legacy to their descendants.

National United Party of Armenia is an illegal organization founded by Armenian painter Haykaz Khachaturian, Stepan Zatikyan⁴ and Shahen Arutiunian on 24 April 1966. The goal in establishing the party was shaped in the framework of the Armenian genocide allegations taking reference the years between 1915 and 1923.⁵ But the allegations in the hearing in the court by the aforementioned terrorists targeted the Russians and the Soviet system.⁶

*

Experts state that the first organized terrorist acts in the history of humanity was observed in Palestine in the 1st century A.D. and those who executed the act were the devotees of the Zealot sect⁷ which is referred to as Sicarii.⁸ The basic characteristics of the acts executed by the members of the sect is that

3 Заявление по поводу казни Степана Затикяна и двух других неназванных лиц, Документ № 81(1), <http://www.mhg.ru/history/15D6785> (19.02.2015)

4 Паруйр Айриkyан о Степана Затикяна и НОП, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UaWQq3lPNt0>; Степан Затикян, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXTKxprsmWs> (19.02.2014).

5 Ազգային Միացյալ Կուսակցություն (ԱՄԿ) մաս 1, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=48Yrny2Gtx8>;

Ազգային Միացյալ Կուսակցություն (ԱՄԿ) մաս 2, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wFzLbr3gp4> ;

Ազգային Միացյալ Կուսակցություն (ԱՄԿ) մաս 3, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Enbgpxurms0> ;

Ազգային Միացյալ Կուսակցություն (ԱՄԿ) մաս 4, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_aNBMRrRbk (19.02.2015).

6 Степан Затикян, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXTKxprsmWs> (23.02.2015);

Армянские Террористы в Московском Метро (Armenian Terrorists in Moscow Metro), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzZWB5GZU-k> (23.02.2015)

7 For the Zealot sect, please see: Свящ. Александр Мень, “Сын человеческий”, Библия –центр, <http://www.bible-center.ru/book/son/009> (21.02.2015). Note: Sica, a latin word, is the plural of sicarii, sicarius (man with dagger).

8 Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, *The History of Terrorism*, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 2007, p. 55.

they had killed the Roman Empire soldiers and the Jews who were in cooperation with the Roman Empire, with the daggers they carried. The Sicarii group had played an important role in the Jewish revolt of 66-71, and disappeared when the uprising was suppressed⁹ (there is information that, rather than surrendering, the sect members had committed mass suicide by means of killing each other¹⁰).

*

While the history of terrorist acts takes us to ancient times, the word “terror”, which has the meaning of “spreading extreme fear” and “causing horror”, came into use during the French Revolution, when it was used to describe “*the action of the revolutionary government known as the “Régime de la terreur”, led by Maximilien Robespierre (July 1793-July 1794)*”.¹¹ Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, taking into account the power of influence countries have on diplomatic history, made the conclusion that “*the French Revolution marked a turning point in the history of terrorism*”.¹² They made such a conclusion because:

“The Age of Enlightenment had bequeathed humanity the idea of popular sovereignty, and it was in the name of that sovereignty that the Revolution claimed to defend it through the deployment of state terror, in which the ends justified the means, including extreme violence.”¹³

With the freedom flag it carried and the slogans of equality and brotherhood, the French Revolution had served as the force that prompted ethnic groups around the globe in their desire for independency. In the process as well,

9 http://ggpi.org/files/istoria_terr.pdf (20.02.2015).

10 Emrah Aydoğan, “Terörizmin Tarihi Gelişimi”, TURKSAM, please see Caspian Weekly for the article, <http://tr.caspianweekly.org/ana-kategoriler/guvenlik-ve-terorizm/1016-terorizmin-tarihi-geliimi.html> (21.02.2014).

11 Brief History of Terrorism, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uB_XPZ26f7U (21.02.2014).

In addition, there is the following information on French sources regarding the usage of the word “terrorism” in the aforementioned period: “30 August 1793, ‘The usage of the concept of terrorism based on the desires of the revolutionary army (ROYER, in the meeting of the Jacobins, according to G. Vanden Heuvel op. cit. p. 898 and footnote 35: Let’s bring terrorism into light), cf. A. GEFFRIO, *Mél. Guilbert (L.)* pp. 125-126; the formula that is often mythicized: November 1793, sacred terrorism (Musset and Delacroix, Committee of Prosperity of People, according to G. Vanden Heuvel op. cit. p. 899 and footnote 42); 5 February 1794 (Robespierre, op. cit. and footnote 45: terrorism is nothing other than quick, strict, and merciless justice [...] it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy implemented according to the urgent needs of the country, cf. H. KESSLER, *op. cit.*, s. 159 sqq.” Source: <http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/terreur> (21.02.2015). The text was translated from French to Turkish by Research Assistant Doğanay Eryılmaz.

12 Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, *ibid.*, p. 95.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 95.

revolutionaries and the revolution itself were mythicized. It draws attention that, following the revolution, especially at the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century, there was a numerical majority of those French revolutionaries who desired to put on their shirts and carry out a revolution and those who desired to realize their demands by means of terrorism. This, namely the desire of new leaders of revolutions to actualize the French Revolution again and again in their own space and time periods, caused danger. This was underlined by Milan Kundera in his comments on the philosophy of Eternal Return (by Nietzsche):

“If the French Revolution were to recur eternally, French historians would be less proud of Robespierre. But because they deal with something that will not return, the bloody years of the Revolution have turned into mere words, theories, and discussions, have become lighter than feathers, frightening no one. There is an infinite difference between a Robespierre who occurs only once in history and a Robespierre who eternally returns, chopping off French heads.”¹⁴

We recognize this danger by hundreds of years of experience and accumulation of knowledge in the living conditions in which societal security can be provided (without threatening individual freedoms). This accumulation has been reflected on the reaction towards the terrorist act in Paris on 7 January 2015 as well:

“France will march this Sunday in Paris to commemorate the victims and to say no to terrorism. But it will not be alone. Heads of states and governments from all over the world will stand ready in the capital. From the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to British Prime Minister David Cameron, leaders of sixty countries including Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu, President of the Palestinian National Authority Mahmoud Abbas and the King of Jordan, will join the ‘Republican Marches’ in Paris on Sunday on the occasion of the attack against Charlie Hebdo magazine and the Jewish supermarket.”¹⁵

In the first weeks of 2015, people from all over the world read news reflecting the content we have included above.¹⁶ This was the first in the history of

14 Milan Kundera, “The Unbearable Lightness of Being”, p.2
http://11th-grade-ib-english.granadahills.groupfusion.net/modules/locker/files/get_group_file.phtml?fid=24475648&gid=3937650 (06.03.2015)

15 Source: <http://www.20minutes.fr/monde/1514443-20150111-marche-republicaine-longue-liste-chefs-etat-gouvernement-presents-paris> (19.02.2015). The text was translated from French to Turkish by Research Assistant Doğanay Eryılmaz.

16 Source: *BBC NEWS EUROPE*, “Charlie Hebdo attack: Three days of terror”, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237> (19.02.2015).

humanity, and with this reaction towards the terrorist act, at least the countries represented by political leaders, announced that they would not sympathize with those who terrorize, frighten, suppress and assassinate innocent people to reach their aim with whatever motive they have.

“Would this reaction become a turning point in combating terrorism?” Time will tell.

*

The symbols and the slogans of the French Revolution fit the spirit of the time; thus, it was quickly adopted, but only with the nuances caused by the economic, political, geographic, cultural and social conditions. In contrast, there is a tendency in studies about the period to ignore the mentioned differences and acknowledge the evidence of the countries that succeeded in industrialization as an absolute criterion. Yet, the effects and the consequences of the French Revolution must be examined in the terms of the political structures that cannot catch up with the industrialization process, but which also cannot avoid the disintegration caused by reactions coming out of the efforts to not be excluded from the process. The Ottoman Empire is an interesting example in this matter.

The symbols and the slogans of the French Revolution fit the spirit of the time; thus, it was quickly adopted, but only with the nuances caused by the economic, political, geographic, cultural and social conditions.

In a short period of 15 years following the French Revolution, terrorist acts began in the territories of the Empire in the Balkan Peninsula. These transformed into rebellions later on and this process continued in the Balkans until the end of the century. These rebellions targeted breaking away from the Ottoman Empire and establishing an independent state. They did not target transforming the political and economic structure of the state and bringing down aristocracy. Thus, there was no perception of threat towards the system in the Ottoman state mechanism. The second case was not even possible, because the Ottoman Empire, with the system it established, did not allow the creation of the aristocratic class. As a result, Serbia, Greece, Romania, Montenegro, Albania and Bulgaria that were within the Ottoman Empire territories in the previous century, had, in the years of the First World War, the status of independent states. As a matter of fact, Bulgaria joined the Great War in the same side as the Ottoman Empire.

The subject of this study, the Armenian terror, has a different structure than those of the above mentioned terrorist acts: the terrorist organizations in the

Balkans completed their missions after independencies had been gained; they transformed within the newly established state system or they disappeared (or at least they succeeded to appear that way). However, the Armenian terror took on new missions and continued to exist even after the independent Armenian states were established as well.

Let us elaborate on this.

The slogan used in the beginning was to establish an independent Armenia. Among the organization which adopted this slogan were those who adopted the socialist view which acquired a political identity in the 19th century; those who defended the liberal idea and the radical nationalists. For example, the Armenekan Party (Արմենական կուսակցություն), that was founded in Van in 1885, “argued for being active only among Armenians”¹⁷, and the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (Սոցիալ Դեմոկրատ Հնչակյան Կուսակցություն), that was founded in 1887 in Geneva, represented the socialist idea. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Հայ Յեղափոխական Դաշնակցություն), that was established in 1890 in Tbilisi, represented the radical nationalist idea. The Democratic Liberal Party (Ռամկավար Ազատական Կուսակցություն), established in Istanbul in 1908, adopted (according to R.G. Hovannisyán) “*liberalism, an anti-revolutionary stance and the rule of laissez-faire (let them do as they please)*.”¹⁸

The irreconcilable structure depicted above gives the impression that, among the Armenian organizations, problems that can arise in the system Armenians imagine are inevitable. As a matter of fact, the Hunchakian Party and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation blocked the support of Armenians living in Anatolia to the Armenekan Party.¹⁹ In another source, we come across the information that speeches of Karakin Hunchakian’s, a member of the Hunchakian Party who traveled from Boston to Sofia, were blocked by the members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.²⁰ The terrorist activities of the secret organization “Black Cross” (this organization had both legal and

17 Orhan Doğan, “Ermeni Komiteleri Hınçak ve Taşnaksütun (Russian Justice Minister Y. Murayyev’s Report on Armenian Committees)”, <http://dergisosyalbil.selcuk.edu.tr/susbed/article/view/370/352> (06.03.2015)

18 Erdal İter, “Ramgavar Partisi Tarafından II.Meşrutiyet (1908) Meclis-İ Mebûsân’ına Sunulan Beyânâme ve Program”, <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/19/821/10434.pdf> (28.02.2015).

19 Sadi Koçaş, *Tarih Boyunca Ermeniler ve Selçuklulardan Beri Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri*, Ankara, 1967, pp. 21-23.

20 Özlem Karsandık, “Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Ermeni Hınçak Cemiyeti’nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndaki Siyasal Faaliyetleri (1887-1908)”, Master’s Thesis, Thesis Supervisor: Remzi Demir, Mersin University Social Sciences Institute Department of History, Mersin 2005, footnote 232.

illegal organs²¹) established in Van at the end of 1879 targeted Armenians who did not support the Armenian national movements.

Another dimension of the Armenian terror is the collaboration (1902-1907) of the leaders of the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (Hunchak) and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) with the Young Turks²², which came together with the purpose of delivering equality and justice for everyone by transforming the absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy with slogans in accord with the spirit of the French Revolution.²³ Later on, despite opposition from other organizations, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, showing its will to become the dominant force, attended the congress of the Committee of Union and Progress²⁴ (which was founded in Paris in 1894 and would come to power in the future) held in 1907. Armenian historian Meri Kochar comments on this support as follows:

“Despite all these circumstances, the 1907 Paris Congress at least had one positive meaning because it aimed to topple the despotic regime of Abdülhamit for the victory of bourgeois law.”²⁵

With this support, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation officially declared its willingness to live with Turks and its position against the absolute monarchy. On the other hand, the goal of the Committee of Union and Progress was grand in scale:

“The Committee of Union and Progress was formed under extraordinary conditions in an extraordinary period when the Ottoman state, even if not de facto, was ex officio collapsing. The committee emerged under the influence of the Young Turks, arose from concepts such as liberty, constitutionalism, elections and public opinion, perceived the Ottoman territories as a whole and set its policies accordingly. When it was established, it embraced all foreign and non-Muslim subjects.”²⁶

21 Ազատագրական խմբակներն ու կազմակերպությունները,
<http://www.findarmenia.com/arm/history/24/459/461> (28.02.2015)

22 Taner Aslan, Dr., “İttihâd-ı Osmani” den Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ne”
<http://yayinlar.yesevi.edu.tr/files/article/201.pdf> (01.03.2015)

23 Мери Кочар, *Армяно-Турецкие общественно политические отношения и армянский вопрос*, Ереван, 1988, pp. 73-130.

24 Until 1907, the Committee of Union and Progress was known as the Ottoman Committee of Progress and Union.

25 Мери Кочар, *ibid.*, p. 128.

26 Selçuk Kızılkaya, “İttihat Terakki Cemiyeti Merkez-İ Umumisi”, Master’s Thesis, Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. İbrahim Ethem Atnur, Ataturk University, Social Sciences Institute, Departement of History, Erzurum, 2013, p. 140.

In the emerging picture following the end of the First World War, it was seen that all sides had lost: The Ottoman Empire, the Committee of Union and Progress and certainly its supporter, the Dashnaktsutyun. From this, the following conclusion emerges: Neither the state, nor the parties nor the organizations supporting them could estimate that they had no power to generate a solution by perceiving the magnitude of the events, the challenges of the conditions, the depth of the discrepancies (as a whole and in parts), and they could not act in the right place at the right time.

The above conclusions could be drawn also from evaluations from two different aspects, from the Turkish and Armenian point of view.

A Turkish historian whose research subject is the Committee of Union and Progress, reflected a common idea with his evaluation below: *“During process from the Young Turks to the Committee of Union and Progress, the Ottoman Empire was shaken from its foundation. This movement, which its foundations and starting points and its results, had different consequences, turned into both a disaster and a chaos affecting the future.”*²⁷

Yervant Odian (1869-1926), despite his father having been an Ottoman consul and whose sympathy for the Hunchak Party is felt from his works and actions (based on the data in my possession), and who was dispatched to Deir ez-Zor within the scope of the “Law of Resettlement”, evaluated those days from the Armenian aspect by looking at Armenian organizations. In his novels, which he penned between 1893 and 1915, he satirized *“the ones who presented themselves as ‘revolutionaries’, ‘patriots’, ‘national heroes’, but who in fact disregarded these glorified values”*²⁸ and introduced the character ‘Comrade Panchoonie’ to literature. Alexander Sarukhan, a fan of the work and its caricaturist, comments on *Comrade Panchoonie* that took its name from the novel’s protagonist: *“< ... > it shows how even correct principles and ideas could be destructive when they are implemented without taking into account the present conditions by demagogues, dreamers, and educated but nevertheless irresponsible and ignorant people.”*²⁹

Vahan Totovents, another Armenian writer who had joined the volunteer units in 1915 and fought in Van and Erzurum, saw the developments as the result of taking action based on unrealistic goals and expressed his complaint in his

27 Durdu Mehmet Burak, Asst. Prof., “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Jön Türk Hareketinin Başlaması ve Etkileri”, p. 291 <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/19/1271/14637.pdf> (02.03.2015)

28 Yervant Odyan, *Yoldaş Paçuni*, translated by: Sirvants Mahlasyan, Aras, İstanbul, 2000, p. 9.

29 Aleksandr Saruhan, “Bir Çift Söz”, see. Yervant Odyan, *ibid.*, p.13.

story titled “Legacy” that he penned in the years 1929-30 using the language of tales:

“Once upon a time, there was a great war. The whole world was enveloped by the smoke of gunpowder, and there flowed rivers of blood. The ministers and the wealthy compatriots shouted into these people’s (Armenians’) ears: ‘The time of freedom has come! Strike your neighbor! Strike his baton with your cross!’ The black and beautiful eyes of this ancient nation sparkled with the desire for freedom. An unequal fight began: they struck and in turn were struck themselves, and of this ancient people there remained a mere fragment, akin to a nightmarish memory.

Whereupon, with supreme and sublime cynicism, the ministers and the wealthy compatriots laughed on top of the bones and the ashes.”³⁰

The independent Republic of Armenia (Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն) was founded on May 28, 1918. The newly founded state of the Armenian Republic established diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire, just as the Balkan states had done. The Dashnaksutyun Party was in government at that time. A council, which consisted of the party members, signed the Treaty of Batumi in Istanbul on June 3, 1918. According to data of Nurşen Mazıçı, during their time in Istanbul, the council members extended their gratitude to Sultan Mehmed V of the Ottoman Empire for being the first state that had recognized the Republic of Armenia, and ceding the essential lands to Armenia.³¹

However, the Republic of Armenia did not turn out to be a long-lasting state. In 1920, with great fanfare of the Armenian people, it became a part of the USSR.³² Two years after that, on November 1, 1922, the abolishing of Ottoman Sultanate by Grand National Assembly of Turkey declared the loss of state

Vahan Totovents, another Armenian writer who had joined the volunteer units in 1915 and fought in Van and Erzurum, saw the developments as the result of taking action based on unrealistic goals and expressed his complaint in his story titled “Legacy” that he penned in the years 1929-30 using the language of tales.

30 Վահան Թոթովենց, Ժամանակություն, <http://www.chi.am/index.cfm?objectID=80F51EE0-8DC0-11E0-9A42005056A30FF7&year=2007&month=05&legacyURL=070508/07050804> (23.02.2015)

31 Nurşen Mazıçı, *Ermeni Sorununun Kökeni (1878-1920)*, Pozitif, 2005, p. 124.

32 Г.А. Аветисян, *История армянского народа*, учебник для 9-10 классов средней школы, Ереван, 1985, с.52. For further information, please see: М.Г.Нерсисян, *История армянского народа*, Ереван, 1980, с. 297.

status of the Ottoman Empire. The Committee of Union and Progress had also comprehended the defeat in World War I, and put an end to its own existence.

Armenian parties and terrorist organizations, however, mutated yet again: they started to feed off from the new atmosphere, and named themselves as ‘Armenian avengers (Հայ վրիժառուներ). They survived until today by transferring their revenge to the new generation of terrorist organizations. Among these new groups, Nemesis (Նեմեսիս), ASALA (ԱՍԱԼԱ), and the Armenian Revolutionary Army (Հայ Հեղափոխական Բանակ) attract attention due to having occupied the world agenda for a long time with their assassinations, and having made sure that their demands were discussed in political and diplomatic platforms.

Armenian parties and terrorist organizations, however, mutated yet again: they started to feed off from the new atmosphere, and named themselves as ‘Armenian avengers (Հայ վրիժառուներ). They survived until today by transferring their revenge to the new generation of terrorist organizations.

At this point, after the overall picture portrayed above, the promise of revenge³³ made by the members of Nemesis, ASALA, and the Armenian Revolutionary Army raises the question of towards whom and for what this revenge is to be directed to.

The terrorist organization called Nemesis targeted the leaders and prominents of the Committee of Union and Progress. Based on this info, the answer to the above question

becomes; members of the Committee of Union and Progress were held responsible for what happened during the World War I. However, victims of Nemesis also included some Azerbaijani statesmen such as Fatali Han Hoyski, Halil Bek Hasmamedov, and Hasan Bek Agayev, the justification being that massacres against Armenians had taken place in Baku in 1918. Furthermore, Armenians like Mkirtıç Arutyunyan, Vage İshan (Eseyan), Amyak Aramyants (ex-member of Hunchakian Party) were also victims of Armenian Avengers. Such assassinations originated from the list of 650 people, was created with the initiative of Shahan Natalie at the IX Congress of the Armenian Revolutionary Army that took place in Yerevan in October, 1919, started all these (events). Among the names in the list, 41 people were determined to be the “main criminals”, and the terrorist acts were thus started.³⁴

The founder of Nemesis terrorist organization, Karekin Pastermadjian (aka

33 Հայ Վրիժառուներ: (Նեմեսիս) (Ասալա) (Հայ Հեղափոխական Բանակ)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGfVpavQvRg> (04.03.2015)

34 Операция Немесис, <http://www.armenianarthall.com/index.php?newsid=104> (04.03.2015)

Armen Garo; 1872-1923) was the first Republic of Armenia's first ambassador to the United States. Karekin Pastermadjian followed an extraordinary path in order to build a career: he was one of the leaders of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. He took part at the Zeitun Resistance in 1895. He was one of the ringleaders of the Raid on the Ottoman Bank in 1896 that resulted in the death of tens of people, deputy from Erzurum in the Ottoman parliament between 1908 and 1912, one of the participants of the Van Insurrection of 1915, and a national hero of Armenia.³⁵

The Jewish Holocaust which took place in Nazi Germany during the World War II, and the postwar judicial process which ended in material compensation, became a new source of synergy for Armenian avengers. The Armenian organizations took action in order to be articulated with the victims of the Jewish Holocaust. The stories of the arrest of organization members on April 24, 1915, which is presented as the “genocide day”, did not become (was not) a fruitful resource for the propounded claims, as such the resettlement stories within the scope of the “Law of Resettlement” (27 May 1915) had to be articulated to the claims. When this process started, terrorism once again became the main propaganda tool of the Armenian claims. This time, 77-years old Gourgen Yanikian started the Armenian terrorism. Yanikian murdered two Turkish diplomats, Mehmet Baydan and Bahadır Demir, whom he invited to the hotel in which he stayed in Santa Barbara (USA) on January 27, 1973, promising to grant a historic painting to Turkey. He struggled to change the case heard at the court into a case for the genocide claims. He did not succeed, but he did lead the way for the establishment of ASALA.³⁶ ASALA terrorist organization carried out attacks against Turkish and other civil and diplomatic targets in different countries between 1975 and 1985, killing and maiming tens of innocent people.

In 1991, Armenia became an independent state once again and took its place among world countries. Mikael Danielyan, in his article titled “Terrorism as an Ideology” on 13 September 2001, explained the attitude of Armenia towards Armenian terror as follows:

“The journalists applauded him when he entered the saloon for his first

35 Նեմեսիս, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62sXI3qNUjM> (04.03.2015);

Մեր մեծերը - Արշավիր Շիրակյան,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O1hNUnSIrak> (04.03.2015);

Սողոմոն Թեղերյան Haxtanaki Skizb@ Հաղթանակի Սկիզբը,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpDW_oCroL0 (04.03.2015)

36 Гурген Яникян — «Цель и Истина»...,

<http://armeniangc.com/2013/09/gurgen-yanikyan-cel-i-istina/> (04.03.2015)

press conference in Yerevan at the beginning of May 2001. Armenian Prime Minister received his visit in the following day. He was not a talented artist or a notable politician, nor was he a famous sportsman or a popular singer. He was a terrorist; he was Varujan Karapetyan, who was a member of the Armenian Secret Army.”³⁷

At this point, the following question may be asked: Can the reactions of people all over the world against the terrorist attacks that occurred on 7 January 2015 in the capital of France, Paris lead to a change on the understanding of terrorism in Armenia? Again, time will tell.

*

Consequently, the horrible terrorist incidents that took place in 21st century have altered the perception of terrorism and reactions toward it. Now, countries of the world have the tendency for cooperation to fight against terrorism with the maturity that was gained with the centuries old knowledge and experiences. The common reaction to the terrorist incidents in France on 7 January 2015 can be seen as a sign of this tendency. Nonetheless, there is also a paradoxical phenomenon in the newly emerged environment, since Armenian terrorists are being perceived as being national heroes.

37 Микаэл Даниэлян, “Терроризм как идеология”, www.prima-news.ru/news/articles/2001/9/13/15705.html (04. 07.2004) for the new address of this article see: <http://irakly.org/forum/post224442.html?style=1> (04.03.2015)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- İlter, Erdal. “Ramgavar Partisi Tarafından II. Meşrutiyet (1908) Meclis-i Mebûsân’ına Sunulan. Beyânnâme ve Program”, *OTAM*, No:4 (Jan. 1993), PP.517-556
- Emrah Aydoğan, “Terörizmin Tarihi Gelişimi”, *TURKSAM*, please see *Caspian Weekly* for the article, <http://tr.caspianweekly.org/ana-kategoriler/guvenlik-ve-terorizm/1016-terorizmin-tarihi-geliimi.html> (21.02.2014).
- Burak, Durdu Mehmet. “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Jön Türk Hareketinin Başlaması ve Etkileri”, p. 291 <http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/19/1271/14637.pdf> (02.03.2015)
- Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, *The History of Terrorism*, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 2007.
- Г.А. Аветисян, *История армянского народа*, учебник для 9-10 классов средней школы, Ереван, 1985.
- Леонид Каневский, Армянский терроризм, взрыв в Московском метро (НТВ), <http://portall.zp.ua/video/armjanskijj-terrorizm-vzryv-v-moskovskom-metro/id-jCwgQ5iO-B0.html> ve <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPjtD5vB-O0> (19.02.2015)
- Milan Kundera, “The Unbearable Lightness of Being”, p.2 http://11th-grade-ib-english.granadahills.groupfusion.net/modules/locker/files/get_group_file.phtml?fid=24475648&gid=3937650 (06.03.2015)
- Мери Кочар, *Армяно-Турецкие общественно политические отношения и армянский вопрос*, Ереван, 1988.
- Микаэл Даниэлян, “Терроризм как идеология”, <http://irakly.org/forum/post224442.html?style=1> (04.03.2015)
- М.Г.Нерсисян, *История армянского народа*, Ереван, 1980.
- Nurşen Mazıcı, *Ermeni Sorununun Kökeni (1878-1920)*, Pozitif, 2005.
- Orhan Doğan, “Ermeni Komiteleri Hınçak ve Taşnaksütun (Russian Justice Minister Y. Murayyev’s Report on Armenian Committees)”, <http://dergisosyalbil.selcuk.edu.tr/susbed/article/view/370/352> (06.03.2015)

Özlem Karsandık, “Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Ermeni Hınçak Cemiyeti’nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndaki Siyasal Faaliyetleri (1887-1908)”, Master’s Thesis, Thesis Supervisor: Remzi Demir, Mersin University Social Sciences Institute Department of History, Mersin 2005.

Паруйр Айрикян о Степана Затикяна и НОП,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UaWQq3IPNt0> (19.02.2015)

Sadi Koçaş, *Tarih Boyunca Ermeniler ve Selçuklulardan Beri Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri*, Ankara, 1967.

Selçuk Kızılkaya, “İttihat Terakki Cemiyeti Merkez-İ Umumisi”, Master’s Thesis, Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. İbrahim Ethem Atnur, Ataturk University, Social Sciences Institute, Department of History, Erzurum, 2013.

Степан Затикян, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXTKxprsmWs> (19.02.2014)

Свящ. Алексанлр Мень, “Сын человеческий”, Библия –центр,
<http://www.bible-center.ru/book/son/009> (21.02.2015)

Taner Aslan, Dr., “İttihâd-ı Osmanî’den Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ne” <http://yayinlar.yesevi.edu.tr/files/article/201.pdf> (01.03.2015)

Վահան Թորոզլեւնց, Ժամանակորթուն,
<http://www.chi.am/index.cfm?objectID=80F51EE0-8DC0-11E0-9A42005056A30FF7&year=2007&month=05&legacyURL=070508/07050804> (23.02.2015)

Yervant Odyan, *Yoldaş Pançuni*, translated by: Sirvants Mahlasyan, Aras, İstanbul, 2000.

ФСБ России, Бомба в метро (документальный фильм),
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZQAK1POXtg>; (19.02.2015)

Армянские Террористы в Московском Метро (Armenian Terrorists in Moscow Metro),
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzZWB5GZU-k> (19.02.2015)

Заявление по поводу казни Степана Затикяна и двух других неназванных лиц, Документ № 81(1), <http://www.mhg.ru/history/15D6785> (19.02.2015)

http://ggpi.org/files/istoria_terr.pdf (20.02.2015)

Brief History of Terrorism, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uB_XPZ26f7U
(21.02.2014)

<http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/terreur> (21.02.2015)

<http://www.20minutes.fr/monde/1514443-20150111-marche-republicaine-longue-liste-chefs-etat-gouvernement-presents-paris> (19.02.2015)

BBC NEWS EUROPE, “Charlie Hebdo attack: Three days of terror”,
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237> (19.02.2015)

Հայ Վրիժառուներ: (Նեմեսիս) (Ասալա) (Հայ Հեղափոխական
Բանակ) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGfVpavQvRg> (04.03.2015)

Операция Немесис, <http://www.armenianarthall.com/index.php?newsid=104>
(04.03.2015) Նեմեսիս,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62sXI3qNUjM> (04.03.2015)

Մեր մեծերը - Արշավիր Շիրակյան,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O1hNUNSIrak> (04.03.2015)

Սողոմոն Թեհլերյան Haxtanaki Skizb@ Հաղթանակի Սկիզբը,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpDW_oCroL0 (04.03.2015)

Гурген Яникян — «Цель и Истина»...,
<http://armeniangc.com/2013/09/gurgen-yanikyan-cel-i-istina/> (04.03.2015)

Ազատագրական խմբակներն ու կազմակերպությունները,
<http://www.findarmenia.com/arm/history/24/459/461> (28.02.2015)

Ազգային Միացյալ Կուսակցություն (ԱՄԿ) մաս 1,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=48Yrny2Gtx8> (19.02.2014)

Ազգային Միացյալ Կուսակցություն (ԱՄԿ) մաս 2,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wfzLbr3gp4> (19.02.2014)

DROSHAK NEWSPAPER: A NEWSPAPER THAT OPENLY SUPPORTED TERRORISM

(DROŞAK GAZETESİ:
AÇIK AÇIK TERÖRİZMİ SAVUNAN BİR ORGAN)

Prof. Dr. Jean-Louis MATTEI
Historian

Abstract: *In this article, the author studies one of the issues of the Droshak newspaper published in January 1897. Droshak (Flag) was the official news organ of the ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) or Dashnaktsutyun. This issue, in particular, mentions the Van Revolt of 1896. The issue also talks about the death of the revolutionary Bedo, who fell during the clashes. Bedo is portrayed as the “Protective Angel of the Armenians” and in the newspaper, Armenians are often called upon to exact their revenge. In fact the, Van Problem was to continue in the following years. For this reason, the Van Committee Members Aram Manukyan and Ishan were to give weapons to the Armenians and kill all of their opponents. Through such violent means, they prepared the 1915 Van Revolt. So, the Armenian thesis pretending that the revolt happened by itself is rebutted. The part of the newspaper that tells how the Priest Komitas was killed by a terrorist from Dashnaktsutyun openly shows that the Armenian terrorism was first of all directed against the other Armenians who refused to co-operate with the Committees. After comparing different documents, the author speaks of the efforts made by Avetis Aharonian and Kristapor Mikaelian for promoting the Droshak on the international arena. In the future, Droshak was to give birth to the French Pro Armenia that concealed its terrorist mindset, and became a tool in the hands of the Dashnaktsutyun Members.*

Keywords: *Droshak newspaper, 1896 Van Revolt, 1915 Van Revolt, Pro Armenia newspaper.*

Öz: *Yazar bu makalede Droşak gazetesinin Ocak 1897’de çıkan sayısı incelemektedir. Cenevre’de basılan Droşak (Bayrak), Devrimci Daşnaktsutyun/Taşnaktsutyun’un resmi basın organıydı. Söz konusu sayıda özellikle 1896’da meydana gelen Van isyanı anlatılmaktadır. Sayıda aynı zamanda çatışmalar sonucunda öldürülen Taşnak Şefi Bedo’dan bahsedilmektedir. Bedo, “Ermenilerin koruyucu meleği” gibi gösterilmekte ve gazetede sık sık Ermeniler intikamlarını almaya*

çağrılmaktadır. Aslında Van meselesi devam edecek bir olguydu ve gelecekteki yıllarda intikam fikriyle hareket eden Aram Manukyan ve İřkhan gibi komiteciler, bölgedeki Ermenileri silahlandırarak ve karşı gelenleri öldürerek 1915 Van İsyanı hazırlayacaklardı. Bu vesileyle Van isyanının kendiliğinden ve hazırlıksız patladığını iddia eden Ermeni tezleri çürütölmektedir. Bir terörist/Taşnak komiteci tarafından Papaz Komitas'ın öldürölüşünü anlatan gazetenin bir bölümü şunu açıkça göstermektedir: Taşnakların terörü her şeyden önce kendi halklarına, yani Ermenilere yönelikti. Çeşitli belgelerle bir kıyaslama yaptıktan sonra yazar, uluslararası alanda Droşak gazetesinin tanıtılması amacıyla Avetis Aharonyan ve Kristapor Mikaelyan'ın çabalarından bahsetmektedir. Droşak gazetesi ilerleyen zamanlarda bu sefer Fransızca olarak çıkan, ancak terörist zihniyetini gizleyen Pro Armenia gazetesini doğuracaktı. Pro Armenia, Taşnakların elinde bir propaganda aleti şekline gelecekti.

Anahtar kelimeler: *Droşak gazetesi, 1896 Van İsyanı, Taşnaklar, 1915 Van İsyanı, Pro Armenia gazetesi.*

Previously, in the 42nd issue of the *Ermeni Arařtırmaları*, I had made an analysis of a copy of the newspaper *Armenia* published in Armenian in Marseille since 1885 by the founder of the Armenakan Party, Mekertich Portukalian. As a result of my analysis, I had come up with the following conclusion: Despite coming from terrorism – as in, from the Black Cross terrorist organization– and also organizing terrorist acts in the Ottoman Empire early on, Armenian leader Portukalian, on the verge of the First World War, adopted a moderate stance and cautioned his Armenian cognates not to leave the Ottoman Empire. He wrote articles titled “Turkey [he meant the Ottoman Empire] is changing after the Second Constitutional Era”.

Armenia was of course not the only newspaper to defend the Armenian cause. Beginning from 1891, the newspaper *Droshak* (or *Troshak*)¹ was representing the theses of the “Dashnaktsutyun”. After a humble beginning (as a matter of fact, its founders, Kristapor Mikaelian and Rosdom could not even save a copy of the first issue),² *Droshak* (Flag) gained a significant importance and in time became the first reference newspaper of the Armenian revolutionaries.

Instead of giving a history of the *Droshak* published in Tbilisi, Geneva and Paris, the purpose of this article is to see and show the contents of *Droshak*.

Hereby, I would like to thank my dear friend Maxime Gauin who e-mailed me the January 1987 issue of *Droshak*.

Indeed, it is very hard to find pictures of the *Droshak*. Recently, the administration of the Dashnaktsutyun Party, which still stands to this day, reissued several issues of the newspaper but it was not possible to attain them.

Anyway, the logo of the aforementioned issue is *Droshak/Troshak*. Right below it is written: “‘Hay Heĝapokhak (an) ‘Dařnaktsutyun’ organ” (an organ of the Armenian Revolutionary ‘Dashnaktsutyun’ Party). However the name of the editor is not given.

First, they break some news:

“Haydukayin krrivi Basenum” (About the fight of the Armenian brigade in Pasen)

1 In Eastern Armenian it is *Droshak*, in Western Armenian it is *Troshak*. K=G, D=T, B=P, P=B. Except the section “Komitas Kahanan”, the issues of the newspaper were redacted in Eastern Armenian. Despite some differences, Armenians generally understand each other. Because she is of Eastern Armenian origin (from the old USSR), Anahide Ter Minassian always writes “*Droshak*” and “*Dashnaktsutyun*” in her books.

2 Jean-Louis Mattei, *Büyük Ermenistan Peşinde Ermeni Komiteleri (The Armenian Committees' Pursuit of a Greater Armenia)*, Bilgi Yayınları, Ankara, 2008, p. 147.

“At the beginning of December of 1896, a fight (krriv) broke out in Pasen³ between an Armenian brigade made of a group of supporters of Dashnaksutyun (hump-himbi) and Kurds accompanying border guards. The fight took 4 hours and it was a great victory for our guys. One of our comrades fell during a second fight, while 5 people died and 8-10 got wounded from the soldiers’ and Kurds’ side”

The newspaper continues:

“1896-1897

The terrible angel of death had spread its wings above Armenia. A person could have thought that only ruins were left of our homeland and that the dark skies were painted even darker with its black smokes. The corpses of hundreds of thousands (hariyur hazar) of innocent Armenians (anmeg Hayeri), cut down by swords were left scattered and were whispering: “Revenge!” (Vrej). A thick layer of snow was hiding the corpses from the eyes of wild animals.”

The following should be immediately stated:

- 1) The news could be true. But there is no evidence of such news in the archives. Besides, not much detail is given on the news.
- 2) After five lines, the author of the article tries to shock his readers with the description of hundreds of thousands of corpses by exaggeratedly saying irrelevant things. Even if he tried to make a metaphor, was the author aware of the exaggeration in his article?

The ridiculous image of corpses whispering “Revenge!” shows that the article slid from the field of news into the field of propaganda. These lines were written for this purpose: to show that the Armenians were innocent and tens of thousands of them were slaughtered. Here, what is talked about here is a time frame before the resettlement. Armenians were going to use the same tactic 20 years later: Blaming Turks and gaining the sympathy of Europeans by not to giving details, exaggerating, manipulating numbers, not proving anything, and putting forth the same sources every time.

However the most discomfoting point is the use of the word “vrej” (revenge). “Vrej”, revenge, should not be the rallying cry of a political party (especially

3 The village Pasen of Avnik in the Erzurum region.

a party that is supposedly “revolutionary”). Nevertheless, “Vrej” was read on the red flag during the Dashnak Kukunyan’s 1890 expedition.⁴ But there is more: Even today, in the ceremonies held by the Dashnaktsutyun, flags similar to that one are still shown and the word “Vrej” can still be read on them.

This should be also added: Such a rallying cry is not fitting of a community claiming to be Christian. An objection could be made to the statement above: The Dashnaktsutyun was an atheist party. But then, how could the increasing affinity between the Armenian Church and the Dashnaktsutyun be explained? Also since when did revenge become a revolutionary rallying cry?

This could be interpreted as such: in reality, the Dashnaktsutyun was not an atheist, a religious or especially a revolutionary party. Dashnaktsutyun was an opportunist organization that had blood on its hands.

The author of the article titled “1896-1897” continues:

“In these circumstances, the Armenians were facing the year 1897. The new year wasn’t promising poor Armenians any new hopes or any new life (voç nor hoys yev voç nor kyank).”

The Dashnaktsutyun was an atheist party. But then, how could the increasing affinity between the Armenian Church and the Dashnaktsutyun be explained? Also since when did revenge become a revolutionary rallying cry?

Then, the responsible person for these disasters i.e. Abdul Hamid II is mentioned:

“Grabbing their lyres with their bloody hands, diplomats were singing the chorus showing Abdul Hamid as the ‘protector of the Armenians’ and their chests were decorated by medals given by the most brutal sultan in the world.”

This is in accord with the discourse employed by the Dashnaktsutyun: that Foreigners should not accept any medals from the Sultan. According to this discourse, a foreigner accepting a medal from the Sultan meant that he was cooperating with the “monster”.

Getting back to the text:

“But the Sultan was not only feeding with the blood of Armenians (Bayts

4 *Greater Armenia*, pp. 164-165.

sultanı terr çer kşdatsel Hayı aryunov), but also sensing that the province called Vaspurakan populated by many Armenians was undefeated.”

An important element is encountered here. Vaspurakan is the Van province in Armenian. It was a very important center for the Armenian civilization in time immemorial. Following their defeat, committee members such as Aram and Ishan were going to focus their efforts on the region. From the beginning of the 20th century onwards, ammunition and fighters coming from Russian were going to go to Van. That is why several Armenian historians such as Anahide Ter Minassian and Jean-Marie Carzou do not tell the truth when they write that the 1915 Van Revolt was unexpected, unprepared and spontaneous.

As a matter of fact, following the 1896 defeats, Armenian Committees started to become active in Van region as of 1904, thanks to Aram Manukyan.

Beside the newspaper analyzed here and the other newspapers, a clear evidence for these is: in the 1910 International Socialist Congress, the Dashnaktsutyun delegation, in the written notice they prepared, was praising themselves for the *armament* of the Armenians in Van. An interesting side of this: All of these were done in contradiction to the rules set by the Young Turks Government. On the contrary, the agreement between the Young Turks and the Dashnaktsutyun was stipulating for the disarmament of the committees. However, none of the other socialist delegations in Kopenhagen noticed the “oddity” present there. They believed everything the Dashnaktsutyun told them. They blindly believed that the Dashnaktsutyun was socialist. This “eclipse of reason” could also explain the complacency of the French socialists.

Returning to the Van events, when the war broke out, the city was already planned to be handed over to the Russians. Indeed, Aram, a committee member coming from Russia, could have only become the governor of Van under Russian rule, and he did indeed become the governor. In other words, because of the Van Revolt, the Ottoman administration was obliged to intervene in 1915 and adopted the Law of Resettlement to prevent other revolts.

The text continues:

“The Sultan saw that, thanks to the revolutionary forces, the heart of the Armenian identity (Hayutyán sirtı) was still strong and that the local Turkish administration was not powerful enough to attack Van with its small forces.

However they had to realize the heinous Lobanov plan. The governor

of Van started to get prepared. Despite all of Armenia trembling because of the executioner's sword (չայելով vor amboğdş Hayastanı doğum er dahci srits), the city of Van gathered several revolutionary forces in autumn.

Finally on June 15, the Van conflict began because of an ordinary reason. Revolutionary forces valiantly fought government forces for six days..."

Before all, Aleksey Lobanov-Rostovski (1824-1896) should be mentioned. As it is seen, this person, who was already dead when *Droshak* emerged, was disliked by the author of this article. As a matter of fact, Foreign Minister Lobanov was not Armenian-friendly. According to the Armenian Wikipedia, Lobanov proposed the Tsar an "Armenia without Armenians" (Hayastann arrants Hayeri).

However, did Lobanov really say such a thing? It should not be forgotten that Armenians also claim that such words were said by Talat Pasha. It is also certain that Lobanov did not understand the benefit of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. The instability created by its destruction could have served the interests of France, Germany and England, rather than Russia. Tsarist Russia could have made a mistake by encouraging the Armenians. Based on clear evidence this time,⁵ Anahide Ter Minassian makes an accurate and important observation: Initially the Tsarist Police was arresting Armenian revolutionaries after catching them. On the other hand, she writes that numerous members of the Armenakan Party were taking refuge in Russia.

Yes, the 1896 Van Revolt ended with a heavy defeat for Committee members and especially Armenakan members. One of the backbones of the organization and a friend of Portukalian, Mıgırdıç Avedisian was killed during the clashes.

Actually, to perceive the 1896 revolt as the rehearsal of the 1915 revolt would not be too wrong.

This issue of *Droshak*, which analyzes the 1896 Van Events and refers to it the most, supports our opinion. The alleged "massacres" perpetrated against the Armenians existed for the most part in the imagination of the committee members and was the product of propaganda. General Mayevsky (Russian consul in Van at that time), who witnessed the 1896 Van events, actually blamed the Armenians.

⁵ Anahide Ter Minassian, *La Question Arménienne*, Editions Parenthèses, Marseille, 1983, p. 136-150, Colonel Debil's report dated February 12, 1903.

Also, the Dashnaks could have complained as they were deprived of Russian support. However, Russia was actually their base of operations and warehouse. On top of that, everything suddenly changed in 1911-1912 and the committees became the most fervent supporters of the Tsardom. Armenian Committees were now freely able to print their propaganda brochures in the Russian Empire. The Ottoman Empire was becoming their target and the First World War was about to break out. Tsarist Russia was not representing barbarism anymore; on the contrary it was civilization itself. Thousands of volunteers (in Armenian: *gamavorner/kamavorner*) from every corner of the world went to Russia. They attacked the Ottoman Empire in 1915, guided Russian soldiers and facilitated the march of the invaders. Maybe the provocateurs coming from Russia could not be called traitors, but what about the ones who were born in the Ottoman Empire?

The article continues as follows:

“... the revolutionary forces fell into the trap of our false protector, the British Consul (*dzuğakn inknelov*) and left the city of Van. The swords of the Turks shined again.”

These lines deserve an explanation. The last name of the British Consul was William or Williamson. In 1895, the Russian Consul writes this about him:⁶

“Revolutionary Armenians gather in the house of the British Consul and are literally encouraged. Committee members are gradually gaining more importance. They extort money from the rich and the elite. They kill the ones who do not obey.”

However the phrase “false protector (*mer keğdz paştpan*)” shows that ultimately the Armenian committee members were not satisfied with the aforementioned person.

Antranik Chelebian gives these other details:⁷

“After an approximately one week long Van resistance clashes, three Armenian party leaders who believed fez wearing British Ambassador [it should be consul] Mr. Williamson’s deceptive words and advices, took the decision to move the resisting youth into Iran.”

6 *Greater Armenia* pp.167-168.

7 Antranik Chelebian, *Antranik Paşa*, Pêrî Yayınları, Translation from Armenian to Turkish: Mariam Arpi and Nairi Arek, Istanbul, 2003, p. 69.

Maybe the British Consul realized that the committee members were not acting chivalrously.

Chelebian writes that the British Consul actually feared a possible Russian intervention. This finding is accurate.

The methods of Dashnaksutyun and other terrorist organizations should especially be kept in mind.

These impressions are already confirmed when one looks at the archives and in the book *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni İsyamları, III. Cilt (Armenian Revolts in Ottoman Reports, Vol. III)*, page 70, the following lines are present:

“The youth, who studied in the aforementioned School [which was previously opened by Portukalian] were nurtured to become fedayeens, and began to take action by distributing brochures calling for a rebellion, killed the Kurds they encountered in the mountains and the country side, killed Armenians loyal to the Ottoman Empire and -arguing that it was for the good of the people- started to demand money from important and respectable Christians of Van by threatening them.”

All these confirm the following: Portukalian, who printed the newspaper Armenia in Marseille, was initially was nothing more than the leader of a terrorist organization.

This important document, dated 16 November 1896, makes us think: These youths who took refuge in Russia or Iran, were no doubt the continuation of the terrorist organization Black Cross (Sev Khach) which was led by Portukalian.⁸ These methods of resorting to the same violence and blackmail were part of the Armenian terror directed towards Armenians themselves.

All these confirm the following: Portukalian, who printed the newspaper *Armenia* in Marseille, was initially was nothing more than the leader of a terrorist organization. Portukalian had left Van in 1885, but his supporters (the Armenakans) were trying to sow discord in the Van region after 11 years. In other words, Portukalian was ruling over the Armenakans of Turkey and Russia by sending instructions from Marseille.

The above mentioned document mentions other organizations as well (the

⁸ For more details, please see: Jean-Louis Mattei, “Mıgırdıç Portukalyan: Terörizmden Şüpheli Bir İlimlılığa” (Mkrtich Portukalian: From Terrorism to A Suspicious Modertaion“, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Issue 42.

Hunchaks and Dashnaks). It should be kept in mind that Dashnaksutyun leader Kristapor Mikaelian was a “specialist” in blackmailing, threatening, violence, assassinations and bombings. Kristapor Mikaelian was also the director of the newspaper *Droshak* in Geneva. But as mentioned above, nothing was written below the newspaper’s logo.

If the copy is further read:

“Revolutionaries moving away from the city ran across Kurds and soldiers of the Government. A fight broke off again and this time Government forces killed the few Armenian revolutionaries. The revolutionaries who fought to the last man died heroically in the battlefield. Along with them died Bedo, the protective angel of Vaspurakan who deserves to be worshipped.”

From what has been written, it is understood that Bedo was an experienced agitator. As a matter of fact, in a letter by a Dashnak sent from Tabriz in 1896, such phrases are found:

“Tasho and Bado have lots of work to do. Ask everything to them and abide to their judgements. Bedo hid in Van for many years like a prisoner. Follow the orders of Tasho and Bedo and support the task.”⁹

On the other hand, since we do not run across his name in any Ottoman document, we can assume that Tasho is the codename of famous committee member Mardig.

Finally, in page 360 in volume II of the same book, it is seen that the Dashnaksutyun seal was taken from the corpse of Bedo. The seal consisted of three letters: H.H.T/H.H.D (Hay Heğapokhagan Taşnaktutyun or Hay Heğapokhakan Daşnaktustyun).

Antranik Chelebian confirms all these:¹⁰

“Under the leadership of Bedo and Mardig, the Dashnak and Hinchak group with 80 rifles headed to Iran through the Abağa line. Like the others, they were also surrounded and cruelly killed. Only their guide survived. “

The interesting part of these is this: Bedo ran wild in Van for years. Yet, he

9 *Ermeni Olayları Tarihi*, “Hüseyin Nazım Paşa”, new issue, Volume I, Ankara, 1998, p. 138.

10 *Antranik Paşa*, p. 69.

was the one who was “cruelly” killed... Moreover, he is referred to as the “protective angel” ...

However, all reports clearly show: the duty of the committee members was to torment the Muslims (Turks and Kurds). So, who in fact were the cruel ones?

Armenian committee members tortured and killed their cognates who did not share their views. According to the militants, Armenians loyal to the Ottoman state were “traitors”.

I will analyze this important subject in another part of this article. But for now let us return to the copy of *Droshak* at hand.

After feeling sorry for the condition of the Armenian people, the author of the article in *Droshak* continues:

“The Dashnaksutyun Party saw the importance of the moment, understood what reactionism is and decided to mobilize (vcrets) them by delivering a strong blow (mi zoreğ harvatsov). The blow has to be a strong one. Affecting both the Sultan and Europe, the terror to be employed (aztoğ) should mobilize the Armenian people embracing reactionism (sarsap). With such a blow, a new life, a new hope, a new spirit will emerge in the people.”

After stating that the Dashnaks are ready to have new martyrs, the author of the article concludes:

“We neither believe the sultan, nor the diplomats. We Armenians, we finish the year ‘96 happier compared to the beginning.

We face the year ‘97 with more faith.

We continue to be careful ... and we certainly declare that it is necessary for us to always struggle. We are convinced that the only way for the salvation of Armenians is revolution. The world wants us to have this sacred fight, of which we are convinced of as well. Only the free Armenians deserve to be members of this world.

We also believe that our enslaved people (isdruk joğovurd), as well as our ruined homeland and the sacred memory of our hundreds of thousands of martyrs want this sacred fight from us.

We start this new year shouting ‘Fight! Fight! A more unrelenting fight!’”

As is seen, the last lines of the article leave no room for doubt: the message of ‘any method may be employed, so that Europe may intervene’ is given. It is stated that Armenian people will be shot if they resist the requests of the committee members.

In fact, it was seen that many Armenians did not obey the committee members, on the contrary they reported them to the Turks. This is an important point that needs to be noted.

This should also not be forgotten: Armenian committee members adopted the methods of blackmailing and assassination in Russia as well. Principally, the founders of the terrorist organization called “Black Cross” and the Black Cross of the Ottoman Empire established with these same methods were Portukalian and Hayrig Khrimian (what’s more, he was a religious leader!)

Demanding money from the rich or the deemed to be rich Armenians in Van region was a method that originated from the Black Cross, and was a common method used by Armenakan and Dashnaksutyun.

However, things did not go as planned. Despite the British support, as it is seen, even the Consul of Britain in Van had left the causes that committees pursued.

The year of 1896 was a catastrophic year not only for the Dashnaksutyun, but also for all Armenian committees. That is why the author of the article (it is uncertain if it was Kristapor Mikaelian, or Rostom, or someone else) calls his fighters to fight, emphasizing the heroism of the committee members. He hereby tries to conceal their defeat.

If we go on analyzing the newspaper: after this general article, there is some kind of a story about the Van Revolt.

Apparently, this method was not an unusual one in the Droshak newspaper. The author of the story says “menk” (us) and hereby brings the reader into his fight. This method had probably aimed to make the Armenian cause more popular. Hence, compared to Droshak, the rival “Hunchak” newspaper sometimes may seem more abstract, more technical. Let us not forget also that in the future illustrations, pictures and photographs would be also published.

Undoubtedly, the director of the newspaper Kristapor Mikaelian was looking for a talented author.

One year later (in 1898), Avetis Aharonian (1866-1948) had sent a story called “Khay” to Mikaelian and one day he excitedly went to the office of *Droshak* in Geneva to learn his opinion. He explains what had happened:

“Kristapor, who was sitting at the table, raised his head and looked at me over his glasses with a smooth and beautiful smile and said:

‘You see, I told you will get through it, didn’t I? ‘Khay’ is a good idea. It should continue.’”¹¹

Aharonian, who wrote many stories for *Droshak* such as “Khay”, “At the Prison”, “Traitor”, “Hazre”, finally became one of the pillars of the newspaper.

Aharonian, who himself did not fight, nevertheless knew very well about the lives of Armenian fedayeens i.e. Armenian committee members. But this should be emphasized: Aharonian, in his stories, does not mention the massacres organized by Turks. He condemns the ill treatment of the militants in prisons. He could have condemned, but as far as I know there is no document about the Turkish prisoners who fell into the hands of the fedayeens or the volunteers. Furthermore, in his story “Hazre”, the old lady Hazre burns the house of the priest with her own hands.

This act reminds us of this fact: With the purpose of blaming Turks, Armenians set their own villages on fire. More precisely, the committee members were forcing all villagers (both their supporters as well as opponents) to do so.

Aharonian was already close to General (in reality, gang leader) Antranik. In his story, old Hazre dies happily on the lap of her hero, Antranik, whom she had never seen.

But another fact opposes this romantic picture: dictatorship of the committee members against the Armenian civilians...

May be Antranik does not represent the opinion of every committee member, but is it not Antranik who said:

“The fedayeen is not at the service of the people, on the contrary, the people are at the service of the fedayeen!”

Moreover, when analyzed, the facts which confirm the things mentioned here can be found at the end of the *Droshak* newspaper.

11 Avetis Aharonyan, *Fedailer; Özgürlük Yolunda* (The Fedayeens on the Road to Freedom). Translation from French: Figen Yılmaz, Introduction by L. Ketcheyan p. 21.

This 24-lined section, written in Western Armenian, is indeed very important to understand the mentality of Dashnaksutyun:

“Priest Komitas (Komitas Kahanan),

The betrayals of Der Komitas, who was murdered by Van Dashnaksutyun Central Committee, were many. It will be enough to explain this: The assistant of the church, along with the cattle herder named Arsen, were excommunicating the revolutionaries from church rostrum, openly calling them ‘rascals’ and ‘immoral’ (sriga; amparoyagan), and putting an effort to call upon those who were receiving and concealing the revolutionaries that they should report the ‘Dashnaks’ and indirectly get in touch with the government or the Armenian Bishop.

Around 11 in the morning, when Priest Komitas went to read the Bible to one of the patients of the church, a terrorist¹² gets close to him and stabs the priest’s neck with his dagger and the tip of the dagger comes through the other side of his neck. His head falls back and suddenly the priest passes away. As a result of this, the government does not take any measures and arrests nobody.

The murdered priest was one of the closest advisors of the traitor (tavacan) Hovhannes Agha (who was also murdered by the Dashnaks recently).

When they see each other in the afterlife, they should take note and *smarten up*.”¹³

Despite being in the “bibliography”, in his book (in fact, Anahide Ter Minassian is daughter-in-law of famous Dashnak, Rüpen Ter Minassian) he does not narrate what is exactly mentioned in the *Droshak* newspaper.

Even the only full text published in the newspaper does not inform about this issue.

In spite of this, he (himself) wants to vindicate the Dashnaksutyun Party in his book *La Question Arménienne*,¹⁴ but at the same time he unwillingly accepts that it is a terrorist organization. Indeed, according to Minassian,

12 The French word “terroriste” is used in the original text.

13 The last word in the microfilm is difficult to read.

14 *La Question Arménienne*, p. 167, note 105.

starting in 1903, by personal order of Kristapor Mikaelyan, a section called 'Terror' is printed regularly at the last page of *Droshak* newspaper.

As is seen, this section is the continuation of the section (Komitas Kahanan) that we just analyzed (this section was probably published irregularly before 1903).

Of course, according to Minassian, Matheos Balyozian, who was murdered in 1902 in Izmir, was a 'spy', a 'collaborator'. However, at the 564th page of the 35th issue of Masis newspaper published in August 31, 1902, and at the "Huşadedr" (Agenda) section, this can be seen clearly: according to "Agenda" which was written before his assassination, and according to Armenian public opinion, Matheos Balyozian was a "philanthropist" who opened up his home to the Armenian orphans.

For this reason, the following determination can be made: Matheos Balyozian was murdered by the organization because he refused the blackmails of Dashnaksutyun.

All these methods, of course, are far from all kinds of democratic principles. Above all, the Armenian civilians were the target of committee members i.e. terrorists. As is seen, people who did not surrender to blackmails and extortion were murdered. Sometimes a "people's court" was gathered, sometimes the Dashnak chiefs did not even feel the need of enact such charades.

Killing their own people's priests would come to be a tradition for the Dashnaks. In 1896 for example, a resident of the Charpanak Monastery, Bishop Boğos was killed due to his loyalty.¹⁵

But there is more; in March 24, 2005, Justin McCarthy said the following during his speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly:

"Arsen, the priest in charge of the Akhtamar Church in Van, the religious center of the Armenians, was murdered by Ishan, one of the leaders of Van's Dashnaks... After Father Arsen was killed, the Dashnak Aram Manukian, a man with undetermined religious beliefs, became the head of Armenian schools."

The reader will recognize Father Arsen. As is seen at the presented document, the clergyman was helping Father Komitas. Father Arsen was the

15 *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni İsyamları* (Armenian Revolts in Ottoman Documents), 1896-1909 III. Cilt, p.70.

“representative” of Father Komitas. Since 1904, terrorist Ishan, who arrived in Van, probably wanted to kill his predecessors and subsequently killed Father Arsen.

Sirak Mesrop Manasiyan, born in 1905 and one of the witnesses- of the “Van Revolt”, was referring to him as “Mr. Ishan”. The witness Sirak Mesrop was 10 years old when Ishan died. According to his testimony, the corpse of the fedayeen was thrown to a well.¹⁶

Considering these assassinations and killings, it is hard to believe that these revolts, which lasted almost 20 years, broke out spontaneously.

Did the parents of Sirak Mesrop know that Mr. Ishan, whom they respected, killed the priests of their people? As Christians, did they approve such acts?

Governor of Van Kapamaciyan, who was an Armenian but not a clergyman, was killed in 1912 by the Dashnaks, probably by personal order of Aram Manukian.

Considering these assassinations and killings, it is hard to believe that these revolts, which lasted almost 20 years, broke out spontaneously.

Siranush Simon Tutuncian,¹⁷ who was born in 1906 in Van, personally knew Father Arsen and told:

“We were going to the Church of the Virgin Mary. The church was quite big: its capacity was enough for 500 people. Father Arsen was performing a religious ceremony when the clashes for the defense started on April 7.”¹⁸

This was probably another Father Arsen. This ceremony was performed openly in 1915 and at the beginning of the revolt.

Whether it was another Father Arsen or Siranush Simon’s mistake, it is certain that Ishan killed Father Arsen, because there is the following Armenian document:¹⁹

“He succeeded, mainly in getting back precious manuscripts [stolen by the Kurds] and enriching the library of the monastery. ... Vartabed Arsen’s end took place in 1904. Tashnag Ishkhan and his band invaded

16 He suspected a trap by Cevdet Pasha.

17 *Memories of the Witnesses of the Armenian Genocide*

18 This date shows that the Van Revolt started before April 24.

19 Levon Kazanjian, *Renaissance of Van-Vasburagan*, p. 57.

Ahtamar and butchered Arsen Vartabed and his secretary Mihran Kevorkian, driving them to the sea, having stolen Vartabed's ring and purloining his wealth. It was being said that Arsen Vartabed was responsible for a battle with the Ishkhan band and the Kurds.”

However, as far as is understood from his memoirs, Siranus Simon did not know anything about the murder of priest Arsen by his father and his mother's friends. The reason he did not know was maybe because he was born in 1904. On the other hand, maybe his father and mother preferred to keep silent about the not so glorious actions of the committee members.

The witness tells elsewhere:

“The fedeyeens visited our home in disguise. They were called ‘fugitives’. Food was provided to them and they paid for it. We kids knew that we were not supposed to talk about them to anyone and we knew that these ‘fugitives’ were revolutionaries. I personally knew most of them. *We had close relations with the Turkish Vali Cevdet and Kasım bey. We visited their houses with my mother.*”

Yes, you read it correctly. All these witnesses prove the two-facedness of some Armenians. But the ill treatment or massacres by Turks are not mentioned. Then, why and what issues are mentioned?

What is mentioned is the Turkish military intervention towards committee members/revolutionaries. This is probably not enough to call Mr. Cevdet a “monster”, whom Armenian women normally often visited.

Well, was the *Droshak* newspaper distancing itself from all these things that happened? No. In 1915, after a long propaganda, armament and killing process, Aram Manukyan finally delivered the city of Van to the Russians...

It is impossible to call him a “traitor”, because he had come from Russia...

To sum up, both Turkish and Armenian documents (especially this issue of the *Droshak* newspaper that we analyzed) show that terror organizations, especially the Dashnaktsutyun, were running wild in Van. More importantly, the documents show that the defense of Van, in other words the revolt organized by the committees, was planned well in advance with certain deeds. Priest Arsen, who was not the primary target at the time, survived in 1896, but he was finally killed by the infamous terrorist Ishan²⁰ in 1904.

20 Ishan (1883-1915). His real name was Nikoghayos Mikaelian or Nigol. Ishan is still respected by Lebanese Dashnaks.

Droshak newspaper and its directors played a part in all of these. As a matter of fact, Aharonian was to meet with famous statesmen such as Georges Clemenceau. Neither Aharonian, nor Kristapor Mikaelian looked like cruel terrorists: they were well mannered, were good speakers, and were well dressed.

As a result of these contacts, in 1900, the first issue of the *Pro Armenia* newspaper was published in Paris. As Anahide Ter Minassian wrote, *Pro Armenia* was actually another press organ of the Dashnaksutyun. It was also a continuation of *Droshak*.²¹

Ter Minassian stated all of these as follows:

“*Pro Armenia* was created by Kristapor Mikaelian (a member of the Western Bureau and the editorial director of *Droshak* newspaper). It is a product of the cooperation between the Dashnaks and the French democrats and socialists. The editing committee consisted of G. Clemenceau, A. France, Jean Jaurès, Fr. De Pressensé, E. de Roberty.”

As might be expected, these important politicians and literary figures did not know much about the Ottoman Empire. They knew neither Turkish nor Armenian. Everything the Dashnaks said was true for them, because according to them, the Dashnaks/Armenians were progressivists, while the Turks were (generally) reactionists. The most interesting part is that Georges Clemenceau hated anarchists. After his appointment as the Interior Minister in 1906, as if to mock himself, he declared himself to be the “first cop of France” (“le premier flic de France”).

Clemenceau, hand-in-hand, arm-in-arm with Armenian terrorists! Was Cleamenceau, a man with a strong sense of humour, aware of this contradiction? Or was he the laughing-stock of these polite murderers? The second possibility is more convincing. As for Jean Jaurès, he was a peaceful socialist but he was also a victim of this right-leaning terrorist group. Certainly, he was deceived.

I have come up with this conclusion since *Pro Armenia* was very different from *Droshak*. In *Pro Armenia*, the heroism of the Dashnaks was not praised to the skies. In *Pro Armenia*, there was no section called “Terror”... Abdul Hamid II, on the other hand, was highly criticized. But these are only preliminary impressions. In a future article, I will make an analysis of several issues of the *Pro Armenia* newspaper.

21 *La Question Arménienne*, p. 165, note 88.

To sum up, the analyzed issue of *Droshak* suggests the following: Van and its surrounding region did not lose their importance even after the Dashnaks' defeat in 1896. On the contrary, Dashnaks wanted to exact revenge there. Its proximity to the Russian and Iranian borders brought it into prominence. In fact, Aram and his comrades, operating in Van region since 1904, had been laying the foundation of the 1915 Van Revolt.

Whether Turkish or Armenian sourced, all documents refute the Armenian theses.

At the beginning of the year 1897, terrorism was more prominent than ever. The so-called socialist Dashnaktsutyun's most favorite thesis was the acts of violence against both Armenian clergymen and Armenian and Turkish civilians.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aharonyan, Avetis. *Fedailer, Özgürlük Yolunda* (The Fedayeens on the Road to Freedom). Translation from French: Figen Yılmaz, Introduction by L. Ketcheyan, Belge Publications, 2001.
- Chelebian, Antranik. *Antranik Paşa, Pêri Yayınları*, Translation from Armenian to Turkish: Mariam Arpi and Nairi Arek, Istanbul, 2003
- Hüseyin Nâzım Paşa Ermeni Olayları Tarihi*. - 2. Ed.. - Ankara: Prime Ministry Printing House, 1998. - 2 c. (LXI, 463, 543 p.) Prime Ministry General Directorate of State Archives No: 15
- Kazanjian, Levon. *Renaissance of Van – Vasburagan Golden Age of Culture* (Veradznoont Van – Vasburagani Mshagootyani Vosgetar 1850 – 1950) Foreword by Samuel H. Toumaian Printed by Toumaian Brothers Boston 1950.
- Mattei, Jean-Louis. “Mıgırđıç Portukalyan ve “Armenia” Gazetesi (Terörizmden Şüpheli İlimliliğe)” (“Mkrtich Portukalian: From Terrorism to A Suspicious Moderation”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Issue 42, 2012.
- Mattei, Jean-Louis. *Büyük Ermenistan Peşinde Ermeni Komiteleri* (The Armenian Committees' Pursuit of a Greater Armenia), Bilgi Yayınları, Ankara, 2008.
- Minassian, Anahide Ter. *La Question Arménienne*, Editions Parenthèses, Marseille, 1983.
- Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeni İsyancıları* (Armenian Revolts in Ottoman Documents), 1896-1909 Prime Ministry General Directorate of State Archives Vol. III. 2008 .

THE PERFECT ETHNOCIDE: A REVIEW OF BAS KROMHOUT'S 'DE PERFECTE GENOCIDE'

(MÜKEMMEL ETNOSİD: BAS KROMHOUT'UN 'MÜKEMMEL SOYKIRIM' YAZISININ DEĞERLENDİRMESİ)

Armand SAĞ

Ph.D. Candidate, Utrecht University
Chairman of the Institute for Turkish Studies

Abstract: *There are a lot of claims surrounding the events of 1915 amongst academics. With the bicentennial of the events in 2015, it is accompanied by even more publications. The publication of Bas Kromhout is one of them. His article is entitled 'De perfecte genocide: 1,5 miljoen Armeniërs vermoord, over tot de orde van de dag' and is entirely in Dutch. It can be translated to English as 'The Perfect Genocide: 1,5 million Armenians killed, but on to today's news'. The article was published in the most read historical magazine in the Netherlands, which is called 'Historisch Nieuwsblad' in Dutch. This can be translated to 'Historical Newspaper' in English. It was featured on the front page of the magazine which had a special issue on the Armenian events of 1915 in January of 2015. Bas Kromhout's article was the so-called prime article of the magazine in the issue of January of 2015. Although Bas Kromhout is a young historian with a Ph.D. in Nazi-history, he now tried to change his field to the Armenian events of 1915 and wrote his first article about it. In my article, I will argue that Kromhout (willingly or unwillingly) is actually a great example of Ethnocide, which is a certain method within academic or scholarly debates to pollute objective and neutral discussions between scholars. Although I started out to review Kromhout's article, I was strongly convinced that Kromhout's article is suited to see in the light of Ethnocide and disturbing the scholarly methods surrounding the historical and juridical debate about the Armenian events of 1915.*

Keywords: *Bas Kromhout, ethocide, Armenian, denial, the Netherlands, genocide.*

Öz: *1915 olayları ile ilgili bilim adamları arasında birçok bilimsel tartışma vardır. Bu olayların yüzüncü yılı yaklaştığı için 2015 yılında her giden gün daha da çok yayın eklenmeye başlandı. Hollanda'nın genç tarihçisi Bas Kromhout'un yayını da bunlardan biridir. Yazısı tamamıyla Hollandaca olmakla birlikte 'De Perfecte Genocide: 1,5 miljoen Armeniërs vermoord tot de orde van de dag perfecte' başlığı taşımaktadır.*

Türkçe'ye 'Ülkü Soykırım: 1,5 milyon Ermeni öldürüldü, şimdi güncel konulara geçelim' olarak çevrilir. Bu yazı Hollanda'nın en çok okunan tarih dergisinde yayınlanmıştır. Bu derginin adı 'Historisch Nieuwsblad', Türkçesi 'Tarih Haber Dergisi' olmakla birlikte Hollandaca'dır. Bas Kromhout'un bu yazısı 2015 yılının Ocak sayısında kapakta yer almıştır. Ocak 2015 tarihinde çıkan sayı, Ermeni meselesi ile ilgili bir özel sayıdır. Bas Kromhout'un yazısı başyazı olarak kapakta yer aldığı gibi, bu özel sayının en göze batan yazısıdır. Doktorasını tamamlayıp Nazi Tarihi'nde uzman olan genç tarihçi Bas Kromhout, bu yazı ile Ermeni Meselesi'ne de açılmak istemiştir. Ermeni meselesi'ne odaklanan bu yazısı, bu konuda olan ilk yazısıdır. Bu yazımda Bas Kromhout'un, bilinçli veya bilinçsiz, ahlak kırımının en güzel örneği olduğunu savunuyorum. Ahlak kırımı, bilimciler arasında tarafsız ve tek taraflı olmayan yayınları engellemeyi öngören bir çizgidir. Bas Kromhout'un yazısını değerlendirmeye başladığımda, bu yazının ancak ahlak kırımı çerçevesinde faydalı olduğu sonuca vardım. Bana göre bu ve buna benzer yazılar, 1915 yılında olan Ermeni olayları ile ilgili tarihsel ve hukuksal tartışma ortamlarını engelleyip olmamış gibi göstermeyi amaçlar.

Anahtar kelimeler: *Bas Kromhout, ahlak kırımı, Ermeni, inkâr, Hollanda, soykırım.*

Introduction

The most read historical magazine in the Netherlands is 'Historisch Nieuwsblad' (Historical Newspaper). Historisch Nieuwsblad focuses on past occurrences and puts them in a new light for a broad audience in the Netherlands. They are self-proclaimed 'sharp, clear of mind and objective'. Their audience is mainly Dutch men from 35 years and older.¹ The readers are high educated men who are either in the first or second class of wealth. His hobbies include going to theatres, concerts, museums; making him a culturally interested intellectual and a philanthropist while being careful with nature and the environment.

Historisch Nieuwsblad reaches 106.000 readers, comprising 0,8% of the 13.845.000 Dutch residents above the age of 13.² It is the most read historical magazine with 23.431 printed issues, which are mostly bought by organisations and libraries and therefore read by at least 106.000 people. The magazine is printed ten times a year and an average page costs € 2.965,00 to make. The price of one issue is a staggering €7,95, while the average price for other (non-historical) newspapers are between one and two euro's. However, seeing the audience, this 0,8% (or 1%) is the elite of the Netherlands; therefore making it a good statistical mode as a case study to see the outcome of Armenian efforts in the important year of 2015.

For the year 2015, Historisch Nieuwsblad has published a special hundred pages long issue on the Armenians as their first edition with the headline 'The Perfect Genocide: 1,5 million Armenians killed, but on to today's news'. Especially the article of Bas Kromhout, a young journalist with a Ph.D. in Nazi-history, is a good example of Ethnocide because this young writer seems to have adopted all the Armenian accusations in one article without being aware of the fact that his sources are all biased and subjective.

Even the first sentence of his article, beginning with the quote of Hitler, is interesting. The article neglects the fact that this so-called 'quote from Hitler' is never been proven, and that most academics such as Tom Segev, Heath W. Lowry and Leon Picon dismiss this quote as being true.³ This first claim, which

1 Zuiver, 'Historisch Nieuwsblad', from: http://www.zuiverwiki.nl/index.php/Historisch_Nieuwsblad (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

2 *Nom Print Monitor* 2010-II/2011-I, from: http://www.zuiverwiki.nl/index.php/Historisch_Nieuwsblad (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

3 Tom Segev, 'Mozart and the Armenian genocide', in: *Haaretz Daily News* (October 18, 2007); Heath W. Lowry, 'The U.S. Congress and Adolf Hitler on the Armenians', in: *Political Communication and Persuasion*, 1985, Vol. 3, No. 2; Leon Picon, 'Armenian "Hitler Quote" Proven To Be Fabrication', in: *ATA-USA*, Fall 1985/Winter 1986.

is presented as a fact by using the pattern of denial within Ethocide, is followed by the claim that “it was the first time a modern state had knowingly planned and executed the plan to annihilate an entire race, using advanced military technology and administrative apparatus”⁴. Unfortunately there are no sources used at this sentence, making it impossible for us to know where it is based upon since most academics such as Boekestijn again agree that there was no systematical plan to exterminate the Armenians:

*“The Armenian side claims that the Ottoman government at the highest level had the intention to kill Armenians. So far, there is no such proof in the Ottoman Archives.”*⁵

Boekestijn is not alone in this, he is backed by Zürcher.⁶ Seeing that both Boekestijn and Zürcher, as well as Kromhout are all Dutch with extensive publications in both Dutch and English, it is very surprising to see Kromhout neglect all these findings. It is a good example of the denialist approach to make it seem as if something is accepted by all scholars and that there is no scholarly debate while in fact it is dismissed by most academics. This pattern is evident throughout the article of Kromhout.

It does not stop there, in the same paragraph Kromhout states that there were 2 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1914. Again, this figure is based on nothing since Kromhout neglects to show any source. Stanford J. Shaw has published the official Ottoman population figures after his research in the French archives, since the last Ottoman census was in fact conducted by French diplomats in the population census of the Ottoman Empire in the year 1914.⁷ The official head count of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was around 1,2 million, almost have lower then what Kromhout argues. Additionally, the French were assisted by the Armenian minority of the Ottoman government, since the Armenians conducted their own census within their own community (or ‘millet’). This was not ordinary, since in 1912 the Ottoman Minister of Interior was in fact an Ottoman of Armenian descent called Gabriel Noradunkyan (or Noradoungian).⁸ Neglecting all this data and unknowingly

4 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, pp. 30-37.

5 Arend-Jan Boekestijn, ‘Turkey, the World and the Armenian Question’, in: *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Winter 2005, Vol. 4, No. 4.

6 Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London 2004), p. 128.

7 Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 2/2 (Cambridge 1977), pp. 315-317.

8 Yılmaz Öztuna, ‘The Political Milieu of the Armenian Question’, in: Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), *Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period* (Ankara 2002), p. 49.

exaggerating the number of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire with almost half, is inexcusable for a scholar.

Yet again on the same page, Kromhout argues that most Armenians were poor peasants living under the yoke of the Kurdish tribes. Again the foundation for these statements is absent. During the siege of Constantinople (present day İstanbul) in 1453 against the Byzantines (the same Byzantines against whom the Armenians still had a grudge for the oppressing of so many Armenians Christians because they were not Orthodox like the Byzantines but Apostolic), the Armenians were eager to fight for the Ottomans. Afterwards the Ottoman ruler Fatih Sultan Mehmet II rewarded the Armenians:

1. The Armenians were given their own Church and Patriarch in İstanbul in 1453;
2. From that point on, the Armenians were known as the 'Sadık Millet'; a title exclusively given to the Armenians by the Ottomans in the history of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1922). It meant 'The Most Loyal People', for their help and relatively peaceful way of live;
3. Trade was given to the Armenians, which helped the Armenians population to become wealthy during the Ottoman period of 1453-1918.⁹

So if the Armenians were mostly involved with trade and one of the wealthiest minorities of the Ottoman Empire, how would the majority be a poor peasant as Kromhout claims?

So if the Armenians were mostly involved with trade and one of the wealthiest minorities of the Ottoman Empire, how would the majority be a poor peasant as Kromhout claims? It seems that Kromhout, again, made a grand error in his article. Secondly, if the Armenians had a representative in the Ottoman capital İstanbul, founded by the Ottoman sultan himself (while the Kurds had no representation whatsoever, nor had the right to form their own community), how would the live under the yoke of the Kurds? Would it not be more logical if it was in fact the other way around? Kromhout unfortunately neglects these topics and therefore denies the academic discussions surrounding it.

On the next page, Kromhout makes the fatal error of stating that the Hamidiye regiments were busy "looting, killing and raping", after which the Armenians defended themselves in august 1894 in Sason.¹⁰ This is peculiar again, since

9 Kamuran Gürün, *The Armenian File* (İstanbul 2007).

10 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 32.

Kromhout denies the happening of almost 30 rebellions of Ottoman Armenians, the first being in Zeytun in 1780.¹¹ The Hamidiye regiments were founded in 1890, the same year the Ottoman-Armenian nationalist Mıgırdıç Portakalyan (or Mekertich Portukalian) founded Ermeni Yurttaşlar Birliği (Union of Armenian Citizens) which aimed to spread nationalism among Armenian youth in the Ottoman Empire.¹² Consequently, Armenians were able to massacre 2.000 people in Erzurum during 1890 and another 1.000 in Kumkapi during the same year. So it becomes clear that the Armenians did not revolt as a reaction to the Hamidiye, but that the Hamidiye were created as a reaction to the Armenian rebellions.

Although Kromhout mistakenly states that Sason resulted in 3.000 Armenian casualties, he denies the 9.000 casualties that were the victim of these Armenian militias.¹³ Immediately hereafter Kromhout states that “the Armenians were not able to accomplish political appeasement” and were confronted with “a reign of terror” from the Ottoman government when they offered a petition. However, Kromhout again neglects the ongoing struggle between Armenian rebels and the Ottoman Empire. Armenian militias caused the death of 500 Ottomans in 1892 in Kayseri; 200 in Yozgat in 1892; 800 in Çorum in the same year; 1.350 in Merzifon in 1893; and the before mentioned 9.000 in Sasun in 1894. Even when Armenians wanted to protest in İstanbul, violence erupted when Armenian militias used the protest to attack Ottomans causing 10 deaths during what people call the ‘Sublime Porte Demonstration’. Even in the year when the some Armenians offered a petition in Istanbul in 1895, some 20.000 Ottomans were slaughtered in Zeytun by Armenian militias. The tight control of the Ottomans were a reaction to the violence at Zeytun, and not, like Kromhout pretentiously argues, to the petition of the same year.¹⁴

Kromhout further argues that in 1895 “hundreds of Armenians were killed by the police”, while in fact the Ottoman Empire had their first police force after the reforms in 1907-1909: some 14 years after the 1895-events making it impossible for the Ottomans to have a police force in 1895, let alone having them go around massacring random people. Prior to the reforms of 1907-1909, the task of police was taken on by local governors and other military

11 Nejlâ Günay, *Maraş'ta Ermeniler ve Zeytun İsyanları* (İstanbul 2007).

12 Özlem Karasandık, ‘Criticism and the First Precautions of the Ottoman Empire Against The Armenian Political Separatist Organizations’, in: *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Issue: 16-17, Volume: Winter 2004-Spring 2005. Available online: <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=tr&Page=Dergiler&IcerikNo=14> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

13 Armand Sağ, ‘Armeens Terreur’, from: *TurkseStudent.nl* Available online: <http://forum.turksestudent.nl/topic/25434-armeense-terreur/> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

14 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 32.

organisation as a side activity.¹⁵ However, this is not Kromhout's only major mistake. He claims that these non-realistic police crack downs inspired the Armenians to attempt to assassinate the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit II on August 26th, 1896.¹⁶ Kromhout combined two events into one, by (knowingly or unknowingly) listing the assassination attempt on Abdülhamit which was in fact on July 21st, 1905 with the Armenian assault on the Ottoman Bank on August 26th, 1896.¹⁷ How an academic can intermix two events that are of such immense importance, is beyond me. Especially because the same article depicts a photograph with the statement: "After their raid on an Ottoman Bank, the Armenian perpetrators fled to France, Marseille, August 26th, 1896." Despite the fact that Kromhout states it is "a bank" while in fact it was "the bank" (it was the headquarters of the Ottoman National Bank), this shows that even Kromhout knows that the raid on the Ottoman Bank was on that date (and not the assassination attempt), as well as that the Armenian rebels did get a free pass to go Europe.

It also diminishes the next arguments of Kromhout, that Abdülhamit "took revenge after the attempt on his life by killing 50.000-200.000 Armenians during 1894-1896" while firstly the unsuccessful attempt on Abdülhamit's life was not until 1905. Secondly, the raid on the Ottoman Bank only ended when European superpowers intervened and forced the Ottomans to enable the Armenians to leave the Ottoman Empire. The leader of the raid, Karekin Pastırmacıyan (or 'Armen Garo/Karo'), was even named the Ottoman parliamentary member for Erzurum during 1908-1912 under pressure of the Europeans. Therefore, the 50.000-200.000 Armenians Kromhout is referring to were not killed but migrated under protection of the European superpowers (mostly) to the Russian Empire and France.¹⁸ Other skirmishes were mostly between the before mentioned Kurdish irregular forces (Hamidiye regiments) and Armenian nationalists, killing people on both sides and were not (like Kromhout is inadvertently insinuating) one-sided massacres on the Armenians since the Armenian rebels killed far more people.¹⁹

Kromhout continues by stating even more completely inaccurate dates. He argues that the contra revolution of 1909 prompted the largest Armenian

15 Hasan Yağar, 'Osmanlı Polis Teşkilatı ve Yenileşme Süreci', from: *TarihTarih.com*. Available online: <http://www.tarihtarih.com/?Syf=26&Syz=293928> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

16 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 32.

17 Armand Sağ, 'Categorizing Historiography: Turkish-Armenian Relations Throughout History', in: *Review of Armenian Studies*, No.: 26, Volume: 2012, p. 146.

18 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Utah 2005).

19 Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922* (New York 1995).

terrorist organisation Dashnakzutyun made an alliance with the political movement of Young Turks who aimed to reform the Ottoman Empire with more rights for minorities. However, Dashnakzutyun did not agree with this alliance after the contra revolution of 1909 but years prior to it in 1907.²⁰ This renders Kromhout's argument that the alliance was a reaction to the contra revolution of 1909 completely useless. It was in fact the alliance of 1907 which made that the rivals of the Young Turks, mostly comprised of local religious conservatives, now also targeted the Armenian rebels. When tensions rose, the Armenian terrorist of Dashnakzutyun saw an opportunity when a contra revolution occurred and seized their opportunity using the slogan "For a Free, Independent and United Armenia" while killing two Turks civilians as well as 15 Ottoman soldiers. Their uprising, in a province where tensions were rising anyway, paved the way for a cruel and brutal civil war between Dashnakzutyun and religious conservatives. In the end some 15 to 30 thousand people lost their lives (and not 15 to 20 thousand like Kromhout argues), but these were victims from both sides and not (like Kromhout argues) from just the Armenian side. In the end, the Ottoman government stepped in and quelled the uprising by arresting 618 Turks, 77 Armenians and sentencing 47 (both Turks and Armenians) to death. This in fact shows that the incident in Adana was not instigated by the government, but that it (in fact) did everything in its power to prevent and stop it.²¹

Therefore the alliance between Dashnakzutyun and the Young Turks did not end in 1910, like Kromhout argues since he put the start of their alliance in 1909, but in 1912 since their alliance started in 1907. The end of the alliance started when the Armenian terrorist organisation Dashnakzutyun targeted innocent civilians which bothered the Young Turks and created serious antipathy between the two.²² Even more bothersome is the fact that Kromhout states that "after 1910 the Young Turks abandoned all hope in a unity of Ottoman peoples and followed a scary-Turkish discourse".²³ In doing so, he neglects the mention of a new law in 1912 that gave minorities in a province the right to govern themselves to ensure the support of the Ottoman minorities for the Ottoman Empire. It also would not explain why all celebration cards of the Young Turks, printed in 1911 to celebrate the revolution of 1908, were

20 Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey* (Leiden 1997), p. 78.

21 Yusuf Delikoca, '1909 Adana Olayları: İdam Edilen Türkler', from: *Ceyhan Haber* (December 10th, 2009). Available online: <http://ceyhanhaber01.blogspot.nl/2009/12/1909-adana-olaylari-idam-edilen-turkler.html> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

22 Roderic H. Davison, 'The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914'. In: Roderic H. Davison (ed.), *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West* (Texas 1990).

23 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 33.

printed in five languages; notably Armenian, Greek, Ottoman Turkish, French, and Hebrew.²⁴

Kromhout's explanatory reason for the Young Turks targeting the Armenians also does not make any sense: "The Young Turks dreamt of one big empire, Turan, which would also incorporate the Turkmens of Russia. Exactly in the middle between the Turks and Turkmens, lived the Armenians, whose presence was increasingly seen as obstructing". However, looking at the map would in fact show us that most Ottoman Armenians lived in the East-Anatolian city of Van (37,8%) which is in the mid centre of the Ottoman Empire and close to only one border: the Ottoman-Persian.²⁵ The Turan-ideology was never an official part of the Young Turk-movement, and even the vast majority of the Young Turks was non-Turkish.²⁶ Additionally, the Young Turks were not focused on expansion of the Ottoman Empire, but on preservation of the collapsing empire, making this reasoning from Kromhout completely obsolete.²⁷ Despite of this, Kromhout continues to argue that the Young Turks did not only see the Armenians as obstructive, but all Christian minorities in general. However, this does not explain why the Young Turks founded the *Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası* (a socialist/communist party) in Istanbul in 1910 with the support of the Armenian and Bulgarian minorities.²⁸

Kromhout also touches upon the Balkan Wars and states that these defeats were reason for radicalization of the Young Turks, and the Ottoman government suspected the Christians in Asia Minor of supporting the enemy. This is incorrect for a number of reasons. For one, the loss of the Balkans was a process that started in the seventeenth century and it is hard to defend why radicalization was not an issue in the first three centuries but "suddenly" would come up in the twentieth century. Secondly, the loss of the Balkans did stir up tension between the Young Turk movement and the Ottoman government cultivating in the Young Turk raid on the Ottoman parliament in 1913. This shows that the loss of the Balkans made the Young Turks wary of the autocratic elite and not the Christian minorities since most Young Turks themselves were

24 Gazanfer İbar, 'Cumhuriyetten sonra da Meşrutiyet kutladık: Hürriyet İlamı İlk milli bayramımızdı', in: *Atlas Tarih*, Issue: 13 (June–July 2012), Istanbul, pp. 70–71.

25 Stanford J. Shaw, 'The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831–1914', in: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Volume: 9, Issue: 03 (August 1978), pp. 325–338.

26 Füsün Üstel, *Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)* (İstanbul 1997), pp. 15–42.

27 Sina Akşin, *Turkey, From Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to present* (New York 2007).

28 Eyal Ginio, 'El Dovér El Mas Sânto. The mobilization of the Ottoman Jewish population during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)', in: Hannes Grandits, Nathalie Clayer & Robert Pichler (eds.), *Conflicting loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building* (New York 2011).

non-Turks.²⁹ Thirdly, since Kromhout does not provide any source for his statements, it is hard to understand where he bases his thesis on. Thirdly, since there were actual uprisings, rebellions and other acts of separatism amongst the Ottoman Christians in Asia Minor ever since 1895, the suspicion was in fact valid.³⁰

Kromhout continues by arguing that the Young Turks established a “dictatorship in 1913”. However, the Young Turks were not organized in a political party, which made it impossible for them to seize power. There was no common factor among the various groups within the Young Turk-movement except for their demand for a constitution and a parliament, which would, in their view, stop the Ottoman Empire from disintegrating.³¹ To bridge the differences among all these diverse groups, the Young Turks were content with the appointment of grand viziers not on the basis of their allegiance to the Young Turks but, rather, on the basis of their allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, nine of the thirteen grand viziers that served the Ottoman Empire between 1903 and 1918 were in fact non-Young Turks making it impossible to establish a Young Turk dictatorship. Between 1913 and 1917 there were a total of three persons appointed as grand viziers (prime-minister) of the Ottoman Empire, of which only one was a Young Turk.³² Therefore there is no logic explanation for calling the Young Turks “dictators”.

The statement that the Young Turks “immediately started turkifying the country” in 1913 by giving Armenian, Greek and Bulgarian villages and cities Turkish names. Again, this is impossible by a number of reasons. For one, the Greek and Bulgarians had already gained independence in respectively 1832 and 1878/1908. So there were virtually no more Bulgarian or Greek villagers and cities left within the Ottoman Empire.³³ Additionally, the campaign of turkification of names is simply incorrect. For one, the name of the parliament building was still the Ottoman version of the Arabic-origin word ‘Bâb-ı Âli’, and not the Turkish ‘Yüce Kapı’. Secondly, some Turkish geographical names were changed as well. This had nothing to do with the process of ‘Turkification’ or nationalism but with creating unity and uniformity through having one form of names applicable to all. For example, the Armenian village name ‘Vak’if’ is changed to ‘Vakıflı’ in order for all citizens to correctly pronounce them. According to the research of Harun Tuncel, other reasons

29 Taner Aslan, ‘İttihâd-ı Osmani’den Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’ne’, in: *Bilig*, Issue: 47, Fall 2008, pp. 79-120.

30 Yunus Özger, *1895 Bayburt Ermeni Ayaklanmaları* (İstanbul 2007).

31 Alan Palmer, *The Decline & Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (New York 1994).

32 Yılmaz Öztuna, *Büyük Türkiye Tarihi* (14 volumes) (İstanbul 1983).

33 Mark Mazower, *The Balkans: a short history* (New York 2007).

were primarily: the confusion when two villages had the exact same name, as well as names that were seen as unacceptable (for instance: 'Stupid Village' or 'Whore Village'). The latter two included changing Turkish names, so the example Kromhout gives is not confined to non-Turkish geographical names. The Ottoman capital of İstanbul was officially still called 'Konstantiniyye' (derived from the Greek word 'Constantinopolis') in governmental documents until 1930, while it was called 'İstanbul' (derived from the Greek word 'Eistenpolin', meaning 'to the city') among its residents. Seeing that not all names were turkified, it is easy to wipe away Kromhout's conclusion. This becomes clear when looking at the examples with İstanbul (instead of Constantinople) and Diyarbakır (instead of Amed), which were respectively Greek and Kurdish names before they were changed. Both İstanbul and Constantinople are Greek names so it does not explain the name change in that specific case. The same applies with Diyarbakır, which is not Turkish but in fact Arabic: 'Diyar-ı Bekr', while Amed is not Kurdish but Assyrian. Kromhout mistakenly states that the cities received Turkish names while in fact the new names were mostly non-Turkish and pre-Ottoman historical names from the period prior to the Seljuks.³⁴

Other arguments include that "only Turkish was allowed in state organisations", while in fact Ottoman (a combination of Arabic alphabet, Persian grammar and Turkish words alongside vocabularies from almost all minorities) was the official language within the Ottoman Empire until the Ottoman Empire disintegrated in 1922. Turkish only became an official language in 1928 in the Republic Turkey which was formed in 1923. Kromhout misses the point by a mere fifteen years, which is not the first time in his article.³⁵ Yet another invalid argument from Kromhout is that the Ottoman economy was forced to fall in Turkish hands, while this did not happen until much later. The only source that argues the earliest record of the switch for Ottoman merchants from being mostly non-Turkish and non-Muslim to being mostly Muslim Turkish is 1914, one year before Kromhout argues it took place without providing any source.³⁶ However, apart from this marginal thesis, most sources put the switch from the Turkish economy in 1942 with the start of the Varlık Vergisi (Tax on Wealth) in the Republic Turkey which is not only 29 years later than Kromhout argues, but also a different country (Ottoman Empire versus Republic Turkey).³⁷ The third argument Kromhout throws up is that

34 Harun Tunçel, 'Renamed Villages in Turkey', in: *Firat University Journal of Social Science*, Volume: 10, Issue: 2 (2000), pp. 23-34.

35 Geoffrey Lewis, *The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success* (Oxford 2002).

36 Various submitted papers, Conference: 'A Civilization Destroyed: The Wealth of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Period and the Early Republican Era' (İstanbul 2015).

37 Faik Ökte, *Varlık Vergisi Faciası* (İstanbul 1951).

“Greek merchants along the Aegean coast were victims of state-organized boycotts, threats, confiscation, murder and deportation” in 1913. Again, Kromhout does not seem to know his timeline of history. The Greek merchants were traded from Turks living in Greece; involving one million Greeks from Anatolia and half a million Turks from Greece. This population exchange between Greece and Turkey was not in 1913, like Kromhout argues, but ten years later in 1923. Additionally, the population exchange, or agreed mutual expulsion, was signed during the ‘Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations’ in Lausanne, Switzerland on 30 January 1923 by the governments of Greece and Turkey under supervision of European

Turkey wanted the half a million Turks living in Greece because of the ethnic cleansing Greece was perpetrating, to which Greece in return wanted one million Greeks in Anatolia. Therefore, Kromhout makes the fatal mistake of not only putting this in a wrong timeframe, ten years prior, but also mentioned it as if it was one-sided while in fact it was not.

states.³⁸ Turkey wanted the half a million Turks living in Greece because of the ethnic cleansing Greece was perpetrating, to which Greece in return wanted one million Greeks in Anatolia.³⁹ Therefore, Kromhout makes the fatal mistake of not only putting this in a wrong timeframe, ten years prior, but also mentioned it as if it was one-sided while in fact it was not. Lastly, it was a population exchange with the consent of both Turkey and Greece, as well as with the approval of the European superpowers. It was not, in any case, what Kromhout insinuates as an anti-Greek policy from the Ottomans.

Kromhout continues by mentioning that Armenians suffered from new Kurdish attacks in 1913 and 1914, but neglects to mention two important factors. For one, it were not only the Armenians that suffered. Kurds, Turks, Muslims and other non-Armenians as well as Ottoman-loyal Armenians, also suffered from massive, inhumane, brutal and cruel attacks from nationalist Armenian militias such as Dashnakzutyun (also ‘Taşnak’).⁴⁰ The sentences that “a lot Armenians were forced to become Muslims” and “the aim was to make Asia Minor homogenic” do not have any sources making them absolute rumours.⁴¹ However, one must bear in mind that Kromhout’s own logic fails when he speaks of Kurds attacking Armenians in order to make Asia Minor a homogenic

38 Bruce Clark, *Twice A Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey* (London 2006).

39 Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922* (New York 1995).

40 Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Utah 2005).

41 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 34.

Turkish region; since Kurds are in no way Turks. The Kurdish attacks were not a systematic policy from the Ottoman government, nor the Young Turks, but mere tribal wars between two competing people: Kurds and Armenians. The Ottomans tried stopping these feudal differences and even went as far as sentencing both parties to death, which would be illogical if they instigated the tribal wars themselves in order to “make the Armenians disappear”.

The statement of Kromhout that shortly before the First World War started, Armenian lobby organisations succeeded in convincing European states to put pressure on the Ottomans to give the Armenians more autonomous rights and two inspectors (one from the Netherlands: Louis Westenek) were ordered to see to this. Kromhout uses the term “lobby by Armenian political organisations” to refer to Dashnakzutyun, who by that period had killed and massacred hundreds of thousands innocent people. Dashnakzutyun was actually an ultraviolent terrorist organisation, while the pressure of the European superpowers had started with the raid of the Ottoman Bank.⁴²

Fellow-Dutchman Schmidt, a Turkish linguist at Leiden University, states that Louis Constant Westenek (1872 - 1930) was appointed, not to ensure that the Ottoman officials did anything against the Armenians, but to “prevent that local non-Armenian Muslims would not take revenge on the Armenians for the fact that Armenians were pursuing their dreams of independence”.⁴³ in which the non-Armenian Muslims would fear that they would be persecuted in the newly established Armenian state for simply being non-Armenian and non-Christian. Unfortunately Kromhout denies all of these undisputable facts as a part of his pattern of Ethnocide. Kromhout even continues by stating that the Ottoman Empire expected a lot from this war, amongst other things: the reconquest of the Balkans and the establishment of the dreamed empire Turan. Both are farfetched, since the Ottoman Empire only became involved in the war after it got attacked; and the Ottomans only waged a defensive war without invading the Balkans or Russia at any point during the war.⁴⁴

Kromhout somehow also states that the Ottoman Empire saw the war as an opportunity to finish off all internal enemies without international supervisors, and Minister of War Enver Paşa held meetings in the Summer of 1914 with high-ranking military officers about “the elimination of the non-Turkish mass”. Again Kromhout has provided with no sources, but the happenings do point

42 Kamuran Gürün, *The Armenian File* (İstanbul 2007)

43 Jan Schmidt, *Nederland in Turkije, Turkije in Nederland: 400 jaar vriendschap* (Leiden 2012), pp. 19-21.

44 Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Greenwood 2001).

us in another direction. The first statement of Kromhout can easily be countered with the following argument. If the Ottomans were foreseeing that they were going to use force against their own minorities, why would the Ottomans mobilize only 150.000 soldiers in the early summer of 1914 of the approximately 3 million that were possible and eventually were mobilized during the remaining four year of the war? In my opinion, this shows that the Ottomans were in fact unprepared for war and in no way preparing a secret campaign against anyone.⁴⁵ Kromhout's second statement can also easily be encountered since the meeting of Enver Paşa is actually pretty known and there is no sheer mention of anything remotely related to Armenians. During the meetings, Enver Paşa gives the least attention to the General Staff, which prompts the Germans (allies of the Ottomans) to take over the position of first assistant chief of staff of the Turkish General Staff. Liman von Sanders (one of the German military officers send to the Ottomans to aid them) appoints Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf. Bronsart von Schellendorf began immediate preparation of mobilization and war plans in the absence of Enver Paşa, since he was no longer taken serious by the Germans. The meetings Kromhout is referring to, were therefore led by the Germans and no mention of Armenians is ever recorded during these meetings.⁴⁶ However, there are other sources that imply that it were the Germans that insisted on the Ottomans to take actions against the Armenians.⁴⁷ Kromhout chooses to neglect and deny these facts and pretend as if these discussions are not present in academia. Additionally, in July of 1914 the Young Turks started negotiations with various Armenian groups in Erzurum to see if a new alliance was possible. Since the Armenians openly stated to have strong ties with the Russians, the Young Turks were convinced that there were strong Armenian-Russian links with detailed plans aimed at the detachment of the region from the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁸

Kromhout goes on by arguing that the Ottoman cry for drastic measures became more apparent after the disastrous winter of 1914, and the fact that the Ottomans were no match for the Russians. According to Kromhout, the retreating soldiers took revenge on Armenian villagers accusing them of treason. Again, Kromhout has no sources to back up his claims. In reality, the winter of 1914 was not as disastrous as Kromhout argues. The Russians

45 Yücel Yanıkdağ, 'Ottoman Empire/Middle East', from: *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*. Available online: http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/ottoman_empiremiddle_east (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

46 Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Greenwood 2001), p. 5.

47 Selami Kılıç, *Ermeni Sorunu ve Almanya Türk-Alman Arşiv Belgeleriyle* (İstanbul 2003).

48 Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Greenwood 2001), p. 97

launched a surprise attack on November 1st, but it was soon unsuccessful. In fact, the Ottoman forces managed to maintain their positions at KöprükÖy in November 1914 and by November 12th, the 3rd Army began to push the Russians back with the support of the cavalry. The 3rd Infantry Regiment of the Ottomans managed to invade KöprükÖy after the Azap Offensive between November 17th and 20nd. By the end of November, the front had stabilized with the Russians clinging on to a small strip of land, some 25 kilometers into Ottoman lands. However, Armenian volunteers from the Ottoman Empire took advantage and occupied Karaköse and Doğubeyazıt, just north of the important Ottoman region of Van. After the capture, the Armenians carried out massive massacres, killings, raping and other forms of torture causing high Ottoman casualties.⁴⁹ It is striking that Kromhout denies this, since this explains why retreating Ottomans were forced to battle Armenians. It were Ottoman Armenians who took Ottoman cities behind the front which took the Ottomans by surprise. The Armenians were so successful that even the Russian Czar himself, Nicholas II of Russia, stated in December 1914 that “Armenians are hurrying to enter the ranks of the glorious Russian Army, with their blood to serve the victory of the Russian Army. Let the Russian flag wave freely over the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus! Let your Armenian peoples, who are remaining under the Turkish yoke, receive freedom! Let the Armenian people of Turkey, who have suffered for the faith of Christ, received resurrection for a new free life!”⁵⁰ And his efforts proved successful, where in the summer of 1914 Armenian volunteer units were established under the Russian Armed forces and numbered 110.000-120.000 Armenians⁵¹, this soon became 150.000.⁵²

Even the before mentioned Karekin Pastırmacıyan, who led the attack on the Ottoman Bank in 1896 and then became an Ottoman member of parliament, united 20.000 Armenian volunteer soldiers under his command, and growing rapidly. To illustrate that not all Armenians were against the Ottomans, Karekin Pastırmacıyan's brother was director of the Erzurum-branch of the Ottoman Bank. Needless to say that he was soon assassinated by Armenian nationalists who saw all Ottoman-loyal Armenians as possible targets.⁵³ This also illustrates that Kromhout's use of the word “accused” is far from justified, seeing that

49 Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Greenwood 2001), p. 54.

50 Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 2/2 (Cambridge 1977), pp. 314–315.

51 Jacques Kayaloff, *The Battle of Sardarabad* (Paris 1973), p. 73.

52 Fridtjof Nansen, *Armenia and the Near East: Middle East in the Twentieth Century* (New York 1976), p. 310.

53 Wolfgang Gust, *Alman Belgeleri / Ermeni Soykırımı 1915-1916* (İstanbul 2012).

around 150.000 Armenians (including an Ottoman member of parliament) were actually occupying Ottoman villages and cities.

Kromhout goes on stating that the Ottoman government first fires all Armenian police officers and government officials, and then turned its attention to the Armenian at the Ottoman army. Kromhout states that the Armenian soldiers were put to work to labour battalions and were forced to build roads and strongholds behind the fort. Again, he has no sources backing his claims but one must bare in mind that since Kromhout states that “all” Armenian police officers and government officials were fired, this one example is enough to cripple his thesis. He is, like in most of his theses, coming off way to strong to prove his point and in doing so diminishes the impact of his own research results as well as his credibility as a scholar. One primary source of the American archives tells us the exact journey of some Christian Ottomans; one example is the testimony of Edward Tashji (or Taşcı). Tashji was the son of an Armenian mother, Zabel Tashjian, residing in the Ottoman province of Balıkesir in Western Anatolia at the start of the First World War; and a Syrian Orthodox father, Circi ‘George’ Tashji, who resided in the Eastern Anatolian city of Urfa at the start of the First World War. The education his father received (seemingly fluent in Arabic, French, Armenian, Ottoman Turkish and English) and the fact that he remained an Ottoman army officer during the entire First World War, are interesting findings and apparently enough to call out Kromhout.⁵⁴

Kromhout’s other claim that Armenians were put to work behind the front can be seen in the light of a simple tactical and strategic decision since there was a serious threat of Armenian desertion to the Russians, remembering the 150.000 Armenians that fought for the Russians as volunteers. However, the example of Circi Tashji clearly shows that not all Armenians were put to work in these battalions, and that they could also still retain their high-ranking position within the Ottoman army. Kromhout continues to state that a lot of the Armenians in the labour battalions died due to the hard work, the bad care and the mistreatment. Kromhout mentions no source and when looking at the Ottoman archives there are no unusual large amounts of deaths in these labour battalions rendering Kromhout’s argument, yet again, useless.⁵⁵ Additionally, the Ottoman archives also clearly show that Muslim Turks above the age of 40 were also put to work in labour battalions and that the amount of Armenians in the labour battalions was only 27,9%.⁵⁶ One can, however, detect the high

54 Edward Tashji, *Armenian Allegations: The Truth Must be Told* (reprint by Rose 2005), p. 20.

55 Cengiz Mutlu, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Amele Taburları* (İstanbul 2007).

56 Cengiz Mutlu, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Amele Taburları* (İstanbul 2007), p. 50.

rate of desertion in the Ottoman army, especially amongst the Armenians; who joined the Russians at large but with their Ottoman weaponry in a period of time where the Ottomans had a shortage of weaponry. This is the main reason for keeping Armenians in the labour battalions without weaponry.⁵⁷

Kromhout states that the decision to destroy the entire Armenian population is “suspected” to have been taken in March 1915. It is striking that Kromhout can make such a great claim without any source and with just some “suspect”. It is also a contradiction since Kromhout himself had stated prior that Enver Paşa had organized meetings with the intent to eliminate all Armenians in the summer of 1914. Apparently, according to Kromhout, there were two decisions aimed at destroying the Armenians although none of the two have any evidence to back up his claims. Even fellow-Dutchmen Boekestijn and Zürcher, like stated before, argue that there is no evidence whatsoever that points to a systematic approach of the Ottomans to annihilate the Armenians, in the Ottoman archives. Therefore, it becomes even more interesting where Kromhout bases his claims upon. He fails to clear this up.

According to Kromhout, the decision to destroy the Armenian population was accelerated by two events. On April 20th, 1915, the Ottomans were decisively defeated by the Russians in Van, states Kromhout. And just three days later the British landed on Gallipoli in Western Anatolia. According to Kromhout, this caused panic with the Ottoman rulers and they wanted to finish off the Armenians before it was too late. Kromhout continues to state that “shrewd propaganda made the people of İstanbul believe that a fifth column of Armenians was on the verge of killing the rulers, taking over power and opening up the Bosphorus for the enemy”.⁵⁸ Again, Kromhout’s claims are unjustified and there are multiple reasons to conclude this. For one, the fall of Van was actually due to the Armenian volunteers who fought for the Russians. The city fell in hands of rebellious Armenians from Van, who decisively defeated the Ottomans.⁵⁹ This makes what Kromhout calls “shrewd propaganda” actually much more real than Kromhout makes it out to be. Secondly, the so-called panic amongst the Ottoman rulers is not solid when one keeps in mind that the Ottomans gained an important sea victory at Gallipoli on March 18th, 1915. The landing of the British, Australians, New-

57 Tuncay Yılmaz, ‘Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Amele Taburları – Cengiz Mutlu’, from: *Gelibolu’yu Anlamak*. Available online: http://www.geliboluyuanlamak.com/36_Birinci-Dunya-Savasi%E2%80%99nda-Amele-Taburlari---Cengiz-Mutlu-%28-Tuncay-Yilmazer-%29.html (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

58 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 35.

59 Justin McCarthy, Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taşkıran & Ömer Turan, *The Armenian Rebellion at Van* (Utah 2006).

Zealanders and French was not as serious as Kromhout argues, since they could not advance and the battle ended in a stalemate between the two armies. Yet again, Kromhout makes a grand mistake by dating the landing at Gallipoli on April 23rd, 2015 while in fact it was April 25th, 2015.⁶⁰ This also cripples the rest of Kromhout's arguments.

Kromhout claims that the fear for the British landing in Gallipoli made that the police arrested 235 Armenians in İstanbul on April 24th, 2015, while in reality the British had not yet even landed in Gallipoli. In reality, April 24th, 2015 was the day that suspected Armenian nationalists (mostly leaders of terrorist organisation such as Dashnakzutyun) were arrested after the fall of Van in which nationalist Armenians took control of the city and forced the Ottoman army to retreat. The arrest of the Armenians was aimed at crippling the Armenian terrorist organizations in Van and other Ottoman regions, as well as to stop the Armenian sabotages in order to prevent other Ottoman cities of falling in hand of the Armenians.⁶¹ All 235 Armenians were leading personalities of the Armenian Revolutionary Party (ARF), or Dasnakzutyun, which was a terrorist organization founded in 1890 but already responsible for hundreds of thousands of dead Ottomans.⁶² Kromhout continues that soon after the arrests of April 24, 2015, other arrests in other regions of the Ottoman Empire took place and even public executions were “daily business”. These arrests are only to be seen in the light of arresting Armenian nationalists from Dashnakzutyun to stop their spiral of violence against Ottoman citizens. The so-called “public executions” were nothing more than suspects who were arrested, found guilty by Ottoman courts and accordingly sentenced to a penalty. One must bear in mind that during the skirmished of Adana in 1909, even Ottoman cavalry soldiers were sentenced to death for cruelty against Ottoman Armenians; showing that the Ottoman penal code made no distinction between ethnicity nor public function.⁶³

Kromhout continues to state that Minister of Interior, Talat Paşa, gave the order to “deport all Armenians from Asia Minor on May 23rd, 2015”. Again

60 Harvey Broadbent, *Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore* (Victoria 2005), p. 47.

61 Kemal Çiçek, ‘Relocation of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915’, from: *Turkish Historical Society*, July 2008. Available online: http://www.dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157:relocation-of-the-ottoman-armenians-in-1915&catid=13:papers&Itemid=13 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

62 Kemal Çiçek, ‘Relocation of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915’, from: *Turkish Historical Society*, July 2008. Available online: http://www.dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157:relocation-of-the-ottoman-armenians-in-1915&catid=13:papers&Itemid=13 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

63 Cezmi Yurtsever, ‘1909 Adana Olaylarında İdam Edilenlerin Listesidir’, from: *Adana 01 Haber*. Available online: http://www.adana01haber.com/author_article_print.php?id=910 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

Kromhout makes some major mistakes. For one, 'tehcir' does not mean "deportation" but 'relocation' since the Armenians were taken from Eastern Anatolia and settled in North-Syria which were both still part of the Ottoman Empire. With the fronts being in Eastern Anatolia and the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen and Palestine), North-Syria was perceived as a relatively peaceful part of the Ottoman Empire, far from the war front where the Armenians could no longer sabotage the war effort. "Deportation" means the expulsion of a group of people from a country, which in this case is incorrect since they were relocated within the same country. Secondly, the Armenians were not forced from Asia Minor but from a couple of provinces in the far east of Asia Minor. Almost all Armenians in the west from Asia Minor were not relocated. Thirdly, the relocation did not start on May 23rd, 1915 but on May 26th, 1915.⁶⁴ Lastly, the policy of Tehcir was a normal practice within the Ottoman Empire as a punishment for groups of peoples after a rebellion or uprising. Turks, like the Karamanoğulları, were also subdued to the Tehcir in the past. It was not a death measure intended to kill people.

"Deportation" means the expulsion of a group of people from a country, which in this case is incorrect since they were relocated within the same country.

Kromhout continues to say that Talat Paşa wrote in a memorandum that "preparations were made" and that the Armenian problem had "a final solution". However, the preparations are a reference to the preparations of the Tehcir, while the final solution is just a final solution to the Armenian problem of rebellions in the past seven months which seriously crippled the war effort.⁶⁵ That Talat Paşa was not using euphemism for mass killings are clear when looking at the British archives. According to Oxford professor Hew Strachan Talat Paşa's is witnessed to have cried (or at least put his hands in front of his face) during an interview concerning the relocation. One can conclude that it at least shows that it wasn't premeditated by Talat Paşa or that even he himself did not expect so many victims during the Tehcir.⁶⁶

One of the scarce sources Kromhout uses, is the letter of the German vice-consul in Erzurum, Max von Scheubner-Richter, who stated that the Ottoman

64 Justin McCarthy, 'The Light Millennium', from: *UNDPI/NGO* (April 21, 2009). Available online: http://dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48:what-drove-the-armenians-and-the-turks-apart-&catid=13:papers&Itemid=13 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

65 Justin McCarthy, 'The Light Millennium', from: *UNDPI/NGO* (April 21, 2009). Available online: http://dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48:what-drove-the-armenians-and-the-turks-apart-&catid=13:papers&Itemid=13 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

66 BBC/Discovery Channel, *First World War: Jihad 1914 - 1916* (part 4 of 10) (2003).

regime openly admitted to him that the actual aim of the relocations was the “total annihilation of the Armenians”. Richter added that “one of the prominent party leaders had said word for word that ‘after the war not a single Armenian would be found in Turkey anymore’.”⁶⁷ Kromhout accepts this as a fact without further hesitation but there are a number of questions about Richter’s statement. For one, why would the Ottoman regime officially deny that it was planning to annihilate the Armenians but admit it to a low-ranking German official? Secondly, even the German Embassy questioned the authenticity of the quote, as well as the reliability of Richter, since there was no written evidence to support the claim of Richter, nor any other witnesses who had heard the quote as well. Richter claimed that he was the only one to have heard the quote but could not give the name of the Ottoman official who stated it, when asked about it. Thirdly, even if one believes Richter, it is important to emphasize that Richter was talking about “party leaders”, and not the Ottoman government itself; and the quote that “no Armenian will be found in Turkey” does not imply that all Armenians would be killed, it can also refer to a well-orchestrated and thorough Tehcir. Fourthly, the German Embassy wrote some remarks about Richter on Richter’s letter calling him “a weird man” and “politically unfit”. Richter was known for his attitude to push towards acceptance in the world of nobility, for which purpose he marries a woman 29 years his senior to gain her old German surname as a form of having his own lineage ennobled. Richter was seen as an aggressively ambitious man, desperately trying to gain prestige. He had even volunteered to be put to work in the Ottoman Empire on August 10th, 1914. Therefore the German Embassy in İstanbul was wary of his sightings, fearing it may have been to put himself in the picture and gain a higher position within the German diplomatic system.⁶⁸ Richter later joined Hitler to gain more political power, after which Richter was shot and killed by police during the Beer Hall Putsch in which he and Hitler (among others) tried to seize power in Munich on November, 9th, 1923.⁶⁹ Richter was to mastermind of this attempt to seize power unlawfully, walking arm-in-arm with Hitler on the day itself.⁷⁰

Kromhout states that “killing 1,5 million people needed cooperation on a high level between different government organisations”. However, how is this possible if the official Ottoman census (carried out by Ottoman Armenians, while supervised by France) shows that only 1,2 million Armenians were

67 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 35.

68 Michael Kellogg, *The Russian Roots of Nazism White Émigrés and the Making of National Socialism, 1917–1945* (New York 2005).

69 Konrad Heiden, *Der Fuehrer: Hitler’s Rise to Power* (New York 1944), p. 184.

70 John Toland, *Adolf Hitler: The Definitive Biography* (New York 1976), p. 170.

present at that time?⁷¹ Additionally, if it needed cooperation between so many different governmental institutions, why is it that there are no incriminating documents? Kromhout continues to state that Talap Paşa was the main organisator, instructing different provincial and district heads by means of telegraph of the procedures they needed to follow. This is peculiar since no Minister of Interior will bother to send out telegraphs himself. Kromhout continues to describe the procedures. First the Armenians were told that they would be relocated, and that they were therefore expected to be ready at a certain time. Muslims were then warned not to aid the Armenians, or they would be killed and their houses burned. Kromhout adds that “most of the time the police held razzias before the announced date. Sometimes the deportees would be transported through train or ship, but most of the time they were forced to walk making the trip a death march. The final destination for most was North-Syria, where the Armenians were put in concentration camps, waiting for their definitive fate”.⁷² However, there are numerous mistakes in this passage. For one, the use of the word “deportee” is wrong since it needs to be “relocated” as explained before in this study. Secondly, if Talat Paşa did send specific instructions about the procedure to different provincial and district heads, why did they all follow other rules? One province used trains, others used ships, while yet others permitted the use of ox carts, and yet others only allowed to go on foot.⁷³ And if Talat Paşa had laid out thorough guidelines, why would (as Kromhout puts it) the police at random carry out razzias before the announced date? And not even at all times at that? Kromhout further states that Muslims were warned, but shows no sources. Since there are no sources, by my knowledge, to back it up, it can be seen as rubbish. The same applies to the mention of concentration camps in North-Syria. Even Kromhout himself fails to put up hard evidence to back this up: no sources, nor photographs. Additionally Kromhout uses the term “death march” but neglects the mention of Ottoman aid during these relocations in the form of baby milk for infants, medicine, beds, blankets, and food.⁷⁴ Kazım Karabekir Paşa, commanding officer in the East of the Ottoman Empire, even asks for more baby milk and doctors for the Armenians during the relocation.⁷⁵

71 Stanford J. Shaw, ‘The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831–1914’, in: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Volume: 9, Issue: 03 (August 1978), pp. 325–338.

72 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 36.

73 Gwynne Dyer, ‘Armenia: The end of the Debate?’, in: *Zimbabwe Independent* (October 22nd, 2009). Available online: <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2009/10/22/armenia-the-end-of-the-debate/> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

74 Armand Sağ, ‘Leugens van de Armeniërs’, from: *Ooggetuigenverlagen Armeense Genocide*. Available online: http://sargasso.nl/ooggetuigenverlagen_armeense_genocide/ (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

75 Balıkesir Üniversitesi, Conference: ‘Ermeni Meselesine Bir Bakış’, available online: http://www.balikesir.edu.tr/~basin/haber_detay.php?id=298 (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Kromhout continues to say that in “a lot of districts only the women and children were transported, while the men were immediately killed”. However, this is also a contradiction with what Kromhout stated about the strict procedures of Talat Paşa. If Talat Paşa had strict procedures for every district and province, how come did “a lot of districts” (like Kromhout states) go their own way by not following orders of their own Minister of Interior? Kromhout also does not mention the fact that only the Armenians in the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire (where there were Armenian rebellions and were close to the war front) were relocated. The Armenians in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, along with Catholic and Protestant Armenians, were not relocated.⁷⁶ Just as Catholic Armenians⁷⁷, Armenian women (in most cases) and children⁷⁸ as well as sick Armenians⁷⁹ were excepted from the relocation.⁸⁰

Kromhout goes on stating that the local authorities got help, not only from the police and the military, but also from the so-called Special Organisation: a paramilitary group with special rights. However, the Canadian military historian Gwynne Dyer explains why this was the case: “Regular Turkish troops could not be spared from the fighting, so most of the job of “guarding” the columns of Armenian deportees marching through the mountains to Syria was given to Kurdish tribesmen, who proceeded to rob, rape and murder them in huge numbers.”⁸¹ Dyer also explains the other claims of Kromhout. According to Kromhout, Armenians all over Asia Minor were put together, shot dead, burned and drowned. However, this is no way an argument for a systematical plan to annihilate Armenians since Dyer explains that it were mostly Kurdish tribesmen who did the killing, without the central Ottoman government knowing, as revenge for the Armenian rebellions in recent year. The next sentence of Kromhout, about Armenian churches going up in flames or changed in mosques, can also be explained as an act of revenge by the local

76 Gwynne Dyer, ‘The Armenian massacres and the French presidential elections’, from: *The Georgie Straight* (January 24th, 2012). Available online: <http://www.straight.com/news/gwynne-dyer-armenian-massacres-and-french-presidential-elections> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

77 Ottoman Archives, Ottoman Imperial Order 76. Available online: http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/yayin/osmanli/Armenians_inottoman/ottoman_armenian.htm (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

78 Ottoman Archives, Ottoman Imperial Order 225 & 226. Available online: http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/yayin/osmanli/Armenians_inottoman/ottoman_armenian.htm (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

79 Ottoman Archives, Ottoman Imperial Order 104. Available online: http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/yayin/osmanli/Armenians_inottoman/ottoman_armenian.htm (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

80 Armand Sağ, ‘Leugens van de Armeniërs’, from: *Ooggetuigenverslagen Armeense Genocide*. Available online: http://sargasso.nl/ooggetuigenverslagen_armeense_genocide/ (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

81 Gwynne Dyer, ‘Sucking up to Armenians’, from: *Hurriyet Daily News* (January 26th, 2012). Available online: <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/sucking-up-to-armenians.aspx?pageID=449&nID=12304&NewsCatID=418> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Muslims that were the surviving relatives or tribesmen of the victims of Armenian violence in recent years. There is no evidence that this violence was instigated by the Ottoman leaders, since this sparkled violence was only seen in a few districts in the far East close to the war front. Consequently, Kromhout's claim that "Armenians all over Asia Minor" can be seen as a major error from the side of Kromhout as well.

Towards the end of the paragraph Kromhout tries to downplay the role of the Kurds by stating that "Kurds often participated in the killings, but that there were also Kurds and Turks who helped the Armenians". It were in fact mostly Kurdish tribes doing the killing out of revenge for the killings of the Armenians, without any knowledge of the central Ottoman government. While Kurdish tribes attacked the Armenians, there were Turks and Kurdish trying to help the Armenians. This is probably the only sentence of Kromhout that is not wrong. However, the next sentences are again full of historical errors. Kromhout states that "whoever could arrive in Syria, would find themselves in the next hell". He adds that the American consul in Aleppo reported about the arrival of 300 naked Armenian women with burns from the sun, and that the local prefect, Ali Suad, tried to ease the pain of the "deportees". Firstly, Kromhout again makes the mistake of using the word "deportee" where "relocated" is the only correct word. Secondly, Kromhout claims that Syria was yet another "hell hole" but then proceeds to give an example of how kind the local prefect was, contradicting himself entirely. Thirdly, his example of women that are burnt by the sun are in no way an example of torture by the Ottoman Empire since the Ottoman Empire had no control over the sun. It seems, on basis of Kromhout's own example, to be just unfortunate circumstances that have led to turmoil. Fourthly, the number of 300 women arriving in Aleppo also shows that not all Armenians were attacked or killed during their relocation when they were on their way; and that except for the burning sun, this relocation was carried out decently. Fifthly, one must also bear in mind that an example of 300 women (on a total of 924.158 Armenians, and 702.905 non-Armenian Muslims being relocated in 1915-1916) is a marginal example with is (by itself) negligible if it is not part of a greater research.⁸² Lastly, Kromhout again does not do a thorough work. Ali Saud Bey is not the local prefect of Aleppo but

*It were in fact mostly
Kurdish tribes doing the
killing out of revenge for
the killings of the
Armenians, without any
knowledge of the central
Ottoman government.
While Kurdish tribes
attacked the Armenians,
there were Turks and
Kurdish trying to help the
Armenians.*

82 Murat Bardakçı, *Talat Paşa'nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi* (İstanbul 2013).

the governor (*vali*) of Deir Al-Zor which is a much higher position. Deir Al-Zor is also some 300 kilometers to the southeast of Aleppo. This shows the negligence and carelessness of Kromhout.

Furthermore, Ali Saud Bey is actually a good example of how the relocation was actually planned. Under Ali Suad Bey, the Armenians were encouraged to settle and develop the remote land to which they had been relocated. Some Armenians even began a small trade and said that they would be happy to stay in the town.⁸³ This eventually backfired for the Ottomans, when the trade made it possible to keep financing the Armenian nationalist movement from Deir Al-Zor. This made Talat Paşa replace Ali Suad Bey with Salih Zeki Bey. Kromhout states that Talat Paşa defended his choice to replace Ali Suad Bey by saying “the presence needs to come to an end, no matter how tragic the taken measures can be, without taking into account age, sex, or conscious”. However, Kromhout added three words, changing the quote to: “the presence [of the Armenians] needs to come to an end, no matter how tragic the taken measures can be, without taking into account age, sex, or conscious”.⁸⁴ In fact, Talat Paşa makes a reference to the presence of both sympathy for Armenian terrorist organizations, as well as the presence of a nationalist Armenian movement in Eastern Anatolia, close to the war front of the First World War.⁸⁵ This was only hastened when the relocated Armenians joined forces with the Armenians from Aleppo, fortifying and arming themselves while occupying the American missionary in Aleppo. Thousands of Ottoman troops could barely break the resistance.⁸⁶

Kromhout continues to state that Suad Bey was replaced by “a less scrupulous man who used the caves of Deir Al-Zor to drive thousands of Armenians into and let them suffocate through the smoke of big fires”. However, this does not compute with the findings of others who state that there is only one cave near Deir Al-Zor, and not the plural “caves” as Kromhout bluntly claims.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the suffocation Armenians in the cave are frequently seen as an accident, as the cave was the only place where Armenians could stay if they had no other place to stay (since there were no camps in Deir Al-Zor according to American historian William R. Everdell, which is also a contradiction with

83 Ronald Grigor Suny, “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”: *A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton 2015), p. 315.

84 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 36.

85 Mehmet Talat Paşa, *Hatıralarım ve Müdafaa*m (İstanbul 1921/2006).

86 Ronald Grigor Suny, “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”: *A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton 2015), p. 320.

87 William R. Everdell, *The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of Twentieth-century Thought* (Chicago 1997), p. 124-125.

the claims of Kromhout that there were “concentration camps present”). When the cave became overpopulated by Armenians, the idea to warm themselves up by starting big fires backfired when the smoke of the big fires (in combination with the cave harboring way more people than it could handle) suffocated many. Kromhout mistakenly misinterprets this as an act of mass killings.

Additionally, Kromhout states that “most Armenians were simply dumped in the desert of the province Deir Al-Zor where they died or fell in hands of the murderous Special Organisation”. However, one must understand that there is, in fact, no desert near Deir Al-Zor since Deir Al-Zor is situated near the shores of Euphrates River, being the seventh largest city in Syria and the largest in the eastern part of Syria. The Special Organisation was only called in, when Armenians rebelled like in Aleppo where they occupied the American missionary (like stated before in this study). Kromhout continues to state that “the houses and belongings the killed en deported left behind were seized by the state. A Commission for Abandoned Property redistributed it. Armenian wealth went to the state treasury. Houses and companies were handed over to Muslims, in a lot of cases to Turkish refugees.” There are again a lot of contradictions from Kromhout in this paragraph. If the houses and buildings were given to refugees, how would the wealth go to the state treasury? And why does Kromhout not mention that A) the Ottoman Empire kept a record of which properties were from whom in order to give it back after the war; B) the Ottoman Empire in some cases sold the property against the official value but kept the money only to give to the rightful owner; C) gave Armenians money to come back to Anatolia after the Tehcir ended.⁸⁸ It becomes apparent that Kromhout neglects to mention that the Ottoman Empire did not seize property as it did save guard it and/or distribute it to refugees that were pouring into the Ottoman Empire in fear of ethnic cleansing from Russians, Armenians, and Balkan peoples.⁸⁹

Kromhout also states that the Ottoman Empire saw an opportunity in the Tehcir to create space to harbor Ottoman refugees. This was not entirely true. The Armenians were not relocated to create space, but after the relocation their void was filled. This was mostly because those regions were thinly populated anyway and in need of loyal citizens. Kromhout continues that the “Ottoman

88 State Archives, number 53/303: *Göç Eden Ermenilerin Geride Bıraktıkları Mal ve Eşyalarla, Sevkleri Tehcir edilen Ermeniler*. Available online: <http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/icerik/1846/goc-eden-ermenilerin-geride-biraktiklari-mal-ve-esyalarla-sevkleri-tehir-edilen-ermeniler/> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

89 Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922* (New York 1995).

government was busy killing an entire nation of people and was not keeping this hidden for the outside world. Through diplomats and religious leaders the news rapidly spread. The American ambassador Henry Morgenthau reported that ‘there was a racial campaign of extermination’ that was controlled from higher above”. Firstly, even Kromhout himself did not give any evidence that would implicate the Ottoman Empire itself in these war time skirmishes. The Ottoman Empire even tried to stop it when after three months of Tehcir, Talat Paşa himself gave the order on August 29th, 1915 to stop the Tehcir: “The Armenian question in the eastern provinces has been resolved. There’s no need to sully the nation and the government[’s] [honor] with further atrocities [*fuzuli mezalim*]”.⁹⁰ One must also wonder that even if the Nazi’s tried to hide the Holocaust from the world, why would the Ottoman Empire not try and hide it? The answer is simple. Since the Ottoman Empire had not intent to kill the Armenians, nor was carrying out massacres, it had no reason to hide anything because it was not doing anything wrong. Secondly, the eyewitness reports of diplomats and religious leaders are more diverse than Kromhout makes it out. Most eyewitnesses (including a Dutch reporter on May 25th, 1920) reported that Armenians were attacking innocent Ottomans until the relocation, when victims and their relatives took revenge.⁹¹ Lastly, using the documents of Morgenthau is very controversial ever since American scholars Heath W. Lowry (Princeton University) and Guenter Lewy (University of Massachusetts Amherst) concluded that after comparing Morgenthau’s memoirs with Morgenthau’s personal archives, there were some serious differences between the two. Therefore the memoirs of Morgenthau are seen as a record of “crude half-truths and outright falsehoods” and not useful in a scholarly debate.⁹² It is sad that Kromhout still insists on using this tainted source, which is proven to be nothing more than falsified memoirs.

Subsequently, Kromhout continues with using Richter as a source, even after even the German Embassy itself discredited Richter’s letters. It is also interesting to see that Richter wrote his letter on May 20th, 1915, some ten days before the relocations actually started, making it plausible he relied solely on rumors to gain the attention of the German Embassy in İstanbul for his wish to get promoted. The German Embassy did not fall for it. It is extra remarkable since Richter wrote the letter on May 20th, 1915 but only started to travel in Anatolia in August 1915 until June 1916. Remembering that Talat Paşa had

90 Ronald Grigor Suny, “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”: *A History of the Armenian Genocide* (Princeton 2015), p. 317.

91 Algemeen Handelsblad, ‘De Armenisch-Turksche kwestie’ (Amsterdam, 25.05.1920). Available online: http://www.nrc.nl/redactie/weblogs/wereld/artikel_handelsblad.doc (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

92 Heath W. Lowry, *The Story Behind ‘Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story’* (İstanbul 1990) & Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Utah 2005), pp. 140-142.

ended the relocations on August 29th, 1915, it is easy to understand why the German Embassy did not believe Richter since he probably did not see anything. Richter's incompetence also becomes clear when he sends a report to his superiors, calling the Young Turks ('İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti' in Ottoman Turkish) a person while it was in fact the name of a political movement: "İttihad (a Turkish leader) will dangle before the eyes of the Allies the idea of an alleged revolution prepared by the Armenian leaders."⁹³ However, Richter had even written that wrong with not one but two letters: 'İttihad' instead of 'İttihat'. In the same manner Kromhout states that "the regime in İstanbul plays dumb" and Enver Paşa tells Morgenthau that the Armenians were only sent to "a new home". Richter was told that the "deportations" were done humanely, according to Kromhout. Firstly, Kromhout uses the "deportations" where he actually means "relocation". Secondly, both the statement Enver made to Morgenthau as well as the explanation made to Richter were in fact correct when looking at the Ottoman archives where one can see that the Ottomans in fact did everything in their power to stop excessive violence by sending out orders. It shows that the regime did not "play dumb" as Kromhout puts it, but merely told the truth as it was.

Kromhout then goes on to claim that Great-Britain, France, and Russia condemned the Ottoman actions in a joint declaration on May 24th, 1915. This is again biased since Great-Britain, France, and Russia were at war with the Ottomans and tried to change the public opinion into an anti-Ottoman stance. Great-Britain and France had just invaded Gallipoli in the Dardanelles but were not able to defeat the Ottomans, and in turn started a rumor to gain more support from other allies in order to beat the Ottomans. The same can be said for Russia, since they had invaded the Ottoman Empire but were also halted by Ottoman forces. Additionally, one must not forget that the decision to relocate the Armenians was taken between May 26th and May 30th, 1915. This means that Great-Britain, France, and Russia condemned the Tehcir even before it began, and even before the Ottomans themselves had even decided to carry out the Tehcir.⁹⁴ Kromhout goes on to state that "after the Ottoman Empire laid down their arms on October 31st, 1918, Enver and Talat together

93 Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, *Situation in Ottoman Turkey*. Available online: https://www.google.nl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fchs.ccsd.org%2Fapps%2Fdownload%2Fagg85GOnLvSwmlPUd4wdVvew38xpBrkVpGjyV9D4jZ1ReybU.doc%2FArmenian%2520Genocide%2520German%2520Telegram%2520about%2520Ottoman%2520Plan%2520%2528Doc%25202%2529.doc&ei=va_0VIKmKYatUdWUgvAH&usq=AFQjCNG3kP39T3gmaLg1WMjtOtJuApTkOg&bvm=bv.87269000,d.d24 (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

94 Justin McCarthy, 'The Light Millennium', from: *UNDPI/NGO* (April 21, 2009). Available online: http://dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48:what-drove-the-armenians-and-the-turks-apart-&catid=13:papers&Itemid=13 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

with other leaders of the Young Turks fled on board of a German submarine boat to Odessa”.⁹⁵ It is striking that Kromhout again makes a huge mistake by dating the end of the war for the Ottomans on October 31st, 1918 while in fact it was October 30th, 1918.⁹⁶ Kromhout states that because Talat and Enver fled, they could not be “tried for genocide” by the Ottoman tribunal that was established by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet V. This is again impossible since Sultan Mehmet V had died on July 3rd, 1918; some three months before the courts were established. It is, yet again, very sloppy of Kromhout to make such an enormous error. It was in fact Ottoman Sultan Mehmet VI, becoming the Sultan on July 3rd, 1918, who established the Ottoman tribunals. However, these were meant to punish the Ottoman officials and military leaders who acted cruel against the Armenians during the relocation; not for genocide.⁹⁷ This is actually impossible since the term “genocide” did not exist until 1948, some 29 years after the tribunals were established. Another fatal mistake by Kromhout is seen here. Of the 1673 Ottoman officials who were arrested and put to trial in these tribunals, 67 were sentenced to death while 1397 were sentenced for the following crimes: A) inflict unnecessary harm the Armenian population; B) seize the possessions of the Armenians; C) being too loose with the organization of the relocation, unnecessarily killing so many relocated; and D) use the relocation to increase their own power, amongst other things by relocating innocent people (mostly local political opponents).⁹⁸ All of this actually shows that the Ottoman government did not intent to have so many Armenians die, undermining Kromhout’s thesis and being in contradiction with what he claims. If the Ottoman government, like Kromhout claims, was aiming to kill all Armenians, why would they sentence almost 1500 high-ranking Ottoman officials for carrying this out?

Kromhout states that the tribunals became a “fiasco” because Talat and Enver escaped, but not just because of that. He does not explain what he thinks are the other reasons for calling the tribunals a “fiasco”. However, seeing that 1673 suspects were arrested and 1464 were sentenced, it would hardly qualify as a “fiasco” in my opinion. Kromhout again makes a fatal error in the next sentence: “Shortly after the end of the war, the Young Turk-movement began to rise up again under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal or ‘Atatürk’”.⁹⁹ This is

95 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 37.

96 Efraim Karsh, *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East* (Harvard 2001), p. 327.

97 Bilal Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri* (Ankara 2008).

98 De Armeense Kwestie, ‘Rechtszaken’ (2009). Available online: http://www.dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8:rechtszaken&catid=1:artikelendearmeensekwestie&Itemid=3 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

99 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 37.

so wrong on so many levels, that one does not know where to start. We will try nonetheless. Firstly, the Young Turk-movement dissolved itself in 1918 after which most Young Turks fled in early November 1918.¹⁰⁰ It was never reestablished. Secondly, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was never a member of the Young Turks nor did he agree with their methods. This is evident through the pamphlet Atatürk wrote as a response to the Young Turks in which Atatürk advocates to keep military officers away from politics. Seeing that almost all Young Turks were military officers and that the Young Turk-movement was even founded by four military cadets, Atatürk's pamphlet is seen as fierce criticism on the Young Turks. Subsequently, Atatürk founded his own movement: Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti.¹⁰¹ When Atatürk was absent (he was stationed away), his friends made Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti a part of the Young Turks and not long after the Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti was shut down in favor of the Young Turk-movement. Thirdly, Atatürk took every opportunity to state that he was denouncing the Young Turks in every manner, even calling the Young Turks "criminals".¹⁰²

Kromhout goes on to state that Atatürk defeated the Armenian nationalist which declared their own state on June 4th, 1918. This is an important fact undermining Kromhout's own thesis that the Armenians posed no threats and that the Ottomans "imagined" a fifth column of Armenians during the First World War.¹⁰³ In reality, the many rebellions of the Armenians during the First World War eventually cultivated in the Armenians being able to form their own state in Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus. This was partly because Talat Paşa ended the Tehcir so early on, after just three months, and allowing Armenians to come back to Anatolia.¹⁰⁴ However, the Armenians (who were occupying Eastern Anatolia) and the Greek (occupying Western Anatolia) were defeated by Atatürk and his generals (who were also opposing the Ottoman regime in İstanbul since the Ottomans had signed the treaty making it possible for the enemies to occupy Anatolia). Kromhout however, states that the victories of Atatürk made the tribunals end in 1920 while in fact the tribunals in İstanbul soon spread to Malta. After the end of the tribunals in İstanbul in 1920, the British started the Malta Tribunals to prosecute another 145 Ottoman officials. This tribunal only ended on July 29th, 1921 when the British head prosecutor stated that there was "no evidence to implicate these high-ranking officials."¹⁰⁵

100 Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London 1993).

101 Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (London 1999).

102 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Interview with *The Los Angeles Examiner* (August 1st, 1926).

103 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 35.

104 Sina Akşin, *Turkey, From Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to present* (New York 2007).

105 Bilal Şimşir, *Malta Sürgünleri* (Ankara 2008).

Kromhout goes on to say that “only three persons were convicted and sentenced for genocide”. This is however, complete rubbish. For one, during the İstanbul Tribunals 1673 were arrested and 1464 were sentenced for cruelty during the relocation; and not genocide since this did not exist for another 29 years. This is a much higher number than three. Secondly, during the Malta Tribunals 145 Ottomans were arrested but all were acquitted for governmental involvement in the killings of Armenians; and not genocide since again this term did not exist for decades. And again, also the Malta Tribunals did not convict any of the suspects, let alone three.

Kromhout continues to state that “Talat could not run away from his punishment. The Armenian socialist Soghomon Tehlirian had the chance to carry out the sentence. On April 15th, 1921, he shot Talat dead in front of Talat’s house in Berlin”. In these sentences, one can almost sense the sympathy Kromhout shows for a ruthless murder. However, Kromhout refers to a “sentence” while there was not a single sentence against Talat. Kromhout makes another error when he states that “Atatürk ended the power of the sultan in 1923”, while in fact Atatürk abolished the Ottoman Sultanate on November 1, 1922 and not 1923. Kromhout claims that hereafter a lot of “perpetrators” received high-ranking position yet again. However, he does not name them and also does not give a source. Subsequently, he also neglects the fact that Atatürk despises the Young Turks making it farfetched that he would offer them high-ranking positions. Kromhout goes on to make maybe his biggest scholarly misconduct by stating that “Winston Churchill calls it a ‘holocaust’ in his 1929-bookseries about the First World War”. This is actually a flat out lie, since Churchill calls it “Armenian Tragedy” and the word “holocaust” is nowhere to be found in Churchill’s book. Kromhout uses the quotation marks for “holocaust”, but the word is absent in the book.¹⁰⁶ With this blatant misquotation, Kromhout loses all of his credibility as a scholar in my humble opinion.

However, Kromhout does not stop there and goes on to state that “nazi’s were inspired by the Armenian genocide”, adding that “the influence of the Shoah should not be exaggerated”. There is actually no evidence that the Nazi’s used what Kromhout calls “genocide” as their inspiration. Even the example Kromhout gives, that Hitler states in a 1931-interview that he saw the Armenian “genocide” and Turkish-Greek population exchange as his envision for Germany, can not be found. The only interviews Hitler gives in 1931 are either focused on hailing Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a hero, or on the accomplishment

106 Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis - Volume 5: The Aftermath* (New York 1929). Available online: <http://www.armenian-genocide.org/churchill.html> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

of Turkey against all odds (defeating all internal and external enemies). Not only Hitler but most contemporary European leaders viewed Atatürk in this manner.¹⁰⁷ If Kromhout wishes to dominantly and aggressively press his own interpretation of the facts on to the reader, he should openly state this instead of hiding it as if he is a subjective scholar.

Kromhout goes on to conclude that “it is not hard to think of a reason for Hitler to state this. The destruction of the Armenians was efficiently organized and almost entirely successful. Most of the perpetrators were unpunished and everybody went on with their lives. From the point of the perpetrators this was the perfect genocide.” However, seeing that Hitler never said this nor said the quote Kromhout used to start his article, it all becomes a blatant lie. The rest of his conclusion is also a big contradiction with earlier statements in his article. For one, he has described in detail that what happened to the Armenians was pretty much different in every province. So how can he conclude that “it was efficiently organized”? Secondly, he calls it “almost entirely successful” while only a small percentage of the Armenians actually perish.¹⁰⁸ Even the most over exaggerate estimates state that “approximately 50 percent of the Armenians” perished. But also the last sentences of Kromhout make no sense, since everybody suffered from the First World War. It is therefore perfectly normal that nobody gets punished in a world where everybody suffered from war. It would be rather peculiar if one would, amidst of all the war drama and trauma, single out less half a million Armenians on a total of 37 million deadly casualties. Therefore, it can only be said that from the point of Ethocide, Kromhout’s article is the perfect example of Ethocide.

Lastly, Kromhout uses some eight pictures and a timeline in his article. The first picture depicts a painting where Kromhout has added the caption: “Elimination. The Ottoman government deals with “non-Turks”.”¹⁰⁹ The painting is searched back to be an illustration of the French ‘Petit Journal’ from December 12th, 1915 as part of the French war propaganda against the Ottomans. The French were at war with the Ottoman from 1914 until 1918.¹¹⁰ The second is the before mentioned photograph with the statement “After their raid on an Ottoman Bank, the Armenian perpetrators fled to France, Marseille, August 26th, 1896” contradicting Kromhout’s statements about August 26th,

107 Hannibal Travis, ‘Did the Armenian Genocide Inspire Hitler? Turkey, Past and Future’, in: *Middle East Quarterly*, Volume: 20, Number: 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 27-35.

108 John D. Grainger, *The Battle for Syria, 1918-1920* (Suffolk 2013).

109 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 31.

110 Petit Journal, *Les massacres d’Arménie* (December 12th, 1915). Available on: <http://www.imprescriptible.fr/documents/petit-journal.htm> and <http://www.imprescriptible.fr/photographies/massacres-genocidaires> (Both retrieved on 10-03-2015).

1896 not being the day Armenians raided the bank, but tried to kill the Ottoman Sultan.¹¹¹ However, the latter was not until July 21st, 1905. Even Kromhout's caption ("Rebels. After their raid on an Ottoman Bank, the Armenian perpetrators fled to France") shows that there were Armenian rebels, although in his article Kromhout shrugs this off as "Ottoman propaganda"; but this is a big contradiction with his photograph.¹¹² The third photograph depicts an Ottoman woman with three kids. Kromhout has added the caption "Hunted. Armenians trying to fly en live in bitter poverty."¹¹³ However, the original picture states that an Armenian woman and her children sought help from missionaries by walking far distances. There is no mention of "bitter poverty" and even the clothes of the woman and her children are in thick layers. They even look well-nurtured. Therefore the picture in no way gives the implication that the people on the photograph are living in "bitter poverty". This could be a biased add-on from Kromhout himself. The fourth photograph depicts Ottoman soldiers marching to the battle field. However, Kromhout added the following caption: "Weapons display. The Young Turks dream of one big empire."¹¹⁴ But how can one see that on this picture? It seems a subjective add-on from Kromhout. The fifth photograph depicts a starving child with the caption "Orphan. The Armenians should be exterminated, despite their age."¹¹⁵ When looking at the original photograph, which was taking by a missionary, the caption is as follows: "This little Armenian was a human skeleton when he was picked up by a relief worker and taken to the orphanage at Beirut."¹¹⁶ This means that the boy was found wondering around and brought to an orphanage by American missionaries. If the boy was part of the so-called death march, where were the Turkish soldiers? And why would they allow the boy the wonder off and (more so) why would they allow missionaries to take the boy? It is more likely that the boy lost his family due to war violence and was wondering around aimlessly, and was starving by the lack of food he found on his way. The sixth photograph depicts a march with the caption "Death march. The Turks force Armenians to make long travels on foot to concentration camps in Syria".¹¹⁷ In reality, this photograph was published by the American Red Cross in the United States prior to January 1, 1923. The original caption states that they were Armenians (probably Armenian rebels) who are being marched

111 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 32.

112 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 35.

113 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 33.

114 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 34.

115 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 34.

116 Corbis Images, UWW459INP (1914-1918). Available on: <http://www.corbisimages.com/stock-photo/rights-managed/UWW459INP/view-of-starving-armenian-boy?popup=1> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

117 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 35.

to a nearby prison in Mezireh by armed Ottoman soldiers. The photograph was taken in Kharperit (Harput in modern-day Elazığ) in Ottoman Empire during April 1915.¹¹⁸ Therefore the caption of Kromhout is wrong for a number of reasons. For one, the photograph does not depict a death march but a convoy of prisoners heading to prison. Secondly, the final destination is not a concentration camp but a prison. And thirdly, the people are not heading for Syria but from Kharperit to Mezireh (both in Elazığ, Anatolia) within the border of modern-day Turkey. Therefore Kromhout's caption is wrong on every possible level. The seventh photograph depicts soldiers in a wrecked village with skulls and bones. The caption is "Mass grave. Remains of inhabitants of the Armenian village Sheyخالان."¹¹⁹ That photograph is released by the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute in Yerevan, Armenia. It is dated as 1915 and it shows soldiers standing over skulls of victims from the Armenian village of Sheyخالان in Muş, Anatolia, on the Caucasus front during the First World War. However, the soldiers are definitely not Ottomans (looking at the uniforms) and may even be British which is peculiar since there were only Russians and Ottomans on that front. That is why even the fierce pro-Armenian journalist Robert Frisk is careful in stating that it were Armenians.¹²⁰

The word 'Armenia' was only encouraged to be replaced by the word "Anatolia" in the press, schoolbooks, and governmental establishments. Not, like Kromhout argues, in "official documents". It was also not a measure against the Armenians, but a measure to support the new ideology of ottomanism which aimed to incorporate all Ottoman minorities as "Ottoman nationalists".

The last photograph depicts Talat Paşa with the caption: "Punished anyway. Minister Talât flees to Berlin and gets killed there anyway by an Armenian." With his biased caption, Kromhout seems to imply that Talat deserved to be killed as a punishment showing only his disregard for human life.¹²¹

Kromhout's timeline starts with 1880 where Kromhout argues that "the Ottoman government outlawed the use of the word 'Armenia' in official documents by law". In reality, the word 'Armenia' was only encouraged to be replaced by the word "Anatolia" in the press, schoolbooks, and governmental

118 Marie Doucette, 'Inconvenient Truths', from: personal blog (November 7th, 2011). Available online: <http://mariedoucette.blogspot.nl/2011/11/inconvenient-truths.html> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

119 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 36.

120 Robert Fisk, 'The Gallipoli centenary is a shameful attempt to hide the Armenian Holocaust', from: *The Independent* (January 19th, 2015). Available online: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-gallipoli-centenary-is-a-shameful-attempt-to-hide-the-armenian-holocaust-9988227.html> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

121 Bas Kromhout, 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 37.

establishments. Not, like Kromhout argues, in “official documents”. It was also not a measure against the Armenians, but a measure to support the new ideology of ottomanism which aimed to incorporate all Ottoman minorities as “Ottoman nationalists”.¹²² It goes on the state that in 1894 “the army of sultan Abdülhamid II killed 3000 Armenian peasants in the district of Sason for supposed nationalism”. However, it were Armenians causing a rebellion under the leadership of Dashnakzutyun and confronting Kurdish irregulars. The Armenians succumbed to superior numbers but the Ottoman army did not play a role in this battle.¹²³ Thirdly, Kromhout puts 1895 on the time line with the sentence “Some prominent Armenians ask the government to have a political say. State terror is what they get”. Kromhout is referring to October 1st, 1895, when two thousand Armenians assembled in Constantinople to petition for the implementation of the reforms.¹²⁴ When the Ottoman sultan saw which reforms the Armenians wanted, he was surprised about the amount of reforms the Armenians demanded. He is stated to have said that if the Armenians get their reforms “this business will end in blood”, expressing his fear that Armenians will misuse their power and start killing Ottomans if they get their reforms.¹²⁵ At the same time, the two thousands Armenians got impatient and tried to raid the Ottoman palace after which violence broke out. The Ottomans could stop the raid, only with difficulty. This is, in contrary to what Kromhout claims, not just “a few Armenians” but two thousand, and it is not just a request for “having a say” but reforms that would make all other (non-Armenian) Ottomans second-class citizens. Kromhout continues to state that in 1908 “The Young Turks (CUP) come to power. Armenian nationalists support this reformist movement.” However, the Young Turk revolution of 1908 was aimed at forcing the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit II to reinstate the constitution. He was neither replaced, nor was he forced to form a new cabinet with Young Turks; making it very illogical to refer to this as “the Young Turks came to power”.¹²⁶ Kromhout continues to state that in 1910 “The CUP chooses a scary-Turkish policy and no longer tolerates Armenians in their large empire Turan.” However, this is impossible since the alliance between the Armenian Dashnakzutyun and the Young Turks ended in 1912. Additionally, although some members of the CUP showed some superficial sympathy to the creating of Turan, the CUP never actively supported nor acted towards this. Therefore, we can once again conclude that Kromhout reinterprets the facts in order to

122 Fuat Uçar, *Türkçülüğün Manifestosu: Osmanlılık- İslamcılık-Türkçülük* (İstanbul 2009).

123 Armand Sağ, ‘Categorizing Historiography: Turkish-Armenian Relations Throughout History’, in: *Review of Armenian Studies*, No.: 26, Volume: 2012, p. 146.

124 Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response* (New York 2003), p. 57–58.

125 Jeremy Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians: 1878-1896* (London 1993), p. 88.

126 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 33.

make his claim logical, while in fact he (deliberately or unconsciously) misinterprets almost everything. The Young Turks, in fact, never had any policy of either creating Turan, nor did they ever have any anti-tolerance against Armenians; especially since they still had an alliance with the Armenians during 1910.

Hereafter, Kromhout states in his timeline that in 1912-1913 “The Ottoman Empire loses European territory in two Balkan Wars. Muslims flee and the Young Turks establish a dictatorship.” Although the first two claims are in fact true, the Young Turks did not establish a dictatorship as we have seen prior in this study. Most members of cabinet were still in hands of non-Young Turks, and the Ottoman sultan and his grand viziers were not in hands of the Young Turks. Kromhout continues to say that in “March 1915 the regime starts to destroy the Armenian population. 1.5 million people will die.” This sentence in Kromhout’s timeline is a direct contradiction with his claims in his article, since Kromhout states throughout his article that “it is suspected” to start in March 1915, while he also states that it was the summer of 1914, and even May 23th, 1915 as dates. This shows that although Kromhout is haunted by the possibility of three dates (summer of 1914, May 23 1915 and March 1915), of which he calls one “suspected”, he (without any evidence, source or document) comes to the conclusion that it is in fact the date that he himself calls “suspected” as the inconclusive date on which “the Ottoman regime decides to destroy the Armenian population”. It seriously lacks any academic or scientific method, immensely damaging his scholarly credibility. The next date on his timeline is April 24th, 1915 where Kromhout states the following: “The police in İstanbul arrests 235 Armenian intellectuals. This is followed by arrests and executions on the country side.”¹²⁷ In reality, April 24th, 2015 was the day that suspected Armenian nationalists (mostly leaders of terrorist organisation such as Dashnakzutyun) were arrested. All 235 Armenians were leading personalities of the Armenian Revolutionary Party (ARF), or Dasnakzutyun, which was a terrorist organization founded in 1890 but already responsible for hundreds of thousands of dead Ottomans.¹²⁸ These arrests are only to be seen in the light of arresting Armenian nationalists from Dashnakzutyun to stop their spiral of violence against Ottoman citizens. The so-called “arrests and executions on the country side” were nothing more than suspects who were arrested, and found guilty for terror by Ottoman courts and accordingly sentenced to a penalty, which may or may not have been the death

127 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 34.

128 Kemal Çiçek, ‘Relocation of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915’, from: *Turkish Historical Society*, July 2008. Available online: http://www.dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157:relocation-of-the-ottoman-armenians-in-1915&catid=13:papers&Itemid=13 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

penalty. This was not only for Armenians, but also for non-Armenians and even Turks as we have seen prior in this study during 1909 and 1919. Kromhout continues with May 16th, 1915: “The government allows Muslim refugees to be allocated in the houses of the Armenians who were driven out.” However, if Kromhout himself even states that the relation of the Armenians started on May 23rd, 1915, how is it possible that one week prior there apparently already were empty houses? Even the very next sentence of Kromhout on his timeline is as follows: “May 23rd, 1915. Minister Talât Paşa orders all Armenians from Asia Minor to be deported. Thousands are driven to the desert.” There are a lot of mistakes in this sentence. For one, the Armenians were not deported (outside of the borders) but relocated (within the borders of the Ottoman Empire). Secondly, not all Armenians in Asia Minor were relocated. The order was only for the Armenians in East-Anatolia with the exception of most Armenians (for instance Catholic Armenians). Thirdly, Talat Paşa did not give the order for relocation on May 23rd, 1915 but on May 26th, 1915. Fourthly, Talat Paşa’s name is not “Talat Paşa” but Talat Paşa and even the phonetically written name is ‘Talat Pasha’. Fifthly, if like Kromhout unrealistically claims that “1.5 million Armenians were killed”, how come Kromhout speaks of “thousands”? Sixthly, when one keeps in mind that the Armenians were relocated to Deir Al-Zor (a very fertile city in present-day Syria) near the Euphrates River, were are these “deserts” Kromhout speaks of? In all, it shows the lack of any real knowledge of the situation by Kromhout. This is also shown by his next sentence on the timeline: “May 24th, 1915. Great-Britain, France and Russia declare that they also keep the Young Turks responsible for the mass killings.” Since Great-Britain, France, and Russia were at war with the Ottomans at that time, they tried to change the public opinion into an anti-Ottoman stance. Additionally, one must not forget that the decision to relocate the Armenians was taken between May 26th and May 30th, 1915, which means that Great-Britain, France and Russia made their declaration even before the Ottomans decided to relocate the Armenians at all, revealing that this declaration was only meant to stir up public support for the war against the Ottomans.

Kromhout states that on October 31st, 1918 “the Ottoman Empire disappears but soon the Young Turk-movement relives under the leadership of Atatürk.”¹²⁹ However, nothing happened on October 31st, 1918. Kromhout seems to be confused by peace treaty of the Ottomans, which was not on October 31st, 1918 (as Kromhout claims) but on October 30th, 1918, and the end of the Ottoman Empire on November, 1st, 1922.¹³⁰ This is a huge mistake for a historian.

129 Bas Kromhout, ‘De Perfecte Genocide’, in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, p. 35.

130 Efraim Karsh, *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East* (Harvard 2001), p. 327.

Additionally, the Young Turk-movement did not “revive” after 1918 since it was dissolved in early November 1918 and never reestablished¹³¹ Lastly, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk took every opportunity to state that he was denouncing the Young Turks in every manner, even calling the Young Turks “criminals”, making it very unlikely (if not impossible) that he would ever support the Young Turk-movement.¹³² Kromhout then states that “in 1920 French troops retreated from the district Cilicia, after which the Turks killed a great number of Armenians there.” However in reality it was as follows: after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the French controlled Cilicia from December 1918 to October 1921 in order to make Cilicia an independent Armenian state under French authority.¹³³ The Armenians formed the Armenian National Union which acted as an unofficial Cilician Armenian government composed of the four major political parties and three Armenian religious denominations.¹³⁴ The Armenians in Cilicia were armed and trained by the French and soon violence broke out between the Armenians and the Muslims in that region. This resulted in the death of many people at both sides and not, like Kromhout states, “Turks massacring Armenians” which is a straight-out blunted inaccuracy.

Kromhout continues with 1920-1921: “Armenia is conquered by the Red Army and added to the Soviet Union as Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic.” Kromhout makes a blunted error as Armenia was not to become the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic until December 30th, 1922; and not 1920 nor 1921. Lastly, Kromhout states the year 1990: “Armenia becomes independent from the Soviet Union. Up until today, the Turkish government does not recognize the genocide.” It is typical for Kromhout that (along with the start of his article) the end of his article is also downright wrong. Armenia was not dissolved from the Soviet Union in 1990, but on September 21st, 1991. Additionally, along with Turkey most countries (including Great-Britain) do not recognize the events of 1915 as genocide. This is also the official stance of almost all international organizations, such as the European Union, the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). All of these errors are a perfect example of how Kromhout tries to create the “perfect Ethocide” by neglecting facts in order to create an alternative history.

Armenia was not dissolved from the Soviet Union in 1990, but on September 21st, 1991. Additionally, along with Turkey most countries (including Great-

131 Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London 1993).

132 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Interview with *The Los Angeles Examiner* (August 1st, 1926).

133 Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia, 1914-1923* (Utah 2009).

134 Robert Farrer Zeidner, *The tricolor over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922* (Ankara 2005).

Britain) do not recognize the events of 1915 as genocide. This is also the official stance of almost all international organizations, such as the European Union, the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). All of these errors are a perfect example of how Kromhout tries to create the “perfect Ethocide” by neglecting facts in order to create an alternative history.

At the end of his article, Kromhout compiles only three books: Taner Akçam’s Dutch translation of ‘A Shameful Act’ (2006) wrongly calling the sociologist Akçam “a historian” and “the first Turkish historian who openly uses the term ‘genocide’”, adding that “the government of Turkey still refuses to do this”. Although only a very small number of governments actually do call the events of 1915 “genocide”, most do not (including Australia and the United States of America). The second book is the Dutch book ‘Prosecution, seizure, and destructing: the deportation of the Ottoman Armenians during the First World War’ (2007) by Uğur Ümit Üngör, while the third one is the Dutch translation ‘The First Holocaust. About the mass killing of the Armenians’ (2003) by journalist Robert Fisk who claimed to have interviewed survivors of the events of 1915. Seeing that the book was compiled 88 years later, most survivors must have been either a small child in 1915, or elderly people, making it hard for them to have descent memories. It is again striking that Kromhout only uses these three books (of which two translations) as a tip for his readers to “read more” while the books are just rewriting one point of view and all have in fact the exact same conclusion. It would have been much better to have three books with each a different point of view and reflect different points of view. Kromhout’s choice for these three books, along with the long list of errors you just read, clearly and distinctively shows his pattern of Ethocide on this topic, as well as his failing to be an objective, independent and non-biased academic who is open to all perspectives and willing to read all academic discussions about this topic. Thus becoming an excellent example for our study of Ethocide, the “perfect Ethocide” if you will.

Conclusion

An enormous list of huge factual errors, such as the implication that Turkish-Armenian relations were always troublesome in the nineteenth and early twentieth century’s, mar the article. However, the most egregious flaws in this article are its polemical tone, its sketchiness, and its overall failure to use Turkish archival sources. Therefore, while the article delivers intriguing insights into the mind-set of pseudo-scholars and their views, it does not constitute as a neutral scholarly work. However, in the light of Ethocide

Kromhout's article is a much valued example of how Armenian propagandists carry out their ethocide. The scholar seems to focus on one-sided sources from Armenian propagandists, making it only suitable to see in the light of Ethocide. It is thus unsatisfying as a whole. This article is more the work of a politically motivated activist-turned-writer than a solid scholar and is therefore not recommended, but this is also why it is so impeccable.

Ever since its inception, activists propagated the view that what befell the Ottoman Armenians was "the perfect genocide". Scholars close to the Armenian thesis have carried on their shoulders some very heavy baggage as a member of the Armenian lobby, but have still managed to portray themselves as part of the international community of neutral academics. How this was managed is an important question. This article is extremely valuable to see how this was carried out, including the methods. So although this article of Kromhout is not suited for academic purposes, it is however extremely suited as an example of the patterns of ethocide in the field of Armenian propagandists.

Bibliography

- Aghajanian, Liana (2011). 'Armenia: Kobe Bryant Getting Heat for Turkish Airlines Endorsement' (May 9, 2011), from: <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63446> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).
- Ahmad, Feroz (1993). *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Akşin, Sina (2007). *Turkey, From Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to present* (New York 2007).
- Algemeen Handelsblad (1920), 'De Armenisch-Turksche kwestie' (Amsterdam, 25.05.1920). Available online: http://www.nrc.nl/redactie/weblogs/wereld/artikel_handelsblad.doc (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).
- Andonian, Aram (1920/1964). *The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official Documents Relating to the Deportation and the Massacres of Armenians*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- Asbarez.com (2015). 'Starbucks to Remove Offensive Posters from Stores' (February 18, 2015), from: <http://asbarez.com/131873/starbucks-to-remove-offensive-posters-from-stores/> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).
- Aslan, Taner (2008). 'İttihâd-ı Osmani'den Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti'ne', in: *Bilig*, Issue: 47, Fall 2008, pp. 79-120.
- Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1926). *Interview with The Los Angeles Examiner* (August 1st, 1926).
- Balakian, Peter (2003). *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Balıkesir Üniversitesi (Unknown). Conference: 'Ermeni Meselesine Bir Bakış', available online: http://www.balikesir.edu.tr/~basin/haber_detay.php?id=298 (Retrieved 10-03-2015).
- Bardakçı, Murat (2013). *Talat Paşa'nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi*. İstanbul: Everest Yayınları.
- BBC/Discovery Channel (2003). *First World War: Jihad 1914 - 1916* (part 4 of 10).

- Boekestijn, Arend-Jan (2005). 'Turkey, the World and the Armenian Question', in: *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Winter 2005, Vol. 4, No. 4.
- Broadbent, Harvey (2005). *Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore*. Camberwell: Viking.
- Can, Sinan & Halıcı, Ara (2015). 'Bloedbroeders (Blood Brothers)', on: NOS (Dutch State Television), trailer available: <https://vimeo.com/103653005> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015, set to premiere on March 22nd, 2015).
- Churchill, Winston (1929). *The World Crisis - Volume 5: The Aftermath*. New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons. Available online: <http://www.armenian-genocide.org/churchill.html> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).
- Clark, Bruce (2006). *Twice A Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey*. London: Granta Books.
- Çiçek, Kemal (2008). 'Relocation of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915', from: *Turkish Historical Society*, July 2008. Available online: http://www.dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157:relocation-of-the-ottoman-armenians-in-1915&catid=13:papers&Itemid=13 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).
- DAK (2011). 'Officieel Nederlands standpunt omtrent Armeense kwestie' (August 14, 2011), from: http://www.dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=5%3Aactueel&id=311%3Aofficieel-nederlands-standpunt-omtrent-armeense-kwestie&Itemid=7 (Retrieved 10-03-2015).
- DAK (2010). 'Turks-Nederlandse afgewezen wegens Armeense lobby' (March 8, 2010), from: http://www.dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=188:turks-nederlandse-afgewezen-wegens-armeense-lobby&catid=5:actueel&Itemid=7 (Retrieved 10-03-2015).
- Davison, Roderic H. (1990). 'The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914'. In: Roderic H. Davison (ed.), *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West*. Texas: University of Texas Press.
- De Armeense Kwestie (2009). 'Rechtszaken'. Available online: http://www.dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8:rechtszaken&catid=1:artikelendearmeensekwestie&Itemid=3 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

Delikoca, Yusuf (2009). '1909 Adana Olayları: İdam Edilen Türkler', from: *Ceyhan Haber* (December 10th, 2009). Available online: <http://ceyhanhaber01.blogspot.nl/2009/12/1909-adana-olaylari-idam-edilen-turkler.html> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

Doucette, Marie (2011). 'Inconvenient Truths', from: *personal blog* (November 7th, 2011). Available online: <http://mariedoucette.blogspot.nl/2011/11/inconvenient-truths.html> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Dyer, Gwynne (2009). 'Armenia: The end of the Debate?', in: *Zimbabwe Independent* (October 22nd, 2009). Available online: <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2009/10/22/armenia-the-end-of-the-debate/> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Dyer, Gwynne (2012a). 'The Armenian massacres and the French presidential elections', from: *The Georgie Straight* (January 24th, 2012). Available online: <http://www.straight.com/news/gwynne-dyer-armenian-massacres-and-french-presidential-elections> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Dyer, Gwynne (2012b). 'Sucking up to Armenians', from: *Hurriyet Daily News* (January 26th, 2012). Available online: <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/sucking-up-to-armenians.aspx?pageID=449&nID=12304&NewsCatID=418> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Erickson, Edward J. (2001). *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*. Greenwood: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Everdell, William R. (1997). *The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of Twentieth-century Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fisk, Robert (2015). 'The Gallipoli centenary is a shameful attempt to hide the Armenian Holocaust', from: *The Independent* (January 19th, 2015). Available online: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-gallipoli-centenary-is-a-shameful-attempt-to-hide-the-armenian-holocaust-9988227.html> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Ginio, Eyal (2011). 'El Dovér El Mas Sânto. The mobilization of the Ottoman Jewish population during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)', in: Hannes Grandits, Nathalie Clayer & Robert Pichler (eds.), *Conflicting loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building*. New York/: I.B. Tauris.

- Grainger, John D. (2013). *The Battle for Syria, 1918-1920*. Suffolk: The Boydell Press.
- Gust, Wolfgang (2012). *Alman Belgeleri / Ermeni Soykırımı 1915-1916*. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları.
- Güçlü, Yücel (2009). *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia, 1914-1923*. Utah: Utah University Press.
- Günay, Nejla (2007). *Maraş'ta Ermeniler ve Zeytin isyanları*. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık.
- Gürün, Kamuran (2007). *The Armenian File*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
- Heiden, Konrad (1944). *Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power*. New York: Lexington Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric (1995). *Een eeuw van uitersten: de korte twintigste eeuw 1914-1991*. Utrecht: Uitgeverij het Spectrum.
- İbar, Gazanfer (2012). 'Cumhuriyetten sonra da Meşrutiyet kutladık: Hürriyet İlanı İlk milli bayramımızdı', in: *Atlas Tarih*, Issue: 13 (June–July 2012), İstanbul, pp. 66-73.
- Journal, Petit (1915). *Les massacres d'Arménie* (December 12th, 1915). Available on: <http://www.imprescriptible.fr/documents/petit-journal.htm> and <http://www.imprescriptible.fr/photographies/massacres-genocidaires> (Both retrieved on 10-03-2015).
- Kansu, Aykut (1997). *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*. Leiden: Brill.
- Karсандık, Özlem (2005). 'Criticism and the First Precautions of the Ottoman Empire Against The Armenian Political Separatist Organizations', in: *Ermeni Araştırmaları*, Issue: 16-17, Volume: Winter 2004-Spring 2005. Available online: <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=tr&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=14> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).
- Karsh, Efraim (2001). *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Kayaloff, Jacques (1973). *The Battle of Sardarabad*. Paris: Mouton.

- Kellogg, Michael (2005). *The Russian Roots of Nazism White Émigrés and the Making of National Socialism, 1917–1945*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kılıç, Selami (2003). *Ermeni Sorunu ve Almanya Türk-Alman Arşiv Belgeleriyle*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.
- Kirlikovalı, Ergün (unknown). 'Ethocide', from: <http://www.Ethocide.com/news.html> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).
- Kirlikovalı, Ergün (unknown). 'It Was Not "Genocide"; It was - and still is - "Ethocide"', from: <http://www.Ethocide.com/news.html> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).
- Kromhout, Bas (2015). 'De Perfecte Genocide', in: *Historisch Nieuwsblad*, January 2015, Number: 1, pp. 30-37.
- Lewis, Geoffrey (2002). *The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lewy, Guenter (2005). *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*. Utah: Utah University Press.
- Lowry, Heath W. (1985). 'The U.S. Congress and Adolf Hitler on the Armenians', in: *Political Communication and Persuasion*, 1985, Vol. 3, No. 2.
- Lowry, Heath W. (1990). *The Story Behind 'Ambassador Morgenthau's Story'*. İstanbul: Isis Press.
- Mango, Andrew (1999). *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey*. London: John Murray.
- Mazower, Mark (2007). *The Balkans: a short history*. New York: Random House Publishing Group.
- McCarthy, Justin (1995). *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*. New York: The Darwin Press.
- McCarthy, Justin Esat Arslan, Cemalettin Taşkiran & Ömer Turan (2006). *The Armenian Rebellion at Van*. Utah: Utah University Press.

- McCarthy, Justin (2009). 'The Light Millennium', from: *UNDPI/NGO* (April 21, 2009). Available online: http://dearmeensekwestie.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48:what-drove-the-armenians-and-the-turks-apart-&catid=13:papers&Itemid=13 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).
- Morgenthau, Henry Senior (1918/2003). *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*. New York: Doubleday.
- Mutlu, Cengiz (2007). *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Amele Taburları*. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık.
- Nansen, Fridtjof (1976). *Armenia and the Near East: Middle East in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Da Capo Press.
- Nom Print Monitor 2010-II/2011-I, from: http://www.zuiverwiki.nl/index.php/Historisch_Nieuwsblad (Retrieved 10-03-2015).
- Orel Şinasi & Yuca, Süreyya (1983). *Talaât Pasha "telegrams": Historical fact or Armenian fiction?*. Nikosia: K. Rustem & Brother.
- Ökte, Faik (1951). *Varlık Vergisi Faciası*. İstanbul: Nebioğlu Yayınevi.
- Özger, Yunus (2007). *1895 Bayburt Ermeni Ayaklanmaları*. İstanbul: IQ Kültür ve Sanat Yayıncılık.
- Öztuna, Yılmaz (2002). 'The Political Milieu of the Armenian Question', in: Türkaya Ataöv (ed.), *Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period*. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society.
- Öztuna, Yılmaz (1983). *Büyük Türkiye Tarihi* (14 volumes). İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi.
- Palmer, Alan (1994). *The Decline & Fall of the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Barnes and Noble Books.
- Picon, Leon (1986). 'Armenian "Hitler Quote" Proven To Be Fabrication', in: *ATA-USA*, Fall 1985/Winter 1986.
- Sağ, Armand (2005). 'Leugens van de Armeniërs', from: *Ooggetuigenverslagen Armeense Genocide*. Available online: http://sargasso.nl/ooggetuigenverslagen_armeense_genocide/ (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Sağ, Armand (2007). 'Armeens Terreur', from: *TurkseStudent.nl*. Available online:

<http://forum.turksestudent.nl/topic/25434-armeense-terreur/> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

Sağ, Armand (2012). 'Categorizing Historiography: Turkish-Armenian Relations Throughout History', in: *Review of Armenian Studies*, No.: 26, Volume: 2012, pp. 127-171. Available online:

<http://www.avim.org.tr/uploads/dergiler/ras-26-pdf.pdf> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Salt, Jeremy (1993). *Imperialism, evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians: 1878-1896*. London: Frank Cass.

Salt, Jeremy (2010). 'Forging the past: Oxford University Press and the 'Armenian Question'' (January 2010), from:

<http://angelsof1915.blogspot.nl/2011/06/forging-past-oxford-university-press.html> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Scheubner-Richter, Max Erwin von (1915). *Situation in Ottoman Turkey*. Available online:

https://www.google.nl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fchs.ccsd.org%2Fapps%2Fdownload%2Fagq85GOnLvSwmlPUd4wdVvew38xpBrkVpGjyV9D4jZ1ReybU.doc%2FArmenian%2520Genocide%2520German%2520Telegram%2520about%2520Ottoman%2520Plan%2520%2528Doc%2520%2529.doc&ei=va_0VIKmkYatUdWUgvAH&usq=AFQjCNG3kP39T3gmaLg1WMjtOtJuApTkOg&bvm=bv.87269000,d.d24 (Retrieved 02-03-2015).

Schleifer, Yigal (2012). 'Armenia's Doomed Quest to Recruit Steven Spielberg' (February 15, 2012), from:

<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/armenias-doomed-quest-to-recruit-steven-spielberg/253131/> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Schmidt, Jan (2012). *Nederland in Turkije, Turkije in Nederland: 400 jaar vriendschap*. Leiden: Leiden University Press.

Segev, Tom (2007). 'Mozart and the Armenian genocide', in: *Haaretz Daily News* (October 18, 2007).

Shaw, Stanford J. & Shaw, Ezel Kural (1977). *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 2/2*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Shaw, Stanford J. (1978). 'The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831–1914', in: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Volume: 9, Issue: 03 (August 1978), pp. 325-338.
- Stanford University (unknown). 'The Armenian genocide: The Turkish side of the story', from: <http://web.stanford.edu/group/ccr/GreenHatBlog/armenian.pdf> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).
- Suny, Ronald Grigor (2015). *"They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else": A History of the Armenian Genocide*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Şahin, Erman (2008). 'A Scrutiny of Akçam's Version of History', in: *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Number: 2, Volume: 28, August 2008, pp. 303-319.
- Şimşir, Bilal (2008). *Malta sürgünleri*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.
- Talat Paşa, Mehmet (1921/2006). *Hatıralarım ve Müdafaa*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.
- Tashji, Edward (2005). *Armenian Allegations: The Truth Must be Told*. USA (unknown): Rose International Publishing House.
- TAT (unknown). 'Vahagn Dadrian's Greatest Embarrassment', from: <http://www.tallarmeniantale.com/dadrian-andonian.htm> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).
- Toland, John (1976). *Adolf Hitler: The Definitive Biography*. New York: Doubleday & Company.
- Toynbee, Arnold (1916). *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1916: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon by Viscount Bryce, with a Preface by Viscount Bryce*. London: Hodder & Stoughton and His Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Toynbee, Arnold (1922). *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations*. London: Constable.
- Travis, Hannibal (2013). 'Did the Armenian Genocide Inspire Hitler? Turkey, Past and Future', in: *Middle East Quarterly*, Volume: 20, Number: 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 27-35.

Tunçel, Harun (2000). 'Renamed Villages in Turkey', in: *Firat University Journal of Social Science*, Volume: 10, Issue: 2 (2000), pp. 23-34.

Turks.nl (2014), 'CDA: Turken moeten oprotten' (July 4, 2014), from: <http://www.turks.nl/nieuws/item/3978-cda-turken-moeten-oprotten.html> (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Uçar, Fuat (2009). *Türkçülüğün Manifestosu: Osmanlılık- İslamcılık- Türkçülük*. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık.

User: bell-the-cat, on: *Hyeclub*, from: http://forum.hyeclub.com/showthread.php/14350-*British-Historian-Norman-Stone-Says-That-There-is-No-Armenian-Genocide?s=87a1745cbe605ee6355118d7b27d47aa&p=240168&viewfull=1#post240168 (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

User: Joseph (moderator), on: *Hyeclub*, from: http://forum.hyeclub.com/showthread.php/14350-*British-Historian-Norman-Stone-Says-That-There-is-No-Armenian-Genocide?p=240118&viewfull=1#post240118 (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Üstel, Füsün (1997). *Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Various (2015). Conference: 'A Civilization Destroyed: The Wealth of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Period and the Early Republican Era'. İstanbul: Hrant Dink Foundation, Boğaziçi University, İstanbul Bilgi University & Sabancı University.

Yağar, Hasan (unknown). 'Osmanlı Polis Teşkilatı ve Yenileşme Süreci', from: *TarihTarih.com*. Available online: <http://www.tarihtarih.com/?Syf=26&Syz=293928> (Retrieved on 25-02-2015).

Yanıkdağ, Yücel (unknown). 'Ottoman Empire/Middle East', from: *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*. Available online: http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/ottoman_empiremiddle_east (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

Yılmaz, Tuncay (unknown). 'Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Amele Taburları – Cengiz Mutlu', from: *Geliboluyu Anlamak*. Available online: http://www.geliboluyuanlamak.com/36_Birinci-Dunya-Savasi%E2%80%99nda-Amele-Taburlari---Cengiz-Mutlu-%28-Tuncay-Yilmazer-%29.html (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

Yurtsever, Cezmi (unknown). '1909 Adana Olaylarında İdam Edilenlerin Listesidir', from: *Adana 01 Haber*. Available online: http://www.adana01haber.com/author_article_print.php?id=910 (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

Zeidner, Robert Farrer (2005). *The tricolor over the Taurus : The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922*. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society.

Zuiver (2012). 'Historisch Nieuwsblad', from: http://www.zuiverwiki.nl/index.php/Historisch_Nieuwsblad (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Zürcher, Erik-Jan (2004). *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Archives

• Dutch

MFA of the Netherlands (1983). *DDI Research Documents*, Number: 122148. Retrieved from: <http://www.mfa.nl/ddi-onderzoek2/122148.pdf>.

• Turkish

Ottoman Archives, Ottoman Imperial Order 76. Available online: http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/yayin/osmanli/Armenians_inottoman/ottoman_armenian.htm (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Ottoman Archives, Ottoman Imperial Order 104. Available online: http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/yayin/osmanli/Armenians_inottoman/ottoman_armenian.htm (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Ottoman Archives, Ottoman Imperial Order 225. Available online: http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/yayin/osmanli/Armenians_inottoman/ottoman_armenian.htm (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

Ottoman Archives, Ottoman Imperial Order 226. Available online: http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/yayin/osmanli/Armenians_inottoman/ottoman_armenian.htm (Retrieved 10-03-2015).

State Archives, number 53/303: Göç Eden Ermenilerin Geride Bıraktıkları Mal ve Eşyalarla, Sevklere Tehcir edilen Ermeniler. Available online: <http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/icerik/1846/goc-eden-ermenilerin-geride->

biraktiklari-mal-ve-esyalarla-sevkleri-tehir-edilen-ermeniler/ (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

• *United States of America*

Corbis Images, UWW459INP (1914-1918). Available on:

<http://www.corbisimages.com/stock-photo/rights-managed/UWW459INP/view-of-starving-armenian-boy?popup=1> (Retrieved on 10-03-2015).

A LOOK AT THE PERİNÇEK V. SWITZERLAND CASE: EXAMINATION OF A LAWSUIT TO UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ARMENIAN-TURKISH DISPUTE AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS

(PERİNÇEK-İSVİÇRE DAVASI'NA BİR BAKIŞ:
ERMENİ-TÜRK İHTİLAFININ GÜNCEL VE GELECEKTEKİ OLASI
DURUMUNUN ANLAŞILMASI İÇİN BİR DAVA ANALİZİ)

Dr. Turgut Kerem TUNCEL

Specialist at the Center for Eurasian Studies

Abstract: *As the first 'genocide denial' case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) other than those on the denial of Jewish Holocaust, Perinçek v. Switzerland is a case that unveils philosophical, legal and political complexities related to the subtle relationship between freedom of expression and what can be generically called hate-speech. It is a case that reveals the problem of legitimate limitation on freedom of expression that the recent trend of the legislation of memory laws brings with it. In addition, the verdict of the ECHR, and the arguments of the parties and the governments of Armenian and Turkey as the third parties in the ECHR Grand Chamber are important indicators of the current state of the Armenian-Turkish dispute that has evolved around 1915 events and the prospective developments. The final verdict of the ECHR Grand Chamber is likely to shape the future framework of the dispute. The examination of almost ten-year long legal process demonstrates that memory laws in their present form are imperfect and vulnerable to abuse. The Perinçek v. Switzerland case reveals the imprecise employment of the term genocide in popular and academic literature and discourse that results in ambiguities as well as misuses. The Case also constitutes an example of the 'genocide politics' notwithstanding the moral discourse that dominates the debates around 1915 events. Moreover, the ECHR verdict is an international document with outmost significance that serves as a corrective to the hegemonic 'myths' on the 1915 events that are effects of the employment of the 'Jewish Holocaust model'. Nevertheless, the ECHR Grand Chamber hearing displays that the Armenian side will continue impose the characterization of the 1915 events as the 'Armenian Holocaust'.*

Keywords: *Perinçek v. Switzerland case, European Court of Human Rights, 1915 events, genocide.*

Öz: *Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nin (AİHM) baktığı, Yahudi Holokost'nun inkârı haricindeki, ilk 'soykırım inkârı' davası olan Peinçek-İsviçre Davası, ifade özgürlüğü ve nefret söylemi olarak adlandırılabilir olgu arasındaki hassas ilişkiye dair felsefi, hukuki ve siyasi karmaşıklığı ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu dava, güncel bir cereyan olan hafıza yasalarının mevzuatı ile birlikte beliren ifade özgürlüğünün meşru sınırları ile ilgili sorunsalı gündeme getirmiştir. Buna ilaveten, AİHM kararı, tarafların ve üçüncü taraflar olarak Ermeni ve Türk hükümetlerinin AİHM Büyük Daire'deki savları, 1915 olayları etrafında şekillenmiş olan Ermeni-Türk ihtilafının güncel hali ve müstakbel durumu hakkında önemli göstergelerdir. AİHM Büyük Daire'nin son kararı, ihtilafın gelecekte alacağı niteliği belirleyen etkenlerden olacaktır. Yaklaşık on seneye yayılmış olan dava süreci, şu anki halleriyle hafıza yasalarının kusurlu ve suiistimale açık olduklarını göstermektedir. Perinçek-İsviçre Davası, popüler ve akademik literatür ve söylemde soykırım kavramının özensiz kullanımının iltibas ve suiistimale neden olduğunu göstermektedir. Dava, aynı zamanda, 1915 olayları hakkındaki tartışmaları belirleyen ahlak temelli söyleme karşın, 'soykırım siyaseti'ne örnek teşkil eden bir olaydır. Bunun yanında, AİHM karar metni, 'Yahudi Holokostu modeli'nin 1915 olayları üzerine giydirilmesi sonucu ortaya çıkan hegemonik 'mit'lerin ortadan kaldırılmasına yarayacak çok önemli bir uluslararası belge niteliğindedir. Bununla birlikte, AİHM Büyük Daire görülen duruşma göstermektedir ki, Ermeni tarafı 1915 olaylarını 'Ermeni Holokostu' olarak nitelendirmeye devam edecektir.*

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Perinçek-İsviçre Davası, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi, 1915 olayları, soykırım.*

Introduction

In May, July and September 2005, Turkish citizen Doğu Perinçek¹ attended various conferences in Lausanne, Opfikon and Kőniz in Switzerland. In these conferences, Perinçek publicly rejected the characterization of the 1915 events as genocide and labelled genocide allegations as an “international lie”. He delivered similar speeches on various occasions in France and Germany during the same period. On 15 July 2005, Switzerland-Armenia Association sued Perinçek for publicly denying the ‘Armenian genocide’. On 9 March 2007, the Lausanne Police Court judged that Perinçek’s “motives were of a racist tendency and did not contribute to the historical debate”,² and found Perinçek guilty of racial discrimination within the meaning of the Swiss Penal Code Article 261bis, paragraph 4.³

Following the judgment of the Lausanne Police Court, Perinçek appealed first to Criminal Cassation Division of the Vaud Cantonal Court and then to Swiss Federal Court. His appeals were rejected by these courts. After no means were left in this country, Perinçek brought a case to the European Court of Human

1 Doğu Perinçek (born in 1942) is a Doctor of Law and a well-known political figure in Turkey. He began his political carrier in his university years in the Faculty of Law at Ankara University as one of the leaders of the left-wing student movement of the late-1960’s. Since 1970’s, he has been leading a Maoist socialist faction known as the *Aydınlıkçılar*. Because of his political activities, Perinçek has been subjected to numerous investigations. Perinçek was convicted eight times and served in the prison for a total of seventeen years. His latest criminal conviction was in 2008 for the alleged conspiracy for the over thrown of the Turkish government. He was released in 2014. He is currently the leader of the *Vatan Partisi* (Homeland Party). Besides his political activities, Perinçek is the author of numerous books.

It would not be wrong to define Perinçek as one of the most idiosyncratic political figures in the recent Turkish political history, who is admired by a small but a devoted group of people and, at the same time, is criticized by the followers of different political ideologies.

2 European Court of Human Rights, *Press Release issued by the Registrar of the Court 370 (2013)* (17 December 2013).

3 Swiss Penal Code Article 261bis on racial discrimination has been in force since 1 January 1995. This article states:

Any person who publicly incites hatred or discrimination against a person or a group of persons on the grounds of their race, ethnic origin or religion, any person who publicly disseminates ideologies that have as their object the systematic denigration or defamation of the members of a race, ethnic group or religion,

any person who with the same objective organises, encourages or participates in propaganda campaigns,

any person who publicly denigrates or discriminates against another or a group of persons on the grounds of their race, ethnic origin or religion in a manner that violates human dignity, whether verbally, in writing or pictorially,

by using gestures, through acts of aggression or by other means, or any person who on any of these grounds denies, trivialises or seeks justification for genocide or other crimes against humanity,

any person who refuses to provide a service to another on the grounds of that person’s race, ethnic origin or religion when that service is intended to be provided to the general public,

is liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty.

Rights (ECHR) against Switzerland. Turkish Government intervened to the case as a third party. On 17 December 2013, The ECHR judged that Swiss authorities had “overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to them in the present case, which had arisen in the context of a debate of undeniable public interest” and violated Perinçek’s right in the meaning of the Article 10 and Article 17 of the European Convention of Human Rights,⁴ by five votes to two. The ECHR ruled that there was no “pressing social need” for Perinçek’s conviction in a democratic society and therefore.⁵ On 17 March 2014, Switzerland requested the ECHR Grand Chamber to take the case. On 2 June 2014, Grand Chamber accepted this request. This time, in addition to the Turkish Government, French and Armenia governments and eight non-governmental organizations also intervened as third parties. The latest hearing was held on 28 January 2015. The Grand Chamber is expected to declare its judgement not earlier than the first months of 2016.

The legal process that began in 2005 and which still has not been finalized is an important case for at least three reasons. As the first case of ‘genocide denial’ other than denial of Jewish Holocaust before the ECHR, Perinçek v. Switzerland case possesses a great significance with respect to the Articles 10 and 17 of the European Convention of Human Rights that regulate freedom of expression and legitimate restrictions on that freedom. It is a case that unveils philosophical, legal and political complications related to the subtle relationship between freedom of expression and what can be generically called hate-speech and the correlated matters including the limits of freedom of expression that legislation of memory laws brings with them. As an effect,

4 European Convention of Human Rights Article 10 states:

Freedom of expression

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

European Convention of Human Rights Article 17 states:

Prohibition of abuse of rights

Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.

5 European Court of Human Rights, *Press Release issued by the Registrar of the Court 158 (2014)* (03 June 2014).

Perinçek v. Switzerland case also exposes several practical inconveniences in the laws of the European countries, particularly Switzerland, and their legislation and enforcement. In addition, the verdict of the ECHR and the arguments of the parties and the governments of Armenian and Turkey as the third parties in the courts are important displays of the current state of the Armenian-Turkish dispute on 1915 events and its prospective evolution. The case particularly exhibits different approaches of those who advocate indisputable factuality of the ‘Armenian genocide’ and of those who advocate a finer examination of the 1915 events and the inherent distinction between the historical and legal approaches.⁶ Thirdly, the final judgement of the Grand Chamber is likely to be an important factor that would shape the future framework of the debates within this dispute. The ECHR’s judgement in favor of Perinçek will undermine the validity of the attempts to restrict scholarly research and informed debates on the 1915 events. A reverse judgement will be a leverage for those who try to prevent the study and discussion of the 1915 events. The first possibility will have positive consequences for the scholarly exploration of these events, whereas the second possibility will mean further consolidation of the ‘Armenian genocide’ as an untouchable dogma. Surely, both results will have scholarly and political outcomes.

For the above mentioned repercussions of the Perinçek v. Switzerland case, this article examines the almost ten-year long legal process and the debates it initiated. It evaluates the judgment of the ECHR on 17 December 2013 and the ECHR Grand Chamber hearing on 28 January 2015. The article first reviews a similar trial that began by the appeal of the Switzerland-Armenia Association in 1997 and finalized in 2001 without any criminal conviction. Then, Perinçek’s investigation by the Swiss courts, debates that this investigation initiated within Switzerland and the tension that erupted between Switzerland and Turkey are examined. Thirdly, the judgement of the ECHR issued on 17 December 2013 is assessed. Finally, speeches of the representatives of the parties and the third parties at the ECHR Grand Chamber hearing on 20 January 2015 are analyzed. The conclusion section is reserved for the discussion of the significant matters that the review of the legal process that Perinçek’s investigation in Switzerland unveiled.

6 As to this point Donald Bloxham rightly states: “genocide is a legal term than a historical one, designed for the *ex post facto* judgments of the courtroom rather than the historian’s attempt to understand events as they develop” (Donald Bloxham, “The First World War and the Development of the Armenian Genocide,” in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Grigor Suny, Fatma M. Göçek and M. Naimark (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 275. He says legal approach moralizes a conflict, searches for victims and victimizers and ignores causal connections. On the other hand, historical approach aims to understand the historical event, rather than making a judgement.

The Bern-Laupen Court in 2001 and the Swiss National Council's Resolution on the 'Armenian genocide' in 2003

As Perinçek insisted as one of the reasons of the unpredictability of his conviction in different Swiss courts and the ECHR, his case was not the first 'Armenian genocide denial' lawsuit in Switzerland. Approximately four years before Perinçek's case, a similar case was heard by the Bern-Laupen Court.

On 26 September 1995, a committee organized by the Switzerland-Armenia Association⁷ deposited a petition to the Swiss Parliament requesting the recognition of the 1915 events as genocide. On 30 January 1996, Coordination of the Turkish Associations in Switzerland appealed to the Federal Chamber with another petition that pleaded not to consider the campaign of the Armenian organizations. On 24 April 1997, Association Switzerland-Armenia filed a criminal complaint against the signatories of this petition with the allegation of violating the Swiss Penal Code Article 261bis.

The District Court of Bern-Laupen asked the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then the Institute for Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Bern to prepare a report on the state of teaching of the matters related to the Armenians in the Turkish schools to determine the general opinion in the Turkish society about the 'Armenian issue'. The District Court of Bern-Laupen also requested a report on Switzerland's position on the 'recognition of Armenian genocide' from the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The report of the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that there had been three failed attempts in the Swiss Parliament for the 'recognition of Armenian genocide' in 1995, 1998 and 2000. In 2001, the District Court of Bern-Laupen ruled that Turkish Associations in Switzerland did not violate the Swiss Penal Code Article 261bis.

The District Court of Bern-Laupen in its verdict noted that finding evidences to decide for cases based on historical events was not very possible and mentioned the importance of the decisions of the competent international courts for such cases. As such, District Court of Bern-Laupen implied that deciding on historical disputes was within the jurisdiction of the international courts rather than the national ones. The District Court of Bern-Laupen also drew attention to the subjective component of the crime defined by the Swiss Penal Code Article 261bis. By this way, the Court pointed out that the verification of the racist incentive was a must for the establishment of the crime defined by

7 For the official website of the Switzerland-Armenia Association visit, <http://www.armenian.ch/index.php?id=1> (latest access 06.03.2015).

the Swiss Penal Code Article 261bis. Association Switzerland-Armenia appealed to the higher court in 2002. This appeal was rejected.⁸

Notably, on 16 December 2003, between the trials in the District Court of Bern-Laupen and the Lausanne Police Court, the Swiss National Council accepted a resolution worded as “the National Council acknowledges the 1915 genocide of the Armenians. It requests the Federal Council to acknowledge this and to forward its position by the usual diplomatic channels” by 107 votes to 67 votes. However, the Swiss Federal Council refused to acknowledge the 1915 events as genocide. This disparity, discharging of the Lausanne Police Court’s claim on the admission of the factuality of the Armenian genocide by Swiss official bodies, created an ambiguity that refutes the claim of consensus on the factuality of the ‘Armenian genocide’, as shall be discussed below.

The Lausanne Police Court

In 2005, Switzerland-Armenia Association filed a law suit against Perinçek for ‘publicly denying the Armenian genocide’. The Lausanne Police Court took on the investigation of Perinçek for racial discrimination by means of denying the ‘Armenian genocide’. In the trial, Perinçek requested an investigation on the alleged factuality of the ‘Armenian genocide’. The Lausanne Police Court, however, refused such an investigation by attesting a consensus on the factuality of the ‘Armenian genocide’ in the Swiss society. It also alleged a wider consensus on this matter by referring to various parliamentary acts, legal publications, statements of Swiss federal and cantonal political authorities, and the resolutions of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.⁹

8 Pulat Tacar, *İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nde Doğu Perinçek-İsviçre Davası* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2012), pp. 21-28. For the account of the Switzerland-Armenia Association see http://www.armenian.ch/gsa/Pages/Genocide/lawsuit_en.html (latest access, 17.03.2015).

9 However, The European Court of Human Rights refuted Lausanne Police Court’s claim about Council of Europe’s recognition of the Armenian genocide in the merits of its judgement on 17 December 2015 (see, European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para. 9). As a correction of Lausanne Police Court’s manipulative mistake, the ECHR stated that “within the Council of Europe, the question of the atrocities committed against the Armenian people has been the subject of discussions many times”, which is obviously different from recognition. The ECHR recalled that “in a declaration dated 24 April 2013 (no. 542, Doc. 13192), for example, some twenty members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe expressed themselves as follows:

Recognition of the Armenian genocide

“[This written declaration commits only those who have signed it]

Recognition of genocides is an act which contributes to the respect for human dignity and the prevention of crimes against humanity.

The fact of the Armenian Genocide by the Ottoman Empire has been documented, recognised, and affirmed in the form of media and eyewitness reports, laws, resolutions, and statements by the

Notably, the Lausanne Police Court claimed that the ‘Armenian genocide’ was comparable to the Jewish Holocaust. Eventually, the Lausanne Police Court ruled that Perinçek’s speeches were not contributions to historical debate and his rejection of the ‘Armenian genocide’ was conditioned by a racist intention. Accordingly, the Lausanne Police Court found Perinçek guilty of racial discrimination within the meaning of Article 261bis, paragraph 4 of the Swiss Criminal Code. The Court penalized Perinçek with 90 days and a fine of 100 Swiss francs suspended for two years, with payment of a fine of 3,000 Swiss francs replaceable by 30 days incarceration, and payment of moral damages of 1,000 Swiss francs for the benefit of the Switzerland-Armenia Association.¹⁰

According to the swissinfo.ch-International Service of the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation,¹¹ Lausanne Police Court Judge Pierre-Henri Winzap accused Perinçek of being “a racist” and “an arrogant provocateur”.¹² The same news portal reported that the co-president of the Swiss-Armenian Association Sarkis Shahinian assessed Lausanne Police Court’s judgement as a “great relief” for the Armenian community.¹³ Turkish community in Switzerland, on the other hand, showed restrained reaction to the court decision. Those Swiss-Turks interviewed by *Basler Zeitung* Daily stated that they were contended that the trial opened up debates about the Armenian issue. Most of the Turkish media raised criticisms about the judgement. Following the judgement, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement partially stating that “the court case was inappropriate, groundless and controversial in every sense... The verdict cannot be accepted by the Turkish people”.¹⁴

United Nations, the European Parliament and Parliaments of the Council of Europe member States, including Sweden, Lithuania, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Switzerland, France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Cyprus, the Russian Federation, as well as the US House of Representatives and 43 US States, Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, Canada, Uruguay and Lebanon.

The undersigned, members of the Parliamentary Assembly, call upon all members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to take the necessary steps for the recognition of the genocide perpetrated against Armenians and other Christians in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century, which will strongly contribute to an eventual similar act of recognition by the Turkish authorities of this odious crime against humanity and, as a result, will lead to the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey and thus contribute to regional peace, security and stability.” (European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para 29.)

10 European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para. 9.

11 For the official website of the swissinfo.ch-International Service of the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation, visit <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng> (latest access 06.03.2015).

12 “Turkish politician fined over genocide denial”, *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/turkish-politician-fined-over-genocide-denial/977094> (latest access 06.03.2015).

13 Ibid.

14 “Swiss and Turkish press mull Perinçek verdict”, *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-and-turkish-press-mull-perin%C3%A7ek-verdict/5772850> (latest access 06.03.2015).

Swiss media's treatment of the judgement was rather ambiguous. *Tages-Anzeiger* Daily, approving the judgement, accused Perinçek of being an arrogant person who deliberately sought provocation in Switzerland. The editorial of the *Le Temps* Daily stated that the Lausanne Police Court's judgement provided the Armenians with "a protection of [their] memory that ha[d] already been recognised for the Shoah victims". *Blick* Daily claimed the Swiss government had to recognize the 'Armenian genocide' after the Lausanne Police Court's "courageous" verdict. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* Daily penned that the judgement of the Lausanne Police Court was correct. Nevertheless, it also stated that because Perinçek was a Turkish politician and the subject of the trial was relevant to Turkey, the trial was neither meaningful nor necessary in Switzerland. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* Daily underlined the tension between Switzerland and Turkey caused by Perinçek's conviction. The editorialist of this daily wrote: "nevertheless, the [Swiss] government is still free to avoid using the world 'genocide' out of foreign (trade) considerations".¹⁵ In brief, whereas some Swiss media organs approved the judgement of the Lausanne Police Court, others remained critical to the judgement particularly by calling attention to the negative effects of that judgement on the Swiss-Turkish political and economic relations

Perinçek's Dismissed Appeals to the Criminal Cassation Division of the Vaud Cantonal Court and the Swiss Federal Court

Perinçek brought the judgment of the Lausanne Police Court to the Criminal Cassation Division of the Vaud Cantonal Court. He demanded inquiry on the alleged consensus on the 'Armenian genocide'. On 13 June 2007, the Criminal Court of Cassation of the Cantonal Court of the Canton of Vaud dismissed Perinçek's appeal by stating that the 'Armenian genocide', similar to the Jewish Holocaust, was a proven historic fact that was recognized by the Swiss legislature on the date of the adoption of the Article 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code. The Court decided that there was no need to refer to works of historians to verify the factuality of the 'Armenian genocide'.

Following this failed appeal, Perinçek appealed to the Swiss Federal Court, the highest court in Switzerland, as the last available Swiss legal authority. Perinçek complained that the two previous courts did not perform an adequate investigation to determine whether the 1915 events could have been considered as genocide. The Federal Court admitted that Perinçek did not deny massacres and resettlement of the Armenians, however stated that Perinçek represented

¹⁵ Ibid.

them as necessary and excusable measures within the circumstances war and accused him of denying the genocidal character of these atrocities. The Federal Court also stated that the task of the Lausanne Police Court was not to conduct historical research, but to observe whether there was a consensus on the genocidal characteristic of the 1915 events in Swiss and wider public opinion. In other words, the Federal Court sustained that the matter was not whether the massacres and resettlement could be identified as genocide but whether these events were accepted as genocide by the public and the historians. Similar to the previous courts, the Federal Court sustained that the ‘Armenian genocide’ was an apparent and known fact like the Jewish Holocaust. The Federal Court highlighted that Perinçek had stated that he would never change his opinion about the 1915 events even if a non-party commission would decide that these events were genocide as a verification of Perinçek’s racist intentions.¹⁶ The Federal Court added that Perinçek was aware of the Swiss law that criminalized the denial of Armenian genocide hence his claim that his criminal conviction was not unforeseeable was not correct. An interesting statement of the Federal Court was that Armenians were a people that define and identify themselves with the 1915 events. Therefore, the Court claimed ‘denial of the genocide’ or presenting the Armenians as aggressors constituted an offense to the Armenians. Upon these sociological determinations, the Court stated that decision of the Swiss courts was to protect the dignity of the Armenians. Eventually, Federal Court dismissed Perinçek’s appeal on 12 December 2007.¹⁷

Tension between Switzerland and Turkey and the Debates in Switzerland

The Swiss media that drew attention to the negative impact of the Lausanne Police Court judgement on the Swiss-Turkish relations, as mentioned above, was remarking a real situation between Switzerland and Turkey. Following Swiss public prosecutor of Winterthur’s questioning of Perinçek on 23 July 2005 for his speech on the day before, the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül expressed his protest to Turkish daily *Hürriyet*. Gül deemed the questioning of Perinçek as “unacceptable” and “absolutely contrary to the principle of free speech”.¹⁸ Likewise, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Turkey’s discontent about the investigation of Perinçek to the Swiss authorities with absolute certainty. On 26 July 2005, Turkish MFA

16 Pulat Tacar, *İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nde Doğu Perinçek-İsviçre Davası*.

17 For the recount of the process see, see European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para. 3-9.

18 “Turkey rejects Swiss genocide-denial inquiry”, *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/turkey-rejects-swiss-genocide-denial-inquiry/4635066> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

requested an explanation of the investigation of Perinçek from the Swiss Ambassador to Turkey Walter Gyger and presented him a protest note. In the meantime, the Turkish Embassy in Bern met with the Swiss MFA to express Turkey's regret. The press attaché of the Turkish Embassy in Bern told the swissinfo.ch-International Service of the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) that Perinçek's investigation by the Swiss authorities was a cause of "discomfort and disappointment in Turkey, and such a measure falls short of freedom of speech and expression which is one of the most fundamental human rights". She added that it was "more regrettable that [the investigation of Perinçek] was launched by the authorities in a friendly country whose reputation for upholding human rights is well known". Few days later, Turkish Ambassador in Bern told the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung am Sonntag* Daily that Perinçek's investigation was "a serious signal to Turks who live or come to Switzerland" that meant that they had to "keep their mouths shut".¹⁹

As a response to the forceful reaction of Turkey, the Swiss President of the House of Representatives' Foreign-Policy Commission accused Turkey of overreacting and blackmailing Switzerland. He advised Turkey to recognize the 'Armenian genocide' once and for all. Notwithstanding his protest of Turkey for blackmailing Switzerland, he stated: "if Switzerland were to turn its back on Turkey, it would be a bad sign for EU entry" in a way that would threaten Turkey.²⁰ Nevertheless, his threats did not withhold Turkey from postponing Swiss Minister of Economy Minister Joseph Deiss' visit to Turkey that was scheduled for September. Although Turkey gave another explanation, Switzerland rightly related this postponement with the tension that grew between the two countries.²¹ In fact, this was the second instance of the postponement of an official visit of the Swiss authorities by Turkey for the reasons related to Switzerland's stance on the 'Armenian genocide'. When in 2003 the parliament of a western Swiss canton recognized the 1915 events as genocide, Turkey withdrew its invitation to the then Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey. Similarly, in June 2005, a Turkish minister postponed his visit to Switzerland to protest a Swiss investigation of a Turkish historian, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, who made speeches similar to those of Perinçek.

19 "Perinçek once more denies Armenian genocide", *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/perin%C3%A7ek-once-more-denies-armenian-genocide/4645442> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

20 "Swiss-Turkish relations hit new low", *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-turkish-relations-hit-new-low/4640406> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

21 "Ankara postpones Deiss visit to Turkey", *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ankara-postpones-deiss-visit-to-turkey/4653360> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

The Swiss Minister of Justice Christoph Blocher visited Turkey about a year later in October 2006. In a meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Blocher, referring to Perinçek's investigation, criticized Article 261bis of the Swiss Penal Code. He stated that "no one would have imagined that this law would

The Swiss Minister of Justice Christoph Blocher visited Turkey about a year later in October 2006. In a meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Blocher, referring to Perinçek's investigation, criticized Article 261bis of the Swiss Penal Code. He stated that "no one would have imagined that this law would have resulted in proceedings against a prominent Turkish historian" and expressed his wish for the re-examination of this article.

have resulted in proceedings against a prominent Turkish historian"²² and expressed his wish for the re-examination of this article. However, Blocher's statements raised criticisms in Switzerland. Swiss President, President of the Federal Commission against Racism, Minister of Interior, Christian Democrats, Radical Party, Social Democrat Party and Switzerland-Armenia Association blasted Blocher particularly for criticizing, instead of defending, a Swiss law that was legislated by the Swiss people in a foreign country.²³ Yet, when Blocher turned back to Switzerland, he endorsed his statements in Turkey by stressing the need for the freedom of expression of the views that may not appeal to everyone.²⁴ In October 2006, Swiss Head of the Federal Justice Office Michael Leupold told the *Sonntags Zeitung* Daily that there was no question about the abolishment of the

Article 261bis of the Swiss Penal Code but certain changes were necessary. He said Swiss judges should "seek assistance from an international institution or that the relevant clause be struck from the law altogether". Leupold's statement raised objections from some Swiss officials.²⁵

22 "Blocher's remarks cause a storm in Switzerland", *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/blocher-s-remarks-cause-a-storm-in-switzerland/5484770> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

23 "Blocher's remarks cause a storm in Switzerland", *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/blocher-s-remarks-cause-a-storm-in-switzerland/5484770> (latest access, 06.03.2015);

"Expert questions Blocher anti-racism remarks", *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/expert-questions-blocher-anti-racism-remarks/5486298> (latest access, 06.03.2015);

"Cabinet rebukes justice minister", *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/cabinet-rebukes-justice-minister/5509272> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

24 "Blocher's remarks cause a storm in Switzerland", *swissinfo.ch*.

25 "Ministry re-examines genocide definition", *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ministry-re-examines-genocide-definition/5562142> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

On 19 December 2006, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law presented a comparative study of the laws of 14 European countries (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden) and the United States and Canada about the offence of denial of crimes against humanity with a particular on genocide denial (see, European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para. 30).

A Look at the Perinçek v. Switzerland Case: Examination of a Lawsuit to Understand the Current State of the Armenian-Turkish Dispute and Prospective Developments

In February 2007, Swiss Interior Minister Pascal Couchepin paid a visit to Ankara to discuss the return of the certain cultural goods.²⁶ On 4 February 2007, Couchepin told to Swiss Radio that Swiss Government's approach to the 'Armenian issue' was to leaving it to historians. He said that an international commission of historians would "examine the issues and look for the causes of the events of that time-including the massacre".²⁷ Perinçek's investigation in Switzerland continued to inflame debates on the delicate balance between hate speech and freedom of expression. In March 2007, while Lausanne Police Court was still examining the Perinçek case, the Dean of the Faculty of Law at Geneva University Robert Roth stated that "the lawmakers wanted to assimilate the negation of a historical reality to a racist proclamation". He said that this was controversial because these were two different things. Referring to Perinçek's trial, Roth pointed out the question of the agent that is supposed to make judgements on historical events.²⁸

Perinçek's Appeal to the European Court of Human Rights and the Judgement of the ECHR on 17 December 2013

After no means were left in the Swiss legal system, Perinçek applied to the European Court of Human Rights against Switzerland on 10 June 2008. Relying on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the freedom of expression, he complained that Switzerland unjustly restricted his freedom of expression. On 18 January 2011, Switzerland handed over its plea to the ECHR. Switzerland claimed that ECHR's task was not to replace the decisions of national courts but to examine their decisions with respect to Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. By emphasizing that this article was legislated on September 25th, 1994 by a referendum, Switzerland asked the ECHR to respect the will of the Swiss people. The ECHR decided to hear Perinçek v. Switzerland as a case on freedom of expression in the meaning of Article 10 and Article 17 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Turkey applied the ECHR to intervene as a third party on 15 September 2011.²⁹

Perinçek argued that Article 261bis, paragraph 4 of the Swiss Criminal Code lacked clarity and specification as to whether it was about the "Jewish genocide" or the "Armenian genocide". Perinçek also claimed that because

26 Notably, about a month before Couchepin's visit, a prominent Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink was assassinated by a 17-year old ultra-nationalist Turkish terrorist.

27 "Couchepin builds bridges with Turkey", *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/couchepin-builds-bridges-with-turkey/5708638> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

28 "Genocide denial trial raises many questions", *swissinfo.ch*, <http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/genocide-denial-trial-raises-many-questions/5762840> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

29 See footnote 4 for articles 10 and 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Swiss Criminal Code Article 261bis, paragraph 4 does not refer to the Armenian genocide, his conviction amounted to the disregard of the principle of *nulla poena sine lege* (no penalty without a law). He also underlined that in 2001 Bern-Laupen Court in Switzerland made an opposite judgment on a similar case. Thirdly, Perinçek reminded the ECHR that the former Swiss Minister of Justice during a visit in Turkey in 2006 criticized the Article 261bis, paragraph 4 of the Swiss Criminal Code. Based on these, Perinçek claimed that his conviction was unpredictable.

Swiss Government responded to Perinçek's claim of unpredictability by arguing that the wording of Article 261bis, paragraph 4 of the Swiss Criminal Code had sufficient clarity. Switzerland also claimed that Perinçek should have known Swiss National Council's resolution adopted in 2002.³⁰ According to Switzerland, the existence of a consensus on the factuality of the Armenian genocide and its recognition by more than twenty national parliaments and the European Parliament were also sufficient to predict the possibility of conviction due to the denial of the 'Armenian genocide'. Switzerland also recalled that Perinçek had declared he would not change his position, even if a neutral commission affirms the factuality of the 'Armenian genocide' as a testimony of his awareness of the Swiss standard of denial. Eventually, the ECHR dismissed Perinçek's claim of unpredictability.

Perinçek accused the Lausanne Police Court of ignoring his theory and views by overlooking the documents he submitted and the scholarly views that reject the characterization of the 1915 events as genocide. As such, Perinçek blamed the Lausanne Police Court of impartiality and hostility against himself. According to Perinçek, the unratified Armenia-Turkey Protocols signed in Zurich on 10 October 2009 refutes Switzerland's claim of Armenian genocide as a "clearly established fact". Perinçek also mentioned Bernard Accoyer's report to the French National Assembly on 18 November 2008 on the inadequacy of court decisions on matters concerning the imputation of certain historic events. Against these accusations, in addition to the above mentioned arguments, Switzerland argued that Armenian genocide is used as a classical example in the study of genocides.

The ECHR stated that it was not possible to speak of a general consensus on the 'Armenian genocide', also by drawing attention to different opinions even within the political bodies in Switzerland.³¹ Likewise, the ECHR underlined

30 However, as stated above, Swiss Federal Council refused to accept this resolution or to issue a similar one.

31 The ECHR stated that "while the National Council, i.e. the lower house of the federal parliament, has officially acknowledged the Armenian genocide, the Federal Council has refused to do so on several occasions" (European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para. 115).

that only about twenty nations out of more than 190 in the world have recognized the ‘Armenian genocide’ and sometimes these recognitions came not from the governments, but “but only from their parliament or from one of its chambers”.

Notably, the ECHR stated that:³²

It is even doubtful that there could be a ‘general consensus’, in particular a scientific one, on events such as those that are in question here, given that historical research is by definition open to debate and discussion and hardly lends itself to definitive conclusions or objective and absolute truths.

More substantively as to the ‘general consensus’, the ECHR underlined that:³³

Genocide’ is a well-defined legal concept...for the violation to be described as genocide, the members of a targeted group must not only be chosen as a target because of their membership in this group, but it is necessary at the same time that the actions committed be accomplished with the intention of destroying, in whole or in part, the group as such (*dolus specialis*). It is thus a very strict legal concept, which is, moreover, difficult to prove. *The Court is not convinced that the ‘general consensus’ to which the Swiss courts have referred, to justify the conviction of the applicant, can bear on these very specific points of law* (emphasis added).

In line with this perspective, against the attempt of Switzerland to draw parallel between the Jewish Holocaust and the 1915 events, the ECHR argued that the Armenian case was “clearly distinct from cases bearing on denial of the Holocaust crimes”³⁴ because Holocaust was an established fact both through historical research and international courts. The ECHR stated that:³⁵

32 Ibid, at para. 117.

33 Similarly, in its press release issued on 13.12.2013, the ECHR further stated that:

The existence of a “genocide”, which was a precisely defined legal concept, was not easy to prove. The Court doubted that there could be a general consensus as to events such as those at issue, given that historical research was by definition open to discussion and a matter of debate, without necessarily giving rise to final conclusions or to the assertion of objective and absolute truths. (European Court of Human Rights, *Press Release issued by the Registrar of the Court 370 (2013)* (17 December 2013).

34 European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para. 117.

35 European Court of Human Rights, *Press Release issued by the Registrar of the Court 370 (2013)* (17 December 2013

In this connection, the Court clearly distinguished the present case from those concerning the negation of the crimes of the Holocaust. In those cases, the applicants had denied the historical facts even though they were sometimes very concrete, such as the existence of the gas chambers. They had denied the crimes perpetrated by the Nazi regime for which there had been a clear legal basis. Lastly, the acts that they had called into question had been found by an international court to be clearly established.

Consequentially, the Court said that whereas Holocaust denial is,³⁶

...today the main driving force of anti-Semitism [and] still a current phenomenon, and against which the international community must be firm and vigilant. One cannot affirm that the dismissal of the description of ‘genocide’ for the tragic events that occurred in 1915 and the following years might have the same repercussions.

Accordingly, the ECHR made a very important observation on the non-existence of a phenomenon that could be called as ‘anti-Armenianism’ that refutes the claim that mere ‘denial of Armenian genocide’ causes threats to the peaceful existence of the Armenians.

The ECHR admitted that Perinçek’s statements such as his thesis of “international lie” were provocative. Yet, the ECHR stated that ideas, which are upsetting, shocking or disturbing including those about historical events were also under the protection of the Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Underlining that whether Perinçek’s statements had the “purpose of inciting to hatred or violence” was an important basis for the application of the Article 17 of the European Convention of Human Rights, the ECHR said that “the dismissal of the legal characterisation of the events of 1915 was not likely to in and of itself to incite hatred against the Armenian people”.³⁷ The ECHR judged that Perinçek’s speech was “of a nature at once

36 European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para. 119.

37 As mentioned above, Perinçek’s statements about his admiration of Talat Paşa was one of the arguments of the Swiss courts in justifying his criminal conviction. As to this point, the ECHR stated:

The Court does not rule out that the said identification, to a certain extent, with the perpetrators of the atrocities can be placed on equal footing with an attempt to justify the acts committed by the Ottoman Empire... However, it does not consider itself obligated to respond to this question, given that the applicant has not been prosecuted nor punished for having tried to “justify” a genocide in the meaning of , paragraph 4 of Article 261bis of the Criminal Code (European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para. 53).

historic, legal and political” and “were not likely to incite hatred or violence”.³⁸ Thus, considering the “public interest that the [Perinçek’s] speech takes on”, ECHR judged that “the domestic authorities’ margin of assessment was reduced”. In its press release, the ECHR stated that:³⁹

...The United Nations Human Rights Committee had expressed its conviction that “[l]aws that penalize[d] the expression of opinions about historical facts [were] incompatible with the obligations that the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] impose[d] on States parties ...” and that the “Covenant [did] not permit general prohibition of expressions of an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events”.

Notably, the ECHR affirmed that it was inappropriate “to apply to certain words concerning historic events the same severity as [if they had been spoken] only a few years previously”. According to the ECHR, this principle “contributes to the efforts that every country is called on to debate openly and calmly its own history”. Elsewhere in its report, the ECHR stated that “the passage of time must necessarily be taken into account to assess the compatibility with freedom of expression of a ban, for example of a book”.

Against Lausanne Police Court’s emphasis on his refusal to revise his ideas on the 1915 events even if an impartial commission would determine these events were genocide, Perinçek raised the issue that his attitude was based on international law. He said, not the ‘impartial commissions’ but valid courts could make a judgement on the character of the 1915 events. He repeated that he did not deny the tragic 1915 events, however, he believed, these events could not be characterized as genocide. By denying the legal character of the crime of genocide, Perinçek insisted, Swiss judiciary digressed the framework of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Perinçek sustained that unlike crimes established by a valid court decision such as the Jewish Holocaust, expressing views on historical events that not have been established by a valid court shall not be criminalized. He also accused Lausanne Police Court of not taking important international judicial opinions such as the ‘Bosnian genocide’ into

38 The ECHR observed that:

[Perinçek] had never in fact been prosecuted or convicted for inciting hatred. Nor had he expressed contempt for the victims of the events. The Court therefore found that Mr Perinçek had not abused his right to openly discuss such questions, however sensitive and controversial they might be, and had not used his right to freedom of expression for ends which were contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention (European Court of Human Rights, *Press Release issued by the Registrar of the Court* 370 (2013) (17 December 2013).

39 Ibid.

consideration and therefore missing important legal considerations. Moreover, Perinçek blamed Lausanne Police Court of not taking into account the differences between different types of crimes such as crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, hence of causing contradictions in terms. The ECHR acknowledged that Perinçek' rejection of the characterization of the 1915 events as genocide was due to legal reasoning.

Perinçek argued his conviction was neither "necessary in a democratic society" nor did it serve any "urgent social need". He claimed that his expressions were not of the quality that would damage the dignity of the Armenian community. On the contrary, he said, Switzerland's judgement was attacking the honor of the Turkish community. Perinçek argued that Switzerland unjustly assessed his words as nationalist and racist statements. He insisted that his theory had a legal character and was inspired by the international law and in particular by the 1948 Convention.

Switzerland argued that Perinçek's conviction was justified for the "the protection of the reputation and the rights of others, in the particular case the honour of the victims whom the applicant publicly described as instruments of imperialist powers, against the attacks by whom the Turks were only defending their country".⁴⁰ It sustained that Perinçek's description of the Armenians as aggressors and his identification of the Armenian genocide as an "international lie" and admiration of Talat Pasha would harm the identity of the Armenians. According to Switzerland, the latter was a particular demonstration of Perinçek's racist and nationalist character and motives. Switzerland insisted that Perinçek's confirmation that he would not change his opinion on the issue demonstrates his ideas stem from his racist view, not from historic inquiry.

The ECHR judged that whereas Switzerland's claim on the protection the honor of the families and friends of Armenian victims of the 1915 events might have justifiable aspects, there should be a balance between the "requirement of protecting the rights of the third parties, namely the honour of the relatives of the Armenian victims" and the freedom of expression, and rejected the argument that Perinçek's words posed a serious threat to the public order. The ECHR stated that "all the other Nations have apparently not felt an 'urgent social need' to provide such a law" as the invalidation of Switzerland's claim of "urgent social need".

40 European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para. 73.

The ECHR stated that only two countries, namely, Luxembourg and Spain criminalize “denial of genocide, without limiting themselves to the crimes committed by the Nazi regime”. However, it added that the Spanish Constitutional Court later on ruled that “simple denial of a genocide crime was not a direct incitement for violence and the simple dissemination of conclusions regarding the existence or non-existence of specific facts, without making a value judgment on them or on their illegal nature, was protected by scientific freedom”.⁴¹ The ECHR, on the other hand, underlined that Luxembourg foresaw the punishment of denial of genocide only if it is recognized by the Luxembourg court or international court.⁴² The ECHR also recalled that the French Constitutional Court also judged that ‘genocide denial law’ was unconstitutional and this law was contradicting freedom of expression and freedom of research. The ECHR stated that “the decision of the [French] Constitutional Court shows perfectly that there is, a priori, no contradiction between the official acknowledgement of certain events such as genocide, on the one hand, and the unconstitutionality of criminal penalties for individuals calling the official stance into question, on the other”.⁴³ Overall, the ECHR said that:⁴⁴

Governments that have acknowledged the Armenian genocide – the vast majority of them through their parliaments – have not deemed it necessary to adopt laws laying down criminal punishment, since they are aware that one of the main aims of the freedom of expression is to protect minority points of view likely to encourage debate on questions of general interest that have not been fully established”.

The ECHR cited the UN Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment no. 34 that says “covenant does not permit general prohibitions on the expression of a mistaken opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events”.⁴⁵ Also, mentioning the Bern-Laupen District Court case in 2001, the ECHR expressed its “doubts that the sentencing of the applicant was required by a ‘pressing social need’”.⁴⁶ Notably, the press release of the ECHR on the hearing of the Perinçek v. Switzerland case issued on 17 December 2013 stated that:⁴⁷

41 European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para. 121.

42 Ibid, at para. 39.

43 Ibid, at para. 123.

44 Ibid, at para. 123.

45 Ibid, at para. 124.

46 European Court of Human Rights, *Press Release issued by the Registrar of the Court 370 (2013)* (17 December 2013).

47 Ibid.

The Court underlined that the free exercise of the right to openly discuss questions of a sensitive and controversial nature was one of the fundamental aspects of freedom of expression and distinguished a tolerant and pluralistic democratic society from a totalitarian or dictatorial regime.

In conclusion the ECHR judged as follows:⁴⁸

...the Court believes that the reasons put forward by the [Swiss] authorities to justify the sentencing of the applicant are not relevant and, considered as a whole, insufficient. The domestic courts have not, in particular, proved that the sentencing of the applicant responded to a “pressing social need” or that it was necessary, in a democratic society, to protect the honour and feelings of the descendants of victims of atrocities dating back to 1915 and thereafter. The domestic courts therefore exceeded the limited margin of assessment that it enjoyed in the case in hand, which is part of a debate which is of specific interest to the public.

In the 28 January 2015 Grand Chamber hearing, Perinçek and his lawyers, first and foremost, underlined that the essence of the case was the freedom expression of the minority views that might appear controversial within a debate of public interest.

The Hearing at the ECHR Grand Chamber on 28 January 2015

On 17 March 2014, Swiss Government applied to bring the judgement of the ECHR to the Grand Chamber. On 2 June 2014, Switzerland’s request was accepted. Turkey applied as a third party on 12 September 2014. Between June and September 2014, fourteen other applications were delivered to the Grand Chamber. Four of them were rejected. The governments of Armenia and France were among the accepted applicants. Only Armenian and Turkish governments were permitted to make an oral presentation in the public hearing. The hearing was held on 28 January 2015, which was broadcasted on internet on the same day.⁴⁹

In the 28 January 2015 Grand Chamber hearing, Perinçek and his lawyers, first and foremost, underlined that the essence of the case was the freedom expression of the minority views that might appear controversial within a

48 European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013, at para 129.

49 See, http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=hearings&w=2751008_28012015&language=lang&c=&py=2015 (latest access 06.03.2015).

debate of public interest. Perinçek's counsels Mehmet Cengizer and Laurent Pech stressed that defining the truth about a controversial historical event was not within the scope of the current trial. Pech emphasized the gentle balance between the freedom of expression and the legitimate and necessary restrictions on that freedom. He recalled that freedoms must be the rule and restrictions must be exception. Pech, emphasizing the importance of the freedom of expression, stated that:⁵⁰

Indeed, freedom of expression can not tolerate state-defined historical truths that infringe it on the basis of an undue broadening of the legal concept of genocide as well as the retroactive application of this concept according to a majority at a given time in a respective country. Many historians over the past years have defended the view that in a free state, it is not up to any political authority to define historical truth, or to define by law a historical truth of which the application may have serious consequences and repercussions for intellectual freedom.

In his second-round speech, Pech stated that:⁵¹

...I think that the rationale of your court is indeed to protection the main values on which the European Court of Human Rights is founded, which primarily means that *minority and unpopular opinions should be shielded from any tyranny of a majority* (emphasis added).

Underlying that genocide is a legal term defined by the 1948 *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, Perinçek's counsels explicated once again that their client does not deny the forced resettlement and the mass killings perpetrated against the Armenian people in 1915 onwards, but reject the idea that these events could be characterized as genocide.

Disqualifying the charges of racism and ultra-nationalism, Perinçek's counsel Mehmet Cengiz reminded the Grand Chamber of the political career of Perinçek and the awards granted to him by some European organizations combating racism. He also recalled previous judgements of the ECHR on Perinçek v. Turkey cases. Pech mentioned several inaccuracies of the Swiss interpretation of international law, the ambiguity of the Swiss Criminal code while reflecting on the current state of legal regulations with respect to genocide denial.

50 http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=hearings&w=2751008_28012015&language=lang&c=&py=20 (latest access 06.03.2015).

51 Ibid.

Spokespersons of Switzerland besides restating Switzerland's above mentioned views, made several noteworthy points. The agent of the Swiss Government Frank Schürmann stated that the legislation of the Article 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code caused many debates in Switzerland and finally it was put into force after a referendum in which 54.6% of the voters voted for the legislation. In a way admitting the controversial nature of the Article 261bis, Schürmann also stated that there had been sixteen attempts in the Swiss Parliament to revise this article, the last one of which was still pending. In defense of the Article 261bis, Schürmann stated that Perinçek was the only case of conviction with respect to this article, which, however, is a half-truth; as mentioned above the Bern-Laupen Court in 2001 investigated several members of the Coordination of the Turkish Associations for violating this law for the same reason with Perinçek, yet that time, the suspects were not found guilty. Schürmann in defense of Switzerland's thesis of "general consensus" on the factuality of the 'Armenian genocide' stated that common people would not understand the legally distinct definition of the genocide and the differences between denial and rejection. Daniel Thürer, the other counsel of Switzerland, mentioned the delicate balance between international and national court and argued that international courts must leave a space for the judgements of the former. He also emphasized the Swiss tradition of democracy as another reason of the necessity of non-interference of the international courts to the national court judgements.

At the Grand Chamber hearing, Turkish Government was represented by the counsel Stefan Talmon. Nullifying the Swiss argument of the 'general consensus', Talmon highlighted that neither Switzerland recognizes the 1915 events as genocide nor had Swiss courts made a judgement on that issue. He recalled the ECHR's judgements on *Dink v. Turkey*⁵² and *Güçlü v. Turkey*⁵³ that stated debates on the 1915 events were indisputably of public interest and argued that, therefore, the discussion that Perinçek initiated was also a contribution to that debate. He also argued that 'genocide denial' *per se* could neither be regarded as racial discrimination nor could it be perceived as accusing Armenian for lying or falsifying the history. Talmon rejected the alleged identity between the Jewish Holocaust and the 'Armenian genocide' by recalling that the former is an established historical fact that was also determined by a valid international court. Moreover, he underlined that whereas at the present time Holocaust Denial is a vehicle of anti-Semitism, the same could not be said for the 'denial of the Armenian genocide' since there is no

52 European Court of Human Rights, *Affaire Dink c. Turquie*, Requêtes nos 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 et 7124/09, 14 September 2010.

53 European Court of Human Rights, *Case of Bayram Güçlü v. Turkey*, Application no. 31535/04, 18 February 2014.

A Look at the Perinçek v. Switzerland Case: Examination of a Lawsuit to Understand the Current State of the Armenian-Turkish Dispute and Prospective Developments

phenomenon of “anti-Armenianism”. Remarkably, he argued that Armenian might find the rejection of the characterization of the 1915 events as genocide distressful, however such subjective sentiments can not mean the dignity of the Armenians are violated. As to that point, Talmon stressed the need for general standards instead of subjective claims.

The content of the speeches made by the representatives of the Government of Armenia were plainly different from those of the speeches of the other parties. The content displayed that the intent of the Armenian Government was also different from the intentions of the other parties. Armenia’s Prosecutor General Gevorg Kostanyan, who was the first speaker in the name of the Armenian Government, delivered a short speech. This short speech displayed that the Armenia Government perceived the case not as a trial on freedom of speech and the legitimate limitation of this freedom, but as a platform to decide about the character of the 1915 events.⁵⁴ The speeches of the representatives of the Armenian Government which were basically on the ‘factuality of the Armenian genocide’ also revealed that the intent of the Armenian Government was to use the Grand Chamber as a platform for spreading propaganda. Armenian Government’s employment of high profile lawyers Geoffrey Robertson QC⁵⁵ and Amal Clooney can be interpreted as a choice relevant to this intent.

The speeches of the representatives of the Armenian Government which were basically on the ‘factuality of the Armenian genocide’ also revealed that the intent of the Armenian Government was to use the Grand Chamber as a platform for spreading propaganda. Armenian Government’s employment of high profile lawyers Geoffrey Robertson QC and Amal Clooney can be interpreted as a choice relevant to this intent.

The content of the speeches of Robertson QC and Clooney were identical, yet

54 In his speech, Gevorg Kostanyan stated:

[Armenian nation] has never asked this court to pronounce on the suffering it has witnessed. But nor, did it expect this court to ever allow the deniers to find a safe haven in its pronouncements, which are already now used for propaganda purposes of falsifying the history. As an intervener, Armenia’s role is to point to the correct principals, under which this case should be decided and to indicate errors that have infected the lower court judgment. Whether or not its conclusion was correct does not matter as much as certain misstatement of fact which have comforted genocide deniers throughout the world

(http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=hearings&w=2751008_28012015&language=lang&c=&py=20, latest access 06.03.2015).

55 Robertson QC published a book titled *An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians?* in 2014. For a critique of this book, see Jeremy Salt’s article titled “A Lawyer’s Blundering Foray into History” in this volume

the wording of Robertson QC was strikingly aggressive, derogatory and manipulative. For example, Robertson QC alleged that supporters of Perinçek were “waving flags and fists” outside of the court building in a way to imply that Armenians were under a threat conditioned by racial hatred. However, in reality, a relatively large group of Turks made a silent demonstration outside of the court building just like a smaller group of Armenians at the same place. In his speech, Robertson QC’s also directed outrageous insults on the person of Perinçek that were hardly suitable to the norms of courtesy in a court-room.⁵⁶

Robertson QC in his speech stated that:⁵⁷

Armenia’s compelling interest today, as you have seen in its submissions, is to refute certain suggestions in the judgement that there was any doubt over whether the 1915 massacres and deportations amounted to genocide. We are all agreed today that’s not the issue. The court in the first paragraph of its judgement on the law, said “we’re not called upon to decide that.” And yet it went on in paragraphs 115 to 117 to actually cast doubt if it was a genocide and then to comfort genocide deniers, a human rights court comforting genocide deniers by errors.

However, both Robertson QC and Clooney dedicated much of their speeches to validate the ‘factuality of the Armenian genocide’ with the help of delusive expressions such as “the Euphrates River filled with blood”. Clooney in the beginning of her speech stated:⁵⁸

The most important error made by the court below is that it cast out on the reality of the Armenian genocide that people suffered hundreds years ago...The court itself admitted that it was quote not required to determine whether the massacre suffered by the Armenians amounted to genocide. This is also the position conceded by the applicant and by the government of the Turkey and the government of Armenia agrees. In addition to being unnecessary, the lower court’s comments on genocide were totally unsupported and made without even inviting Armenia’s assistance.⁵⁹

56 Robertson QC, during his speech referred to Perinçek as “this man, Perinçek” with a facial expression that openly displayed a disgust. He called Perinçek a racist and a designated him a “laughable, rather than dangerous” character.

57 http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=hearings&w=2751008_28012015&language=lang&c=&py=20 (latest access 06.03.2015).

58 Ibid.

59 Armenian Government did not apply to intervene as a third party to the previous ECHR trial.

A Look at the *Perinçek v. Switzerland* Case: Examination of a Lawsuit to Understand the Current State of the Armenian-Turkish Dispute and Prospective Developments

Notwithstanding the subject of the case before the Grand Chamber, Clooney accused Turkey of restricting freedom of expression by the following words. Interestingly, these words have been the most widely circulated quotation from the Grand Chamber hearing in the Armenian media.⁶⁰

But I would like to finally note that Armenia, as a third party intervening in this case, has not made submissions on the merits and is not here to argue against freedom of expression any more than Turkey is here to defend it. This court knows very well how disgraceful Turkey's record on free expression is. You found against the Turkish government in 224 separate cases on freedom of expression grounds. So although this case involves a Turkish citizen, Armenia has every interest in ensuring that its own citizens do not get caught in the net that criminalizes speech too broadly and the family of Mr. Hrant Dink know that all too well.

In her closing remarks, Clooney accused Perinçek of spreading anti-Armenian hatred with the following words:⁶¹

The comments in the lower court judgement on genocide dishonor the memory of the Armenians who perished in the Ottoman Empire a century ago and assist those who will deny the genocide in order to incite racial hatred and violence.

In the second-round speeches delivered by the parties of Perinçek and Switzerland, Perinçek's counsel Laurent Pech made several important points. Pech explained why he did not reply to the Armenian Government by the following words that captures the irrelevance of the Armenian Governments approach to the case:⁶²

I would like to focus on the main points raised by the representatives of the Swiss government- I will not refer to the observations made on behalf of the Armenian government because I could not identify any relevant legal arguments for settling the pending case.

Pech criticized Switzerland's argument on the common people's incomprehensibility of the legally distinct definition of the genocide and the differences between denial and rejection. He argued that criminal law shall not be dependent on the population's comprehension or incomprehension of certain

60 http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=hearings&w=2751008_28012015&language=lang&c=&py=20 (latest access 06.03.2015).

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

legal terms. As such, Pech defended the autonomy of law and legal processes by pointing out the problem of flexing the law according to the commonly held views. He stated that:⁶³

The notion of general consensus was mentioned on several occasions to back up the thesis according to which the aforementioned events have to be classified as genocide, but I agree on the approach that we should rather refer to the definition of the UN Convention of 1948 than relying on the somewhat subjective notion of “general consensus” which only serves a public majority opinion. It was also argued that the public would not understand the legal distinction which is made between the denial, the challenge of a historical fact and the opinion according to which certain historical events do not qualify as genocide under international penal law. I consider that we should not apply criminal law depending on whether or not the population understands certain legal terms.

He also underlined that it was “wrong to say that there were no States which refused to recognize [Armenian genocide]” by referring to the decision of the German Federal Court on 13 January 2015 that refused to explicitly recognize the 1915 events as genocide “within the meaning of international penal law” also by underlining that the German Federal Government was against “a retroactive application of the 1948 UN Convention”. Pech also referred to a similar declaration of the Australian government in 2014.

As mentioned above, one of the arguments of Switzerland was genocide was an inherent constituent of the Armenian identity and for that denial of genocide was an insult on the dignity of the Armenians. As to that argument, Pech stated the following that reveals the inconvenience of making claims based on subjective concerns:⁶⁴

Considering the concept of genocide as the exclusive means and thus indispensable to prosecute such comparable crimes on the grounds that these might be a threat to the identity as a group is in our opinion not in line with the freedom of expression because *the concept of identity is extremely vague, and accepting this would leave the door wide open to abuse*. The Swiss courts have often referred to identity in relation to dignity. This concept of identity should be only used with big caution since *one does not know how a court could objectively decide which historical tragedies have contributed to the creation of a national*

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

identity or which ones are at the heart of a national identity or community. And why should it be prohibited to use another characterization than that approved by one house of parliament or a jurisdiction of a third country (emphasis added).

Conclusion

Doğu Perinçek's investigation and conviction in Switzerland for publicly rejecting the characterization of the 1915 events as genocide and the following legal processes expose several philosophical, legal and political complexities. It is also a case that demonstrates the current state of the dispute on the 1915 events. The final verdict of the ECHR Grand Chamber is likely to shape the prospective framework of the dispute.

Perinçek v. Switzerland case unveils the inherent complications of memory laws.⁶⁵ First of all, memory laws bring about the difficult question regarding the justifiable limitations on the freedom of expression. The clauses that tie the restriction of freedom of expression to the condition of intention of racial discrimination, spreading hate, disturbing social order etc. hardly deliver a solution to the problem arising from the challenge of determining the very fine line between criticism and what can be generically called hate speech. Consequently, memory laws remain exposed to abusive instrumentalization by those who seek to illegitimate and silence views that displease them by asserting subjective claims about their ethnic, national, religious or other identities.

Certainly, identities have both objective and subjective elements. Yet, recognition of the subjective elements of identities does not eliminate the existence of this inherent fallacy of the memory laws. Perinçek v. Switzerland case illustrates this paradox. It is true that 'genocide' is the main constituent of the contemporary Armenian identity. However, when this is used as a justification to restrict the study of the 1915 events and to inhibit the expression of views that are perceived as offensive, it turns to be an unacceptable impediment on research and freedom of expression, hence an oppressive weapon. As to this point, Laurent Pech's above mentioned statement about the vagueness of the concept of identity that permits abuse is of crucial importance. Law must clearly distinguish objective and explicit offenses from subjective

⁶⁵ The legislation of the memory laws has been accelerated since 1990s. These laws, not only but particularly, aim at preventing the denial of the Jewish Holocaust, which is perceived as one of the main expressions of anti-Semitism.

claims of insult. Unless such a distinction is made, memory laws are likely to become tools in the hands of those who are predisposed to abuse them.

The *Perinçek v. Switzerland* case also reveals the problem that stems from the indifference to the precise definition of the crime of genocide and the ways in which that crime shall be established. Switzerland's insistence on the supposed

The Perinçek v. Switzerland case also reveals the problem that stems from the indifference to the precise definition of the crime of genocide and the ways in which that crime shall be established. Switzerland's insistence on the supposed consensus on the 'factuality of the Armenian genocide' is a striking example of this hazy usage of the term. Not only in the popular literature, but also in the academic one, the term genocide is erroneously used in a way to refer to any mass killing or atrocity.

consensus on the 'factuality of the Armenian genocide' is a striking example of this hazy usage of the term. Not only in the popular literature, but also in the academic one, the term genocide is erroneously used in a way to refer to any mass killing or atrocity. However, genocide is a strictly legal term that is defined very narrowly. An act can only be labeled as genocide only if that act targets a national, ethnical, racial or a religious group (not, for example, a political group) only because of the national, ethnic, racial or religious identity of that group (not, for example, because of an economic or a security reason, but because of a hatred directed to national, ethnic, racial or religious identity of that group) with the intention (not as an undesired side effect of, for example, resettlement or war time circumstances) destroying that group in whole or in part. To put it simply, a crime can be called genocide only if the criminal act targets a national, ethnical and is motivated by a kind of racial hatred and executed with the intention to destroy that group. As such, the term

genocide signifies a crime that is separate from a war crime or a crime against humanity. Furthermore, because genocide is a legal term that defines a crime, as the Article 6 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948 states an act can be established as the crime of genocide only by the judgement of a competent tribunal. This means the authority to decide whether an act is genocide are neither historians nor parliaments. Likewise, general public opinion cannot be considered to be a judge on this matter, as well. Therefore, Perinçek's counsel in the ECHR Grand Chamber Laurent Pech's criticism of Switzerland's argument on the public consensus is a very important correction. Yet, what Pech has not said is that historians must focus on understanding the 1915 events, instead of focusing on making

judgements on the character of those events. Today many historians working on the 1915 events have become parties to the ongoing debate on the proper characterization of the 1915 events. The unproductive results of the partisanship of the historians reflect themselves in the rather low quality research on the 1915 events that often include deliberately falsified arguments based on fabricated or distorted data.⁶⁶

As explained above, Turkey's stern reaction to Perinçek's investigation and conviction raised concerns in Switzerland that followed by debates in that country on the Swiss Criminal Code Article 261bis and the necessity of Perinçek's investigation. Battle of words and reciprocal intimidations between Switzerland and Turkey also followed. Swiss-Turkish friction and the debates in Switzerland reveal important things about 'genocide politics' and, by extension, the insincerity of the arguments based on morality. One of the arguments of the Swiss courts was to protect the dignity of the Armenians that 'genocide denial' threatens. As such, Swiss courts implied a kind of moral responsibility, in addition to more practical concerns on public order, which indeed was an offshoot of the former. However after Turkish reaction, debates began in Switzerland. As the review above shows Switzerland's economic and political interests were at the core of those debates. This not only shows that when economic, political or other interests are at stake, 'moral responsibilities' may be overlooked by the states and other actors, but also demonstrates the political nature of the 'genocide debate', which is obvious, but often obfuscated by the utilization of a moral discourse. Without admitting the political nature of the 'genocide politics', Armenian-Turkish dispute and the attitudes of the third parties cannot be fully understood. In brief, as the Swiss attitude reveals, today not the higher moral imperatives but political interests determine the attitudes of state and non-state actors involved in the dispute on the 1915 events.

As explained above, Perinçek's investigation in Switzerland was initiated by the appeal of the Switzerland-Armenia Association. Likewise, the investigation of the Coordination of the Turkish Associations in Switzerland, in 1997 was also initiated by the appeal of the same organization. This is one of the concrete displays of the significance of the lobby of the Armenian diaspora organizations for the implementation of 'genocide politics'. It seems that Turkey and the

⁶⁶ Regarding distorted scholarship on the 1915 events, Taner Akçam is a paradigmatic example. As a German citizen of Turkish origin, he has been put in the limelight as a scholar who furiously stands up for the 'Armenian view'. In that, his ethnic origin has been the most important factor; Akçam, defending the 'Armenian thesis' as a 'Turk' certainly has a great 'use-value' for the propagandist circles. For a recent critique of Akçam's scholarship see, Maxime Gauin, "Proving" a 'Crime against Humanity'?", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 35(1) (2015): pp. 141-157.

Turkish communities in North America and Europe have recently comprehended the significance of the 'diaspora factor' and began organizing their own lobby. The response of the Armenian diaspora to that is yet to be seen. However, what is most likely is that 'diaspora wars' will become one of the decisive factors of the evolution of 'genocide politics'.

The ECHR, in the merits of its judgement, mentioned some very important points. It recalled the following: 1) there is, indeed, no consensus on the factuality of the 'Armenian genocide, 2) arriving at definitive conclusions and absolute truth in historical scholarship is not possible, 3) genocide is a narrowly defined strictly legal concept, 4) the passage of time must be taken into account while deciding whether usage of a specific terminology would be an offense, 5) the disparity between the 1915 events and the Jewish Holocaust for the attested factuality of the later by a valid court judgement, 6) 'denial of Armenian genocide' *per se* is not spreading hate, racial discrimination or an offense, 7) debates on the 1915 events is to the interest of the public. As such, the merits of the judgement of the ECHR demonstrate another important facet of 'genocide politics'. Put differently, the merits of the judgement of the ECHR show that despite the hegemony of the 'Armenian view' in the popular domain, things change considerably when it comes to the legal domain. The final judgment on *Perinçek v. Switzerland* is yet to be declared. If the ECHR Grand Chamber confirms the judgement of the lower chamber with the same or similar merits, those who advocate the indisputable factuality of the 'Armenian genocide' and those who attempt to prevent the discussions on the 1915 events that exceed the boundaries they impose will lose much of their credit. This will have positive results for the healthy study of the 1915 events.

Lastly, the intervention of the Armenian Government to the ECHR Grand Chamber hearing as a third party evidently demonstrates the strategy of the Armenian side. Quite obviously, Armenian side not only rejects the acknowledgement of the legal quality of the term genocide, but also attempts to prevent discussion of the 1915 events by imposing it as an undeniable historical fact. Doing that, Armenian side frames the 1915 events as the 'Armenian Holocaust'. Even in an international court, instead of rational and legalistic arguments, Armenian side employs a demagogic rhetoric based on victimhood. A final judgement of the ECHR Grand Chamber that is parallel to the judgement of its lower chamber will invalidate that strategy and pave the way for rational argumentation.

Bibliography

- “Ankara postpones Deiss visit to Turkey”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ankara-postpones-deiss-visit-to-turkey/46533-60> (latest access, 06.03.2015).
- “Blocher’s remarks cause a storm in Switzerland”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/blocher-s-remarks-cause-a-storm-in-switzerland/5484770> (latest access, 06.03.2015).
- Bloxham, Donald. “The First World War and the Development of the Armenian Genocide.” in *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Grigor Suny, Fatma M. Göçek and M. Naimark, pp. 260-275. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- “Cabinet rebukes justice minister”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/cabinet-rebukes-justice-minister/5509272> (latest access, 06.03.2015).
- “Couchepin builds bridges with Turkey”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/couchepin-builds-bridges-with-turkey/5708-638> (latest access, 06.03.2015).
- European Court of Human Rights, *Press Release issued by the Registrar of the Court 158 (2014)* (03 June 2014).
- European Court of Human Rights, *Matter of Perinçek v. Switzerland*, Application no. 27510/08 (17 December 2013).
- European Court of Human Rights, *Press Release issued by the Registrar of the Court 370 (2013)* (17 December 2013).
- European Court of Human Rights, *Affaire Dink c. Turquie*, Requête nos 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 et 7124/09 (14 September 2010).
- European Court of Human Rights, *Case of Bayram Güçlü v. Turkey*, Application no. 31535/04 (18 February 2014).
- “Expert questions Blocher anti-racism remarks”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/expert-questions-blocher-anti-racism-remarks/5486298> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

Gauin, Maxime. “Proving” a ‘Crime against Humanity’?, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 35(1) (2015): pp. 141-157.

“Genocide denial trial raises many questions”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/genocide-denial-trial-raises-many-questions/5762840> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

“Ministry re-examines genocide definition”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ministry-re-examines-genocide-definition/5562142> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

“Perinçek once more denies Armenian genocide”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/perin%C3%A7ek-once-more-denies-armenian-genocide/4645442> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

“Swiss and Turkish press mull Perinçek verdict”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-and-turkish-press-mull-perin%C3%A7ek-verdict/5772850> (latest access 06.03.2015).

“Swiss-Turkish relations hit new low”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-turkish-relations-hit-new-low/4640406> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

Tacar, Pulat. *İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nde Doğu Perinçek-İsviçre Davası*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2012.

“Turkish politician fined over genocide denial”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/turkish-politician-fined-over-genocide-denial/977094> (latest access 06.03.2015).

“Turkey rejects Swiss genocide-denial inquiry”. *swissinfo.ch*.
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/turkey-rejects-swiss-genocide-denial-inquiry/4635066> (latest access, 06.03.2015).

BOOK REVIEW

(KİTAP TAHLİLİ)

A LAWYER'S BLUNDERING FORAY INTO HISTORY

Review Essay

(BİR HUKUKÇUNUN TARİHE KARŞI KÖR EDİCİ SALDIRISI)

Jeremy SALT

Author: Geoffrey Robertson, QC, *An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians?* (London: Biteback Publishing, 2014), 293 pp.

The author of this book is well known, as an international human rights lawyer, as the author of other books and as a television panelist and former moderator of the BBC quiz program 'Hypotheticals.' His reputation alone will ensure sales and favorable reviews but this book cannot be regarded as a serious study of the Armenian question, let alone as the historical basis for a legal judgment of any kind.

Mr Robertson's problems begin with the front cover. 'Who now remembers the Armenians?' refers to a statement allegedly made by Hitler on the eve of the invasion of Poland, yet in three versions of the speech admitted as evidence at the Nuremberg tribunal there is no mention of the Armenians.¹ They appear in a version passed around by an American journalist, Louis P. Lochner, who claims to have been given it a week before the invasion of Poland by a confidant of one of Hitler's enemies

¹ The forensic work on this question has been done by Heath Lowry. See his article 'The US Congress and Adolf Hitler on the Armenians,' *Political Communication and Persuasion*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1985. www.ataa.org/reference/hitler-lowry.html

inside the military, Colonel Beck. The Lochner version first surfaced in the book he had published in 1942, *What About Germany?* In a second book published in 1956, *Always the Unexpected*, Lochner reveals how his version of the speech was passed on to him, headed as a protective measure ‘a piece of filthy propaganda’ (ein Stück gemeine propaganda) in case the bearer was arrested. The number of insulting references to Hitler’s allies or erstwhile allies in the Lochner version of the speech indicate that it was certainly not the one he made and was in fact falsified to cause him embarrassment. The Japanese emperor is described as weak and cowardly; King Carol of Rumania is the corrupt slave of his sexual desires; the king of Italy is a nitwit and the crown prince a scoundrel; and the people of the Far East and Arabia are ‘lacquered apes’ who crave to be flogged.²

The two versions of the speech admitted as reliable by the Nuremberg tribunal are consistent with each other and with a diary account of the speech. They contain no mention of the Armenians. The first version was found in notes taken by Admiral Hermann Boehm, the Chief of the High Seas Fleet, who was present; the second was located in a memorandum retained in the files of the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces; the third came from the diary of General Halder, who was party to a plot to kill Hitler in 1939 and barely escaped execution in 1944 for his alleged role in other conspiracies.

In fact, Hitler made two speeches at Obersalzberg the same day (August 22, 1939). The prosecutor declined to table the Lochner version, purportedly based on the speech Hitler made to ‘Supreme Commanders and Commanding Generals’. Given the widespread use of the Hitler quote for propaganda purposes, the prosecutor’s remarks are worth repeating. He said that the document ‘came into our possession through the medium of an American newspaperman and purported to be the original minutes of the meeting at Obersalzberg, transmitted to this American newspaperman by some other person and we had no proof of the actual delivery to the intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document, therefore, merely served to alert our prosecutors to see if they could find something better’.³

The prosecutor concluded that the Lochner version was a ‘slightly garbled’ merger of the two speeches Hitler made. The Lochner account was accidentally leaked to the press, after which the president of the tribunal remarked that ‘the tribunal is trying the case in accordance with the evidence and not in accordance with what is in the press and the third document [the Lochner

2 ibid.

3 ibid.

version] is not in evidence before us'. The primary documents tabled as evidence at Nuremberg indicate that the Lochner version of the speech was more than 'slightly garbled' but was, rather, a somewhat crude attempt to embarrass Hitler at a time his opponents inside the military had already been thinking of assassinating him if necessary to prevent Germany from being plunged into war.⁴

Having begun his book by referring to a statement Hitler probably never made, Mr Robertson proceeds to examine Ottoman history as a prelude to what happened in 1915. He does not begin with a survey of conditions in eastern Anatolia on the eve of the war. This is the essential context for anyone who wants to get to the truth of what happened to the Armenians during the war (except for those who think they know the truth). Eastern Anatolia was the crucible of the 'Armenian question.' It was from the eastern provinces that the bulk of Armenians were 'relocated' and it was in the east that Ottoman armies fought the Russians. It was in the east also that Armenians fighting with the Russians launched insurgency operations from behind the Ottoman lines. Setting the scene for all of this means taking into account conditions on the ground. The notion of a central government controlling all things has to be scotched immediately. Outside the town and the governor's konak (mansion), real power and authority lay in the hands of tribal leaders, Kurdish and even Christian (Nestorian) in southeastern Anatolia and Arab further south. This was the arrangement put together by the Sultan Abdülhamit in the late 19th century: in return for tribal leaders upholding his sovereign right, he acknowledged their traditional prerogatives.

Eastern Anatolia was the crucible of the 'Armenian question.' It was from the eastern provinces that the bulk of Armenians were 'relocated' and it was in the east that Ottoman armies fought the Russians. It was in the east also that Armenians fighting with the Russians launched insurgency operations from behind the Ottoman lines. Setting the scene for all of this means taking into account conditions on the ground. The notion of a central government controlling all things has to be scotched immediately.

Apart from these factors, the word 'backward' is scarcely sufficient to describe conditions on the ground. No sealed roads, only tracks leading from the interior to the coast; no railways except for a short line near the Black Sea coast and a line from Konya broken by the Taurus mountains; poor communications, a telegraph link from the middle of the century and an unreliable postal service;

4 *ibid.*

very few doctors, hospitals or pharmacies; military garrisons and police but not nearly sufficient to maintain or restore authority once it had broken down, especially in wild and remote areas cut off for months during the winter; on top of all this, a largely illiterate population easily stirred into outbursts of fanaticism. It was for all these reasons that the two most prominent Armenian militant groups, the Dashnaks and Hunchaks, chose eastern Anatolia rather than the Caucasus as the staging ground for their uprisings in the late 19th century. These conditions remained unchanged at the outbreak of the First World War and to repeat, the fate of the Armenians, indeed of the whole civilian population of eastern Anatolia, cannot be understood without taking them into account.

Unreliable ‘facts’

Mr Robertson’s general account of Ottoman history is inaccurate in almost every respect. His account of Muslim-Christian relations paraphrases attempts by propagandists to break down the truth of the ‘ancient symbiosis’ - the phrase of the Armenian historian Avedis Sanjian – between Muslims and Christians until the 19th century came along. Muslim society was segmented rather than segregated, creating a system in which Christians and Jews enjoyed far greater protection under Ottoman law over the centuries than Jews did even in western Europe. In eastern Anatolia venal administrators or brutal Kurdish tribal chiefs could treat Muslims just as cruelly as Christians. The difference was that missionaries and consuls took notice of Christian grievances but mostly ignored the suffering of Muslims. In Istanbul, Armenians were part of the court circle. They mingled with the Muslims on the basis of equality; they served the sultan as senior bureaucrats; they were the architects of his palaces and even the guardians of his arsenal. The lines of division were socio-economic rather than sectarian: the Armenians of the *amira* (aristocratic) class in Istanbul and their patrician Muslim counterparts had far more in common with each other than with their impoverished coreligionists in eastern Anatolia. As for Armenian ecclesiastics, they were far from passive, as Mr Robertson writes, but aggressive managers of the Gregorian Armenian millet, their grip in favor of lay control only being released under the pressure of a reformist Ottoman government.

The ‘ancient symbiosis’ began to disintegrate in the 19th century but rather than look for reasons peculiar to the time and circumstances, Mr Robertson presents the unraveling of Muslim-Christian relations as being part of an endless historical cycle of discrimination against the Armenians. His ‘facts’ are unreliable. Thus he can write that the Sultan Abdülhamit ‘oversaw the slaughter

of some 200,000 Armenians between 1894 and 1896.’⁵ Thousands of Armenians did die but the figure of 200,000 is a wild exaggeration, and in no way did the sultan oversee let alone prescribe massacres. No mention is made here of the role Britain played in provoking turmoil by demanding spurious ‘reforms’ favoring the Armenians which the sultan told them the Muslim population would not understand and could not accept and would only end in chaos for which he would be blamed (as he was).

Mr Robertson claims that the ‘Hamidean massacres’ began at Sasun in 1894 when ‘the provincial governor urged local Muslims to teach the insubordinate Armenians a lesson.’⁶ He provides no evidence of this and goes on to cast doubt on the reality of an uprising. In fact - in real fact as opposed to the propaganda facts strewn across these pages - Armenian militants had been stirring up trouble in the east in the hope of provoking an outrage so great that one or more of the European powers would intervene. The Sasun uprising was their handiwork. The Armenians murdered Kurdish Muslims and the Kurds retaliated before a force of 4000 troops was sent from the 4th Army headquarters at Erzurum. By the time they arrived they were facing an Armenian force of up to 3000 men, most armed only with muskets, swords and hatchets but some with modern weapons. The Armenians apparently planned to seize more weapons from barracks at the nearby town of Muş but were deterred by the advancing military force. Despatches were sent to the government on a daily basis giving the latest estimates of the number of Armenians involved in the insurgency and the number of soldiers that would be necessary to suppress it. This was a regular military operation involving a small number of Kurdish *hamidiye* cavalymen (about 300) and not the ‘regiments’ to which Mr Robertson refers.⁷ Civilians caught up in this conflict probably were among the dead but not in the thousands or tens of thousands claimed by the former British Prime Minister, William Gladstone, and other racist and religious bigots. An Ottoman commission of inquiry found that fewer than 300 Armenians had died: the British consul attending as an observer, H.S. Shipley, demurred but still put the figure at no higher than 900.⁸

Mr Robertson repeats the lurid stories told by British consuls of events at Sasun and Urfa, apparently unaware that they were not there at the time. Vice-Consul Hallward was prevented by the Ottoman authorities from travelling to the

5 Robertson, *An Inconvenient Genocide*, 37.

6 Ibid, 40.

7 For an account of the Sasun uprising from the Ottoman archives see Jeremy Salt ‘The narrative gap in Ottoman Armenian history,’ *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 39, No.1, January, 2003, 26-29.

8 Jeremy Salt, *Imperialism. Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians 1878-1896* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 75.

Sasun region. Vice-Consul Fitzmaurice, accompanying two Ottoman commissioners of inquiry, did not visit Urfa until months after the fire which destroyed the Armenian church (December, 1895) during mob attacks in which many Armenians died. Mr Robertson refers to the ‘stomach turning’ consular account of the events at Sasun but does not mention Ottoman accounts of the atrocities committed by Armenians in their attempt to set off a major conflagration that would bring in the European powers. The British consular reports were heavily based on material provided by missionaries and their Armenian protégés and have, furthermore, to be set in the context of a British government trying to blame others for the blundering and disastrous consequences of its own failed Armenian policy. It should be mentioned here that the victims of Armenian ‘revolutionary’ violence included many Armenian ‘traitors’ and ‘backsliders’ who refused to cooperate with them. Given the demographic imbalance between the overwhelming Muslim majority and the Armenian minority, the provocations by the militants would seem to have been suicidal but the death of their own people was part of their grim ‘revolutionary’ calculus: the more violent the explosions across the eastern provinces and the greater the number of Armenians who died in mob attacks, the more likely it was that the powers would be compelled to intervene.

‘Peaceful’ protests

Mr Robertson claims that after Sasun ‘ordinary Armenians’ attended a ‘peaceful protest’ in Istanbul ‘organized by the Hunchak Party’ to demand ‘civil rights’ (a phrase surely belonging to the 20th century), fair taxation and protection from the Kurds. He does not give the date but presumably is referring to the demonstration outside the government offices (Bab i-Ali) on September 30, 1895. Mr Robertson claims that the police opened fire, ‘charging the demonstrators with clubs, killing many of them.’⁹ In fact, according to the British ambassador, Sir Philip Currie, and the American Minister Plenipotentiary, Alexander Terrell, it seems to have been an Armenian who fired the first shots, triggering off an affray in which 15 gendarmes and about 60 Armenians were killed or wounded.¹⁰ Terrell believed the presence of a British fleet off Lemnos had encouraged an ‘aggressive feeling’ among the Armenians, while Currie thought the Hunchaks had arranged the demonstration in the hope of compelling the European powers to intervene.¹¹ Currie, it should be noted, was a forceful advocate of ‘reforms’ for the Armenians and the last person to make up stories about Armenians starting the shooting.

9 Robertson, 41.

10 *Imperialism, Evangelism and Ottoman Armenians*, op. cit.,

11 *ibid*, 92-93.

'Peaceful' demonstrations calling for the redress of grievances were simply the triggers Armenian militants pulled to cause chaos in Istanbul or other cities. In 1890 a Hunchak organizer had disrupted mass at the Armenian patriarchate cathedral in Istanbul by going to the altar to read out a list of grievances and then pulling a gun on Patriarch Ashikian, who fled the cathedral and took refuge in a chemist's shop until its windows were smashed by a mob worked into a fury by the Hunchaks. The patriarch was eventually saved by a contingent of soldiers and police. Shots were fired and a policeman and soldier killed: according to the British ambassador, Sir William White, it was the first time since the Ottoman conquest of the city in 1453 that Christians had dared to challenge government forces.¹² The arrest of 10 Armenians the same year for instigating uprisings is further evidence of the determination of the Hunchaks and Dashnaks to cause chaos in the hope of compelling the European powers to intervene and force the sultan to grant Armenian autonomy which eventually would become independence. Sasun in 1894 was their most serious attempt yet to attain this objective.

'Peaceful' demonstrations calling for the redress of grievances were simply the triggers Armenian militants pulled to cause chaos in Istanbul or other cities.

Mr Robertson's sources are questionable throughout. He quotes unspecified 'church records' for an Armenian population 'in Anatolia' of 2.1 million.¹³ No figures are entirely reliable, but the Ottoman census figures are certainly more reliable than 'church records', i.e the estimates of Armenian patriarchs playing their own political game ever since the 'Armenian question' was created at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The figures are important because of the way they have been used for propaganda purposes ever since the European diplomats met at Berlin: the greater number of Armenians that the world could be led to believe lived in the eastern provinces the stronger the case for Armenian autonomy or independence. According to the Ottoman census taken two years before the outbreak of war, there were 1.2 million Armenians in the empire (not just Anatolia). Making all allowances for census vagaries the Armenian population by 1915 could have been no more than about 1.5 or 1.6 million. The Armenians did not constitute 30 per cent of the population of the eastern Anatolian provinces as Mr Robertson claims but about 22 per cent. Only in one province (Van) did they amount to 30 per cent of the population.

¹² Ibid, 62.

¹³ Robertson, 13.

Bryce's broadsides

In dealing with the First World War, Mr Robertson's authorities include the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, and his Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour. As the senior figures in a government at war with Germany and the Ottoman Empire their statements cannot be regarded as anything other than propaganda designed to do maximum damage to the enemy. They were scarcely moral exemplars themselves: Lloyd George was a principal architect of the Greek invasion of Anatolia in 1919, described by Arnold Toynbee as a 'war of extermination' of the Turks.¹⁴ Balfour set in motion the establishment of a colonial settler state in Palestine: just as Lloyd George loved the Greeks and loathed the Turks, Balfour professed to love the Jews while showing nothing but contempt for Arabs.

Robertson also relies heavily on the parliamentary 'Blue Book' prepared by James Bryce and Arnold Toynbee. In 1878 Bryce had founded the Anglo-Armenian Association, whose campaign for reforms, remarked the author and diplomat Sir Charles Eliot, 'was hampered by their invincible ignorance of the spirit and methods of the east.'¹⁵ A key figure in the 'Armenian agitation' of the 1890s, Bryce's status as a former ambassador to the US was the packaging used by the government to give his tirades against the Ottoman government the veneer of respectability. In 1915 he published a propaganda broadside against Germany¹⁶ which was shown once the war was over (and it no longer mattered) to be full of gross exaggerations if not downright lies.¹⁷ In 1916 Bryce oversaw the compilation of accusations against the Ottoman government which has stood as a mainstay of Armenian propaganda until the present day.¹⁸ Toynbee was his right hand man and appears to have done most of the spade work. That Bryce might have had a propensity for exaggeration can be deduced from his claim that 15,000 Armenians had been killed at Sasun in 1894, not the 900 given as the maximum figure by Consul Shipley.¹⁹

The claim by Robertson that Toynbee was 'no propagandist' is absurd because that is precisely the role he and Bryce played during the war and the argument

14 Arnold Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. A Study in the Contact of Civilisations* (London: Constable, 1922), 259.

15 *Imperialism, Evangelism and Ottoman Armenians*, op. cit., 114.

16 James Bryce, *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages* (New York: Macmillan, 1915).

17 See Jameson Ryley, 'The Historian Who Sold Out: James Bryce and the Bryce Report,' *Iowa Historical Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2008).
www.ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=iowa-historical-review

18 *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16*. Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon by Viscount Bryce (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916).

19 *Imperialism, Evangelism and Ottoman Armenians*, op. cit., 75.

that ‘denialists have failed to prove the fabrication of a single document’²⁰ is pure sophistry. The word ‘document’ implies an official or legal record, whereas the mass of material gathered in the Blue Book consists largely of accounts, frequently hearsay, often lurid and inflammatory, provided by missionaries or taken from Armenian newspapers or written by people far from the scene. Here is a representative sample of Bryce’s source material, from the province of Van:

1. The American missionary establishment at Van, letters printed privately in the US by Miss Grace Higley Knapp.
2. A letter from Mr Y.K. Rushdouni published in the *Manchester Guardian*
3. Narrative by Mr Y.K. Rushdouni published in the Armenian journal *Gotchnag*.
4. Letter from Herr Sporri of the German mission at Van
5. Narrative of Mr A. Safrastian published in the Armenian journal *Ararat*.
6. Interview with a refugee, Mrs Gazarian, published in the *Pioneer Press* Minnesota.

Complete fabrication as well as dissimulation and lurid exaggeration probably was involved in the compilation of the Armenian report: doubt has to exist, for example, whether there ever was a ‘Bedouin notable’ called Fa’iz al Ghusain who wrote the book Martyred Armenia.

These are not ‘documents’ but accusations launched against the Ottoman government by people who were driven by religious rancor and/or political fervor. Nevertheless, they were the primary source material for an extensive British government propaganda operation involving the services of a long list of eminent writers and thinkers and nominally independent publishing houses. Like Bryce, they all lent their reputations to the war being waged against the German and Ottoman governments. The records kept at the centre of their operations - Wellington House – could not be found after the war and it is fair to conclude that they were destroyed by the government because they were too incriminating. Only the fragments are left but they are still enough to gauge the scale of the campaign directed against the German and Ottoman governments, partly driven by the need to get the US into the war. Complete fabrication as well as dissimulation and lurid exaggeration probably was involved in the compilation of the Armenian report: doubt has to exist, for

²⁰ Robertson, 12.

example, whether there ever was a 'Bedouin notable' called Fa'iz al Ghusain who wrote the book *Martyred Armenia*.

Morgenthau's stories

Robertson also relies heavily on the memoirs of Henry Morgenthau, the former New York real estate agent who serves as the US ambassador in Istanbul from December 1913 to February 1916. *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*,²¹ his account of his time in the Ottoman Empire, was put together by a ghost writer, Burton J. Hendrick, with the assistance of Morgenthau's Armenian office staff. Morgenthau never visited eastern Anatolia, remaining heavily dependent on missionaries and his Armenian informants for what he passed on to others. He kept a diary throughout his time in Istanbul and maintained a stream of letters to friends and family back home. In these private sources there is no mention of the evil intentions he attributes in his book to the Ottoman Interior Minister, Talat Paşa, on the basis of conversations he claimed they had.

George Abel Schreiner, the American newspaper correspondent, who did visit the interior of Anatolia and believed that 'Turkish ineptness, more than intentional brutality, were responsible for the hardships the Armenians were subjected to,'²² wrote to Morgenthau accusing him of slandering the dead (former German ambassador Baron Wangenheim) and misrepresenting the character of the Ottoman Minister for War, Enver Paşa, 'after you had made so much of him Is it not a fact that Enver Pasha was an enlightened young leader as could be found', even if 'rather inexperienced and 'somewhat impulsive'? Furthermore, 'nor did you possess in Constantinople that omniscience and omnipotence you have arrogated unto yourself in the book. In the interest of truth I will also affirm that you saw little of the cruelty you fasten upon the Turks. Besides that, you have killed more Armenians than ever lived in the districts of the uprising. The fate of those people was sad enough without [it] having to be exaggerated as you have done.'²³

Schreiner almost certainly had Morgenthau in mind when he wrote in *The Craft Sinister*: 'It is to be hoped that the future historian will not give too much heed to the drivel one finds in the books of diplomatist-authors. I at least have found

21 Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1918).

22 George Abel Schreiner, *The Craft Sinister* (New York: G. Albert Geyer, 1920), 124-25.

23 Heath H. Lowry, *The Story Behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990), Chapter V, 'A Contemporary View of Ambassador Morgenthau's Story,' www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&page=Yayincerik&SayinNo=18#

these books remarkably unreliable on the part played by the author. It would seem that these literary productions are on a par with the ‘blue books’ published by governments for the edification of the public and their own amusement...’²⁴

He goes on to refer to the ‘diplomatists’ of the United States and of the countries defeated by the Allies who write memoirs that are personal and partial ‘but which for all that aspire to being accepted as ‘truth and nothing but the truth.’ Study of these books will lead to no other conclusion that they are at best a record of backstairs gossip perpetuated by the mighty master of the house – a rather ludicrous situation, to be sure. Yet it is from books of this sort that the public of the United States has taken the scant knowledge – or what it mistakes for knowledge – it has of the Great War.’²⁵

Of his other sources, Mr Robertson makes use of Peter Balakian, whose book, *The Burning Tigris*, the late Andrew Mango concluded in his review, was ‘not a work of historical research’ : some of his assertions, wrote Mango, ‘would make any serious Ottoman historian’s hair stand on end.’²⁶ Other sources include the Armenian historian-as- propagandist Vakahn Dadrian and his Turkish protégé, Taner Akçam. A full critique of Akçam’s tendentious writings is beyond the scope of a book review but enough has already been exposed to show that his ‘scholarship’ is more of a ship full of holes. Akçam’s claim that the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress met early in 1915 and took a decision to wipe out the Armenians, is based entirely on conjecture and supposition. He has no names, places or dates or indeed anything that would lend credibility to such an infamous assertion.²⁷

Arrests and uprisings

Moving to specific events, Mr Robertson deals with the arrest of Armenians in Istanbul on April 24 1915. He writes that several hundred Armenians were

24 Schreiner, xxi

25 *ibid*, xxii.

26 Review of *The Burning Tigris*, The Times Literary Supplement, September 17, 2004.

27 Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act. The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (London: Constable, 2007). See pages 162 for how Akçam’s claim that it was ‘very likely key decisions concerning the massacre’ were taken in March, 1915, slides into ‘the decision for genocide’ without a shred of proof of a decision being taken for either. If there is anything remarkable about this claim it is that it could run the gauntlet of editors and peer reviewers and pass into print without apparently being challenged. For a critical examination of Akçam’s works see Erman Şahin ‘A scrutiny of Akçam’s Version of History and the Armenian Genocide’, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 2, August, 2008 and the same author’s review essay, ‘The Armenian Question Resolved: Policies Towards the Armenians in the War Years According to Ottoman Documents,’ *Middle East Policy*, Vol XVII No. 1, Spring 2010.

arrested on that night and ‘transported in ships to military prisons near Ankara’.²⁸ How this was possible when Ankara is hundreds of kilometers from the nearest coast, he does not say. What the Ottoman records show is that 155 Armenians were sent to the town of Çankiri (by train).²⁹ They were not kept in military prisons but were placed under house arrest. They had to report to the police station every 24 hours but otherwise were free to move around the town. They were held until August 31. Of these 155 individuals, 35 were found to be innocent and were allowed to return to Istanbul; 25 were convicted of offences against the state and imprisoned in Ankara or the nearby town of Ayaş; 57 were sent to Deir al Zor in Syria; of the seven foreign nationals among the arrested men, three were deported and four kept in custody; the remaining 31 men were pardoned. The 71 Armenians sent directly to Ayaş from Istanbul, all allegedly members of the higher committees of the Dashnak and Hunchak organizations, were detained for the duration of the war. One died before the war’s end: the rest were released either when the fighting stopped or after the wartime government collapsed and the victorious powers took control.³⁰

The detention of Armenians sent to Çankiri or Ayaş is a separate issue from the trial and conviction of Armenians found guilty of conspiracy against the state. Masses of weapons, bombs and ammunition were found in churches and houses after the decision was taken to close down the Armenian committees. The German ambassador wrote of an Armenian plot to bomb government buildings during celebrations to mark the anniversary of the sultan’s accession to the throne on April 27 while a French report spoke of alleged plans to assassinate Talat and Enver Paşas.³¹ In the event, 20 Armenians were tried before a military court on June 5 and sentenced to death for attempted assassination and other charges. On June 15, 18 of them were hanged: others were sentenced to imprisonment or internal exile.

The arrests in Istanbul were preceded by an Armenian uprising in the city of Van a week before. Mr Robertson argues that there was no revolt and that the Armenians simply ‘defended their quarter against aggression by troops under orders from the Turkish governor.’³² He admits to ‘heavy casualties on both sides’ but comes nowhere capturing the essence of what happened in and around Van, which had been a major centre of arms stockpiling and uprisings

28 Robertson, 48.

29 For a detailed study of the arrests see Yusuf Sarinay, ‘What Happened on April 24, 1915? The Circular of April 24, 1915, and the Arrest of Armenian Committee Members in Istanbul’, *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 14, Nos. 1 and 2, Fall, 2008, 75-101.

30 *ibid.*

31 *ibid.*, 77-78.

32 Robertson, 74.

since the late 19th century. Either during the fighting or after it was over, the Armenians ransacked the Muslim quarter and massacred its inhabitants. The slaughter continued in the villages around the lake, which were crowded with refugees fleeing Russian advances further north. Either in the city of Van, in the nearby villages or amongst civilians taking flight many thousands of Muslims - tens of thousands according to official figures - were killed. Miss Knapp writes only of Russian-Armenian volunteers 'cleaning out' these villages. That the missionaries inside the city saw only the harm suffered by Armenians is testimony to their unreliability as balanced and objective witnesses.

Mr Robertson claims that the Ottoman army returned to Van 'with a vengeance' at the end of July. If that was the case, there was virtually no one left on whom they could take revenge. Once conquered the city was placed under Russian military command and administration but within six weeks an Ottoman force was advancing to retake it. 'On Friday the 30th of July', according to Miss Knapp, 'General Nicolaieff ordered all the Armenians of the Van province, also the Americans and other foreigners, to flee for their lives. By Saturday night the city was nearly emptied of Armenians and quite emptied of conveyances.' As the Armenians and foreign missionaries crossed into the Russian Caucasus, they were set upon by Kurdish tribesmen. In a tribal society one strong motive for these attacks would have been revenge for Armenian attacks on Kurds.

Either during the fighting or after it was over, the Armenians ransacked the Muslim quarter and massacred its inhabitants. The slaughter continued in the villages around the lake, which were crowded with refugees fleeing Russian advances further north. Either in the city of Van, in the nearby villages or amongst civilians taking flight many thousands of Muslims - tens of thousands according to official figures - were killed.

With the Russian army advancing on Bitlis (as Miss Knapp admits) and threatening other cities, Van rather than the imminent allied landing at Gallipoli was the tipping point. Further archival research may yet show that the Van uprising was coordinated with the British and the Russians (about to engage with the Ottomans in northwestern Persia). Armenians and Greeks had already been shifted from regions where it was feared they would act as a fifth column and now the order went out for the bulk of the Armenian population to be 'relocated'.

Apart from Van, Mr Robertson argues, 'rebellion seems to have been low level or non existent.'³³ This is not the view taken by Edward Erickson, who has

33 Ibid., 49.

actually done the research in the Ottoman military archives and argues that widespread sabotage of the war effort from behind the lines was the sole reason for the military command recommending that the bulk of the Armenian population be moved away from the war zone.³⁴ There is an abundance of documentary evidence in support of his findings. Moving civilian populations on the basis of military necessity was undertaken by the Spanish in Cuba in the 19th century, by the British in South Africa, by the Americans in the Philippines in the early 20th century, by the French in Algeria, by the British in Malaya and by the Americans in Vietnam. Suffering and death was always involved and if the ‘relocation’ of the Ottoman Armenians turned out so catastrophically the backward conditions on the ground outlined at the beginning of this article were certainly an important element.

Blockade and plague

Other factors one would have to take into account would included the British naval blockade of the eastern Mediterranean coast, which killed off cash economies and blocked the importation of machinery and spare parts needed for agricultural production. Another would be the locust plague of 1915, which devastated farmlands and orchards along the coastal plain. Starvation and destitution were soon widespread. Even in the streets of Beirut people were dropping dead or eating weeds in the attempt to stay alive. The war was catastrophic for the Syrian people but these conditions were widespread across Ottoman lands and indeed, wherever the war was fought, including northwest Persia and the Caucasus, affecting Muslims just as badly as Christians.

Mr Robertson tries to soften the significance of anti-government activities in the mountain town of Zeytun, which had also been a major centre of Armenian agitation since the 19th century. Even amongst the British sponsors of the Armenians, the Zeytunlis had the reputation of being a wild and warlike people. During an uprising in late 1895 they attacked nearby Muslim villages and slaughtered civilians: in the town itself, they overran government buildings and the military garrison, massacring an estimated 50 officers and 600 soldiers with knives, hatchets and pickaxes. The bodies of the soldiers were heaved into a river ravine where they froze: when a British consul examined the bodies six weeks later he found ‘some with their heads split open with axes, others with their arms or legs chopped off or covered with stabs or gun wounds on every conceivable part of their body.’³⁵ The siege of the town by an initial

34 Edward J. Erickson, *Ottomans and Armenians. A Study in Counterinsurgency* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

35 *Imperialism, Evangelism and Ottoman Armenians*, 105-6.

Ottoman force of 18,000 men³⁶ (against 10,000-12,000 Armenians, according to the estimate of a US consul³⁷) lasted for months before being settled through negotiations which gave the Hunchak instigators of the uprising a safe pass to the coast, and a sea passage to Marseilles paid for by the government in Istanbul.

In August, 1914, the Zeytunli Armenians defied government mobilization orders: according to Ottoman documents they attacked a military unit and killed and robbed Muslims. Further attacks followed in December.³⁸ Later in the year the British navy began patrolling the eastern Mediterranean and landing raiding parties and Armenian agents. In February, 1915, the Zeytunli Armenians assured Russia of their support if it initiated simultaneous military action in Cilicia (the eastern Mediterranean region) and around the northeastern city of Erzurum. Armenians in the coastal region were known to be well-armed and were already attacking soldiers and jandarma as well as postal services and recruitment offices.³⁹ In March, the Russian ambassador in London informed the British government that the Hunchaks had 3000 followers in Zeytun along with committees established at Adana, Hadjin, Sis, Furnuz, Maraş and Aleppo. The leading figures were the same men who had directed the uprising of 1895. The Zeytunlis were talking of being able to raise an armed force of 15,000 men.⁴⁰ Between March 18-24, hundreds of Zeytunlis who had based themselves in a monastery fought Ottoman forces sent to suppress them, killing a number of enlisted men and their commander, Süleyman Efendi⁴¹.

In this same period of time expatriate Armenian community leaders in Egypt and the US were assuring Britain that if it opened a new front in the eastern Mediterranean local Armenians would rise up in its support. Even if the British government ultimately decided not to go ahead, the opening of a new front in the eastern Mediterranean was seriously contemplated in 1915. In short, there was every reason for the Ottoman military command to fear the consequences of actual or potential links between the British and Armenians in the region. It was this perceived threat that lay behind the decision to ‘relocate’ the Cilician Armenians.

36 The numbers soon began to drop because of deaths in combat or from disease and desertion.

37 *Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians*, op. cit., 102, Consul Poche, writing from Aleppo.

38 Salahi Sonyel, *The Great War and the Tragedy of Anatolia. Turks and Armenians in the Maelstrom of Major Powers*. (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2001), 91.

39 Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia 1914-1923* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), 70-77

40 Sonyel, op. cit., 109.

41 Kemal Çiçek, *The Great War and the Forced Migration of Armenians* (Belfast: Athol Books, 2012), 44. In honor of the dead commander, the town was subsequently renamed Süleymanli.

Mr Robertson argues that ‘up to’ two million Armenians were ‘deported’ and that about a million died. In fact, the Armenians were not ‘deported’ but moved within the borders of the Ottoman state. The figure of two million is a wild exaggeration if only because there were not two million Armenians in all the lands of the Ottoman Empire in the first place. Ottoman statistics show that close to half a million Armenians had been shifted into Syria by February, 1916, when the ‘relocations’ were officially declared at an end. Others were still on the move: the total number moved was probably close to 700,000. Many thousands of Armenians were massacred on the way south by marauding bands, sometimes with the active complicity of police, soldiers and officials or through their negligence. Many others died on the way from disease or malnutrition and many more were to die in Syria. While some Ottoman officials were guilty of neglect or criminal complicity, others did their best to alleviate the situation. Many Armenians had already left Ottoman lands, as we know from the flight of virtually all Armenians from the Van province in early August, 1915. Hundreds of thousands survived the war only to be caught up in the fighting which continued in the Caucasus and what was soon to become southeastern Turkey. The size of the Armenian population, the number of people ‘relocated’ and the number who died from all causes – massacre, disease, malnutrition, exposure and combat – remain the subject of bitter controversy and, as a century has already passed, will probably never be clarified to the point of any kind of consensus.

Manpower problems

Mr Robertson claims that the Ottoman government ‘decided’ not to protect the conveys adequately.⁴² He provides no proof for such an assertion and has no apparent comprehension of the scale of the crisis facing the Ottoman military in 1915, especially after the near annihilation of the Ottoman Third Army at Sarikamiş in January. Facing the British at Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia and the Russians in northeastern Anatolia and northwest Persia, the Ottoman military command was completely stretched for manpower. It had not recovered from the disasters of the Balkan war of 1912-13 and was caught short at all levels when pulled into the European war. Stricken by logistical problems, it is remarkable that until the very end the army fought as well as it did. By 1915 all young men of fighting age were off at the front. Many died of disease or exposure before they even got there; many died of the same causes soon after; many had to march hundreds of kilometers to the front because there was no transport and many were sent into battle poorly equipped and

42 Robertson, 130.

clothed, down to not even having shoes to wear. Soldiers were sent into battle in summer wearing winter clothing and sent into battle in winter wearing summer clothing. Epidemics - typhus, dysentery, spotted fever, cholera and other diseases - swept the ranks (and the civilian population) and shortages of food and proper medical care prevailed throughout the war. Battlefield demands meant that there were not enough soldiers, jandarma or police left to protect the civilian population from attacks by armed bands, whether they were Armenian insurgents or Ottoman army deserters. Was the Ottoman government also deliberately setting up the massacre of Muslim civilians as well as Christians by failing to provide them with adequate protection?

When reports came in of attacks on the Armenian convoys, the government sent dispatch after dispatch demanding that the officials put in charge of the 'relocation' punish the perpetrators and provide the Armenians with adequate protection. These instructions were sent in code and cannot plausibly be passed off as propaganda designed to pull the wool over the eyes of the enemy or the Ottoman Empire's German ally.

With the attacks on Armenians continuing, the government established three commissions of inquiry in the late summer of 1915. These resulted in the court martial of 1673 people; 528 police, army and intelligence officers; 170 civil servants, up to the level of provincial sub-governors; and 975 members of gangs or civilians who simply joined in the attacks and pillaging. The charges included murder, assault, theft, bribery, extortion and the forced marriage of Armenian women: by the middle of 1916, 916 individuals had been or were in the process of being prosecuted: of this number, 67 had been sentenced to death and another 524 sentenced to prison terms of varying length.⁴³ These trials were far more authentic than the trials set up after the war during the allied occupation of Istanbul. Research still has a long way to go, but on the basis of the evidence already available, an obvious question arises: if the Ottoman government was determined to kill the Armenians, why was it putting on trial people accused of doing just that? The orders sent out to protect the Armenians and the court-martials which followed are evidence that the government was not at all 'indifferent' to the death toll.⁴⁴

The importance of these trials is downplayed by all Armenian propagandists because they subvert the core of accusations made against the Ottoman government. Mr Robertson mentions them only to dismiss their significance.

43 For these and other details of the trials see Yusuf Sarıncı, 'The Relocation (Tehcir) of Armenians and the Trials of 1915-16,' *Middle East Critique*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Fall, 2011: 299-315.

44 Robertson, 135.

As for the killing of Muslims by Armenians, he writes that while ‘some atrocities’ were committed by ‘vengeful Armenians’ after 1917, it was the Russians, the British and the French and not the Armenians who were largely responsible for the killing of ‘Turks’. Where he gets this from he does not explain. In fact - real fact and not a Robertson fact - whatever individual atrocities they might have committed during the war, it was not Russian, British and French soldiers who were largely responsible for the massacre of Muslim civilians but Armenians. Furthermore, the dead were Muslims of varying ethnic backgrounds and not just ‘Turks’; furthermore, again, Armenians were killing Muslim civilians throughout the whole course of the war and not just after 1917. The military records are full of accounts of attacks on Muslim villages well before the ‘relocation.’ The massacre of nearly 70 men and women in the Van province villages of Mirkeho and Astoci in March 1915 is only one example.⁴⁵ Many of the women were raped before being murdered. The methods of killing were often sadistic in the extreme. Many of the victims of the attacks by Armenian gangs were Kurds, indicating again that revenge was a probable motive for later attacks on the Armenian convoys.

In fact - real fact and not a Robertson fact - whatever individual atrocities they might have committed during the war, it was not Russian, British and French soldiers who were largely responsible for the massacre of Muslim civilians but Armenians.

Depopulated provinces

Ottoman forces returning to depopulated eastern provinces in 1918 entered ruined towns still strewn with the bodies and body parts of the victims of Armenian gangs. The destruction was enormous. Survivors told stories of the most horrific cruelties by Armenians. These accounts came from across the region and are consistent in their descriptions of the vicious behavior of Armenian gangs. The atrocities were not Mr Robertson’s dismissive ‘some’ but large-scale, involving the murder of many thousands of people. If Mr Robertson wants evidence of truly ‘stomach turning’ crimes he will find it in Ottoman records detailing the utterly inhumane and sadistic methods by which Armenian gangs disposed of their Muslim victims, men, women and even infant children. To Russian officers it seemed that they were bent on exterminating the Muslim population, as well they might have been because an Armenian state could not be established in a region in which the Armenians formed a small minority.

⁴⁵ See *Armenian Activities in the Archive Documents 1914-18* (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basim Evi, 2005), Vol. 1, 65-70.

Mr Robertson writes that ‘the idea of an Armenian nation – Russian Armenia together with the Ottoman provinces of Van, Bitlis and Erzuram [sic.]’ proved to be a pipe dream once ‘Kemal’s nationalist army advanced in 1920.’⁴⁶ In fact, while demographics changed according to whether the prevailing power was Muslim or Christian, ‘Russian Armenia’ was predominantly Muslim by the time Russia advanced through the Caucasus in the 19th century and drove the Muslims out. As for the eastern Anatolian provinces, the idea of an Armenian state being established there always was a pipe dream. The Armenians were scattered across the region and the only way to create an Armenian state – rather as Israel was created out of Palestine – would have been to drive the Muslims out. Until Russia withdrew from the war, and for some time afterwards, this might have seemed feasible to the Armenian gangs operating in the east. They certainly behaved as if it was.

The war was catastrophic for Armenians and other Christians but at the same time, no less catastrophic for Ottoman Muslims civilians. Probably about 2.5 million of them died during the war from the same range of causes as the Christians: massacre, disease, exposure, malnutrition and combat. The official estimate of those actually massacred – mostly by Armenians - is upwards of half a million. One does not have to believe this figure any more than one should take at face value the casualty figures circulated by Armenian propagandists but that an enormous number of Muslims was massacred by Armenians there is no doubt. Kurdish tribal chiefs put the number of Kurds killed by Armenians in the Van-Bitlis region alone at about 400,000 and the number of Armenians killed by Kurds about the same, but went on to say that now the war was over, both groups should put it behind them.⁴⁷ Even a century later, this is not the message the propagandists want to hear.

These killings followed the slaughter of Muslims in the Balkans in 1878 and again in 1912-13 and preceded the Greek invasion of western Anatolia in 1919 which Arnold Toynbee and the representative of the International Red Cross both called a ‘war of extermination’ against the Turks.⁴⁸ These wars declared in the name of religion would quickly seem to fulfil all the criteria of the UN genocide convention of 1948 yet somehow have eluded the attention of the soi-disant ‘genocide scholars.’ They may not be directly linked to the core of Mr Robertson’s accusations but they stand in a continuum involving massacre

46 Robertson, 28-29.

47 They were speaking to Captain C.L. Woolley, a British officer travelling through Kurdistan. See *The Arab Bulletin: Bulletin of the Arab Bureau in Cairo 1916-1919* (Oxford: Archive Editions, 1986). Vol. 4, No. 113, July 17, 1919, 122-23.

48 See Jeremy Salt, *The Unmaking of the Middle East. A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 75-76.

and dispossession of and by Muslims and Christians, in which Muslims were by far the principal victims, running from the early 19th century until the treaties signed after the 1914-18 war.

There is much more in this book that shouts out to be challenged or rebutted apart from the occasional absurdities and/or mistakes that show Mr Robertson does not have the competence to write any kind of book on late Ottoman history but a bad one. He refers to the Young Turks' 'tame ayatollah'⁴⁹, a religious title referring only to Shia ulama, and the 'Union and Progressive Party'⁵⁰ (not the Committee of Union and Progress) on one page and the 'Congress of Union and Progress Party' somewhere else.⁵¹ His reference to prisoners being moved to Ankara by ship has already been noted. His favored sources are 'eminent' and 'respected' while those who don't share his views are 'denialists,' a word he archly claims is descriptive and not pejorative. The bishops and priests of the Star Chamber used exactly the same line of argument against heretics burnt at the stake for 'denying' the existence of God. Justin McCarthy is one of them. Here is someone who has spent his entire academic life studying Ottoman history being abused ('denialist') by a man who demonstrates time and again that he knows little of this history outside propaganda and historical clichés.

Mr Robertson was given a retainer by the Armenian lobby some years ago to put pressure on the British government. He does not say whether the retainer covered the writing of this book but if he did it for money, that at least makes sense. Otherwise, while vindicating the Armenians in their own minds, it will not persuade the Turks or indeed anyone with sufficient knowledge of the Ottoman past to change their views one way or the other. He adds nothing to reconciliation and everything to rancor and division.

Turks have a saying: a fool throws a stone into a well and it takes 40 wise men to pull it out. Mr Robertson is no fool but has still thrown yet another stone into a well already filled with them. He talks authoritatively of the 'existing evidence' and the 'facts' when the central fact in his collection of 'facts' is that he does not know the history well enough to pass judgment on it. But he is Geoffrey Robertson, QC, after all, and his reputation along with the general ignorance and gullibility of reviewers and readers will save him from the obloquy this book deserves.

49 Robertson, 112.

50 Ibid., 43.

51 Ibid., 23.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akçam, Taner. *A Shameful Act. The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* London: Constable, 2007.
- Armenian Activities in the Archive Documents 1914-18* Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basım Evi, 2005, Vol. 1.
- Bryce, James. *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages* New York: Macmillan, 1915.
- Çiçek, Kemal. *The Great War and the Forced Migration of Armenians* Belfast: Athol Books, 2012.
- Erickson, Edward J. *Ottomans and Armenians. A Study in Counterinsurgency* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Güçlü, Yücel. *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia 1914-1923* Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010.
- Lowry, Heath H. "The US Congress and Adolf Hitler on the Armenians" *Political Communication and Persuasion*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1985. www.ataa.org/reference/hitler-lowry.html
- Lowry, Heath H. *The Story Behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990.
- Mango, Andrew "Review of The Burning Tigris", *The Times Literary Supplement*, September 17, 2004.
- Morgenthau, Henry. *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1918.
- Robertson, Geoffrey QC. *An Inconvenient Genocide: Who Now Remembers the Armenians?* London: Biteback Publishing, 2014.
- Ryley, Jameson. "The Historian Who Sold Out: James Bryce and the Bryce Report" *Iowa Historical Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2008). www.ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=iowa-historical-review
- Şahin, Erman. "A scrutiny of Akcam's Version of History and the Armenian Genocide", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 2, August, 2008

Şahin, Erman. "The Armenian Question Resolved: Policies Towards the Armenians in the War Years According to Ottoman Documents" *Middle East Policy*, Vol XVII No. 1, Spring 2010.

Salt, Jeremy. "The narrative gap in Ottoman Armenian history" *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 39, No.1, January, 2003.

Salt, Jeremy. *Imperialism. Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians 1878-1896* London: Frank Cass, 1993.

Salt, Jeremy. *The Unmaking of the Middle East. A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.

Sarinay, Yusuf. "The Relocation (Tehcir) of Armenians and the Trials of 1915-16" *Middle East Critique*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Fall, 2011.

Sarinay, Yusuf. "What Happened on April 24, 1915? The Circular of April 24, 1915, and the Arrest of Armenian Committee Members in Istanbul" *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 14, Nos. 1 and 2, Fall, 2008.

Schreiner, George Abel. *The Craft Sinister* New York: G. Albert Geyer, 1920.

Sonyel, Salahi. *The Great War and the Tragedy of Anatolia. Turks and Armenians in the Maelstrom of Major Powers*. Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2001.

The Arab Bulletin: Bulletin of the Arab Bureau in Cairo 1916-1919 (Oxford: Archive Editions, 1986). Vol. 4, No. 113, July 17, 1919.

The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16. Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon by Viscount Bryce London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916.

Toynbee, Arnold. *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. A Study in the Contact of Civilisations* London: Constable, 1922.

CALL FOR PAPERS: REVIEW OF ARMENIAN STUDIES

The Review of Armenian Studies was established with the aim of publishing papers of a high standard of quality to stimulate inter-disciplinary debate between academics and practitioners on issues falling within its scope of research. The Review of Armenian Studies invites paper submissions on any topic related to Armenian Question.

The peer-reviewed Review of Armenian Studies journal is published twice a year. Articles submitted for publication are subject to peer review. The journal's language is English. Review of Armenian Studies accepts scientific research that has not been previously submitted to another journal for publication. Submissions must be written in accordance with the principles of scientific writing and standards put forward by the journal and with a straightforward language.

Since 2001, 31 issues of Review of Armenian Studies had been published. Previous issues include contributions from prominent academics (including Prof. Justin McCarthy and Prof. Guenter Lewy) as well as leading historians and accomplished students engaged in the field of historical, political and social research on the Armenian Issue.

Review of Armenian Studies is indexed by the EBSCO and TÜBİTAK/ULAKBİM.

Topics

Although we welcome any contributions related to the Armenian Issue, some major topics may well include the following titles.

- Politics of Armenia
- Armenian History
- Culture and Socio-politics in Armenia
- Regional and international politics of Armenia
- Turkey-Armenia Relations
- Armenia- Iran Relations
- Armenia's relations with the States in Caucasus region
- US-Armenia Relations
- Armenia's Relations with the EU

Manuscript Submission

Please submit manuscripts via e-mail to Aslan Yavuz Şir

ayavuzsir@avim.org.tr or info@avim.org.tr

Manuscripts should range from 3,000 to 13,000 words and be approximately 10-30 single-spaced pages in length including footnotes and bibliography. Articles must be word processed using Microsoft Word, 12 point font, Times New Roman, and should be single-spaced throughout allowing good (1 1/2 inch) margins. Pages should be numbered sequentially.

The title page of the article should include the following information:

- Manuscript title
- Names and affiliations of all contributing authors
- Full address for correspondence, including telephone and email address
- Abstract: please provide a short summary of up to 300 words.
- Keywords: please provide 5 key words in alphabetical order, suitable for indexing. Ideally these words will not have appeared in the title.

We are now welcoming contributions for the 32nd issue of this journal.

Complete submissions are due September 1, 2015.

The editorial office will make every effort to deal with submissions to the journal as quickly as possible. All papers will be acknowledged on receipt by email.



ORDER FORM

Name : Address :
Last Name :
Telephone :
E-mail :

Subscriptions

- Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal - 4 Months Annual 25 TL ~~X~~
 Review of Armenian Studies Journal - 6 Months Annual 15 TL ~~X~~
 Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal - Per Year Annual 9 TL

Ordering of Single Volumes

- Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal – Latest volume (volume 49) 9 TL
 Review of Armenian Studies Journal – Latest volume (volume 31) 9 TL
 Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal – Latest volume (volume 15) 9 TL

Ordering of Previous Volumes

- Previous volume/volumes of Ermeni Araştırmaları Journal Each is 5 TL
 Previous volume/volumes of Review of Armenian Studies Journal Each is 5 TL
 Previous volume/volumes of Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Journal Each is 5 TL

Books

- Ermeni Sorunu Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler / Ömer Engin LÜTEM 15 TL
(Extended version and 2nd edition)
 Armenian Diaspora / Turgut Kerem TUNCEL 35 TL
 Balkan Savaşlarında Rumeli Türkleri 25 TL
Kırımlar - Kıyımlar - Göçler (1821-1913) / Bilâl N. ŞİMŞİR
 'AZA BEAST' Savaşın Köklerine İnmek / Colum MURPHY 30 TL

* To receive your order, send the form with your receipt.

Contact

Address: Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12/B Daire: 3-4 06550 Çankaya / ANKARA
Telephone: 0312 438 50 23 - 24 • Fax: 0312 438 50 26
E-mail: terazi yayincilik@gmail.com

Account Number:

Terazi Yayıncılık Garanti Bankası A.Ş. Çankaya /Ankara Şubesi
Account No: 181 /6296007 IBAN No: TR960006200018100006296007

Postal Check Account No: 5859221



AVİM
AVRASYA İNCELEMELERİ MERKEZİ
CENTER FOR EURASIAN STUDIES

Türkmeneli İlgirliği ve Kültür Vakfı
AVRASYA İNCELEMELERİ MERKEZİ

ENGLISH Arama yap

AVİM

Anasayfa Hakkımızda Yayınlar Yazılar Toplantılar Analiz / Duyurular Linkler İletişim

ASIA ARAŞTIRMALARI İRAK AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI

KAFKASYA VE ERMENİ SORUNU BALKAN ARAŞTIRMALARI

ANALİZ / DUYURULAR

FRANSA VE ERMENİ SORUNU
Ömer İsmail LÜTEM

GÜNEY KAFKASYA'DAKİ SON GELİŞMELER - ALEV KILIC
Alev KILIC

BİHAL RUSYANIN "BALKAN SAVAŞLARINDA RUMELİ TÜRKLERİ
KİMLİKLER-KITILAR-ÖÇLER (1821-1913)" İSİMLİ KİTABI TERAZİ
YAYINLIKTAN ÇIKTI
AVİM

EREMENLER VE SURİYE - 1915 VE 2013 - 31 Aralık 2013
Jeremy SALT

Bülten Aboneliği
E-bülten Adı: Gönder
E-posta: Gönder
Tüm Segitler:

Günlük Bülten İçin Tıklayınız

KAFKASYA VE ERMENİ SORUNU

ÖZBEKİSTAN AZERBAJYAN'DA ÜRETİLEN SAVUNMA
SANAYİSİ...
Azərbaycan Savunma Sanayisi Bakarı Yaver Camalov, bugün ülmemizi
ziyaret eden...

AGIT DÖNEM BAŞKANI, AZERBAJYAN VE...
İzmirde Değişir Bakanı ve AGIT Dönem Başkanı Didir Burkhalter,
yapış...

FRANUZLAR NE İSTİYOR?
Stratejik Görüş: Dağlık Karabağ
20 Ocak 2014'te Ankara'da "Narabalı Sorunu: Herndon Nereye?" başlıta
bir...

Fransa 22 yıl aradan sonra ilk üst düzey resmî ziyaretini...

HistoryofTruth.com
Armenian Allgallness

BALKAN ARAŞTIRMALARI

AB HİNKATİSTAN GÜZETİN ALTINA ALDI
Anuscu Bilişim popuyl oransında öne çıkan herfordan, yiksek bütçe...
TÜRKİYE-BULGARİSTAN EKONOMİK İLİŞKİLERİ
Türk-Bulgar İnanç ve Ticaret Odasının 6. Olağan Genel Kurulu...

BOSNA OLİMPİYAT KOMİTESİ
ANLAŞMADIKI
Bosna Hersek Olimpiyat Komitesi (OİKB) dün
gözetimleştireli toplantıda Top

DÜNYA BANKASI'NDAN BOSNA
HERSEKE İŞSİZLİK...
Dünya Bankası Güneydoğu Avrupa Direktörü Ellen
Goldstein, ülkesi mevcut istatistik...

İRAK

İRAK CUMHURBAŞKANI TALABANIN SAĞLIK DURUMU
Sak Cumarbaşkanı ve Kirdistan Yurtbaskarı Burşü (KİB) Udesi Celal
Talabani...

İRAKIN 12 YENİ İLİ OLACAK
İrakın en yakın zamandı 12 yeni il oluşabilir. Böylece ülkenin...

HAKŞİNDEN MALİKİYE UYARILAR
Kürtler başta olarak yapılan Irak devlet başkanı oldu yerdinmiş Tank...
İRAK ORDUSU İLE AŞİRET ÜYELERİ...
İrakta Bİ Erbilin ziyaretim merkezî Ramadi kentinde Irak ordusu ile
silahli...

ASIA ARAŞTIRMALARI

KIRGIZİSTAN KIRGIZCAYA DÖNÜŞÜR
Kırgızistan talabeme stratejik kopemdeki ana-dil Kirgizcaya tamamen
görüye yere...

ÖZBEKİSTAN, ABD'NİN TEHLİKELİ ÜLKELER
LİSTESİNDE...
ASD Özbekistan'ı tehlikeli ülkeler listesinde çıkardı. Söz konusu kararın
finalet...

TÜRKMENİSTANIN YENİ HEDFİ İHRACATI ARTIRMAK
ERKİLEMEZ...
İranın Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın misyon-perfi Saidmahmudi Sadri düzenlediği
basın toplantısında...

ZENCANÉ DOSYASI İRAN-TACIKİSTAN İLİŞKİLERİNİ
basın toplantısında...

AVRUPA ARAŞTIRMALARI

MALTA, 'AB VATANDAŞLIĞI SATSINDA'
Malta, Avrupa Birliği'nin gelen listeler
karpında AB vatandaşlığı olmayışına karar...

GÜL İTALYAN YATIRIMCILARI
TÜRKİYEYE DAVET...
Roma'da düzenlenen Türkiye-İtalya İş
Forumu'nda katılan Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah

FRANSA VE ERMENİ SORUNU
Fransız Cumhurbaşkanı François Hollande'in bu hafta başında Türkiye'ye yaptığı
ziyaret

Sipariş formu için tıklayınız

Dünyadan Seçme Haberler

'HAYAL KIRIKLIĞI İÇİNDEYİM'

NULAND KIBRIS'İ ZİYARET EDECEK

SURİYE KİMYASAL SILAHLARIN
İMHASINDA AVYAK GÖRÜYÖR

İSRAİL'DEN GAZZE'YE HAVA SALDIRISI

TUNUSTA YENİ BAŞBAKAN CUMA
YEMİN ETTİ

Tweets

Özge Firdinoglu
@GozgeFirdinoglu
GENEVRE 2 KONGRESANSI HARARETLİ
BAŞLADI avim.org.tr/bulten/tr/81658
Expand

Ozge Oputcu
@ozgeogutcu
23 Jan

www.avim.org.tr